Calendar of events in Prof. R. D. Ranade's life

1886  Birth.
1901  Initiation into spiritual life by Shri Bhausaheb Maharaj, Umadi.
1914  Awarded Chancellor's Gold Medal.
1915  Lectures at Bangalore on the philosophy of the Upanishads. The lectures were later published under the title 'A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy'.
1924  Started Academy of Philosophy and Religion. Launched upon the scheme of an Encyclopaedic History of Indian Philosophy.
1927  Invited to the chair of Philosophy, Allahabad University.
1928  Delivered Basu Mallik Lectures under the auspices of Calcutta University which were later published under the title: Vedanta the Culmination of Indian Thought.
1928  Delivered Rao Bahadur Kinkhede Lectures under the auspices of Nagpur University which were later published under the title: The Bhagvad-gita as a Philosophy of God-realisation.
1933  Publication of Mysticism in Maharashtra.
1947  Awarded D. Litt. degree honoris Causa by Allahabad University.
1954  Delivered lectures at Karnataka University, Dharwar which were later published under the title: Pathway to God in Kannada Literature.
1957  Niryana.
STUDIES IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
Studies in Indian Philosophy

Prof. R. D. Ranade

Editor
B. R. Kulkarni
FOREWORD

It has always been my earnest desire to preserve every word of Shri Gurudev and to offer it to the world of scholarship. I am exceedingly happy that the present work is being published under the auspices of the Sahitya Samskriti Mandal, Maharashtra State. My thanks are due to them.

The work, though partly in the form of Notes, will be found highly useful by students of philosophy and research scholars.

It is with great satisfaction that I place this scholarly treatise in the hands of all those interested in Philosophy and Religion.

Bombay:  
20th March 1986

(Mrs.) VIJAYA V. APTE
PREFACE

It is our great privilege to publish ‘Studies In Indian Philosophy’, by late Prof. R. D. Ranade, a doyen of Indian Philosophy.

The history of philosophy is its own critique. The historical process involves development, evaluation, attempt at cancellation and rehabilitation of doctrines. Different Darsanas of Indian philosophy have their own basic assumptions which they sometime share with others. Nyaya, Vaisesika, Samkhya, Yoga or Dvaita Vedanta all share the doctrine of the reality of the world. Similarly, Buddhism and Jainism, though very different in approach from Advaita Vedanta, share with the latter several epistemological doctrines. The Advaita system itself, to which Shri Ranade belongs, has developed on account of the intellectual warfare with other philosophical systems and the conflicts arising within the system itself. Comparisons and criticisms have always helped development of philosophical thought. This is borne out by the present work also, though briefly. We wish we had a fuller exposition of such comparison from this great master.

We are happy that we are able to publish this yet unpublished work during Professor Ranade’s Birth Centenary Year. The Board deems it an honour that Shri Gurudev R. D. Ranade Samadhi Trust, Nimbal (R.S.), has asked the Board to undertake the publication of this Volume. What more befitting tribute can be paid to late Professor R. D. Ranade, than bringing to light his hitherto unpublished works?

Bombay:
Gudi Padava
Chaitra Shuddha Pratipada
Shake 1908
10th April 1986

S. S. BARLINGAY
Chairman,
Maharashtra State Board for
Literature and Culture, Bombay.
EDITORIAL NOTE

The preservation of the thought of the Master throws on the disciples a special responsibility of propagating his philosophy in all its pristine purity. What a disciple or an Editor can do is to add a foot-note here or a foot-note there.

The Notes left by Gurudev R. D. Ranade are valuable and constitute a rich heritage. They contain original suggestions and judgments and thus make a contribution to world-scholarship in general and to Indian Philosophy in particular. They are highly critical in value; though succinct, they are very lucid couched that they are in a simple style. The logical and developmental manner of arrangement of topics reflects his method of study and presentation. It is our confidence that many a research scholar would be benefited by a study of these Notes as they give a new vision to look at Indian Philosophy. Particular mention may be made of two Sections of Mimāmsā System, namely the Doctrine of Šābdā and the Doctrine of Sphoṭā. The topic “Contribution to the Science of Interpretation”, will be very valuable for those who are interested in the study of Linguistics, and by those who want to specialise in the interpretation of the Hindu Law. In fact, the science of interpretation is a basic discipline. These days there are very few who study and appreciate the value of Mimāmsā Philosophy. Unfortunately, it is dubbed as meaningless ritualism. The two sections treated in the present brochure are an epitome of the fundamental Mimāmsā teachings. In our opinion, students of Linguistics cannot afford to disregard Mimāmsā doctrines.

The Notes are unbiased and do not advocate any particular ‘ism’ of philosophy. Both the orthodox and heterodox schools are subjected to a severe criticism whenever their theory is not in conformity with logical reasoning. Neither the thrill of poetry nor an emotional out-burst is allowed to have an edge over cool philosophical reasoning.

Under Six Systems, Gurudev has included: (i) Sāmkhya, (ii) Yoga, (iii) Buddhism, (iv) Jainism, (v) Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and (vi) Pūrva-Mimāmsā. This classification is different from the traditional school of Six Systems (Śaḍ- darśanas) which (a) does not include Buddhism and Jainism, (b) treats Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika as separate systems and (c) includes Vedanta or Uttara-Mimāmsā. His new classification seems to be oriented towards grouping non-Vedantic Schools together and treating them as Pūrva-pakṣas, and as such Vedanta constituting Uttara-Pakṣa is taken out of the traditional fold. By the by the stand-point of the Uttara-pakṣa, namely Vedanta, has already been elucidated in his volume: Vedanta the Culmination of Indian Thought published by Bharatiya Vidyā Bhavan, Bombay in 1970. A few of the Notes with some exposition appear in the above-mentioned volume.
Gurudev Ranade's interpretation of any doctrine is most natural. While scholars—both eastern and western—have laboured hard to understand correctly the import of the Buddhistic doctrine of Pratitya-Samutpāda, Gurudev takes the term in its most natural sense. He splits the word into two parts—Pratitī + Asamutpāda and elucidates that what the doctrine implies is that in Pratitī or intuition, there is Asamutpāda i.e. non-creation of the world (P. 22). Only a God-realiser can give such an interpretation.

It is really wonderful how he would translate a technical term from Indian Philosophy into a technical term from Western Philosophy instead of just explaining its meaning. Thus the technical term Nayābhāsa (opposing stand-points) to be found in Jaina epistemology is rendered into the Kantian term—Antinomy.

His mathematical brain would always incline towards graphic presentation of the data wherever possible. Thus he would divide a page into two sections to present side by side the views of Prabhākara and Kumārila on all topics so that the similarities and differences between the two philosophical heavy weights (Pp. 71 ff) become at once obvious. The symbolic representation of systems expressing varying views on validity of knowledge (P. 55) makes the whole discussion precise and clear.

The salient features of his writings—systematisation, comparative approach, clarity of thought and lucidity of exposition, chaste language, employment of apt, western terminology and doctrines to display ancient Indian thought in the modern out-fit which make it more appealing—are all present in these Notes many of which are just jottings.

Mostly Gurudev Ranade has not—barring one or two places (P. 49)—specifically mentioned his own judgments regarding a topic dealt with. But the brief outline of a topic is interspersed with his own comments which can be easily noted by a discerning reader. At times there are brief summaries of standard works on a particular philosopher or a topic kept ready for critical exposition.

Sometimes two drafts of a section are given—one rough and one fair. If there is a specific instruction to omit the rough draft, it is omitted. If, however, there is no such specific instruction, the rough draft too is retained. In the latter case a comparative study of both the drafts shows how the topics were rearranged, the rearrangement showing that Prof. Ranade was always thinking of the subject in order to put it in a still more systematic way. In this connection, we may refer to two drafts of the subject-headings of his Vedanta and Western Thought one of which was prepared as early as 1927.

Sometimes the sub-sections are indicated at 1, 2, 3 . . . . .; sometimes as i, ii, iii . . . . .; or A, B, C, . . . . .; or even a, b, c . . . .; bracketed or unbracketed. As every system was prepared independently and as these are but Notes, his usual rigour of maintaining uniformity is not found here. Again we do not know whether he wanted to develop each system into a separate book or prepare one single volume comprising all the Six Systems.
Notes on one section viz. ‘Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’ place for which is indicated in Chapter III as well as Chapter V, are not available. It is mentioned that this section is typed separately but nowhere could it be found. So too “Analysis” of the Yoga Sūtras referred to on Pp. 14 and 18 could not be traced.

We have also included here his plan of the Pathway to God bearing the sub-title : A Study in the Philosophy of Beatificism. He wanted to write a volume on the Pathway to God (see P. 114) for which his works on the Upa- niṣads, the Bhagavad-gītā, Vedanta or the Three Pathways (Pathway to God in Marathi Literature, Pathway to God in Hindi Literature and Pathway to God in Kannada Literature) would constitute the basis.

Some of these Notes were taught by Shri Gurudev to his M.A. students.

Gurudev’s Bibliography given at the end of each of the six systems would be found useful by those who want to undertake an intensive study of a system. The bibliography is not just a list of books; but it gives an analysis of the important contents of a book. There are also thought-provoking comments which would help a student to think independently and form his own judgment. In a couple of places, Gurudev’s Bibliography refers to the Call Number of a book of the Allahabad University Library.

I must express my gratitude to Mrs. Vijayatai V. Apte (daughter of Shri Gurudev) for having made available the material for publication. It is very kind of her to have written a Foreword to this volume.

My heartfelt thanks are due to Dr. S. S. Barlingay, Chairman; Shri S. D. Deshmukh, Secretary of Sahitya Sanskriti Mandal, Maharashtra State, as well as Members of the Mandal for the keen interest they took in the publication of this work. But for their kind gesture the work would not have seen the light of day. The indefatigable efforts which Shri Vidyadhar Gokhale made in the furtherance of this sacred cause are beyond all praise. Shri R. B. Alva, Director; Shri G. D. Dhond, Dy. Director; Shri P. S. More, Manager and Shri A. C. Sayyed, Dy. Manager and the concerned staff of Government Central Press, Bombay have laid us under great obligation by their valuable help in the printing of the volume.

The Mss. was very old and in some places difficult to decipher. It goes to the credit of Shri S. D. Shintre who took the trouble of making a clean typed copy ready for the Press. Shri V. G. Nisure typed the Bibliography appended to the Six Systems. Shri Vyankatesh Apte and Dr. P. M. Upadhye rendered whatever help was sought from them. To all these earnest devotees who have done the job in a spirit of sacrifice our gratitude is due.

Bombay
Tukarambīj
Falgun Vadya Dvitiya, Sake 1907
B. R. KULKARNI
27th March 1986
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CHAPTER ONE

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SAMKHYA

*I. Introduction

1. *A Scientific World-view.—*Sāmkhya is very old, going back to the days of the Upaniṣads, and tries to give a scientific explanation of Reality; Cf. Homer and Thales. Evolutionism. Realistic, atheistic, spiritualism.

2. *The Criteria of Truth.—*Recognition of Pratyakṣa, Anumāṇa and Šabda. As scientists, the Sāmkhya Philosophers attach great value to Pratyakṣa. As Rationalists, they credit Anumāṇa with the power of proving even the super-sensuous (अतिदिव्याणां प्रतीतिनिर्माणः Kārikā 6). Āpta-vākyā recognised (Kārikās 4 and 5), but misinterpreted. This means that the Sāmkhya Philosophers want to interpret the Upaniṣads as supporting Sāmkhya Philosophy only, that is to say, a pluralistic, spiritualistic atheism. They take Upaniṣadic passages and foist a philosophy of their own thereon (प्रधानमल्लिनिर्धं).

3. *Heterodox System.—*Sāmkhya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā should all be excluded from the ‘orthodox’ systems; Sāmkhya, because Nirīśvara; Vaiśeṣika because no Āptavākyā; and Mīmāṃsā, because no necessity of God. It is curious that in the three doublets Sāmkhya-Yoga, Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā-Vedanta, the first is heterodox, and the second orthodox; probably a movement of thought.

*The points I to X cover the entire Samkhya thought—mostly evaluative. Professor Ranade had re-grouped the ten points under three heads:

(1) Cosmology (Categories and Causality).

(2) Psychology (Buddhi, Linga and Guṇas).

(3) Ontology (Prakṛti and Purūsa).

Perhaps the ten points would have appeared as re-arranged under these three major heads in the final exposition. Points I (Introduction), II (Criticism of Samkhya Categories) and IV (Samkhya Doctrine of Causality) would have gone under Cosmology. Points V (the Schematic Function of Buddhi), VI (Doctrine of Linga Sarira) and VII (Relation of the Guṇas to Prakṛti) would have been covered by Psychology. Finally, Ontology would include Points III (Evaluation of Arguments for the Existence of Prakṛti and Purūsa), VIII (Criticism of the Nature of Prakṛti), IX (Criticism of the Nature of Purūsa) and X (The Samkhya Ideal):
II. Criticism of Sāmkhya Categories:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Praṅśi} & \\
\text{Mahat} &= \text{Buddhi} \\
\text{Ahamkāra} & \\
\hline
\text{Manas} & 5 \text{Jñānendriyas} & 5 \text{Karmendriyas} & 5 \text{Tanmātras} \\
\hline
^*5 \text{Prāṇas} & & & 5 \text{Mahābhūtas}
\end{align*}
\]

1. Four logical combinations, because two co-present and co-eternal entities; Praṅśi, Praṅśi-Vikśi, Vikśi, na-Praṅśi na-Vikśi; Cf. Aristotle: Moved, Mover, Neither, Both; also Cf. Yoga: Śukla, Kṛṣṇa, Śukla-Kṛṣṇa and AŚuklākṛṣṇa.

2. Mahat, the cosmic principle, cannot be identified with Buddhi, the psychic principle (a) Implicit parallelism in the equation of Mahat and Buddhi, the cosmic and the psychic as in the attributes of Spinoza. (b) Not even the parallelism but an indentitiat philosophy in the huddling up of mind and matter.

3. Violation of the law of Satkāravāda, the vaunted Sāmkhya doctrine of Causality. There must not be more in the effect than in the cause. It is wonderful how from the unintelligent Praṅśi, the intelligent Buddhi could spring. This means that non-intelligence is superior to intelligence.

4. (a) Ahamkāra, a superfluous category; sometimes dropped even by the Śaṅkhya philosophers in the concepts of Linga-Śaṅkra (सङ्करड़ीक स्त्रिमृ—
17 or 18, महाद्विध्वस्याहवर्कस–) dropping Ahamkāra, it is 17, (b) The ego, according to the scheme, becomes a product of nature. Contrast, however, the Puruṣa.

5. Tanmātras and Mahābhūtas: (a) The priority of functions to structures, (b) Also qualities, (Śabda, sparśa, rūpa, rasa and gandha) as (c) essences of substances or elements (ākāśa, vāyu, tejas, aap, ātpī) (Kārikā 38). The Tanmātras are the first to exist, but the last to be known—Aristotle. Idealism vs. Naturalism.

6. The unsatisfactory position assigned to Manas (a) Doctrine of Inner Sense: (2, 3, 4, 5). The triple internal organ, not treated accurately from the psychological point of view. If Manas is an internal organ like Buddhi and Ahamkāra, it must be on a par with them, and cannot be their offspring. While Buddhi and Ahamkāra are products as well as productive, the Manas is only a product. (b) Moreover, Manas partakes both of intelligence and activity, from the Jñānendriyas and Karmendriyas respectively. Hence, in a way, it is

*In the above table the category '5 Prāṇas' is mentioned in Prof. Ranade’s notes. The प्राणाः do not form part of the Sāmkhya categories. Perhaps he would have given his comments regarding the place of प्राणाः in the Sāmkhya scheme—Editor.
superior both to Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Intelligence and activity made compatible in Manas.

III. Evaluation of arguments for the existence of Prakṛti and Puruṣa

1. Arguments for the existence of Prakṛti.—Three main proofs for the existence of Prakṛti (Kārikā 15):

From Finite to Infinite: from Peras to Apeiron; from Effect to Cause (if there is identity of cause and effect in Sāmkhya, why should it argue from effect to cause?) and from Plurality to Unity (avibhāga, or indivisibility of cosmic substance). Prakṛti or the Avyakta, which according to Sāmkhya is supersensuous, is in the system proved not by Intuition but by Anumāna, Kārikā 6 ज्ञाति धिरुमियाणां प्रतीतिसनानात्. Such a great importance the Sāmkhya philosophers attribute to the method of Inference. Inference from the Vyakta must lead not to Avyakta, as in the system, but to Jīva or Spirit. Interposition of Avyakta between Vyakta and Jīva, gratuitous. There must, again, be a “sacetana” cause for Prakṛti, as Śaṅkara contends. The arguments for Prakṛti only prove the Spirit.

2. Arguments for the existence of Puruṣa: Three main proofs for the existence of Puruṣa. No proofs for Purusa should have been given; only for Puruṣas:

Proofs from Immanent Teleology [or Vinculum Substantiate—there must be a vinculum (bond) for all complexes], Contraries, and Substrata.

3. Plurality of Purusas: (a) Differentiation of organs, (b) Unsimultaneity of actions (c) Variety of enjoyments:

Pluralism (Mc Taggart). The Vedāntin आनंदबोध in his न्यायमकरंद criticises these Sāmkhya arguments for the plurality of selves. See Das Gupta, Vol. II.

4. Evaluation. Intimations of the great philosophical proofs of Reality. Recognition of the cosmological or causal argument, of the teleological or design argument, of the logical argument from contraries, and of the ontological argument from the substratum, substance, or background.

IV. Sāmkhya Doctrine of Causality

1. The Sāmkhya Philosopher speaks not merely about Pariṇāma, but even about Sarga (Kārikā 21), and Prasava (Kārikā 11), which is Creation. The mere presence of Puruṣa (Puruṣasannidhi) is the cause of creation. Pariṇāma vs. Sarga. Transformism vs. Creationism. Loose terminology. “Puruṣasannidhi” reminds one of the World’s desire for God in Aristotle. God, a magnet.

2. Causation is referred to the sphere of nature and has no application to Puruṣa; Cf. Kant.
3. Two different conceptions of Causality in Sāmkhya: Separateness of Cause and Effect (Kārikā 15) and Identity (Cf. Bradley and Vedānta) of cause and effect (Kāryam at kāraṇabhisvāt, Kārikā 9, or Avibhāgat Vaiśvarupaya). Tādātmya or Ananyatva, on a lower level than Gaṇapāda’s Ajāti. Cf. Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya, II. I. 18. Probably, the Sāmkhya philosophers borrowed the Identity doctrine from the Vedanta.

4. (a) Śaṅkara sides with the Sāmkhya doctrine of Satkārya-vāda, as against the Naiyāyika doctrine of Asatkārya-vāda, or Arambha-vāda: only by Sat he means Brahman, while the Sāmkhyas mean Prakṛti.

(b) Satkārya-vāda or Pariṣṭāmavāda, Evolutionism or Transformism. Satkārya-vāda in Sāmkhya (preformation or equilibration), and Asatkārya-vāda in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (epigenesis or new formation), both inaccurate expressions: they stand only for Satkāryā-vāda. Why not equate Kāraṇa with God? In Sāmkhya, Kāraṇa is Prakṛti; in Vaiśeṣika, atoms; in Vedānta, God. All these schools join hands in Satkāraṇavāda. Asatkāryavāda in Vaiśeṣika, generation from अनुवृत्त. Asatkāryavāda in Nyāya, generation of घट from तत्त्व which are already destroyed (?). Asatkāryavāda is a contradiction in terms. Kāraṇa must exist previously in some shape. The Naiyāyikas are also called अवैधानिक. The Vaiśeṣikas are वैपर्यायकविद्या (generation in 7, 9, 10, 11 moments). The Naiyāyikas are वैपर्यायकविद्या not cumulative transformation but total transformation.

5. Violation of the law of नस्तकार्यावाद in the evolution of the intelligent Prakṛti from the non-intelligent Pradhāna. The generation of the conscious Buddhi from the unconscious Prakṛti is a violation of Sāmkhya Satkāryavāda.

V. The Schematic Function of Buddhi

Three points in Sāmkhya Psychology: (a) The Nature of Buddhi, (b) Doctrine of Linga-Śarira, and (c) the Nature of Qualities.

1. Nature of Buddhi.—Buddhi is the unifier, the mediator, the Janus-faced interpreter (Kārikās 36, 37). Time in Kant. A new schematism required for any pair of schematiser and schematised.

2. Infinite regress involved in all schematism.

3. Fictitious function. Why, then take exception to Semblance? Through Buddhi, Prakṛti becomes intelligent or sentient as it were, as Puruṣa becomes active as it were. But only, ‘as it were’, and not really (Kārikā 20):

\[ तस्मात् संपथोग्न्यतः बुद्धिः ्
\]

VI. Doctrine of Linga-sarira

1. The Linga-śarira, a good hypothesis, but incapable of proof (Kārikās 40, 41 and 42):

\[ पुरुस्त्राणमकतां निनादं महोदयकृमयैव नमः ्
\]

\[ संसर्गसंपन्नः भावाचिन्तनितिः विन्दुः ्
\]

*See Foot note on P. 1.*
The Bhagavad-gītā (XV. 10) says we can see it, उत्तममस्तम् etc.

2. The only concept in the whole History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western, for the *modus operandi* of Transmigration. (The horrible interpretation of Anguśṭa-mātra by Jung, *Psychology of the Unconscious* Pp. 130–32).

3. A new concept of Bhāva (traces or disposition), additional to the concept of Linga. Also reciprocal causation of Bhāva and Linga (Kārikā 52):

   नवतिं भावेः तद्भवितः नित्यतिमन्यति।

   निक्षिप्तः भावसात्मस्मार्थिनः प्रवर्तते सर्वं।

As of seed and sprout. Which is the root, and which is the fruit? Bhāvas or traces are deposited in Linga: Cf. दमस्तमनूच्छति.

4. The Linga must retire (*Vinivṛtti*, Kārikā 55) or break before liberation can be attained.

5. The Linga must have a body (Kārikā 42). A mere encasement (Mahadādi Sukṣma-paryantam) cannot transmigrate; this would either make the Linga a substance, or in the alternative, destroy the Udāsinatva of Puruṣa; and even then Transmigration would be inconsistent with the eternity of Puruṣa.

6. Psychoplasm and Anlage.

**VII. Relation of the Gunas to Prakṛti**

Examination of the doctrine of qualities.

1. Is Prakṛti an aggregate or a whole? Are Gūṇas components or only subsidiary? Members or Parts? (strands of a rope). Are they dependent or independent, adjectival or substantival? If adjectival, they are super-fluous; if substantival, they are super-numerary. The Gūṇas have no substantival existence. Which of the two viz. Gūṇas or Prakṛti is prior, is left unsaid (Jha).

2. The condition of the Gūṇas during the state of Pralaya: are they in equilibrium, or are they yet dynamic?

3. The mutual relation of the Gūṇas, their reciprocal generation, conquest and concert (Kārikā 12):

   श्रीत्रीयবी विद्वातादयका: प्रक्ताप्रूक्तिनिमयमार्थाः।
   अयोगाभिभवाश्चेतजनलाभिन्द्रुच्छच गुणा:।

निरस्तैर्गुणम also: Puruṣa is beyond the reign of qualities.
4. Only three in earlier Sāmkhya, an infinite number in later; this latter does away with the triplicity of the Guṇas. Cf. the Attributes of Spinoza (Cf. सत्त्वादित्यमात्मार्थपरिवर्तवत्तां साम्यक्रा Pravacana Bāṣyā on I. 127 Sutra).

5. The Guṇas co-operate towards one purpose viz., the satisfaction of Puruṣa (Kārikā 31 पुरुषाः एवं एक हेतु). They are destroyed (नियत्तया), as the liberation is attained. Lamp in action; wick, oil, and flame: Sattva Rajas and Tamas (Pradipavacārthatojñī, Kārikā 13). In a different sense Cf. प्रदीपश्यद्विधम् तथाभिन्यययति (श्र. IV. 4.15). This has two meanings: either that the Atman remaining in himself illumines all existence or that the Atman enters into an infinite number of Jivas.

6. Analogy with the doctrine of Humours in Medieval Physiology, or Tridoṣas in Indian Medicine. Compare also the three types of modern psychology: intellectual type, feeling type and conative type; also the eidetic types in Jaensch or the types of men in Spranger or Carlyle.

VIII. Criticism of the Nature of Prakṛti

1. Personality. The personality of Prakṛti is seen from the Andhapangu-nyāya (Kārikā 21). Buddhī lifts up the Pangu over the shoulders of the Andha. (Andha-pangu-nyāya applied also to Karma and Jñāna). The milk and the calf, no doubt (Kārikā 57); but the cow is neglected!

2. The Actress or dancing girl or नात्की (नात्तक्यतत्स्तं लिङ्गं) Cf. U.P. and Bengal, where dancing is regarded as an art. Sexual imagery. She is also very tender. मुक्तामृतर. She is rainbow-coloured. (Kārikā 63):

रूपः सप्तस्मिनेन वलनहरतामालामलाना प्रकृतिः.।
सौभ नृत्यायं प्रति विमोचनयेत्य रूपेण

The colours are the prakṛtivikṛtāyaḥ sapta. सप्तहस्तायोप्यश्च. White light = seven prismatic colours.

3. Benefactress (Kārikā 58):

आः सुकृत निवृत्तयं यथा क्रियामु अवतते लोकः।
पुयस्य समोक्षायम् अवतते तदः समस्यम्॥

Prakṛti is generous (Guṇavati) while Puruṣa ungrateful (Aguṇa). Guṇa = Virtue or Quality or also strand. Kārikā 60:

नानाबिधेश्यस्य मात्रायं कार्यानुसारेण पुनः।
गुणांतिगुणाः सर्वत्रत्रायं समायत्॥

4. Modest (Kārikā 61):

प्रकृतेऽः मुक्तामृतर न किंचिन्तति मे मतिभवति।
या बृह्मस्मै मुनि न दशोंमुपैति पुष्पस्य॥

And therefore evanescent. मुक्तामृतर; dalliance with a mental creation? Two co-present and co-eternal entities, one of which is likely to be evanescent, passes beyond philosophic comprehension. Retiring of the dancing girl (Kārikā 59). Mutual retirement; “I am seen”, “I am the seer”, (Kārikā 66):

बृह्मस्मै वेत्तै एवं दशोंमुपैति पुष्पस्य॥
सति संयोगिणि तथ: प्रभोजन नाति सर्वस्य॥
5. Relativism. The Prakṛti retires for the relieved soul, but continues to exercise her function for the others. This makes Prakṛti subjective. She is, and is not. Why not Prakṛti a semblance of an Āvaraṇa? Why not equate with Māyā? Subjective and illusory. The vaunted Sāmkhya Realism does not hold much water. Why not have a multiplicity of Prakṛtis for a multiplicity of Puruṣas? (Kārikā 18).

6. It is not the Puruṣa who is bound or emancipated, or transmigrates (Kārikā 62):

\[
\text{तस्मात् सङ्केत नामे मुन्य्ये नामे संसर्गति काव्यचतु।}
\]
\[
\text{संसर्गति कस्यते मुन्य्ये नानात्मा प्रकृति:॥}
\]

but it is the Prakṛti, which is emancipated (Kaivalyārtham Pradhānasya, Kārikā 21).

IX. Criticism of the Nature of Puruṣa

1. The Puruṣa not entirely Udāsina (Kārikā 65) or Upekaṣaka (Kārikā 66). No doubt, he is described as looking at Prakṛti unconcerned. He has a purpose (Puruṣārtha), which is the motive to action. The Indriyas, the Guṇas, the Linga, and the Prakṛti, are all described as contributing to this Puruṣārtha: Cf.—

\[
\text{स्वां स्वां प्रतिपादने परस्परकूल हेतुको बृत्तम।}
\]
\[
\text{पुरुषार्थं एवं हेतु: न केतितिचिंतकं करणम्॥ ३९॥}
\]
\[
\text{(प्रतिपादने Contrast करणार्थ)}
\]
\[
\text{हेतु: प्रदीपकल्य: परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषं।}
\]
\[
\text{ईस्तव पुरुषविध माहाकालिको प्रकृतिन्ति। ३६॥}
\]
\[
\text{एते, गुणविशेषं: Contrast गुणा;}
\]
\[
\text{पुरुषार्थंहेतुकांतिः निमित्तासामासिक प्रकृतिः।}
\]
\[
\text{प्रकृतिविभूषणं नन्दयस्यविलक्षणं लिङ्गम्। ४२॥}
\]
\[
\text{हेतु: प्रदीप: बद्धत्वात्स्यामाल्लमात्मा प्रकृति।}
\]
\[
\text{सैवं पुरुषार्थं प्रति विवेचनप्रकृति। ६३॥}
\]
\[
\text{(लिङ्गम्, सैव Contrast प्रकृति।)}
\]

2. The Puruṣa is described as Sākṣi, Kevala, Drāstā etc., (Kārikā 19):

\[
\text{तस्मात् विपर्यासारसिद्ध सामाधिस्मय पुरुस्य।}
\]
\[
\text{कौसिक्यं माध्यमस्य इत्युस्मात्मकाभ्यं।}
\]

But he cannot be a Sākṣi or Cetā, because this implies intelligence, and intelligence is Jaḍa (Prākṛti); Cf. Bergson. Puruṣa is said to be neither Prakṛti nor Vikṛti nor Prakṛti-Vikṛti; and Buddha is Prākṛti. Sākṣitva might involve intuition, and not intelligence.


भर्ति भोज्या महेन्द्र: परमात्मा XIII. 22.
Double fault in the Bhagavad-gītā.


X. The Samkhya Ideal


4. Separation of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, to be attained by a contemplation on their separateness, which is a circle. पुष्पकमलः Hypnotic hoax. Cf. Rashdall’s Criticism of Bradley’s Self-Realisation : the self is real already.

5. Knowledge of not-ness: Nāśmi, Na me, Nāham:
   (Not-ness : no predicate : nāśmi : no subject).
   गृहमेतर्यश्चायाम्भुवाने पारस्परिकल्पनायां.
   अन्तःप्रृथ्विमर्त्तमोऽर्जुनवोऽपि साधनम् । ॥ ९७ ॥
   (नाहम्, नाहम्: Buddhistic element in Sāmkhya; influence of Buddhism).
   What then becomes of the eternity of Puruṣa? Two interpretations. Buddhistic and Vedantic.

6. The Vedānticised Sāmkhya: The conceptions of Jivatkaivalya (Aikāntika, pertaining to an end) (Kārikā 67, potter’s wheel) and Videhakāivalya (Ātyantika, beyond all end) (Kārikā 68):
   सबगत्र जानातिधिमतात्र धर्मातिधिमाकारण प्राप्तो।
   तत्ष्यति संस्कर्षबत्तात् चक्रप्रभवद्धृसूर्यीर्यः । ॥ ९५ ॥
   प्राप्ते शरीरस्मेव चिन्तायार्थबाला प्रधानविनिवृत्तोऽपि
   ऐसार्थातिस्थितिप्रभुप्रकाशकोऽपि अन्ततः ॥ ९६ ॥
   ऐसार्थातिक might mean also catastrophic liberation. Prototypes of Jivanmukti and Videhamukti. Implicit Vedāntism in Īśvarakṛṣṇa. He goes to the length of positing both Jivanmukti and Videhamukti. Running with hare and hunting with hound.

7. The ultimate aim, emancipation of every Puruṣa (Kārikā 56):
   ह्यवेय प्रकृतिकृती महत्तविशिष्टप्रमुत्तरेऽत्तरः ।
   तत्रित्ययेयविशिष्टवाय स्वायं इत्व पराय आरभः ॥ ॥ ९७ ॥
   Cf. the Vedāntic doctrine of Sarvamukti. Doctrine of universal salvation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Book</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jha</td>
<td>Edition of Sāmkhya-Tattva-Kaumudi by Ganga Nath Jha (Tukaram Tattya). Introduction should be read carefully. The text of Kārikās should be read carefully. The translation of the Kārikās might also be read. Commentary of Vācaspati Misra might be read in places.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surya narayana Shastri</td>
<td>Edition of Sāmkhya Kārikā. Text and translation of the Kārikās may be read. There are notes only by Mr. Shastri and no translation or text of Sāmkhya Tattva Kaumudi. Introduction Pp. 11–38 might also be read.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. H. Wilson</td>
<td>Sāmkhya Kārikā with the commentary of Gauḍapāda and translation of both might be read from H. H. Wilson’s Edition. Wilson adds his own English commentary to every verse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keith</td>
<td>Sāmkhya System. (Heritage of India Series) should be read. Chap. II discusses Sāmkhya and Buddhism; Chap. III discusses Sāmkhya and Māhābhārata; Chap. IV discusses developments which Yoga made beyond Sāmkhya; Chap. VII discusses the classical Sāmkhya Philosophy in the Kārikās; Chap. VIII is important discussing the contents of the तत्त्वसमाप्ति as well as the सांक्यसूत्र. It gives a good account of Sāmkhya philosophy as found in the सांक्यसूत्र. Criticism by Sāmkhya of all the other systems of philosophy in this work is important. (Cf. Vedantic criticism of all the other systems in Vedanta Sutras II. 1 and 2). Finally a very good account of विज्ञानमित्तु occurs Pp. 113 ff.</td>
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CHAPTER TWO

YOGA

I. Introductory

1. Two Patanjalis; Patanjali, the Grammarian, and Patanjali, the Yogin:

योगेन वित्तस्य पदेन वानाम्
मलं शरीरस्य तु वेश्येन।
योजाकरोत्त प्रवरं मुनीनाम्
पतंजलि प्राणिनिराला।

Keith on wrong grammar. We should read Pratibhādvā sarvam, (III. 33) instead of Pratibhādvā sarvam.

आर्यप्रयोगं उदस्त्रोपः. Ahiśah:

पालंजलम् भवायचरकार्यतां संस्कृते।
मनोवाचकायुपाध्याम् हुतेजिन्तत्यन् नम:।
(पतन् अजली इति पतंजलि।)

Yoga defined as stemming the tide of consciousness so as to make it stable and placid. योग derived from यूज् to concentrate (समाधी), not from यूज् to join, 7th conjugation (उभयपद) (Contrast Yoke). see Woods. Svarupa (I. 3) and Sārupya (I. 4).

II. Metaphysics

2. The conflict of Self and God in Yoga: which of them is the primary reality? Draśṭuḥ svarupe avasthānam (I. 3). Īṣvarapraṇidhānādvā (I. 23). God from the back-door. Could be resolved only in Vedantic fashion by identifying Self and God. Yoga, a half-way house between Sāmkhya and Vedanta.

3. Transcendence of God; Cf. the deistic God of Aristotle. God as a mere Epiphenomenon. Deus Ex Machina. Concession to Bhakti. Pancaśikha, the Sāmkhya philosopher, said by Hopkins to have introduced the 26th Principle, namely God, under Bhāgavata influence (?) Kleśa-Karma-vipākasayaḥ. (I. 24).

पुन्द्रविचारः — Primus inter pares. Two meanings to “Self of Selves”. Is Yogic God theistic or deistic? No God-realisation in Yoga, but self-realisation,
but the self-realisation of a kind, namely, ideological. Remover of obstacles
(I. 29). Teacher and without time (I. 26). Omiscience (I. 25). Eka-tattva, the
only Reality (I. 32).

4. Avidyā, root cause of the world experience. Approach to Vedanta
Definition of Avidyā, taking Anitya for Nitya: Anitya-suci-duḥkhānāmasu
Nitya-suci-sukhātmakhyātiravidyā (II. 5). Breeding ground of all other
Kleśas (II. 4).

5. (i) Definition of Viparyaya as: मिथ्याज्ञानमत्वप्रतिष्ठम् (I. 8). Again,
approach to Vedanta. वस्तूनिव्वस्तवतारोपणांत्तरां (Cf. Vedantic Adhyāsa.
(also Atadvati tatprakārakam jānām). (ii) This inconsistent with Sattva-
puruṣānyatatākhyāti, (anyatā=separateness), which is so often mentioned in
the Yoga sutras. The first is unrealistic while the second is realistic. (iii) A
third description yet under Sāmkhya influence: Unreal for the knower,
real for the ignorant; इतस्तथप्रतिष्ठा नष्टमयन्ति तद्व्यसाधारणवत् (II. 22),
(Tat=Pradhāna).

6. Also attack on the Vedantic conception of Asmitā (Unity of Self and
अन्तःहृद्. Contrast the Yogic unification of gṛhitṛ, grahāṇa and gṛhṛya. Āṇanda
which constitutes Samprajñāta samādhi (I. 17.) Asmitā is a Kleśa (II. 3) and
also constitutes Samprajñāta Samādhi (I. 17). Two meanings of Asmitā : one
while going out of the door and one while returning through the door.
(मृष्ट अन्तिमें त्युष्टम शुद्ध स्वरूपम नहंज समाधी).

III. Epistemology

Berkeley. The Proof of (a) mind (b) minds (c) Mind of minds.

(i) The mind is not self-illuminative (Śvābhāsa IV. 19) nor can one mind
be cognised by another (IV. 21) hence a self exists as the knower of mind :
egative aspect. (Difference between Self and Mind).

(ii) The states of a mind are known to its Lord who never changes (IV. 18) :
positive aspect.

(iii) The objective world exists for a Self (II. 21). The being of the spectacle
is for the Seer. Esse est percipi.

(iv) A thing uncognised by one mind still exists for another (IV 16); hence
other Selves and God exist. Thus there is no solipsism. This kills two birds
with one stone. Cf. also Berkeley’s proof of God.

(v) One Mind the Director of many (IV. 5). Hence corresponding to a
supreme Mind, there must be a supreme Self. Conception of primus inter pares,
namely God. Compare on the whole Yoga-vāsiṣṭha and its Idealistic Philosophy.

IV. Ethics

8. (a) Parallelism of the ten virtues included under Yama and Niyama
with the Ten Commandments of the Old Testament, Exodus and Deuteronomy,
the latter of which gives an older scheme and the former a newer one, which
is the one now usually adopted. (I) Thou shall have no other gods beside me.
(2) Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven images. (3) Thou shalt not take the name of thy God for a vain end. (4) Thou shalt work during the week, and rest on the sabbath. (5) Honour thy father and thy mother. (6) Thou shalt not kill. (7) Thou shalt not commit adultery. (8) Thou shalt not steal. (9) Thou shalt not bear false witness. (10) Thou shalt not covet.

Yama and Niyama, a high moral code. *Negative* and *positive* aspects. (Self-regarding and other-regarding virtues). This distinction not ultimately valid.

Virtues included under Yama (II.30) : (1) Non-Killing (*Ahimsā*), (2) Truth (not bearing false witness) (*Satya*), (3) Non-stealing (*Asteeyam*), (4) Celibacy (no adultery) (*Brahamacarya*), (5) Non-possession (*Aparigrahah*).

Virtues included under Niyama (II. 32) : (1) Purity (*Śauca*). (2) Contentment (*Santosa*). (3) Austerities (work and rest) (*Tapas*). (4) Uttering the name of God, Praṇava (*Śūdhyāya*). (5) Worship of God (*Īśvara-pranidhāna*), offering of actions at the feet of God, a kind of Karma-yoga : *Sarvakriyāyām paramagurvārpaṭām* (II. 1). Īśvara-pranidhāna = Īśwarabhakṣya śūdhyāya Īśvarāyām kriyā aparāj kārṇa —/vismān krama. प्रणिधान स्थानत : तुज्यत: तद्वर्मायनम्। (I. 28) This is superior to Vedanta.

Eight of the Ten are almost identical (Hocking). Cf. also Virtues in the Bhagavad gītā.

(b) Other Virtues, Maitri, Karunā Muditā (contrast Ānanda), Upekṣā (I. 33). We must feel happy when we see other people happy. Cf. also Virtues in Buddhism.

(c) Mystical virtues : Tivrasanvega (I. 21); Dirghakāla, Nairantarya and Satkūra (I. 14), or Ādara. Brown’s laws of association.

Control of Citta in its intellectual and emotional aspects by Abhyāsa and Vairāgya (enoughness of heard and seen, I. 15). Abhyāsa and Vairāgya intellectual and moral bridles (I.12); Cf. Bhagavad gītā (VI-35). Vairāgya, not different from Upekṣā.

(d) Four kinds of Karmas, Šukla, Kṛṣṇa, Śukla-Kṛṣṇa, Aśuklā-krṣṇa. अशुकलक्रष्ण योगिनः। तिव्रस्थितीर्थाः (IV. 7). This last for the Yogins, “Anticipation” of Vedantic Prarabdha, Śancita and Kriyāmāna. Sāmkhya influence also traceable—लोकितसुक्रष्णायुपमः। तीनां निरुपक्षमेव कर्म (III. 22). We have to suffer संचित and प्रारंभ but we can control the क्रियामाण i.e. the future :

भोग प्रारंभाण इरुस्तिक्रमेन नाना। —एकतन्त्र.

प्रारंभ क्रियामाण सकलसंचित नाहीं जनाः। —नूतनामः.

(a) Knowledge of Puruṣa alone leads beyond Guṇas, Puruṣa-khyātegunāvaitṛṣṇyam (I.16). (b) Thinking of the opposite, Pratipakṣabāhavanam. Schiller, Aristotle’s wand. Measure. (c) Virtues of universal application, (Śārvabhauma), नारिक्षेत्रकारणमात्रार्थिनः सार्वभौमा महत्तत्त। (II. 31); Birth, place, time, circumstances must not matter. Cf. Kant. For Vratas of two kinds, Mahāvrata and Anuvrata Cf. Jainism. (see Hiriyanna, p. 167). Virtue is virtue irrespective of clime or time. One must not kill under any circumstances.
V. Occultism

10. The different powers: Estatic impediments, Post-ecstatic realities (III. 36.), Powers, an impediment for Samādhi. Compare:

अष्णम विश्राम व्रतात: प्रकारम् सतिमा तथा

ईश्वरल बलाश्रय तथा कामाक्षापितता

महिमा लक्ष्म्यमण्डल: प्रकारम् विषमित्वता

प्रतिष्ठा: कामाक्षापितकं शंभोरेवस्मात्

Dispersion for Powers may bring Kaivalya. From subtlest to the highest (I. 40). Physical, Psychical, Moral (desirelessness may bring on Isolation), and Mystical (Sages and Self). Asteya-pratiṣṭhāyām sarva-ratnopasthānam (II. 37). Cf. अक्स्मा. (गो चुक्ति स्त्रेण एव म: । Bhagavad-gītā (III. 12). As knowledge becomes infinite, the knowable becomes infinitesimal (IV. 31). आपात्य आपत्यात् ज्ञातमलाम्। For details see “Analysis”.

VI. Psychology of Mysticism

11. Dhārarā, Dhyāna, Samādhi, stages of one continuous process. (a) Dharā, local (nose, heart, navel, brain or external object, III. 1), Dhyāna, ideological. (b) तदेव (व्याहि) अर्थमात्रायामसं। सवृष्टिमण्डल: समाधि: III. 3. Dhyanā, nisus to continuity of experience; Samādhi, attainment of continuity. Dhyanā is defined as Pratyayaikātāna (III 2); but in this way it could hardly be distinguished from Samādhi. Hence it is better to understand Dhyāna as effort to attain to continuity without reaching it, which is Samādhi. (C) Traya-meekatra Samyama (III. 4). as opposed to Yama and Niyama. Samyama, a search-light (Prajñāloka, III. 5). (d) Samādhi of two kinds. Samprajñāta (Conscious), objectful; Asamprajñāta, Super-conscious, objectless. Moral, Physiological, Psychophysical, and Psychological.


13. The ‘dichotomy’ between Samprajñāta and Asamprajñāta, unjustifiable.

Four kinds of Samprajñāta Samādhi (Vitarkavicārānandāsmitā, I. 17). If there is Vicāra, how can there be Samādhi?

Two kinds of Asamprajñāta, Bhavaprātyaya and Upāyaprātyaya: Bhavaprātyaya for the bodiless, Upāyaprātyaya for the aspirant who pr actsises Śraddhā, Virya, Smṛti, Samādhi and Prajñā (I. 20). विदेहसाधकतायांगम्प।


Is there anything like Asamprajñāta? Different of Degree, and not of kind. Otherwise, Asamprajñāta would be catalepsy. No Ārūḍha (as contrasted
with Arurukṣu and yunjāna). Infinite progress, as in Croce and Gentile. There has never been a man who has reached the end. Approximationism.

14. The conflict between the Intellectual and the Mystical in Yoga: Kaivalya or Samādhi? Isolation or Svarūpāvasthāna? Why two independent chapters on Samādhi and Kaivalya?

15. The Yogic Ideal: (1) Affective: Painlessness (All indeed is pain, Durkhammera sarvam vivekinaḥ, II. 15), and Desirelessness; Cf. Ataraxia and Apathia. Beatification absent from Yoga. Ānanda is regarded as inferior, constituting only Samprajñāta Samādhi. Is there anything higher than Ānanda? (2) Epistemological: Unity of Grhita, Grahaṇa, and Grāhya like a jewel (I. 41) not like a mirror; this sustains the Yogic attack on Vedantic Asmītā. (3) Intellectual: Ṛtambharā, prajñā intellect big with truth, or truth-bearing consciousness (I. 48). सत्त्व superior to Satya महाविज्ञान परिप्रेक्ष्याधी: Also Viveka-khyāti, discernment of the self from not-self (See Seven stages below). (4) Mystical: Svarūpāvasthāna, also Pratyayānupāśyāḥ (II. 20). (5) Moral: Dharmameghaḥ samādhiḥ, showers blessings like a cloud. The cloud of Virtue comes to him who has no interest left in intellect. प्रस्वयेतुपूर्वनृत्ति सत्त्वम बिवेकवाच्च: धर्मयज्ञ: समाधि (IV. 29), पुस्तिदेव निद्रिकांश्च मार्गपथिः (स्कन्ध: कर्मचार्य) (6) Ontological: Kaivalya or Isolation, Sattva-puruṣahānyatā-khyāti. सत्त्व = विचारचय उपदान कारण, अन्तता = Separateness. (7) Psychological: Svarūpa pratisūttā vā citiśaktiḥ (IV. 34). The power of Consciousness abiding in itself.

16. The seven stages of Viveka-khyāti: (Four objective, and three subjective). Too Buddhistic in character. (1) The nature of pain has been known. (2) The causes of pain have been removed. (3) This removal has become a fact of direct experience in Samādhi. (4) Discriminative knowledge (विवेकव्याित.), which is the means to it (Hānopāyaḥ, the cause of the removal of pain, II. 26) has been attained, which implies that Viveka-khyāti is a stepping-stone to Isolation. On the other hand, Viveka-khyāti is also described as the end. Cf. Tadā vivekanimnam kaivalya-prāgbhavam cītum (IV. 26); “The mind, weighed down by the thought of Isolation, bends towards Discrimination”. Description of Jivanmukta. His mind being laden with Kaivalya descends to practical life with discrimination; also Cf. योगानुत्तातादधुलये ज्ञानद्रिष्टिविचेतस्याते: His illumination goes on extending until he realises the separateness of the body and the self. Inconsistency. Does Kaivalya proceed from Viveka-khyāti, or does Viveka-khyāti proceed from the thought of Kaivalya? (5) The Buddhhi has achieved its purpose; Cf. Sāmkhyā. (6) The qualities, (here also, Cf. Sāmkhya) now finding no support, have been destroyed as stones rolling from a mountain top; Cf. also, तत: वृत्तान्तानां परिप्रेक्ष्याञ्जलसामालमिन्नास्ताः (IV. 32). (7) The Puruṣa has thus attained to the state of complete isolation. A mere intellectual ascent to isolation. Self-hypnotism.


VII. Doctrine of Sphota

18. Transfer to Mimāṃsā under heading—Relation of Śabda to Sphoṭa.
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Patanjali’s Yoga Sūtras in “The Sacred Books of the Hindus Series” Allahabad, with a “Text and Translation” of the commentary of Vyāsa and the "translation" only of Vācaspati’s gloss. In the translation of the Sūtras the author tries to give the meaning of every word. The Introduction by S. C. Vasu is good.

Ganga Nath Jha .

The Yoga Darśana (Tukaram Tattya 1907) contains no text but the translation of Sūtras and the Bhāṣya of Vyāsa. The author also subjoins to the translation of the Bhāṣya notes on the commentaries of Vācaspati Misra, Vijñānabhikṣu and Bhoja. The Preface is good but introduces some Vedic arrangement.

Woods .

The Yoga System of Patanjali (Harward Oriental Series). Read the Introduction Pp. XIII to XXIII) which is historical in nature concerning the date of Patanjali. The Yoga Sūtras, the Yoga Bhāṣya and Vācaspati Misra; Analysis of the contents of the Sūtras in serial order of the Sūtras as well as Wood’s Adhikaraṇas thereof might be read but the language is quaint. The Bibliography at the end might be referred to; Index of quotations in the commentaries might also be referred to. Index of Words in the Sūtras is valuable which would enable us to fix the meanings of the words by collation.

S. N. Das Gupta .

Yoga Philosophy (In relation to other systems of Indian thought. Calcutta 1930). Doctorate Thesis. Yoga Cosmology, Yoga Psychology, Yoga Physics, Yoga Ethics etc. valuable.

Das Gupta .

Yoga as Philosophy and Religion (Kegan Paul) should be read. Especially Chaps. VII from Book I and Book II generally. The Appendix on “Sphoṭavāda” is valuable.

Das Gupta relies too much on commentaries and does not exercise independent interpretation or philosophic judgement.

Das Gupta .

“Study of Patanjali” (Calcutta University) might be read.
Rajendra Lal Mitra... “Yoga Aphorisms of Patanjali” (Asiatic Society of Bengal, Bibliotheca Indica). Text and Translation both of Yoga Sūtras and Bhoja’s “Rāja-Mārtanqa”. Mitra’s reflections are subjoined in square brackets to the translation of the commentary. The Index is valuable. But besides reference to Sanskrit words in the text and the commentary, it contains references to English words also in his own reflections and no reference to words in the Preface. The Preface is valuable philosophically and contains good English but it is somewhat long.

Our own Analysis of the Sūtras seriatim and reflections thereon according to subject-matter such as Metaphysics, Epistemology, Ethics, Occultism and Mysticism.
CHAPTER THREE

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF BUDDHISM

I. The Problem of the Historical Buddha

(a) The doctrines of the Buddha recently separated from the doctrines of Canonical Buddhism. Mrs. Rhys Davids (1934) entirely changes her old opinions as expressed in her *Buddhism*, Home University Library, 1912: *peccavi*. The first Edition of Mrs. Rhys Davids was written from the stand-point of materialistic pluralism. "Mrs. Rhys Davids' method sound": see Article on Pre-Canonical Buddhism by Keith in the Indian Historical Quarterly, March 1936. The problem of the historical Buddha thus exactly resembles the problem of the historical Socrates Cf. Burnet and Taylor. To add to the analogy, Buddha like Socrates, is regarded as a mystic. Religion requires uncommon insight, must go not to the Less but to the More, and thence to the Most (Mrs. Rhys Davids). No foundation or propagation of Religion without mystic insight.

(b) Very different from the doctrines of the Buddha are the doctrines of Canonical Buddhism. Buddha, according to the new theory, must be regarded as merely the mouth-piece of the Canonists. What are the reasons for this disparity between the teachings of the Buddha and the teachings of Canonical Buddhism? They are probably these: (i) The Canonists misunderstood the teachings of the Buddha (lapse of three centuries, want of writing, necessity of system, dogma, and so forth); (ii) The Canonists misrepresented the doctrines of the Buddha in the interest of their monadom. "Monkish hostility". The negative side of the Buddha's teaching thus emphasised by the monks at the cost of the positive. They retained Buddha's Ethics, dropped his Mysticism and stressed the negative side of his Metaphysics *viz.*, Change and Causality.

II. The Teachings of the Historical Buddha

Mrs. Rhys Davids cites Fragments to prove that the Buddha believed in the Self, the reality of the Moral Law, and so on (Cf. expressions like Ṭatmadipa, "Live as they who have the Self for a lamp, the Self for a refuge; Dharma for a lamp, Dharma for a refuge and none other,‘ (P. 73) in Mrs. Rhys Davids' *Buddhism*, Home University Library; Cf. Butler's *Candle of the Lord within us*. Buddha likewise believed in what in Western terminology may be called God
(P. 148 in Mrs. Rhys Davids’ Ch. VII entitled ‘The Message of the Fragments’). Also see Mrs. Rhys David’s criticism of Max Muller’s five marks of religion. The only difference between the doctrine of the Upanisads and the doctrine of the Buddha is that while the Upanisads preach Tattvam Asi, the Buddha preaches Tattvam Bhavasi (Bhava—Becoming or growth). See review of Mrs. Rhys Davids’ Manual of Buddhism I. B. Horner, Pp. 307—312, Journal of Theological Studies, 1933. The doctrine of Anattā only means that the body, the senses, and the rest are not the Self. Cf. the important reference in Keith to the reality of the Self, in the Alagaddupama-sutta in his “Buddhist Philosophy ”, Pp. 64-65. Buddha harks back to the Upanisads: Cf. Chapter V, ‘A Mis-reading of Buddha’ in E. Holmes’ Creed of Buddha; the author severely criticises the no-soul doctrine read by Mr. Rhys Davids, and Mr. Paul Carus, in the teachings of the Buddha. The author says (Chap. VIII): ‘Western Thought is bankrupt’. The whole is very valuable as being a positive interpretation of the doctrine of Buddhism. Cf. also Radhakrishnan. E. Holmes probably supplied an inspiration to Radhakrishnan and Mrs. Rhys Davids. Buddha taught a doctrine of Two Truths, the exoteric and esoteric, one for the layman and the other for the philosopher (?). This is probably anachronism going later to the times of Nāgārjuna. Buddha had no philosophical insight, says Poussin, to understand the inconsistency of the two doctrines; his silence on metaphysical questions interpreted as incapacity for rational thought. Did not care for Metaphysics. Buddha refuses to answer questions concerning the soul, because they do not conduce to enlightenment and Nirvāṇa (Digha-Nikāya 9).

Postscript.—The so-called Anattā-lakkhana-sutta proves that Buddha believed in Self by denying the reality of body mind and senses—Mrs. Rhys Davids, P. 78. The dying Buddha said ‘Heed ultimately not what men say. Heed the inner monitor, the still small voice’, Mrs. Rhys Davids, P. 86. Patīccha Samuppāda means setting afoot of beneficent causes which should on no account be stopped, P. 92: Progress to Nirvāṇa instead of suffering. Buddha’s doctrine or Bhava or growth: A Deva appears in a vision to the Buddha and says, “Teach religion, sir! Teach religion, welfarer! Learners of religion will become ” (P. 102). Cf. also ‘Bhava’ in the expression Bhava-suddhi, in Asoka’s edicts; also compare ‘Now shall I turn back no more, but I shall become a further farer in the life divine (P. 122). ‘Just as a man who has climbed up a crag can see more, lovely gardens, lovely wood, lovely landscape, while the crag blocks the view of the other, similarly Jhāna adds to one’s vision (Pp. 138-139). कृत्ति पृष्ठ गिरेरिचि। Also देव पाहो देव पाहो उन्च ठगरी उमे राहो। Lofty ethics of moral tele-volition (P. 144): abundance of benevolence towards others through Telepathy.

III. Canonical Buddhism

(i) Samghāta and Santāna, contradictory conceptions. Samghāta and Santāna, cardinal points also in Sarvāstivāda or Vaibhāṣika school, that of Materialistic Pluralism. See Śankara’s criticism below. Incessant Change (Cf. P. Carus, Gospel of Buddha, Identity and non-identity, Pp. 131, 140) without
a permanent substratum, is an impossible concept; Cf. Kant. No substance, Self, Cause, and God. Buddha's catechism to Rāhula on Impermanence: Many gods come to listen (Cf. Cula-Rāhulovāda-sutta 147 of Majjhima-Nikāya). Does the Doctrine of Becoming involve merely the 'impermanence' of phenomenal existence? This line of interpretation adopted by certain modern interpreters of the doctrine of Māyā. Evanescence, instead of illusion. Herakleitos, though he recognises incessant change, yet recognises a God. Bergson, in spite of his doctrine of change, has made a place for mystical reality in his 'Two Sources of Morality and Religion'.


(iii) A critical examination of the doctrine of Patijca-samuppāda, a very defective theory of Causation. It has been argued that the concatenation of the 12 links in the chain of Causation merely symbolises the fatuity or the non-existence of the self, and the reign of mechanical law, vide Keith, Ch. V, Section 4, Buddhist Philosophy, for various interpretations of the Law. (Pp. 105-106).

According to Keith, the first link in the Chain of Causation, namely "Avidyā" has no 'Vedantic' significance; Jacobi says it has only a Sāmkhya significance. Kern interprets the Chain of Causation as based on a Cosmic myth and says it only implies the creation and destruction of the world; Frank says on the other hand that the Chain has only an ideal significance. Burnouf tells us that the Chain implies the emergence of a concrete entity from non-existence; while Kirste says that it tries to bring about a relation between independent temporary
existences, which are not changes as in an organism. Oltramare similary tells us that the Chain does not try to explain the origin of life, but only points out to the emergence of misery; while Mrs. Rhys Davids says that the Chain may imply progress to Nirvāṇa (P. 92), and not necessarily the emergence of misery. It need not be a pessimistic doctrine but may be a melioristic one. The Buddhists did not make sufficient use of their doctrine of Samtāna to explain Causation, otherwise Causation to them would have meant no more than mere continuity. Das Gupta tells us that the Pratityasamutpāda means dependent emergence which is only another name for collocative production, assemblant origination or contingent necessity; while to us it seems to imply the doctrine of ‘asamutpāda’ or non-creation as experienced in ‘Pratiti’ or intuition (Pratiti + asamutpāda). The Asamutpāda doctrine of the Buddhists thus comes quite near to the Ajāti doctrine of Vedanta.

(iv) Probably the chiefest defect of Canonical Buddhism: the doctrine of Re-incarnation running riot. Buddha remembers on his death-bed that in his previous life he was King Sudassan (Dīgha-Nīkāya 17). Mahāgovinda also (Dīgha-Nīkāya 19). Also Makkhādeva (Majjhima-Nīkāya 83). 547 “Jātaka” tales (Khuddaka-Nīkāya 10). Previous lives of monks and nuns also (Khuddaka-Nīkāya, 13, (Apadāna).

(v) Occultism.—Meditation on emptiness (Majjhima-Nīkāya, 121). Practising internal emptiness (Majjhima-Nīkāya 122). Belief of Buddha: A spell (in verse) given by the four great kings to Buddha to serve as protection against evil spirits which he repeats to the monks (Dīgha-Nīkāya 32). A poem on the Three jewels, the Triratna viz., the Buddha, the Doctrine, and the Order, forming a charm to win the good will of spirits (Khuddaka-Nīkāya 1 Khuddaka-pāṭha). Also Spiritual Exercises in Coomarswami. Read Section ‘Ecstasy’ in Rhys Davids’ Early Buddhism, Pp. 86-89. Read also ‘skillful practice of Trances’ in Poussin’s way to Nirvana, Pp. 159–66. Cf. also the occult process of Jhāna or tele-volition in Mrs. Phys Davids. Tele-volition good in a moral sense, but its objective validity questionable. See Buddhist Ethics below. Mahāyānists’ Dhyāna: Meditation called Tatthālambana (Das Gupta, P. 150).

Postscript.—Stories of celestial mansions. Beings who have been reborn in one of the heavens explain the acts of merit that led to their reward (Khuddaka-Nīkāya 6, Viman-vattthu Stories of Petas, Beings condemned for their former misdeeds to a wretched existence as ghosts (Khuddaka-Nīkāya 7, Petavatthu). No purgatorio in Buddhism.

IV. Buddhistic Ethics

The sublime of empirical or descriptive ethics in Buddhism. Its strongest point, the message of peace and contentment. Sanctity of Life. India, the true representative of Buddhism, says Mahatma Gandhi; neither Burma nor Ceylon, neither China nor Japan. As Logic sprang full-grown from the head of Aristotle, so Ethics sprang full-blown from the head of the Buddha. Hinayānas and Mahāyānists could only add a point here or a point there.
The Elephant (Bodhisattva) gives over his physical tusks in order to gain spiritual tusks (knowledge). Cf. Coomarswamy, Pp. 290-93, Shaḍḍhaanta Jātaka: "the tusks of omniscience are a thousand times dearer to me than these; and may this worthy gift be the cause of my attaining Omniscience". Buddha on taking meat. Buddha tells us that a monk should eat meat only if he has not seen, heard or suspected that it was specially prepared for him (Majjhima-Nikāya 55). Contrast Tachibana, The Ethics of Buddhism, "As to Buddhism, it is perfectly clean from this sort of bloodshed. As we say repeatedly, it has no gods to appease or to control by means of sacrifice; and killing any animal, to say nothing of a human being, is interdicted as an abominable sin in Buddhism" (P. 41). Peacocks may be killed (Cf. The Ideal of Kingship*, or D. R. Bhandarkar’s Asoka). Let the monk wander alone like a rhinoceros; Cf. Khaggavisāṇa sutta in Khuddaka-Nikāya 5 (Sutta-nipāta). Even though a monk were to be sawn limb from limb he should not lose equanimity, Majjhima-Nikāya, 21 (Kakaceupama-sutta). The gain that a man obtains by leading a religious life, (See the entire Sutta on the ‘Fruits of the Life of a Wanderer’, Coomarswamy, Pp. 266-68). Vammika-sutta: the anthill smokes by night and blazes by day. A monk is commanded by a Brahmin to dig into it. The ant-hill is the human body and the Brahmin is Buddha himself (Majjhima-Nikāya 23). Buddha leaves instruction behind. Buddha asks the monks not to perform a miracle except the miracle of instruction (Dīgha-Nikāya 11). Buddha set up no monk after him to take his place, but he left only his Doctrine after him (Majjhima-Nikāya 108). Many of the Buddha’s disciples left him because he did not work a miracle, or expound the beginning of things (Dīgha-Nikāya 24).

Post-Script.—Devadatta leaves Buddha’s Order (Majjhima-Nikāya 29). Jaina Nātaputtra sends Ahāyā to Buddha to ask him about the severe condemnation which he passed on Devadatta (Majjhima-Nikāya 58). Buddha’s discourse to the Brahmins of Kosambi who were quarrelling violently (Kosambiya-sutta, Majjhima-Nikāya 48). Buddha is offended at a band of noisy monks at Chātumā, but is appeased (Majjhima-Nikāya 67).

Why did India lose her greatness? On account of Atheism + pessimism + passivism. Maitri, Karunā, Muditā common to Yoga and Buddhism. The Buddhists condemn suicide, the Jainas uphold it. Four Āryasatyas; not four, but one, viz, Suffering. Insistence on suffering. Buddhist Ethics, universal appeal; hence the Christian sympathy.

Post script.—Buddhism effected expansion in the nature of the moral life, in the parental, the filial and the conjugal relations. Buddha built up an interworld or intermonial ethics (Mrs. Rhys Davids). Paṭicca-samuppāda in its moral aspect, a double-edged sword. It works up and it works down; down to suffering and up to Nirvāṇa.

On the various ways of meditating on impassibility (incapacity for passion) (Majjhima-Nikāya 106). On the middle path between two extremes (Majjhima-

Ethics in Mahāyāna : The conception of Pāramitas from Subhuti's Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā, such as Dāna-pāramitā, Kṣānti-pāramitā, Dhyāna-pāramitā, Śīla-pāramitā, Virya-pāramitā and so on.

V. Scholastic Buddhism

A. General.

B. (a) Four Buddhist Schools.
   (b) Mahāyāna Buddhism.

A. General.—(a) According to some, the Sarvāstivādins were the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sauntrāntikas. Das Gupta says they were the Vaibhāṣikas (P.167). The Theravādins are the Cannonists. The materialistic pluralism of Sarvāstivādins (Cf. Stecherbatsky, Central Conception of Buddhism). Contradiction in the conceptions of Samghāta and Samtāna; also incompatibility of Samghāta and Samtāna. This point has already been mentioned. Curious explanation of Perception as due to the conglomeration of a sense-atom, a mind-atom, and an object-atom. Mere contiguity. Cf. Greek Philosophy. The Dharmas no better than Vaiśeṣika अपूर्त.

(b) The history of Buddhism. Four important schools : Vaibhāṣika, Sauntrāntika, Yogācāra, and Mādhyamika. The first two Realists (Hinayāna), and the other two Idealists (Mahāyāna). The doctrine of Sva-lakṣaṇa (Cf. Radhakrishnan). Sva-lakṣaṇa-unnecessary between Universal and Particular—as debated between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sauntrāntikas. (Cf. "The Indeterminate" of Plato, which however, is mathematical in character). Vijnānvāda, ideas or reality of consciousness: Śunya-vāda, reality of nothing whatsoever. The general parallelism of these four schools to Descartes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Application of this principle to their teachings about Nirvāṇa. Samsāra and Nirvāṇa : real, and unreal; permutation and combination (See Stecherbatsky "Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa"). (i) Vaibhāṣika : Samsāra real; Nirvāṇa real. (ii) Sauntrāntika : Samsāra real; Nirvāṇa unreal. If Nirvāṇa is unreal, how can the Sauntrāntika be a Buddhist ? (iii) Vijnānvāda : Samsāra unreal; Nirvāṇa real. (iv) Śunya-vāndin : Samsāra unreal; Nirvāṇa unreal (See Stecherbatsky, P. 27).

(c) Yogācāra : The concept of Ālaya-vijnāna for the Yogācāras (vide Suzuki) takes the place of God. Āsvaghoṣa's Bhūta-tathātā implies the ineffable character of being, Cf. The This-ness of Bradley. The Dharma-kāya is the moral equivalent of God. Buddha's Three Bodies.

(d) Mādhyamika : The Mādhyamika philosophy of Nāgārjuna consisting in its Self-Relativism and Scepticism. The Mādhyamika : middle path. Four classical truths not real; Buddha unreal; Nirvāṇa unreal.


(2) *Saurāstantika.* Kumāralabdha : Locke.


(3) *Yogaicāra* or *Vijñānavādins.* Vasubandhu : Berkeley. Both recognised ideas but Berkeley, also mind. Mahāyāna. Mahāyāna = expelled believers in soul who went to China (Mrs. Rhys Davids, P. 26).

(iii) Berkeley : only Ideas are real.


The first two are Realists—Realists so far as knowledge is concerned; objects must be beyond knowledge. The other two are Idealists—Idealists so far as knowledge is concerned. Objects must be inside knowledge.

Vaiśeṣika : Conception of Svalakṣaṇa, i.e. that which characterises itself. It is equivalent to attribute, qualities, characteristics, etc. e.g. Blueness. Vaiśeṣikas say that only Sva-lakṣaṇas exist and they are objective. Cf. Dharma. They say that the Svalakṣaṇas are directly perceived.

Saurāstantika : Relying upon Suttas. The Saurāstantikas say that Svalakṣaṇas are perceived not directly but indirectly. Psychological analogy : Between stimulus and perception there is impression. Vaiśeṣikas do not recognise impression.

Yogaicāra : Relying upon Yoga. The Yogaicāravādins or *Vijñānavādins* use *Vijñāna* i.e. *Idea* for Svalakṣaṇa or Dharma (Stcherbatsky) only. They are floating ideas. Cf. Bradley. They advance the following arguments for their Idealism:

(i) The Svalakṣaṇa is objective, *Vijñāna* is subjective.

(ii) Analogy of the dream.

(iii) Triplet of knowledge, knower and known. The latter two go away and the Jñāna (knowledge) alone remains. Disproof of inference or Vyāpti. All inferences and judgements are wrong, because both of them deal with matters of fact which do not exist. Hence inference cannot exist.

(iv) Relativism. Cf. Protagoras. Thorns are good for the camel and bad for man. So they are both good and bad. So no judgement is possible. Cf. Antinomianism in Plato or Relativism. Hence objectivity is impossible. So only ideas are real.

Mādhyamika. Relying upon eight-fold middle path. Ālayavijñāna Bhūt-ata-thätā. They say that even ideas do not exist. Nāgārjuna says nothing exists.
Cf. Zeno. This is only his sceptical side. Positive side: He believes in mystical intuition. Cf. Stecherbatsky. Thus there comes to be a world of two Realities: Samyati-satya and Parinispamana-satya: Cf. Vyavahārika-satya and Pāramārthika-satya: Also Phenomenal and Noumenal Reality; Opinion and Knowledge; Appearance and Reality; and not-Being and Being. This-ness or That-ness, ineffable character of Reality. Dharmakīya from the moral point of view. Gauḍapada and Śamkara exactly believed in these two conceptions. Hence the two are called, 'crypto-Buddhists'. They are also called Prachānna-Buddhists, and Ardha-vaināikas. Naiyāyikas also are called Ardha-vaināikas. Nāgārjuna says: nothing comes into existence. Nothing goes out of existence. Creation is impossible. Annihilation is impossible. Cause is an illusion, Effect is an illusion. No unity exists, and no plurality exists:

अनिरूपेण अनुस्वर्णं अनुवृत्तं अन्य वत
अनिरूपेण अनात्मत्वं अनानिवर्त्तम || नागार्जुनकारिका.

Tathātā may imply that continuity exists. Dharma (Yogācāra) ten stages of Bodhisattvavahād. Last being consecration or Abхиṣeka.

Aristotle's doctrine of the mean analogous to Nāgārjuna's Doctrines of the मध्यम. The mean must steer clear of Śeylla and Charybdis.

(b) Mahāyāna Buddhism.—Three chief conceptions in Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Vijñānavādins (i) The Tathātā or That-ness.
(ii) Vijñāna or Idea.

Śunyaavādins (iii) Śunya or Void.

See Das Gupta

The first is stressed by Āśvaghosa, the second by the Lankāvatārasūtra, and the third by Nāgārjuna. All the three really are inter-related.

Āśvaghosa stresses Tathātā, but refers incidentally to Vijñāna and Śunya. Lankāvatāra stresses Vijñāna, but refers to Tathātā and Śunya. Nāgārjuna stresses Śunya, but also refers to Tathātā and Vijñāna. The difference between the three conceptions is the difference of stress.

Tathātā is the plus ultra of Buddhist Philosophy. It is their absolute or God. It transcends all pairs. It is ineffable. Tathāgata is one who has realized this Thatness. And Tathāgata-garbha is the womb of such.

Considered in such a way, the Tathātā Philosophy of Āśvaghosa comes dangerously near to Vedantism. The Buddha says that all things forever abide in Nirvāṇa. The Tathātā of Āśvaghosa comes nearer to the Vedantic Absolute. Āśvaghosa's approach to the Vedantic Absolute in his philosophy of Tathātā may be explained by his early Brahmanical nurture.

Vijñānavāda: Vijñānavāda is a philosophy of Ideas. Consciousness creeps in only surreptitiously. In Berkeley consciousness is the very foundation. Ālayavijñāna which is another name for mind is merely the habitat of Ideas.

*In the original Notes, the space remained blank. The word तथ्यता has been inserted by the Editor.
The Viśiṅgas are to the Ālayavijñāna as the waves are to the ocean. In the Ālayavijñāna are produced the ripples of sense-experience or ideas. They are what we may call the modes. The relation between Viśiṅga and Viśiṅgalaya is both that of identity and difference. The ocean is both identical with and different from waves. What causes these waves? The Viśiṅga philosophy tells us that Avidyā causes it, just as the wind is responsible for the waves in the ocean. This principle of Avajā in Viśiṅgalavāda comes again perilously near to the Vedantic doctrine of Māyā. What exists essentially is merely the idea. In the all-conserving mind, ignorance manifests itself in the shape of the perceiver and the perceived. Various grades of individuation due to ignorance more than the number of the sands on the Ganges. Buddha's answer to Rāvaṇa in the Lankāvatāra-sūtra. Buddha does not teach the Nairūrtmya or Niṣvabhāva doctrine, lest his followers should be scared away. The external world is merely an expression of these ideas. Hence there is no objective world as such, cf. Berkeley and Johnson's criticism. A fight takes place between Tathatā and Avidyā. If Avidyā conquers, sorrow and the world appearance are produced; and if Tathatā conquers, Nirvāṇa is the result. The fight between Tathatā and Avidya may be compared to the fight between the ego and the Id in Freud, or the reality-principle and the ego-principle, or death instinct and the life instinct in Jung.

Śūnyavāda has seven modes of voidness: (i) inter-dependence of things, (ii) essencelessness of things, (iii) unknowability, (iv) phenomenal causality, (v) ineffability, (vi) pollution by desire, (vii) temporal and spatial limitation. On its sceptical side from Gorgias downwards, disbelief in Space, Time, Cause, Mind, Substance and the World. On the other hand, there is a mystical side to Nāgarjuna's philosophy. The seeing of the Buddha and the Tathāgatas. Mahākaraṇa. Buddha is an illusion, Nirvāṇa is an illusion and Pratitya-samutpāda is itself an illusion, and also four Ārya-satyas are an illusion. Yakamaki's interpretation of the Śūnya. It does not mean the void, he says: No process or Change अवगतावस्तमस्व च अनायमभवनमस्व | Middle path. Grace derived from them. Dhyāna or the mode of meditation preached as that of Tathatā-lambana, which corresponds to Aham Brahmāmi. Stages of Bodhi-sattvahood. Two grades of Reality: Śamānta-satya and Pārāśpananna-satya, Cf. Parmenides, Plato, Kant, Bradley and Śāṅkarācārya. The statement of untruth is itself untrue. To this Candrakirti replies that truth consists in silence.

VI. Badarayana's Criticism of Buddhism

Bādarayana's criticisms of Buddhism fall into two Adhikaraṇas. The first is supposed to be devoted to the Realists, including the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, the second to either the Viśiṅgalavādins (Belvākar) or to the Śūnyavādins (Jocobi). Jocobi does not seem to be wrong; on the other hand, he seems to be right on account of the reference in the Sūtras to Abhāva. In any case, it is a criticism of the doctrine of the Void by whomsoever it may have been preached, and at any rate, the Śūnyavādins preached it more than the Viśiṅgalavādins.
Points in Śankara’s criticism: (i) Samudāya (=Samghāta, Cf. Stecherbatsky), an impossible concept: conglomeration impossible. (ii) Samtāna (Cf. Stecherbatsky), or continuity, an impossible concept; because when a later existence is produced, the previous is destroyed (Purva-nirrodha). (iii) The simultaneity of cause and effect (Yaugapadya), an impossible concept. The horns of a bull are not causally related, says Gaugapāda. (iv) The Buddhists speak of Nirodha or destruction, see (ii) above, but neither caused destruction as of a pitcher (prati-samkhya), nor uncaused destruction as of the world into the elements (apratisamkhya), can be explained on the hypothesis of incessant becoming. Nirodha, in other words inconsistent with Samtāna. See Yamakami’s criticism of Śankaracārya. (v) ‘Anumṛti’ or recollection becomes impossible. Subjective sphere. These are the arguments against the Realists. (vi) As against the maintenance of a Void, Bādarāyaṇa says that the Void does not exist, because Reality is actually experienced, Cf. Nābhīva upalabdheḥ; Cf. also Na bhūvah amupalabdheḥ. Śankara fights Realism with the weapons of Idealism and Idealism with the weapons of Realism. The world is phenomenally real, but noumenally unreal. Empirical reality and transcendental ideality as in Kant. Śunya is not equal to Void: Yamakami Sogen.

VII. Dialectical Buddhism
Śantaraksita and Kamalaśila.

VIII. An Exfoliation of the Different Conceptions of Nirvana
1. Psychological:—
   (i) Rooting out of Desire.
   (ii) Cessation of Suffering (especially Ādhyātmika).

2. Epistemological:—
   (i) Discovery of the Law of Causality.
   (ii) Destruction of Avidyā or Ignorance. Snapping of the first link in the chain of the Twelve Nidānas (by knowledge).

3. Ontological:—
   (i) Annihilation of Being, and perpetuation of Being. Realization of essencelessness, negative; Realization of Tathatā, positive.
   (ii) Going beyond Being and not-Being. Transcending duality.

4. Ethical:—

5. Mystical:—
   (i) Realization of Supreme Bliss. The different conceptions of Nirvāṇa are summarised very beautifully by Mr. Rhys Davids in his Early Buddhism, with a wealth of epithets such as, “the harbour of refuge, the cool cave, the island amidst the floods, the place of bliss, emancipation, liberation, safety, the supreme, the transcendental, the uncreated, the tranquil, the home of
ease, the calm, the end of suffering, the medicine for all evil, the unshaken, the ambrosia, the immaterial, the imperishable, the abiding, the further shore, the unending, the bliss of effort, the supreme joy, the ineffable, the detachment, the holy city” (P. 72).

(ii) Living in Dharmakāya here and now. Dharmakāya is a logico-metaphysical, as well as an ethico-religious conception. This last conception of Nirvāṇa may be compared to the Vedantic Jivanmukti, the Pari-Nirvāṇa being comparable to the Vedantic Videhamukti. The Mahāparinirvāṇa of the Buddha may be something higher.

IX. The Mystical Element in Buddhism

No great religious genius without an uncommon insight. A vein of mysticism throughout the history of Buddhism.


Advice to Rāhula on contemplation by breathing in and out (Majjhima-Nikāya 62). Practising meditation by in and out breathing (Majjhima Nikāya 118). The practice of breathing in and out (Khuddaka-Nikāya 12).


The light that is seen round about the Buddha (Nimbus), see Monier-Williams Lecture X, Mystical Buddhism, Pp. 232-38, for a fine description of the stages of Buddha’s Enlightenment. Buddha’s criticism of Mystical experience in the Story of the two Brahmaṅgas (see P. Carus, Pp. 117-122; probably Canonical influence). Immeasurable light of moral comprehension (see P. Carus, P. 98). Knowledge of the chain of the twelve Nidānas constitutes Enlightenment (see Monier Williams and Warren). In the last watch of the night, Buddha discovered the Law of Dependent Origination under the Bo-tree, H. C. Warren (P. 82). Also he discovered the Builder of the House (P. 83). A great halo of light was seen round about the Buddha by one who went to see him.

Ten stages of Bodhisattvahood, the last stage is that of Consecration (Abhiṣeka, see Suzuki; also E. J. Thomas, the Chapter on Bodhisattva’s career Pp. 202-203. (1) उपराज्य (2) बुद्धमान (Bound) (a) पुष्पमहित (4) सत्ता (5) चित्रबिस्तर (6) हृष्टी (7) हुर्जया (8) जन्मविष (9) योगराज (10) अर्म्येक. Different degrees of Bodhisattvahood, all reaching towards Buddhahood. As a consequence, there ought to be only one Buddha and not many. But Buddha himself says that there have been many Buddhas before his time.

One has a vision of the Tathāgatas and Buddhas (in Mahāyānaism) and receives instructions from them. Grace or Mahākaraṇa of the Buddha. Mahāyāna Mysticism. Cf. Mystic intuition in Nāgārjuna (Stcherbatsky). God in us and we in God (Cf. Sogen, P. 301). Buddha present in all things, in stars, flowers etc. (Cf. Yamakami Sogen). Buddha must be heard, seen etc. at all times (Rockhill 'Life of Buddha', P. 198): the Buddha must be the cynosure of all our senses. Cf. also Nāgārjuna's mystical intuition as in Stcherbatsky. Suzuki, a Neo-Buddhist; Sogen, Suzuki, Stcherbatsky, all Neo-Buddhists.
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<th>Author</th>
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<tr>
<td>Warren</td>
<td>Buddhism in Translations—all five parts are important.</td>
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<td>Rhys Davids</td>
<td>Lectures on the origin and growth of Religion as illustrated by the History of Indian Buddhism (Hibbert Lectures 1881). Lecture III Doctrine of Karma. In Lecture II Pp. 56–70 Summary of the Tevijjā suṭta on the threefold wisdom of Buddhism as contrasted with the Trayā Vidyā of Brahmins. (A good table of contents).</td>
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Saunders  The Heart of Buddhism, (in passing only).
Saunders  The Story of Buddhism—First four chapters, important. Very good.
Stcherbatsky  The Central Conception of Buddhism. The whole of it.
Stcherbatsky  The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa Pp. 1–62, as well as text.
De La Vallee Poussin  The Way to Nirvāṇa. Pp. 107–139 Chapter V Nirvāṇa. Pp. 159–166 Chapter VI Section 4A Skilful Practice of Trances. (also whole VI Chapter)
E. J. Thomas  The Life of Buddha (1927). Read the appendix and the Bibliography.
Rhys Davids  Buddhism. (American Lectures). Lecture II The Three Piṭakas.
H. S. Gour  Spirit of Buddhism. Chronology and glossary good. (A good index also). Also Bibliography. Chapters XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XIX also. There are some beautiful pictures.
Buddhist Logic 2 vols. of which the first is important containing elaborate "Comparative" discussions on judgement, reasoning, cause etc. Also questions on Reality of the External World, प्रामाण्यवाद, Causation, negation etc. Second volume is a mere translation of text of Dharmakirti etc.
CHAPTER FOUR

JAINISM

I. Pan-psychism (a better word than Monadism)

1. More consistent Atomism than that of the Vaiśeṣikas. All atoms qualitatively alike. Transmutation of metals into gold, therefore, not chimerical. The Jainas did not make sufficient use of Dharma or motion (Anaxagoras) in their cosmology. Contrast Democritus: "Give me matter and motion". Interlinking of atoms explained on account of wetness or humidity (Kundakunda).

2. Every material atom ensouled by Jiva. Hylozoism (Jacobi) or Pan-psychism. According to Śankara there is Caitanya in Pāśāna and Mröttikā; only it is not Āvirbhuba. The Jaina conception of substance. Substances cannot exist without qualities (see Upadhye). Contrast Naiyāyikaś view निर्माण द्रव्य प्रकार अण उत्पन्न. According to Jainas, Dravyas or Substances are divided into Jivas and A-Jivas the former of which are of five grades or degrees and the latter are of five classes or kinds. Their Pan-psychism goes against the division of existence into Jivas and A-Jivas. These latter are: (i) Kāla, (ii) Dik, (iii) Dharma—motion (Ṛgveda), (iv) A-dharma, and (v) Pudgala (Atoms). Time is Nāṭikāya, while the four others are Astikāyas. Substance must be One, and not many as the Jainas suppose: Cf. Plural number of substances in McTaggart.

(Atomism in Jainism and Democritus: (a) Pudgalas are atoms. They are qualitatively alike while Democritus says they are qualitatively different. As the atoms are alike, "Alchemy" is possible in Jainism. (b) Both recognise motion. Dharma is the principle of motion in Jainism. (c) The combination of the atoms is explained in Jainism by humidity; in Democritus, it is explained by hooks. In contemporary science, it is explained by electric attraction. In Nyāya God is responsible for making द्रव्यंक, others follow themselves. (d) While Democritus recognised secondary qualities, the Jainas did not. (e) Democritus did not deny God while the Jainas did).

3. Gradation of Jivas according to development of sensation (Is this biologically sound?) One sense: minerals; Touch. Two senses: Wormś; Touch;
Taste. Three senses: Ants (Do not the ants see?); Touch+Taste+smell. Four senses: Bees; Touch+Taste+Smell+Sight. Five senses: Men; Touch+Taste+Smell+Sight+Hearing. Hearing seems to be the highest sense according to Jainas.

4. Also, mirroring of all experience in the perfect soul; ordinary souls do not mirror. Cf. the nature of Omniscience or Kevala-jñāna discussed later. (In Leibnitz, there is a monas monadum. In Jainism, there is not, except it be the Tirthankara). In Jainism difference between Matter and Spirit. In Leibnitz matter, a lower grade of spirit.

5. Hylozoism+Gradation+Representation—a theory of Monadism. No God required in either. Cf. Jaina Tirthankara. (The Tirthankaras in Jainism have not the power of incarnation but are otherwise like the liberated souls of Bādarāyana, who also have not the power of creation which God alone possesses. Panpsychism, a better word for the Jaina theory than either hylozoism or monadism though with either it has got analogies.

II. Probabilistic Epistemology

(i) The discussion of the Nayasa is a necessary ancillary to the Syādvāda. The Syādvādamanjari, which is a standard epitome of Jaina Doctrine, discusses both the Nayas as well as the Syādvāda (which is itself called Saptabhanga-naya). For the discussion of Nayas vide also Vīśeṣāvāsyaka Bhāṣya on the Niryukti of Bhadrabāhu. (a) There are infinite Nayas (philosophical stand-points or doctrines) possible. Anekāntavāda. But the Jainas consider only four Nayas as prominent. The Samgraha-naya (synoptic) of Vedanta, all-inclusiveness. The Vyavahāra-naya of Sāmkhya, the practical (pragmatism) or scientific stand-point. The Naigama-naya of Nyāya. This refers to the Nigamana of Naiyāyikas. And the Rju-Sutra-naya of Buddhism (See Das Gupta). The Jainas approve of the straightness of the Buddhists (Radhakrishnan, however, says that Samgraha-naya belongs to Sāmkhya and Vyavahāra-naya belongs to Vedanta (Vol. I, P. 301. Is this right?) Just because all these Nayas look at Reality each from its special point of view, they cannot apprehend Reality at all. Hence arise Nayābhāsas or Antinomies. Four Antinomies as in Kant. (b) Or, as in Radhakrishnan, the Sāmkhyas believe in Satkārya-vāda, effect in cause; the Vaiśeṣikas believe in A-satkārya-vāda, effect not in cause; the Jainas would say that these views are only probable. (c) Or again, the Upaniṣads say that the Self exists and the Buddhists say that it does not exist (See Das Gupta); both views again are only probable. It follows, therefore, that not absolute knowledge but Relativity alone is the truth. Cf. Sophists. What we call knowledge is only probable knowledge. Hence,

(ii) The seven-fold formulation of Syādvāda or as it is also called the Saptabhanga doctrine: (The seven dicta of Probabilism or Antinomianism): (1) Probably it is. (2) Probably it is not. (3) Probably it is both and is not. (4) Probably it is ineffable. (5) Probably it is, and is ineffable. (6) Probably, it is
not, and is ineffable, and (7) Probably it is, is not, and is ineffable. Cf the मणिद्रव्यम्, 

(iii) Criticism of Syādvāda: (1) The first implies the second, hence the second becomes tautological. (2) The third combines two incompatibles, Astī and Nāsti. It breaks the Law of Contradiction (Śankara and Rāmānuja). Herakleitos: Sea-water is good for fish, bad for men. Grapes have seeds and have not seeds. The tree is moving and yet is not moving. Black teeth are beautiful, black teeth are ugly. Slender waist is a mark of beauty, slender waist is a mark of ugliness. Thorns are good for the camel, but bad for man. Antinomianism. (3) Probability may itself be probable, just as the Relativity of Nāgārjuna itself is relative. (4) Probability not applicable to the Moral Law, to Mokṣa, to Tirthankara, (just as Herakleitos’s Relativism stops at God). “As the subject, the object, and the subject-object relation all become indefinite, how can the Tirthankara teach with authority,” asks Śankara, “and how can his followers act on his precepts?” Ethics thus which is the pivot of Jainism would come to an end. May it not be, however, that, as recently in the case of Buddhism, so in the case of Jainism, the founder and the dogma might be sharply distinguished? Yes. Cf. पुज्जयादिनि समाधिष्ठति which is perfectly spiritual. It is only in Bhadrabāhu, the author of Nityukti, 1st Century B.C., that we probably definitely hear of Syādvāda. There would be also great justification for this as the Canon is separated in Jainism from the Founder by a longer period than in Buddhism (800 years instead of 400 years). (5) Coming to Ineffability, combination of Astī with Avaktavya is impossible. It is Vadatovyāghāta. (Avaktavya = Anirvacaniya?) (6) The ineffability would be justifiable (Ward criticises Spencer by saying that he knows his unknowable) if spiritual experience is to be stressed (e.g. in तद्विनित्य तन्त्रक्षति etc. in Isāvāya Upaniṣad), instead of intellectual conviction. (7) Why should we stop at the seventh stage, and not go on further? Progressus ad infinitum. Why not add Syat na avaktavyah as the eighth? And then go on with further formulations, later adding Syadavaktyasca na vaktavyah, and permuting and combining these with Astī and Nāsti, go on ad infinitum? (Na avaktavyaḥ is different from vaktavyaḥ). Relativism, ultimately, inconceivable without an Absolute (Radhakrishnan). Relativism is relative to Absolute. Change implies permanence Relativism implies
the Absolute. (8) Logically speaking. Probability may have a categorical basis, as negation itself has. Categorical, Hypothetical, Disjunctive; Problematic, Assertoric, Apodictic. Is there greater reality from categorical to hypothetical, and from hypothetical to disjunctive? “Yes, if the hypothetical is the expression of the Causal Law, or the disjunctive exhausts reality”, would say Bosanquet. But if this is not so, then Bosanquet is not right in giving greater and greater reality from categorical to hypothetical, and from hypothetical to disjunctive. Ultimately, there must be a categorical basis for the hypothetical and the disjunctive. **Tattavamasi** is a categorical proposition. Bosanquet puts a premium upon the knowledge of conditions or upon doubt, which the Vedantin does not allow. (9) Spinoza said Determination was Negation; the Jainas say Indetermination is Reality.

\[
A \text{ is } B \\
\therefore \text{ Not-}A \text{ is Not-}B \quad \text{does not follow.}
\]

If Spinoza is right, Jainas are wrong. (10) Relativism good only as a tentative stage. Relativism as a necessary ancillary to Mysticism is what Gauḍapāda himself would teach; Cf. Bradley: Blend of scepticism and mysticism. But to dissect relativism and mysticism is not desirable.

### III. Doctrine of Two Truths

Two degrees of Truth: Vyavahāra and Niścaya, cf. two degrees of reality in Nīgārījñāna: Samvīrtisatya and Parinīspanna-satya, also two degrees in Śaṅkara. The Ātmakāvyādapurva, which is certainly earlier than the Angas and therefore may express the opinion of Mahāvīra himself, states two different points of view, namely, those of Vyavahāra and Niścaya, Commonsense and Philosophy, which correspond to the Phenomenal and the Noumenal. (1) From the commonsensical point of view, the Self does good or bad actions (Kartā); from the philosophical point of view, it remains absolutely in its own nature. (2) In commonsense, it enjoys the fruits of its actions (Bhokta); in reality it enjoys nothing. (3) In commonsense, it absorbs the material Karmas and is material or corporeal; in reality, it is not matter and is incorporeal. (4) In commonsense, it fills the whole body; in reality it fills the whole world and is therefore called Viṣṇu (see Jain).

### IV. Arguments for the Non-existence of God

Jaina criticism of the Nyāya doctrine of God. All these are included in हृदंतकृत्त्वकार्रे’s द्वारिकासाहित्यानि with its commentary called स्यादेवमज्ञ. Cf. कारकलित्वि and मुक्तासाहित्य (1) Has God intelligence? (2) Does He perceive or infer? If so, has He any organs such as eyes and so forth? (3) Is God omniscient? (4) Has God a body? then, He must have a very big brain in order that He may create this world. Du Bois Raymond. (5) Nobody creates the shoots of corn they spring of themselves (Nature or Svabhāva). Hence the Naiyāyika’s syllogistic argument is wrong. Creation according to Jainism is without beginning or end. (6) Has God a will and a purpose? (7) Does God move in order that He may create the world? (8) Is the world an effect of God’s caprice or whim? (9) Is God dependent upon the action of men? (10) Why should we not regard
Karma or the Order as creator of the world instead of God? (11) Is God dependent on Adrṣṭa? (12) Is the world merely His play? (13) Is not God partial; Has God not hatred? (14) Has He any instruments for the world creation? (15) Is God subject to change? (16) Supposing there are many gods would they not quarrel with one another? If so, the ants and the bees would be superior to these gods because they do not quarrel (see Guṇaratna’s Tarkarahasya-dipikā; as well as Haribhadra Sūri’s Śaṭḍarśana samuccaya. (which is earlier than Mādhavacārya’s Sarvadarśanasangraha); Pp. 115–24, Edited by L. Suati, Bologna 1905; also, Das Gupta Volume I, Pp. 203–6. On the whole, we cannot understand Creation. The world has been real from eternity and will continue so to eternity. Anādyananta and real. Jainism: the world always exists and is not created. Vedanta: the world does not exist and is not created, Ajātivāda.

V. The Ethical Code of Jainism

(i) Five chief virtues: Ahimsā, Satya, Asteya, Brahmacarya and Aparigraha. Close analogy with the virtues of the Bhagavad-gitā. The story of five grains of rice given by a father-in-law to his four daughters-in-law. The first throws them away, the second neglects them, the third preserves them, and the fourth sows them and propagates them (see Winternitz, Vol. II, P. 446). Preservation and propagation of the Faith.


VI. Liberation vs. Omniscience

seem to be identical in meaning); Cf. Stages of the eclipse of the sun. The second, the third, and the fourth may be compared to the penumbra, the umbra, and once more the penumbra.

(ii) (a) Doctrine of the Superman: The nemesis of the denial of God is the apotheosis of the founder. Hopkins: "Deny God, worship man, nourish vermin". The spiritual Super-man. The Tirthāṅkara in Jaina philosophy takes the place of God. Qualifications of a Tirthāṅkara: Infinite knowledge, infinite bliss, infinite power. Infinite knowledge: 'Kevala-jñāna' or omniscience:

जिमेंद्रो देवता तत्र रामोपविवर्जितः
हतमोहमहामल्ल: केवलज्ञानदृष्टिः।

Distinction between Arhat (Jivanmukta) and Siddha (Videhamukta). A Jivanmukta might also be a Videhamukta; Cf. Janaka called Videha; also distinction between Siddha and Tirthāṅkara (see Jaini, Pp. 1–2). To deserve, to accomplish and to sanctify. The Tirthāṅkara is those Siddhas who propound the Truth during their lifetime, which is a higher thing. The Tirthāṅkara are Asāmānya-Siddhas; the others are Sāmānya-Siddhas. The Tirthāṅkara, however, like a society of gods (McTaggart). They sit on the Siddha-śilātala. It is possible for every man to reach the highest state or divinity. The Tirthāṅkara is the only lone being in a world of non-possibles.

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<th>Author</th>
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<tr>
<td>Jaini</td>
<td>Outlines of Jainism—For the 24 Tirthankaras <em>see</em> table facing page 6. Read the note on Jaina History and chronology (Pp. XXVI to XL). A small section of Theology (Souls) (Pp. 1 to 6). Chapter II Metaphysics—important. (Pp. 7 to 66), Leave away all tables. Chapter III Ethics (Pp. 66-73) should also be read. Two Chaps. on Texts or Sources are important. Theology, 77-81. Metaphysics 82-111. (The Pūrūṭa sources for Jaina Philosophy taken from various books and arranged in logical order are very valuable Pp. 77-111. Quotations e.g. from पंचासितिकाय, निमयमसार, तत्त्वार्थमूल, इत्यमग्रह, समयमसार, गोमदसार, पुरुषार्थसिद्धांत. The note on two degrees of truth in the आत्मप्रद्युत्तप्त, P. 140 is very valuable). Appendix I on Jaina Logic (Pp. 112-118) may also be read. Cf. Buddhistic Logic. Сyādvāda is given on Pp. 116 and 117. On Jaina Literature read Appendix V (Pp. 135-146) containing an account of Angas, Sutras and Purvas.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jacobi</td>
<td>Article “Jainism” in Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics Vol. VII.</td>
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<td>Kanoomal</td>
<td>Study of Jainsim—The whole book is good, particularly Chapter I Jaina Philosophy Pp. 4-39.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jacobi</td>
<td>Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XXII. The Ācārāṅga Sutra contains a life of a Jaina Mendicant. The Kalpa Sutra contains the lives of Mahavira, Pārśvanātha and Rṣabha. The Introduction may be read.</td>
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<td>Jacobi</td>
<td>Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XXXV contains Uttarādhyayanana and Sutra Kṛitāṅga. The Introduction may be read.</td>
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<td>Buhler</td>
<td>Indian Sect of the Jainas (Luzac and Co.) should be read.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Herbert Warren</td>
<td>Jainism in Western Garb. Useful for English Readers.</td>
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Champatrai Jain ... The Practical Path. Contains practical discipline such as an account of Āsrava, Bandha, Samvara, Nirjara and Mokṣa. "May the happy reunion", says C. R. Jain, between mother and daughter, Hinduism and Jainism bring happiness to all, P. 233. This spirit is bristling through the work.


CHAPTER FIVE

A CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF NYAYA-VAIASESIKA

I. Reduction of all Categories (Vaisesika) to one. Hegel’s Categories

1. (i) History of the doctrine of the Categories. Kanâda recognises only six, and does not recognise Abhâva. Abhâva comes to be added later on.

(ii) There are four kinds of Abhâvas: (a) Prâgabhâva, anterior negation which implies anterior eternity. (b) Pradhvânsâbhâva, posterior negation which implies posterior eternity. The meeting point of prior eternity and posterior eternity is the “specious present”; अवधिकालीन सूतानि (c) All negation involves affirmation. Cf. प्रतिघोषणप्रभावित विना विकटाधानपालेः (वर्णदीपिका).

(d) Anyonyâbhâva, reciprocal negation which implies the law of contradiction, e.g., the sun is not the moon. And (e) Atyantâbhâva, absolute negation which is negation proper, e.g., hare’s horn or mountain of gold. Mountain महृ does not exist, but it exists in parts, viz. Mountain and Gold. In that way also negation implies affirmation. जगपूर्व does exist according to Râmânuja. Also निलोभवत: शृङ्खले पीति पञ्चाति according to Râmânuja, is not a भावनित. This Abhâva has no reference to time and is independent of the past, the present, and the future.

(iii) While Abhâva is supposed to be apprehended by Pratyakṣa in Nyâya Philosophy, it is supposed to be apprehended by a new criterion, viz., Anupalabdhi in Mîmâṃsâ. Nyâya is right and not Mîmâṃsâ.

(iv) That Abhâva is regarded as a category involves that negation implies affirmation. Cf. Bosanquet who says that all negation has a positive basis. The very fact that prior negation and posterior negation imply prior eternity and posterior eternity, itself makes Abhâva a positive category. Also the fact that the Naiyâyikas say that Abhâva is apprehended by Pratyakṣa, is another argument for its positive character. Two significant negations, says Bosanquet may imply a valid conclusion. Cf. also, the Pragmatic view of negation in Bergson.

Negation implies affirmation; but this does not mean that it is a positive entity. अमाव has thus no characteristics of a separate category.
2. An indefinite regress in Viśeṣas. "Qualitative" distinction between atoms of the different elements. Viśeṣas among atoms even of the same element (Svatoṣvāvarttaka). Consequent merger of Vaiśeṣika in Nyāya. Contrast Jainism, where all atoms of any element whatsoever are always alike.

3. (i) The Nyāya conception of Sāmānyā attacked by Vedāntins, Buddhists and Jainas. Criticism by Parmenides and Śankarācārya: Divisible or Plural.

(ii) The Vaiśeṣikas retort by saying that this criticism is wrong because it presupposes a spatial view. On the other hand, they say that the particular is only the revealer (vyānajāka) of the universal.

(iii) There is no Sāmānyā for Sāmānyā, Viśeṣa, Samavāya and Abhāva. There is Sāmānyā for the first three Padārthas—Dravya, Guṇa and Karma, e.g. Dozeness, Quality-ness seem to be an absurdity, also Actionness. There is not merely Dravyatva, Guṇatva and Karmatva, but there is also cowness, redness and running-ness.

(iv) Sāmānyā is also of two kinds: Para and Apara Sāmānyā. This highest Sāmānyā is Sattā, thus indistinguishable from reality. This involves probably a hierarchy as in Plato’s "Theory of Ideas". If there are two Sāmānyās, there must be a Sāmānyā for them. Nityam Ekaṃ Anekanugatam Sāmānyam. Why then two kinds of Sāmānyās?

(v) Two meanings of the word 'Sāmānyā': (a) A universal characteristic and (b) a class-concept (Jāti). In the first it is a correlative of Viśeṣas, involving quality; in the second it is a correlative of Vyakti, involving number:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Connotation</th>
<th>Denotation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Universal</td>
<td>Particular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>सामान्य्य</td>
<td>विशेष</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>जाति</td>
<td>व्यक्ति</td>
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<tr>
<td>Genus</td>
<td>Individual</td>
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The particular and the general together constitute the Definition of Aristotle.

4. (i) Criticism of the concept of Samavāya or the relation of inherence as the red colour in the rose. This is also supposed to be an eternal and intimate relation. (Differentia or inseparable accident?). The separation of the relata conjoined by it, means the destruction of at least one of them. Such relata are called Ayutasiddhas i.e. those which are not Yuta-siddhas. They are five:

अवयव-अवयविन्य: गुण-गुणिनि, विशेष-विशेषिनि, जाति-जातिः, व्यक्ति-व्यक्तिः

अवयव-अवयविन्य: there is no Samavāya relation between part and whole (Avayava and Avayavin); while it is doubtful whether there is such between Kriyā and Kriyāvān, Jāti and Vyakti.

(ii) The problem of external (Samyoga) and internal (Samavāya) relations. Samyoga, a Guṇa; Samavāya, a Padārtha. Bradley criticism of relation as involving infinite regress. Similar criticism by Śamkarācārya. The maternal relation is in the mother; the filial relation is in the son. These can not be brought together. The relation of aboveness is in the book and that of belowness is in the table; they can not be brought together. Infinite regress in these
cases also. To relate relata and the relation between them, new relations must be found out, and so on ad infinitum.

Samyoga always predicative about Ākāśa as well as Atman, in relation to things.

(iii) Intensification of the difficulty in Samyukta-samavāya, Samavetasa-mavāya, or Samyukta-samaveta-samavāya, hence Samavāya does not exist. A useless category. The unrelated Absolute.

5. and 6. Dravya, Guṇa and Karma.

An exhaustive investigation of the different Dravyas. The seven categories are reduced to one, viz. substance as in Citsukha. Substance is that which exists by, and for itself—Spinoza. Atman the only ultimate substance and not fire, water, air and earth. Cf. Truth as the adjective of Reality (Bradley) and Ānanda as the adjective of Brahman (Śāṅkaraśārya).

Guṇa and Karma adjectival to Dravya. Adjectival existence but not substantial. An exhaustive investigation of the different Guṇas.

Details

(Dravya., Prthvi, Ap, Tejas, Vāyu, Ākāśa, Kāla, Dik, Atman, and Manas. These have been very severely criticised by Buddhists and Advaitins. They make a common attack. Ākāśa is ether, while Dik, is space. Ākāśa and Dik distinguished from each other by Kumārilabhaṭṭa. Śrīharṣa’s view (?).

Ākāśa—Sabdagunataḥ ākāśam. Modern views—ether carries light-waves while air carries sound-waves. The Pythagoreans called it the fifth entity over and above earth, water, fire, and air: the “quintessence” or fifth essence as we may call it. But the Pythagoreans did not care to define what this fifth entity is.

Kāla and Dik both realistic and objective in Naiyāyika philosophy; subjective according to the Buddhists, and phenomenal according to Vedantins. Bhartrihari, Dikkālādayanavacchinna.

Atman: difficulties about it (i) Put on a par with other elements; (ii) All Atmans are Vibhu, jostle with one another qualitatively; (iii) Jivatman and Paramātman. God comes under Paramātman, reduced to an epiphenomenal entity. The Buddhists bring in the doctrine of relativity in Kāla and Dik.

Guṇa. Samkhya is a quality! The objections of Vedantins and Buddhists. One quality qualifies another. Three colours, two colours, for example (Tadguṇā-lamkāra). Samyoga is also a Guṇa. External relation separated from Samavāya which is regarded as a Padārtha. “Aboveness” is a Padārtha.

Karma. Five kinds.

Śāmānya (connotation, general characteristics), Parasāmānya and Aparasa-mānya. Sāmānya for Sāmanāyas? Sāmānya for Viṣeṣas?

Four kinds of Abhāva. The whole scheme not well carried out. Has Abhāva a Sāmānya? Samavāya between Dravya and Guna. Samyoga is separable relation. Samavāya is inseparable. To say that there is Sāmānya for Guṇa and Karma is nonsense. Self, a Dravya.)
II. Analysis of the concept of Cause

1. The three-fold definition of Kāraṇa as Samavāyi, Asamavāyi and Nimitta' not tenable. The Samavāyi and the Nimitta compared to Aristotle’s Material and Efficient cause. As the Formal or the Final cause of Aristotle is not a real cause, similarly the Asamavāyi in Nyāya philosophy is not a cause. The Final Cause useless in Science—Bacon. As illustrations of Samavāyi or the material cause we have earth for the pot, and atoms for the world (The word Samavāya has got nothing to do with Samavāyi) and as illustrations of Nimitta or the efficient cause, the rod, the wheel and the man. Also the ass. The ass plays such an important part in Indian Logic. Nimitta=exciting or predisposing cause, not occasional cause.

2. Futility of the conception of the Asamavāyi. By definition the Asamavāyi is said to be either Guṇa or Karma as the Samavāyi is said to be Dravya. The Śāmkhyas do not recognise Asamavāyi (?). In the case of Paṭa, the Tantu (Dravya) is Samavāyi-kāraṇa, and the Tantu-samyoga (Guṇa) or Tantu-prasīrana (Karma) Asamavāyi-kāraṇa. In the case of Paṭarupa, Paṭa (Dravya) is Samavāyi-Kāraṇa, and the Tantarupa or the whiteness of the Tantu (Guṇa) the Asamavāyi-kāraṇa. (Difficulties in the conception of Asamavāyi arise because a quality or a motion can never be a cause. Presentationism). Emergence of new qualities out of old. Ultimately there is no cause except God; all causation is artificial.

3. (i) Three points in the Nyāya definition of cause. That which is not epiphenomenal (ananyathāsiddha), that which invariably precedes the effect (niyatapuruvavṛtti) and that which is unique (asādhāraṇa), is the cause. Anyathāsiddha—that which can be dispensed with. Ananyathāsiddha—indispensable. Five kinds of epiphenomenal causation.

(ii) The Conception of Śādhāraṇa Kāraṇas, such as time, space, God. Definition of Cause which corresponds to Mill’s definition of cause, as the invariable (ananyathāsiddha) and unconditional (asādhāraṇa) antecedent (niyatapuruvavṛtti). If S. C. Vidyabhushan is right in saying that Gautama borrowed his syllogism from Aristotle, then why did he not borrow the definition of Cause from Mill? Four thousand years hence, a man might rise up and say that Gautama had borrowed from Mill.

4. Unnecessary distinction between Kāraṇa and Kāraṇa. In the conception of Kāraṇa the expression Vyāpāravat is occasionally added. Four such Kāraṇas: Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Upamāna and Śabda.


Śādhakatamam Kāraṇam—Pāṇini’s definition of Karana in Aṣṭādhyāyī.

III. Proofs for God’s Existence

(1) Cosmological proof.

(2) Logical or Ratiocinative proof.

(3) Udayana’s proof by experiment.
(4) Moral proof.
(5) Intuitive proof.
(6) Jaina Criticism of Nyāya Doctrine of God.

1. Cosmological—

(a) All production requires perception of materials by Agent. God so required for perceiving the super-sensuous atoms.

(b) God is required for the original motion: Prime-mover.

(c) God is required for creating the first binary compound: 2! Why not bring in God in between all stages from 2! to n! ? Occasionalism.

(d) Adṛṣṭa: Unseen force: Physical, Biological and Moral. Aḍṛṣṭa thus responsible for earth-quakes, growth of plants, and recompense for actions. In a physical sense, it is equivalent to the conception of original motion in Democritus which he super-added to those of atoms and void. Aḍṛṣṭa in the moral sense is equivalent to Apurva in Mimāṃsā philosophy. It is also equivalent to the doctrine of Karma. Five proofs given by Udayana for Aḍṛṣṭa: Sāpekṣatvāt, Anāditvāt, Vaicitryāt, Viśvavṛttitah, Pratyagātmaniya. Problem of God in Nyāya doubly precarious on account of the presence of Aḍṛṣṭa. Is Aḍṛṣṭa dependent on God or independent of Him? If the first, it is unnecessary; if the second, God is not all powerful. Aḍṛṣṭa is an impersonal force, and Daiva is the power of God. Cf. ’ Daivam caivastra paṇcama', Bhagavad Gītā XVIII, 14, Aḍṛṣṭa in Nyāya is like Satan in Christianity as one opposed to God.

2. Logical—

God must be proved by reason alone.

(a) All revelation condemned as proof of God. Revelation according to Naiyāyikas is created, and hence non-eternal. Contrast Nyāya on this head with Mimāṃsā and Vedanta.

(b) Syllogistic argument. A blade of grass exists; therefore, God exists. Cf. the causal argument in Descartes: I exist, therefore God exists.

(c) Fused with Teleological. Teleology only incidentally brought in. A blade of grass (Ankurādikam) or a flower (Tennyson) on all fours with a watch (Palley) or an eye; only analogical inference.

(d) Denying God is worshipping Him, says Udayana. Udayana a rational theologian. A logical investigation of God, he says, is also His worship. Even those who are controverting His existence, are earnestly meditating on Him.

3. Udayana’s proof by experiment

Solvitur ambulando or Argumentum ad baculum mortuum.* He throws down a Buddhist and a Brahmin from the top of a hill; the Buddhist dies, the Brahmin survives and therefore God exists.

*As pointed out here, Udayana’s argument is a glaring fallacy as the adversary is silenced by inflicting death on him. There is no logic in the argument; there is only appeal to brute force—Editor.
4. Moral argument—


(b) God the painless Soul. cf. यथ तु वेश संभिर्म न च वस्तमस्तरम् . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . एष नीति च तत्सुर्वत स्वः पदास्तुद्धम् — मीरामा क्ष्ठिओ स्वः — स्वमे.

5. Intuitive proof by Vātsyāyana.—Probably only negative. God, says Vātsyāyana, transcends perception, scripture and inference; he thus sees the limits of reason and possibly inclines towards intuitive apprehension of God. Yogajapratyakṣa is recognised by all Naiyāyikas.

6. The Jainistic criticism of the Nyāya doctrine of God (vide Das Gupta) is of the routine type.

IV. Nyaya Doctrine of Epigenesis or Qualitative Novelty

(1) General Theory of Epigenesis.

(2) Epigenesis in Atomism:
   (i) Differences of quality among atoms.
   (ii) Formation of Dvyaṭuṅka.
   (iii) Factorial n, an Epigenetic product.

(3) Epigenesis in Generation:
   (i) Generation of a Product.
   (ii) Emergence of Qualities.
   (iii) Cumulative versus Total Metamorphosis.

(4) Epigenesis in Causation.

(5) Epigenesis in Knowledge.

(1) General Theory of Epigenesis:

The Ārambhavāda or the Asatkāryavāda of the Naiyāyikas is a doctrine of Epigenesis or new creation. The Pariṇāmavāda or the Satkāryavāda of the Sāmkhyas is a doctrine of Equilibration or evolution. The Naiyāyikas suppose that the effect was not present formerly viz. in the cause; hence epigenesis. The Sāmkhyas suppose that the effect was present formerly viz. in the cause; hence equilibration.

(2) Epigenesis in Atomism:

(i) Nyāya philosophy lays stress on differences of quality between atoms, not merely of the different elements but even of the same element; not so Jainism which recognises only differences of quantity. To use another terminology, Nyāya considers the differences as physical, Jainism considers the differences as mathematical. Physical differences or differences of quality are epigenetic in character.

(ii) It is strange how from the अघु which according to the Naiyāyikas, enjoys only infinitiesimality (Parimāṇḍalaya) or a mere ideal content, a Dvyaṭuṅka should ever be formed. The rise of the Dvyaṭuṅka is an illustration of epigenesis.
(iii) The general formula for successive atomistic formations or patterns is \(1 \times 2 \times 3 \times \ldots \times n\), or \(n!\). The द्वियक्ष, the तिरुम्पुक, the नृत्यकुफ and the rest are all epigenetic formations as they involve the process of multiplication and not of summation.

(The Mīmāṃsā differs from Nyāya in regarding the Tryaṇuca as the minimum, visible (minimum perceptible) and not the द्वियक्ष as the Nyāya supposes).

(3) Epigenesis in Generation:

(i) Generation, destruction. The doctrine of momentary existence of the Buddhists is a hob-goblin to the Indian Logicians. Two moments instead of one. Momentary existence according to them can explain neither generation nor destruction. For both generation and destruction, more than one moment is necessary. Thus they hold that the Ghaṭa comes into existence one moment after the Kapālas are united, thus involving epigenesis; also they hold that the Ghaṭa is destroyed one moment after the Kapālas are destroyed.

Criticism. This latter doctrine as applied to an organism would be manifestly absurd because the cells would have to die first before the body dies. Now it is a fact of experience that the cells live even after the body dies. The most that we can say is that the body and the cells die together. Also the action of a decapitated frog or a decapitated warrior show that the parts are active even though the whole may be dead, e.g. Bajiprabhu Deshpandé.

(ii) Emergence of qualities. The Indian Logicians are not content with explaining generation and destruction only as occupying more than a moment’s span. They say that every product e.g., a pitcher at the moment of production, is a neutral entity, and that qualities e.g. red colour in the pitcher or smell in the rose, emerge later, say, in the second moment, and which are therefore epigenetic.

(iii) पीत्यक, पिटर्पाक. Much discussion has centred on the emergence of qualities in the product between the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas who are respectively called पीत्यपाकवादिनु and पिटर्पाकवादिनु or those who hold the doctrines of cumulative metamorphosis and total metamorphosis respectively. According to neither, is the emergence of qualities co-eval with the emergence of the object. It comes later, is emergent and therefore epigenetic. The पीत्यपाकवादिनु in their different schools hold that the emergence of red colour, for example, may occupy 5, 9, 10 or 11 moments and would involve disintegration first into द्वियक्ष and then into अमुक which having assumed the new qualities reintegrate into new द्वियक्ष and a newly metamorphosed red pitcher. This has a significance for cosmogenesis. The पिटर्पाकवादिनु say that the whole black pitcher is metamorphosed into red without the process of disintegration and integration.

The quality of holding water in a pitcher, for example, could be explained on the hypothesis of the पिटर school and not of the पीत्य school, as evidently that quality belongs to the whole pitcher, and not to the atoms or parts constituting it (R.D.R.).
(4) Epigenesis in Causation:

We have also the doctrine of epigenesis in the concept of the Asamavāyi Kāraṇa of the Indian Logicians. They hold, for example, that the many Tantu
rūpas constitute a qualitatively new Paṭarūpa being its Asamavāyi kāraṇa.
The whitenesses of the Tantus, in other words, produce a new whiteness of the
Paṭa which is unique and sui-generis. As compared with the Tanturūpas,
therefore, the Paṭarūpa is an epigenetic formation.

(5) Epigenesis in Knowledge:

The self, according to the Naiyāyikas, is without knowledge in Suṣupti,
while Jñāna emerges later in Jāgṛti and is therefore epigenetic in character.

(In Prabhākara the soul is always Jaḍa. In Nyāya the soul is Jaḍa in Suṣupti,
but in Jāgṛti it gets the attribute of knowledge. Knowledge is thus, according
to the Naiyāyikas, adventitious: a quality of the self (Cf. Buddhī in the चुरुच
शक्तिपूर्ण), and not its substance. In Kumārila the soul has Samvit even in
deep sleep not to speak of the state of wakefulness. In Vedanta the soul is
Samvidrūpa at the least. There may be even Aparoksānubhūti. We may thus,
so far as the problem of knowledge is concerned, arrange the four systems in
a graded order as follows:—Prabhākara, Nyāya, Kumārila, Vedanta).

V. Nyāya Criticism of Buddhism

1. (i) Vātsyāyana criticises the Buddhistic Relativism in his Bhāṣya on
IV.1.39 and IV.1.40. He shows that Relativism is self-contradictory. The
long and the short must be regarded as self-existent; otherwise no relation can
be established between them, and relativism would be impossible.

(ii) He criticises the Buddhist doctrine of Vijñāna or knowledge alone as
real, in his Bhāṣya IV.2.26 and IV.2.27. He tells us that the doctrine is self-
destructive, in as much as the Buddhist in separating things from thoughts is
giving a reality to them.

(iii) The Buddhist doctrine of momentariness is criticised in his Bhāṣya, on
III.2.11. We must always suppose that there is a connecting link between the
origination of an entity and its cessation.

2. (i) Udyotakara, in his Nyāya-vārtika, III.1.1, criticises the Buddhist
doctrine of Soul-less-ness. He tells us that the Bhadanta teaches that there is
a burden and there is a burden-bearer. The five Skandhas are the burden, and
the burden-bearer must, therefore, be the soul.

(ii) In his Vārtika on the Nyāya-sutra I.1.37, Udyotakara criticises a
Buddhist logician who says that the middle term and the major term co-abide in
a syllogism. Udyotakara passes two criticisms: (a) How can a Buddhist, a holder
of the doctrine of momentariness, hold to the doctrine of co-abidances and
(b) If we take such a syllogism as Śabdo’nityaḥ kṛtakatvāt ghatavāt, Anityata
which designates posterior non-eternity, and kṛtakatva which designates prior
non-eternity will have to co-abide in the Ghaṭa, which according to the Buddhists
exists for a moment.
VI. Doctrine of Perception

(1) The doctrine of atomicity of sense, also this sense exists at the tip of the respective sense-organ, Nāsāgravarti and Jivhāgravarti etc. (अनुवारिकाणथित्यतः ्अनुवारिकाणथित्यतः)

(2) Perception requires actual contact between sense and object. This is to be effected by the further artifice of the motion in sense-organ. Doctrine of three-fold contact; contact between soul and mind, mind and sense, and sense and object. Sannikārṣa has two aspects: (i) Contact and (ii) Proximity e.g. vision is aprāpyakāri, touch is prāpyakāri. This is a truly crass materialistic conception (Cf. Windelband).

(3) Gangeśa criticises this original doctrine of perception, saying that it is both too wide and too narrow. It is too wide because it includes recollection, which is the contact between the mind and the image; and too narrow because it excludes perception by God. Has God, for example, mind and the senses? The question whether God perceives or not can be solved by the Naiyāyikas, only by taking an anthropomorphic view of God.

(4) With this Naiyāyika theory of perception, we may contrast the Vedantic theory as well as the Buddhistic theory. The Buddhistic theory of perception is presentationistic in the extreme; so their theory of perception consists in the following of one presentation by another, not involving the mind at all. The Naiyāyika's theory involves mind, but says that, perception consists in the physical contact of the mind and the object through the senses. The Vedantic theory takes a via media, the Antāṅkaraṇāvṛtti, taking the form of the object, and it is this form which is known (Cf. Dharmarājādīvarindra). The present scientific theory would explain perception as due to an electro-magnetic influence being carried by the sense-organ through its respective nerve to the nerve-

*This criticism of Jayanta, in our opinion, is multi-pronged and is applicable to all those who deny the reality of the world but revel in its enjoyment. Then why crown over Buddhism alone?—Editor.
centre. Another theory which might be contrasted with the Vedantic is the theory of *eidola* or *similacra*.

(5) Difference between sensation and perception recognized by Vācaspati and Udyotakara. A very clever anticipation of modern theory. Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka. In this, the Naiyāyikas with their realistic bias fall into the mistake of supposing that there is a 'perception of the Universal'. Dinnaga had said that perception concerns itself with the individual and not with the universal. The Naiyāyikas answer that we must be supposed to perceive the universal, otherwise, we cannot communicate it to our fellow-men (Cf. Russell and his doctrine of the perception of the universal). Stout's doctrine takes however, a via media between idealism and realism. All categories of the understanding are latent in sense, and there is only a difference of degree and not of kind. This is a doctrine to which the Naiyāyikas should have subscribed in respect of their distinction between sensation and perception.

(6) We have thus a sensuous perception of the cow, and again a sensuous perception of cowhood; but we have a supersedensuous perception of cows (Cf. Laukika and A-laukika pratyakṣa). Really speaking we ought to have a supersedensuous knowledge of cow-hood.

(7) Gangeśa however tries to evade the difficulty by making a three-fold classification of non-sensuous perception. (i) Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa (ii) Jñānalakṣaṇa, and (iii) Yogaja. According to the first we have a super-sensuous perception of all cases of smoke or cow—past, present and future. According to the second, we have an associational perception of fragrance, when we perceive a piece of sandal wood; according to the third, we have an intuitional perception of the supreme Being, of atoms, of duty, of things past and future, and so on. In this last doctrine of Yogaja pratyakṣa, Gangeśa is playing into the hands of Intuitionists.

**FAIR : LATER DRAFT**

VII. Judgement, Inference and Induction

(1) The Naiyāyikas are scientists and realists and not idealists. Hence they start with perception and conception and not with judgment as the unit of thought. Jayanta alone of Indian Logicians regards the sentence or the Judgment as the beginning of all thought; 'words' he says, 'are parts of a sentence.' This is a position very similar to that of Bosanquet who regards the judgment as the unit of all thought. As against the position of Bosanquet, one might ask why we might not start with the percept or concept on the one hand, or, with inference on the other. Jayanta alone takes the idealistic view of judgment. His theory is like that of the Anvītābhidhānavadins, who take a representational view, as against the Abhilātiṇavayavadins, who take a presentational view. The one view depends upon meaning, the other upon fact.

(2) Nature of inference. We cannot understand the nature of inference in Nyāya without contrasting it with that of the Buddhists or of Bosanquet.
(i) In the first place inference as with Dinnaga, moves from particular to particular, and yet Dinnaga feels the necessity of taking recourse to the law of causation. Herein he commits the same fallacy, as Mill who says that inference moves from particular to particular and yet recognizes the law of causation. Causality among particulars is a contradiction in terms. Hume was thus more consistent than Mill when he recognized the particulars but denied the law of causation.

(ii) Bosanquet also denies causation, but substitutes the law of ground and consequent, as the basis of inference. No time element is involved in inference. When reality is the subject of all judgment, there is no reason why causality should exist.

(iii) The Nyayikas on the other hand recognize Causation. They however overhit the mark in that, they recognize all cases of inseparable accident also as cases of causation (for example, the green colour of parrots). It is only our ignorance of the real nature of things which makes us suppose that there is anything like accident.

(3) Nature of Induction. The chief problem is—how do we arrive at scientific laws, how is it that we are able to formulate the major premise ? What, in short, is the ‘Vyaptigrahopaya’ or the means of attainment of the knowledge of induction, as Gangeśa puts it.

(i) According to the Buddhists there can be no scientific induction as logic deals merely with perception. Inference they take as invalid. As against this, Gangeśa tells us that those who try to prove the invalidity of inference cannot do so without themselves invoking the aid of inference. Mere percepts without concepts are beads without a thread.

(ii) Udyotakara, an earlier logician, however says that the ‘vyaptigrahopaya’ can be explained by the combination of perception and remembrance: perception of the minor term, and remembrance of the concomitance of the major term and the middle.

(iii) Even against this, Gangeśa argues by saying that perception is not required for induction at all. Induction is arrived at by the Methods of Agreement and Difference: (a) To illustrate this we have to understand what the older logicians called the Sapakṣa and the Vipakṣa, i.e. to say, the positive instance and the negative instance, corresponding respectively to the table of presence and the table of absence in Becon. (b) Again, Vācaspāti’s doctrine of Upādhi as Śādhivyāpākatve sati śādhanāvyāpakā upādhi. The syllogism to be valid must be free and unfettered and have no delimiting conditions. The Upādhi is the delimiting condition [for example, in the transposed or re-adjusted (inverted) syllogism, parvato dhūmavān vanhimatvāt, contact with wet fuel, ārdradhanā-samyoga is the Upādhi’]. In Udyotakara, there is no ārdradhanā-samyoga, while, however, wherever there is ārdradhanasamyoga there is smoke. The fallacy called Vyāpyatvāttiśa, which is one of the three kinds of Asiddhas. (c) Gangeśa, like Mill, tells us that it is the Method of Agreement and Difference, and the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference which would give us the induction. This he calls respectively, the Kevalānva, Kevala-
vyatireki and Anvayavyatireki anumānas. In short, it is reason alone which, according to Naiyāyikas, gives us the major premise.

(iv) As contrasted with this, is the Aristotelian explanation of the formation of inductive law, as due to the combination of experience and intuition, which supervenes all of a sudden, and gives us the knowledge of a scientific law. In the last resort, therefore, laws are discovered by intuition and not by reason.

VIII. Problem of Validity in Nyāya and Mimamsa

(a) The Nyāya theory of Knowledge is known as Paratah-prāmānya, while the Mimāṃsā theory of Knowledge is known as svatah-prāmānya. The Nyāya theory of Error is known as Anyathā-khyāti, while there are two Mimāṃsā theories of Error, the Akhyāti of Prabhākara and the Viparitakhyāti (which is almost equivalent to the Anyathā-khyāti of Nyāya) of Kumārila. (The difference between the two Mimāṃsā theories of Error, viz. the Akhyāti and the Viparitakhyāti we shall notice under "Prabhākara and Kumārila" in the next chapter). At present we shall consider the Mimāṃsā and Nyāya theories of knowledge, viz. Svatah-prāmānya and Paratah-prāmānya, as well as the very famous discussion by Vācaspati of the five theories of Error (See S. C. Vidya-bhushan, History of Indian Logic, Pp. 138-39). The five theories of error here enumerated are : (i) The Ātmakhyāti of the Yogācāra Buddhists (Vijñānavādins), (ii) The Asat-khyāti of the Mādhyamika Buddhists (Śūnyavādins), (iii) The Anirvacaniya-khyāti of the Advaita-Vedantins, (iv) the Akhyāti of the Prabhākara and (v) the Anyathākhyāti of the Naiyāyikas. As Vācaspati is a Naiyāyika, he puts the Anyathā-khyāti last. The Advaita-Vedantin may put the Anirvacaniya-khyāti last. A fuller discussion of all these theories should be carefully read from Kuppuswami Sastri’s Primer of Indian Logic, Pp. 157-180, where there is a Vedantic criticism (from the point of view of the Anirvacaniya-khyāti) of the other theories of Error; See P. 160 where he puts the Anirvacaniya-khyāti last. The Rāmānujanian theory of Error is referred to on P. 164. This will enable one to form one’s own independent opinion of all the different theories, and then to construct one’s position.

(b) (i) Corresponding to the Svatah-prāmānya and Paratah-prāmānya of Mimāṃsā and Nyāya, theories of Intrinsic and Extrinsic validity, we have, so far as the authorship of the Vedas is concerned, theories of Apauruṣeya and Pauruṣeya-vāda. According to Mimāṃsā, knowledge has its criterion within itself. According to Nyāya, knowledge has its criterion outside itself. Mimāṃsā inclines towards internal coherence, Nyāya towards external reference.

(ii) Thus according to Nyāya, knowledge would be valid, provided the source from which it springs is perfect, or the cause from which it proceeds is real (Keith, P. 18), provided the sense-organs are not deficient, or provided that it leads to some useful purpose. Thus e.g., the dream-consciousness would be invalid because there is no perfection in its cause; the yellowness of the conch would be invalid because there is jaundice in the eye; and again, the water of the mirage would be unreal, because it does not lead to the quenching of thirst. The realism of Nyāya, however, is tinged with Pragmatism. Thus,
according to Naiyāyikas, knowledge is not true by its very nature, but becomes true by the fulfilment of an extra condition, Samvādi-pravṛtti, e.g. quenching of thirst. Cf. the Arthakriyākārita of the Buddhists. Thus Nyāya includes in its criterion of reality both correspondence and satisfaction, objective verification as well as subjective utility. See Hiriyanna.

(iii) The criticism which Mimāṃsā would pass on the Nyāya theory of knowledge is that to guarantee one cognition, such as reference to a correct source, another cognition would be required, this, another cognition, and so on ad infinitum, so that no knowledge could be valid.

(c) Realistic pragmatism in Nyāya.

(i) The Realism of Nyāya. All secondary qualities reduced to primary. Even secondary qualities objective. Compare the tertiary qualities in Neorealism. Holt’s physiologism.

(ii) Realistic theory of Error. The illusory yellow colour itself objective. The Naiyāyikas hold that when a jaundiced man sees a conch to be yellow, the ‘yellowness’ as well as the ‘Samavāya’ relation in which it stands to the conch, are equally real along with the conch itself.

(iii) Yet, Error results because there is no correspondence with fact: the silver is Āparastha. Also, no quenching of thirst follows. Hence, fusion of Realism and Pragmatism.

(d) In regard to Pramāṇavyāda or validity of knowledge, Gangeśa tells us that two questions arise: (i) Whence is the validity of knowledge derived, and (ii) How are we conscious of it? (In our opinion these two questions reduce themselves to the same thing). The Mimāṃsakas answer the questions by saying that knowledge is self-evident. If so, says Gangeśa, invalid knowledge would be identical with valid knowledge. It follows therefore that knowledge is not self-evident, but is inferred from the fruitful correspondence between the knowledge and the activity. After Ghaṭa is known a quality called Jāttata is produced in Ghaṭa according to Mimāṃsakas and a quality called Jātrattva or संविधि is produced in Atman (knower) according to Naiyāyikas.

As regards Apramāṇa or invalid knowledge, the Mimāṃsakas (Prabhākar?) do not admit invalid knowledge or error at all. All knowledge according to them is valid. According to Gangeśa, Apramāṇa is that knowledge which does not abide in its own subject but in the subject of another generic nature (Anyathā-khyāti). Moreover, in our consciousness ‘ this is silver ’, says Gangeśa, we must suppose that there is only one kind of knowledge, and it is cumbersome to assume two like the Mimāṃsakas, viz. perception and recollection. See Vidyabhushan.
(e) In a general way, the problem of validity and invalidity may be mathematically exhibited as follows:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Validity</th>
<th>Invalidity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-evident</td>
<td>Other-evident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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and

Worked out in plain language this means:—

Sāmkhya—Both Validity and Invalidity self-evident;
Nyāya—Both Validity and Invalidity other-evident;
Mimānsā—Validity self-evident, Invalidity other-evident; and
Buddhism—Validity other-evident, Invalidity self-evident.

See Kane Pūrva Mimānsā (references to Ślokāvārtika and Prakaraṇapancikā).
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Author                      Book                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
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Athalye                     "Tarkasamgraha"—The Introduction which is historical in character should be read. The notes are very good, every chief topic being discussed separately in a different note. The notes are of much philosophical importance. The topics of the notes are concerned with separate philosophical problems.  
Keith                      Indian Logic and Atomism—Part I is a historical Introduction, containing in two Chapters the old school and the new school respectively. The notes are philosophical. In Part II, the philosophy of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The following Chapters might be read. Chapter I is Epistemological and discusses the nature of knowledge and error according to the School, contrasting it with the standpoints of Buddhism and Mimāṃsā. Chapters II and III discuss प्रेक्षण and अनुमान (Perception and Inference) respectively. Chapter VII discusses the categories of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika respectively. Chapter VIII discusses Atomic Theory. Chapter IX is Psychological and Chapter X Theistic. On the whole, a valuable book.  
Jha                        Translation of वास्त्यायन भाष्य on the Gautama Sūtras.  
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CHAPTER SIX

A CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF PURVA MIMANSA

I. Reduction of all Pramanas to one

Progressive delineation of the six Pramāṇas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Carvaka</th>
<th>Pratyakṣa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vaiśeṣika</td>
<td>+ Anumāṇa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sāmkhya</td>
<td>+ Šabda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyāya</td>
<td>+ Upamāṇa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prabhākara</td>
<td>+ Arthāpatti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kumārila</td>
<td>Arthāpatti + Anupalabdhi.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bauddhas do regard Anumāṇa as Pramāṇa but their Anumāṇa is invalid. Criticism of these Pramāṇas in the light of the Vedantic “Anubhava”.

A. (1) Anupalabdhi or non-perception cannot be a criterion at all. It is invented to explain our apprehension of “Abhāva” or negation. Set a thief to catch a thief. Both are non-existent. If Abhāva is Bhāva-rupa, Pratyakṣa will suffice.

(2) Pratyakṣa does not lead to valid knowledge. We see the sun to be only of a span’s length. Rāmānuja makes Upamarga of Pratyakṣa as follows: ज्ञातामेदानुमाणन प्रत्यक्षोपगमति। ज्ञातामेद् = भिभिष्ज्ञाता. But Rāmānuja who believed in the reality of the world should not stultify Pratyakṣa.

B. (3) (i) Upamāṇa involves the analogy of a “वायु” with “गो”, as well as of a “गो” with “वायु”. Indefinite and infinite reciprocity. Reciprocal similarity involves an unending series of resemblances.

(ii) At most, it may be a case of Anumāṇa only. Analogy, such as the “counting” of points of resemblance between the Earth and Mars in respect of their suitability as habitations for life. Mars is a planet like the Earth. Therefore, must have a life on it. Does not “weight” but only count. Analogical inference cannot be valid inference. It only leads to probability.
4. (i) Arthāpatti or "Implication" (which is the soul of inference). It can, therefore, be very well reduced to Anumāna either of the Kevalānvayi or the Kevalavyatireki type, which can be shown to be not linear inference, but Implication (Bosanquet).

(ii) Prabhākara says that there is doubt in Arthāpatti which is ultimately resolved. Kumārila says there is contradiction which is ultimately reconciled. Saṃsāya is required as an initial stage even in Anumāna नानुपलब्धे न निर्णयति यथा: वयसति । Both recognise Arthāpatti.

(iii) While the Mimāṁsakas contend that we must recognise Arthāpatti to be a new Pramāṇa, as we cannot assign a Linga or Hetu or middle term which alone would justify its being classed under Anumāna, the Naiyāyikas hold that we cannot regard Arthāpatti as a new Pramāṇa, but that it can very well be shown to be included under Anumāna ; and Nyāya is right. The formula for Arthāpatti can very well be exhibited in the form of "Barbara" (AAA) in the first Figure as follows :—

All fat non-eaters by day must eat at night,
S. N. is a fat non-eater by day,
Therefore, he must eat at night (Kevalānvayi type.)

The "non-eater" here, however, is a negative expression. Or, alternatively, the formula could be exhibited as follows in Celarent (EAE) in the first Figure:

No fat man non-eating by day is a non-eater at night,
Devadatta is a fat man non-eating by day,
Therefore, Devadatta is not a non-eater at night (Kevalavyatireki type).

Formally, this Anumāna would be correct; also the "implication" of it would cover what is intended to be proved by Arthāpatti. Arthāpatti is thus implicative inference.

(5) The Anumāna gives us only a partial grasp of reality. Judgment and inference are only appearances and not reality. Truth, as Bradley says, always falls short of Reality. Therefore, Anumāna invalid. (see Buddhist criticism of Anumāna in Śāntarakṣita, as well as Vedantic criticism in Śriharṣa.) We can not bring all the Tārākās, together: पुण्यतस्विरूपायत् शामकरा ताराप्रतिष्ठानात्. Šāmκara uses logic to combat the logicians and to defend 'insight'.

C. (6) Varieties of opinion in regard to the value of Śabda as a philosophical criterion. The Vaiśeṣikas do not recognise this at all. The Šāmkhyas recognise it hoping that the Upanisads might be regarded as advocating only Šāmkhyaism. Cf. अज्ञातसाक्षातपिपलकुण्ड्राम् शेतावत् IV 5. The Naiyāyikas believe in it; but make it ancillary to God. The Mimāṁsakas exalt it above evry other Pramāṇa making it supreme even above God whom they feel no necessity of recognising. At the most Deva—Devatā. Šabdapramāṇa would only be a ritualistic dogma unless we mean by Šabda the eternal sound, which can be validated only by "Anubhava". In that sense it becomes
equivalent to Šphoṭa or the primal sound which is validated only by ‘Anubhava’. Hence it follows that “Anubhava” is the only true criterion of Reality.

For a complete statement of the relation between Šabda and Šphoṭa see next point.

II. The Doctrine of Šabda and the Doctrine of Šphoṭa

(Max Muller, Pp. 516-544; also Das Gupta, Yoga as Philosophy and Religion, Appendix)

(A) The supremacy of the criterion of Šabda, in Mimāṃsā. Šabdaprāmāṇya-vāda contrast the Pauruṣeya-vāda of the Naiyāyikas, and their insistence on God as the creator of the Vedas. The Naiyāyikas give only lip-service to Vedas. The Vaiśeṣikas take this tendency to its logical conclusion in the denial of Āptavākyas. According to Vaiśeṣikas, verbal testimony is included under inference. As against this Gangeśa tells us that verbal testimony does not depend upon invariable concomitance, like inference; hence, it cannot be included under inference. Like Laplace, the Mimāṃsakas did not feel the necessity of a Creator.

Mimāṃsā doctrine of the supremacy of Word attacked by the Naiyāyikas on various grounds: (i) Word, adjectival, not substantival. “Šabda” guṇam ākāśam. Petition Principi. (ii) Šabda is a product, is made, changes, is augmented, perishes (See Max Muller, p. 524). (iii) Eternity of Word only in the sense of “uninterrupted tradition” (Sampradāya). Sound, according to Naiyāyikas, is non-eternal. Also there are certain “branches” of the Vedas that are lost as we know from Smṛtis and tradition. Hence the Veda is non-eternal; and the Mimāṃsakas are wrong in saying that it is eternal because its continuity is uninterrupted. (iv) Word created by God. God, author with unlimited intelligence; hence, God greater than Word. Pauruṣeya-vāda.

The thesis and the anti-thesis of Mimāṃsā and Nyāya reconciled by Vedanta by identifying Word with God. Šabda-brahma; Cf. Kabir Šabda. While with Mimāṃsā, Word is greater than God; and in Nyāya, God, greater than the Word, in Vedanta, Word is made co-equal with God. There are also personal Vedantins and impersonal Vedantins.

(B) In spite of their differences in regard to the Word, however, the Mimāṃsakas (Das Gupta, Pp. 181-182), the Naiyāyikas, and the Vedantins (Max Muller, Pp. 537-39) all agree in attacking the doctrine of Šphoṭa advocated by the Vaiyakaraṇa and Yoga philosophers. The identity of the two Patanjalis, Cf. Yogena cittasya padena viśeṣam. The Naiyāyikas denied both the supremacy of the word as well as the doctrine of Šphoṭa; the Mimāṃsakas and the Vedantins made Šabda supreme but denied Šphoṭa. Even the Vedantins failed to understand the mystical significance of Šabda. It was Pāṇini alone who said that the Šabda, which he identified with the Šphoṭa (explosion), was the primal energy of the world. “What bursts forth”.

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Cf. Bhattoji Diksita: Sphuṭyate avidyā anena iti Sphoṭah, that by means of which ignorance is destroyed (Śābdakauśṭubha, first Āhnika). Cf. एकः ज्ञत्: गम्यशत: गमयकः प्रवृत्त: स्वायं जिके न गामधुकः भवति। पालजस्याय।

Pāṇini also refers to one Sphoṭāyana in his Sūtra, Avaṇi Sphoṭāyanasya. Later grammarians failed to catch the mystical significance of Pāṇini, e.g. Paṇijnal Kaṭayāta (Max Muller, P. 529), and Bhartṛhari (Das Gupta, Pp. 183-184). We should like to exclude Patanjali from this company, if possible. With them Sphoṭa meant the power of signification (Das Gupta, P. 183) ? or “Meaning” of a word: Cf. स्थुरते अथ: अनेन। A logical instead of a mystical view (see Sarva-dārśana-saṅgraha, Pp. 114-119).

Various difficulties in the conception of Sphoṭa as meaning: Is meaning subjective or objective? Is it individual or collective? Is it implicit or explicit? Is it a string or an aura? Does it depend upon the order of the words? शीत and चरी. Does it reach progressive consummation? अन्तवर्त्तिनिर्यात (The Yoga Philosopher Vācaspati, Das Gupta, P. 185). Does it precede or follow the word? Different varieties of Sphoṭa: Varṣa-sphoṭa, Pada-sphoṭa, Vākya-sphoṭa. These are tried to be established by Bhartṛhari in his Vākya-padiya. Is there any Meaning for sentences, such as the Vākya-sphoṭa (Das Gupta, Pp. 185-186, Anvīṭābhidiḥāṇa-vāda) (Lotze and Bosanquet: Conception and Judgment). Where shall we stop? Grantha-sphoṭa! ad infinitum. Epistemologically, ultimate reality would be thus the meaning of meanings.

From another point of view, viz., the logical, as Bhartṛhari cleverly saw (Max Muller, P. 531), Śabda or Sphoṭa is highest Sattā or existence, the Summuṃ Genus. All genera merely “vanishing species” of it, merely illusory forms (Bhartṛhari, Max Muller, P. 532). वाक्यविद्य उन्मत्तिकल्य ungrammatical for पदवाक्यिण Relation like that of Paramātman to Jīvātmanas (Max Muller, P. 532). Compare all ideas as species of the Idea of the Good in Plato.

From the philosophical point of view, all words ultimately mean God, the Logos, (Max Muller, P. 532). Cf. the Nārāyaṇa of Sannyāsins. Cf. also Bosanquet, “Reality” as the only subject of all judgments.

Three points of view therefore: Epistemological, Logical and Philosophical. From any one of these approaches, Śabda or Sphoṭa becomes identical with absolute reality.

All these approaches however, are merely intellectual and not mystical. Pāṇini alone saw the mystical significance of it. “The eternal Word”, says Mādhava in his Sarva-dārśana-saṅgraha, “which is called Sphoṭa, and which is without parts, is the true cause of the world”.

Bādarāyana (I.3.28) and Śāṅkara in criticising the doctrine of “Sphoṭa” failed to sympathise with the mystical significance of it. Both Bādarāyana and Śāṅkara say that the world comes from the “Word” (and not Sphoṭa), and this Word is Brahman (Max Muller, P. 521). Contrast जन्मात्सर्वः बत। वातः from God. In his criticism of the doctrine of Sphoṭa, Śāṅkara particularly quotes Upārasa, the Mimāṃsaka-Vedantist, according to whom the word is nothing but the aggregate of its constituent letters (वर्णसमुपर्वः: शब्दः) as
against grammarians who teach that over and above the aggregate of the letters there exists a supersensuous entity called Sphoṭa which is the cause of the apprehension of the meaning of a word (Thibaut, P. xxxvii). (1) उच्चरित शब्द and (2) स्फोट (Idea) suggested by उच्चरित शब्द. Inquilab Zindabad should be uttered proximately. उच्छरित शब्द is to स्फोट (Idea) what वाक्य is to व्यक्ति. The doctrine of Sphoṭa as understood in a mere logical sense may indeed be objectionable, but when it is identified with the mystical doctrine of शब्द, the Vedantins and especially Śamkara need have no cause of grievance against it.

For the doctrine of Sphoṭa, cf. the Logos of St. John, the “Let there be Light” doctrine of the Old Testament, the Ḍvīn (let it be done) in Arabic Philosophy, the Vāk in Rgveda, and the Anāhata Nāda in Kabir. The Ālankārikas utilised the conception of Sphoṭa in their doctrine of Vyāngya or Dhwani.

III. Metaphysical Doctrines of the Mimamsa

The World, Self and God:

1. The Reality of the World.
3. Criticism of the Doctrine of God.

1. The world: (a) Critical: Criticism of Buddhistic unreality. The external world is not a product of mere idea. Also no momentariness like that of an idea.

(b) Epistemological: Object exists because the report of one sense is corroborated by that of another. Hence the world objective and real.

(c) Cosmological: The world is also eternal:

2. Self: Jaimini does not, but Śabara does give elaborate arguments for the existence of the Self.

(a) Critical: Criticism of Buddhistic doctrine that one Idea knows another. Hume and Buddhism: Separate and contiguous ideas. Like beads. James: enveloping Idea. Unity and continuity of mental life must be explained.

(b) स्वर्गकामो गजितं Therefore the self is Anumaya.

(c) (i) Cognition implies a cogniser. Self different from senses and mind. Cf. Śālikanātha: बुद्धिक्षणारूपमें विना आत्मा विभूति।

(ii) Yet the one self becomes many. Cf. the next line of Śālikanātha: नानापुरुष: प्रतिवेदितत्वविदितांभासति। The विभूति आत्मा who is प्रतिवेदितत्व नानापुरुष is no other than the Vedantic परमात्मा. Here there is incipient recognition of God. Śālikanātha, however, does not make clear whether the
manifoldness is merely apparent or real. "नामाशृङ्खः" may mean both. If नामाशृङ्खः means apparent then the individual self is unreal. If it is real, then it must posit a परमात्मा.

(iii) According to Prabhākara and Kumārila similarly, selves are many; all eternal. नित्यः संवैत्तिकः पुरानः (क्लोकवाचिकः आस्मान, verse 73). Is this not itself ambiguous?

(iv) The real argument for plurality of selves in Mimāṃsā, however, is epistemological. Plurality of selves, because same reports about an object e.g. the sun. Also analogy of the relation of bodily activity and feeling to mind.

(d) Even dream experience, say the Mimāṃsakas, implies a real substratum viz. the self.

(e) The self as the seat of Apūrva.

(f) Reality of moral values. Punishment. The sower and the reaper must be the same.

(g) Transmigration also implies the soul. The sea remains despite the movements of its waves. The serpent uncoils without change of essence.

3. God: (a) Vedas and no God; Apūrva or invisible potency of actions, and no God. Yet Āstika Dārśana, Apauruṣeya. "नामाशृङ्खः केदारनाथः." According to मीमांसा, therefore, Naiyāyika is Nāstika in this sense. अपूर्वः of the मीमांसा is a moral force; and the अदृश्य of the वैदिक is a cosmic force.

(b) A fortiori, no deities. हृद्वि more important than देवता. हृद्वि. निमित्ते गुरुभाषो हरिर्विन्यासं देवता। Deities partake in हृद्वि which is, therefore, more fundamental. The fruit of sacrifice does not proceed from deities. Devatās are गुण (subordinate). They are only symbols. Mantras are deities मन्त्रारीत्रिः देवता: No synonym can be used, e.g. Pāvaka for Agni cannot be used. For अनिन्मृत्तिः पुरोहितम् we cannot use बिन्द्वदमृत्तिः पुरोहितम्।

(c) Criticism of the proof of God: Jainistic: No omniscience, no omnipotence, no benevolence, no fore-knowledge. Contradictions of one with another. What motive again could God have for creating? Vaiśamya and Nairgrhaṇya, seem to be the objections urged against God by Mimāṃsakas. Vaiśamya and Nairgrhaṇya are arguments used by Jainas also for the disproof of God. Cf. स्वात्रविन्यास. Finitie God. God is the sum-total of all privation of knowledge: शान्तभावनियम् : (see Kane).

Rough Draft

Sections III and IV in this rough draft are made to constitute Section III in the fair draft above and are together entitled: The Metaphysical Doctrines of the Mimāṃsā.

Mimansa Criticism of Buddhism

(See Keith, Pp. 44–52; also Pp. 64–69. Also Śloka-vārttika).

(i) We must posit the reality of the external world; of virtue and vice; of teacher and pupil. Even in dream cognition, we must posit a real substratum.
The external world is not a product of mere intellect. Our ideas are imposed upon us by an external unity.

(ii) It is wrong to say that “cognition” alone exists, to the exclusion of cogniser and cognised.

(iii) No idea can comprehend itself; nor any one idea be comprehended by another. It is wrong to say that one idea as it originates becomes known to the first.

(iv) The unity and continuity of our mental life cannot be explained without the recognition of a substantial unity of the self. In Hume and Buddhism one idea contiguous with and yet separate from another. In James the next idea envelopes the first.

(v) The law of Retribution requires that the sower and reaper of actions must be the same.

(vi) The Buddhist cannot explain “transmigration”. A momentary idea cannot transmigrate itself. It is the soul alone which transmigrates. “The sea remains despite the movements of its waves; the serpent uncoils, without change of essence.”

(vii) The fact that I feel with my hand what I see with my eyes shows that there exists something beyond sense-organs.

(viii) Other souls also exist. The “perception” of another soul is impossible, but one can “infer” another soul from the activity of its body.

The Metaphysical doctrines of the Mimansa

1. The World eternally existent:

   Tasmādādyavadevātra sarga-pralaya-kalpanā
d Samastakṣaya janmabhyām na sidhyatypramāṇikā
t Tasmāt-prāgapi sarvemī sraṣṭuḥ āsan padādayah
Anveṣyo vyavaharoyamanādirvedavādibhīh

   —Ślokavārttika, Sambandhākṣhepa-parihāra,
   verses 113–117.

Neither creation nor destruction of the world. No creator required.

2. Jaimini gives no Sūtras for the establishment of the self. The Self is only to be inferred: Svargakāmo yajeta. Though Jaimini is silent, Śābara enters into an elaborate proof of the soul which is independent of the body and senses, and beyond pleasure and pain. According to Prabhakara and Kumārila, there are many souls, all eternal: Nityah sarvagath punān (Śloka-vārttika, Ātmavāda, verse 73). Cf. also Śālikanātha—

   Buddhindriyaśariredbhyo bhinnā ātmā vibhuṛdhraḥ
Nānābhūtah pratikṣetram arthavittiṣu bhāsate.


3. God is not required in Mimāṃsā for giving rewards and punishments. The Apūrva or the invisible potency alone can do so. Jaimini says that the
deity is guna, or subsidiary in a sacrifice. Havis is more important than Devatā, Cf. Haviṣa niyameta (Pūrva Mīmāṃsā VIII.1.32), and Gunavaté davatāśruth, (Pūrva Mīmāṃsā IX.1.9). The deity has no body. The sacrifice cannot be intended to please the deity. The deity is not the Lord of all things. The fruit of the sacrifice does not proceed from the deity. The deities of the sacrifices are merely symbols and objects, and to whom Sūktas are addressed: Sūktabhājo havirbhājaśe devatāḥ. They are to be distinguished from the deities of the Purāṇas, which occupy a higher position. No synonym can be employed for Devatās. We cannot substitute the word Pāvaka or Śucī for Agni. No personal god required for creating the world. God is not omniscient. As there can be no object of knowledge, God has neither knowledge nor omniscience. He is only the sum-total of all privation of knowledge. Jñāna bhāvanīṣayah (see Kane).

For the arguments which Mīmāṃsā uses against God, see Keith, Pp. 61-64; also Śloka-vārttika. Cf. Jainistic arguments against God. The arguments can be summed up as follows: (i) Impossibility of God having a body. If he has a body, then there must be a matter which must have existed before him. (ii) What can be his motive in creation? Why does he feel a desire to multiply? (iii) Why should God create a world full of misery, if he is all good? Hence God is not benevolent. Vaiṣṇava nairgṛhya-prasangāt. (iv) If there is moral evil in the world, God is either not omniscient or not omnipotent. (v) He has also no fore-knowledge. Did God fore-know the Bannauri disaster? God’s knowledge and power conflict with his goodness, his fore-knowledge conflicts with man’s freedom.

Here the Rough Draft Ends

IV. Contribution to the Science of Interpretation

The Tarkapāda of Jaimini, viz., 1.1, is dedicated to a discussion of philosophical topics. The remaining Pādas of the first, and the other Adhyayas upto the twelfth are devoted to a discussion of the principles of ritual interpretation.

The “Arthavāda” discussed in 1.2 has its value in extolling desirable, or censuring forbidden acts; it thus comes into immediate connection with injunctions or prohibitions.

1.3 discusses the relation of Smṛti to Veda. Below Smṛti in value comes the practice of good men. 1.4 discusses the subject of names or Nāmadheya. It seems that the Mīmāṃsā felt the necessity of dealing with a number of obscure sacrificial terms.

Mīmāṃsā (II.1) develops such principles as Ekavākyatā (syntactical unity) Vākyabheda (syntactical split) and Anuṣanga, i.e., the principle of extension.

Vidhis or injunctions are incitements to actions. Action may be either positive or negative, or may partake of both characters. When it is negative, it is called Pratiśedha and when it partakes of both characters, it is called Paryudāsa.

Actions may also be classified as Puruṣārtha and Kratvartha, done for the sake of the agent and done for the sake of the offering.
Injunctions or Vidhis are primarily of three kinds; Adhikāra-vidhi or Vidhi relating to qualification, Utpatti-vidhi or originative injunction, and Viniyoga-vidhi or injunction of application.

Originative injunctions are few in number, relating that they do to the principal Vedic offering only; they do no more than excite in the mind of a hearer the desire to perform the action.

Injunctions of application denote the exact manner of procedure (itikar-tavyata) by specifying the numerous subsidiary actions. These subsidiary actions are called Śeṣas, and the distinction between Śeṣa and Śeṣin occupies the greater part of the attention of the Mīmāṃsā.

While dealing with injunctions of application, we may note the six means by which the relations of subordination of actions may be determined. These are: Śruti or express declaration; Linga or indirect implication; Vākya or syntactical connection; Prakaraṇa or context; Krama or order which is the same thing as Sthāna or position; and finally Samākhyā or names. Each of these means is deemed to be of “less” value than the preceding. Contrast the Paribhāṣa of Śekhara (38) : Pūrvapara-nityāntarangāpavādānām uttarottaram baliyāh (Kielhorn translation, P. 185).

In addition to this division according to content, injunctions may be classified on the basis of the knowledge possessed by the agent of the mode of performance. There are thus three kinds of Vidhis again, Apūrva-vidhi or original injunction, Niyama-vidhi or restrictive injunction, and Parisamkhyā-vidhi or injunction of limitation or exclusion.

Over against these Vidhis or injunctions which direct a positive act, there are prohibitions or Niṣedhas, e.g., the Brahmacārin must not look at the sun.

The above are the main topics with which Pādas 2-4 of Adhyāya I and Adhyāyas II-VI of the Mīmāṃsa-sutra deal. Adhyāsa. VII and VIII discuss Atideśa or transference. The process of transference, however, involves modifications (Ūhas) which are discussed in Adhyāya IX. In other cases, the transference must be accompanied by the annulment of details, which are discussed in Adhyāya X. Adhyāya XI discusses the relation of subsidiary to principal offerings, and Adhyāya XII discusses the topic of options or Vikalpa. These last might be either Vyavasthita, fixed or limited and Avyavasthita, that is to say, unlimited (see Keith, Chapter V).

The rules of interpretation which the Mīmāṃsā laid down were later utilised by the Dharmasastras for the interpretation of their texts, and they may also be found to harmonise with the rules of interpretation which modern Law employs. Compare Maxwell.

The first rule of the interpretation of Statutes is that words and sentences must be construed in their ordinary and natural meaning, which is the same as the Mīmāṃsā rule of Śruti. Another rule is that conflict between the statutes is not to be readily assumed, which is the same as laid down in Mīmāṃsā, that an option is to be declared only in the last resort. Another rule is that we must take into account the history of the causes of an enactment corresponding to
the rule of Prakaraṇa or context in Mimāṃsā. Another rule is that all parts of a statute are to be construed together and each part is not to be construed separately, which corresponds to the rule of Vākya or syntactical connection in Mimāṃsā.

The Mimāṃsā tells us that the principal word in a sentence is the verb, and that the subject is, therefore, subordinate; and hence the attributes or Viśeṣaṇas of the subject are not to be supposed to be intended as a necessary part of the rule or proposition. The king is entitled to the tax on land, and not to the land itself. The sovereign ruler is not an absolute owner of his kingdom, and cannot make a gift of it. In the Viśvajit sacrifice where everything is to be given away, the sacrificer cannot make a gift of the things deposited with him, or of his wife or of his children.

Then again there is arguing from similars; thus for example, if a Nīṣāda is allowed to offer a Rudrayāga, it follows that a Śūdra can also do so.

An Arthavāda is not a positive command like Vidhi. When Mitākṣarā says that one should kill without deliberation even a Guru, a child, an old man, or a learned Brāhmaṇa if he comes as an Ātātāyin, this is merely an Arthavāda and not a Vidhi or command. That sons have not the competence to divide in their father’s lifetime is merely an Arthavāda extolling the prohibition to do so.

Kratvartha Vidhis are those which are of absolute obligation, and Puruṣārtha Vidhis are those which are addressed to the conscience of the agent. A breach of the first brings on sin, of the second only blame or censure. Compare duties of perfect and imperfect obligation in Kant. When Yājñavalkya says that one should marry a girl who is free from disease, who has a brother, and who is not of the same Gotra or Pravara, the last is Kratvartha, and the first two are Puruṣārtha. When Manu tells us that the son to be adopted is to be given by the mother or father “in distress” the “distress” is not Kartavartha but Puruṣārtha.

Krama is illustrated in allowing, e.g., a mother a prior claim, for the word ‘pitarau’ is explained in grammatical treatises as Mātā pitarau which means mother and father and not father and mother. Sometimes, however, there is difficulty about the understanding of this Krama, e.g., when Yājñavalkya says that the heirs of a hermit are the teacher, the good pupil, and a fellow student in order, the Mitākṣarā says that the order is to be reversed as common sense would require it. We may not, however, agree with Mitākṣarā.

Options are always an improper procedure, as both texts are thereby nullified. Hence, if possible, an endeavour should be made to explain the negative proposition as an exception (Pāryudāsa) or as an Anuvāda.

The Anuvāda is merely a variety of Arthavāda, e.g., in the Vedic sentence ‘Fire should not be consecrated on the bare ground, nor in the sky nor in heaven’. Every one knows that no one can consecrate fire in the sky, and therefore this sentence is a mere Anuvāda for praising the Vidhi that fire must be consecrated on ground with gold. As an illustration of the Nityānuvāda we can give the instance that a man can donate what he owns, but there is no
ownership in a deposit, or in wife, or children, e.g., Dharma and Draupadi. This prohibition repeats only what is well-known. When, again, Manu apparently both allows and condemns Niyoga, the Mitakṣaraṇa tells us that this is to be understood in a “limited” sense, viz., that a maiden may marry the deceased’s brother, if the intended husband dies before actual marriage. Manu śṃtti (IX.59) defines Niyoga as follows:

Devarādvā sapinādvā striyā samyanniyuktayā Prajepātādhigantavyā santānasya parikṣaye.

In this way Paṇḍu and Dhrṛtarāṣṭra were born from Vyāsa from the widows of Vicitravirya.

When it is enacted that words in the singular shall include the plural, the Mimāṃsā illustrates this by enjoining that when it is said that a vessel is to be cleansed, it is implied that all vessels are to be cleansed.

Finally, the fault called Vākyabheda occurs when one and the same sentence is construed as laying down two different rules or Vidhis, vide Śābarabhāṣya P. 1 and P. 44 for examples of Vākyabheda (see Kane).

V. The Ethical Ideal of the Mimāṃsā

1. The mass of the Vedas being vast Jaimini divides it into five parts: Vidhi, Arthavāda, Nāmdhaya, Pratiṣṭedha and Mantra.

2. Difference between Vidhi and Arthavāda, Command-injunction and fact-assertion. Cf. Hume: Relations of Ideas and Matters of fact. Sometimes Arthavāda may not be a fact. e.g. (i) Rāma says to Cara: अथवादः कल्पम्। दोषं तु मे किचिद् क्रय (उत्तरप्राप्तित). (ii) श्रीरं रज्जनं न देयम्, says the priest. सोचिस्ति etc. because they adduce the story that when अति ate the oblation on the way, he was beaten by the gods and his tears became silver. Therefore gold should be given in sacrifice as Dakṣinā and not silver—this is Stuti of Suvartā and Nindā of Rajata. Various kinds of Vidhi (see Kane page 20) such as Niya, Parisankhya, Nitya, Naimittika, Kāmya, Utpatti, Viniyoga, Prayoga and Adhikāra; also Kratvartha and Puruṣārtha. Vidhi or Niyoga means a mandate of the Veda. Arthavāda has no independent logical status and has to be interpreted as contributory to Vidhi. “Action” is the final import of the Veda: आन्विकम् तिर्यागर्थम्। अन्विकम् अद्वितीयम्। Contrast Upaniṣads which are not तिर्याग्य but only आन्विकम्। The Upaniṣadic dictum Tattvamasi, though assertive in character, refers only to a kind of action (Kriyā), which will bring on the result. Cf. Tantra-vārttika P. 13: एतेन कल्पस्य तिर्याग्रितत्वस्य दर्शन उपनिषदां नैरार्थां व्यास्वात्मम्। No “is” but “ought” in Tattvamasi.
3. It is the Vidhis which can lay down Dharma. The ideal in earlier Mimânsâ is Dharma; Artha and Kâma being subordinated to it. Nitya and Kâmya Karmas constitute Dharma and Pratiṣiddha Karmas constitute Adharma. The Kâmya may be, and Pratiṣiddha Karmas must be avoided but Nitya-karmas cannot be so avoided. The ideal in later Mimânsâ is Mokṣa.

4. (i) Relation of Dharma to Apûrva : The true sphere of Dharma is trans-empirical. धर्मापिष्ट धर्मं स्वरूपी राहणं हृ व्यथनं. Providing Prapâyus e.g. says Šabara, would not constitute Dharma because Vedas do not enjoin it. The Aṣṭakasrâddha (Aṣṭamisrâddha) may have been enjoined by a Lupta-śrutu; therefore it may be performed, says Šankara. Cf. Šankarabhâṣya on Smṛtipāda. Prabhâkara gives the name Apûrva to Dharma and Adharma. Apûrva is inaccessible to any Pramāṇa except Veda (Mānântarâpûrva). Different kinds of Apûrva, such as Phalâpûrva, Samuddâyâpûrva, Utpattpûrva, Angâpûrva, vide Jaiminiya Nyâya Mâlâ-vistâra on II. 1.5 Cf. also तद्वच अनन्यदृष्टां वास्तविक सत्यमत्त न नित्तिन्म न स्वात्... Šabara on II. 1.5 (see also Ganga Nath Jha, “Prabhâkara School” in detail. The whole book must in fact be studied. See our markings of contents.

(ii) Adrśta and Apûrva : The Adrśta of the Vaiśeṣikas was a cosmical principle. The Apûrva of the Mimânsakas is the moral counter-part of it. Atoms, Adrśta and God. Cf. Matter, motion and void in Democritus, as well as the indeterminate jumping of electrons in modern science. The Jack out of the Box. “Indeterminism”. The Apûrva of the Mimânsakas is equally indeterminate.

(iii) The five-fold character of Apûrva :—

(a) The ritualistic character of Apûrva as being the indeterminate effect of a sacrificial act which abides in the self (Ātmasamavâyi).

(b) The metaphysical character of Apûrva as taking the place of God.

(c) The moral character of Apûrva as bestowing reward and punishment for virtue and vice. A lame moralism and a lamer theism.

(d) The psychical character of Apûrva as being the traces (Samskāras) in the self as brought out in a dream, a fact of which the Mimânsakas make epistemological use. (Cf. Keith Page 20). See below.

(e) The epistemological character of Apûrva as being responsible for the fusion of impressions which in Prabhâkara leads to Akhyåti, and for new creation which in Kumârila leads to Viparitakhyåti.

(iv) Vedantic critiqueism of Apûrva. While Jaimini regards Dharma or Apûrva as the bestower of fruit, Bādarâyaṇa regards God or Pûrva as the bestower (Cf. III. 2.38–40, 41). The Pûrvamimânsâ is really Apûrvamimânsâ and Vedanta is really Pûrvamimânsâ as it deals with God.

5. The conception of Mokṣa in Mimânsâ : For Prabhâkara’s and Kumârila’s opinions on this head see next point. The Mimânsâ refutes the Vedantic view that the physical world is sublated or transcended in the state of Mokṣa. “The world” endures in the same form, even if the soul becomes
free. Cf. also Mimāṃsā criticism of the Vedantic “Absolute” and of “Neiscience”.

6. Doctrine of “Jñāna-karma-samuccaya” : Jñāna or the knowledge of the self obtained in the process of meditation is only a “contributory” aid, and then the doctrine is known as “Jñāna-karma-samuccaya”. But this might be criticised both by Mimāṃsā and Vedanta which respectively uphold Karma and Jñāna. (e.g. See Suresvarācārya’s criticism of Jñāna-karma-samuccaya in his Naiṣkarmya-siddhi.) In that doctrine, however, Mimāṃsā and Vedanta meet. विद्यां चालिबिद्यांत्... उभयस्तृः सूर्योपनिषत्रः।

Five theories about the relation of Jñāna and Karma :

(i) Only Jñāna . . . . Advaita Vedanta
*(ii) Only Karma . . . . Mimāṃsā
*(iii) Jñāna and Karma on the same level A kind of Mimāṃsaka. Cf. the two wings of a flying bird and also ईश्वरवास्य उपसनिष्ठृ
(iv) Jñāna higher and Karma subordinate Rāmānuja
(v) Karma higher and Jñāna subordinate Mimāṃsaka

* These three Schools of Mimāṃsakas.

VI. Prabhākara and Kumārina

The two great Mimāṃsa philosophers : Prabhākara and Kumārina, one inclining, on the whole, more towards Nyāya, the other inclining, on the whole, more towards Vedanta. The chronological relationship between Prabhākara and Kumārina : according to some, Prabhākara is earlier, while according to others Kumārina is earlier. These latter say that Guru was a title bestowed by Kumārina on his disciple Prabhākara, when Prabhākara intelligently interpreted अज्ञानी नोक्तत तत्तु नोक्ततम्।

Prabhākara

(i) Bheda (hence inclined towards Madhva) between different categories, hence no sanction to Pariṇāma. No recognition of Abhāva as a category, or Anupalabdhi as a Pramāṇa.

Kumārina

(i) Bhedabheda between the different categories hence Kumārina’s doctrine of Pariṇāma (hence parallelism with गौत्त्य in परिणाम and also with निष्कृत in भद्रचर.) The Bhedabheda doctrine was probably an inspiration to Nimbārka who came about 800 years later. Das Gupta however finds the Bhedabheda doctrine in Badārāyaṇa himself (see Vol. II) Ahikunḍalavat? Recognition of Abhāva as a category and Anupalabdhi as a Pramāṇa.
(ii) The self is unconscious or Jaḍa (If the soul is Jaḍa how can it be the locus of Āpūrva ?) even in the state of liberation, as contrasted with the self in Vedanta which has Caitanya. The expression स्वभाविक of Prabhākara is meaningless because it is bodily or physical.

(iii) The self though unconscious, yet an eternal subject.

No self in Buddhism; a Jaḍa self in Prabhākara; a conscious self in Nyāya, though the consciousness is adventitious; a fully conscious entity in Kumārila; the self-illuminator in Vedanta: (a) happiness enjoyed in deep sleep, and (b) bliss enjoyed in ecstasy.

(iv) Anvitābhidhāna-vāda

Both Anvita and Abhihiita refer to Padas.

(iv) Abhihitānvaya-vāda

Mimāṃsā theories of Error

(v) Akhyāti (or Alpakhyāti) Three forms:

(i) Fusion of Presentation and presentation such as is involved in illusions of perception: (a) A crystal appearing read on account of an adjacent rose; (b) appearance of two moons (visual); (c) two pencils (tactual); (d) conch appearing to be yellow (here, the sense organ is defective).

(ii) Fusion of Presentation and Memory, such as is involved in hallucinations: (a) presentation of shell and memory of silver; (b) presentation of rope and memory of serpent.

(iii) Fusion of Memory and Memory such as is involved in cases of doubt: A tall object appearing either like a pillar, or like an ascetic in meditation. All these cases involve a fusion of two elements, both of which are real, and yet in combination lead to error. Realistic tinge. Error, thus, a grade of reality (Bradley).

(v) Viparitakhyāti, Cf. the Anyathākhyāti of Nyāya. No fusion or combination, but experience new and unique. Illusionistic tinge. Doctrine of aberration or distortion on the way to Śaṅkara’s doctrine of Adhyāsa or Vivarta.

In Anyathākhyāti according to Naiyāyikas there is a memory of silver. In Viparitakhyāti according to Kumārila, there is no memory of silver but only an aberration of the mother-of-pearl as silver. In Viparitakhyāti as against Anyathākhyāti there is an element of distortion.
Satkhya (Ramana). Macbeth's dagger real. Cf. the realistic tendencies in Nyaya according to which the secondary qualities are reduced to primary. Real particles of silver in Sukti. The chaikkvaj in mother of pearl is according to Ramana due to veritable particles of silver. Real yellowness in conch.


Atmakhyata (Yogaara or Vijnanavadin). Really it ought to have been called Jnanaakhyata or Vijnanakhyata. No justification for use of the word Atman which does not exist. It only means: "The idea manifests itself as an object".

Akhyata (Prabhakara): Alpakhyata. Grade of reality. Two reals [(a) perception + perception; (b) perception + memory; (c) memory + memory] produce an unreal.

Anyathakhyata (Nyaya). Silver isapanastha. Or else it is remembered. Viparitakhyata kumara. The shell forsakes its nature, and appears as silver.

Anirvacaniyakhyata of Advaitins. Beyond being or not-being. Neither real nor unreal. Unknowable, Inexplicable, Ineflable, Agnosticism. Anirvacaneya-khyata connected with:

(i) Adhyasa or superimposition of bodily characteristics on self (Ksama Ksita); of world on God.

(ii) Vivarta, mal-transformation opposed to Parinama which is transformation only. Rajjarsapa or Sukti-rajata.

(vi) Categorical Imperative or Duty. (vi) Recognition of end, either positive or negative, in the shape of Duritakshya or Ananda. Istanthathanat-jhana.

(vii) Prabhakara understood Moksa as the setting of avidya, avidyastamayo moksha, or as the destruction of all Dharmas and Adharmas (Nihshadharmadharma-pariksa). Vedantic tinge of उस तीव्र मुक्तिवर्णनः-उपनिषद. He, however, makes room for Atmajnana as supported by Samadama. (आत्मज्ञान अ यां)

(vii) Kumara also regards Moksa as the destruction of Karman, but Moksa is only of a negative character (na hi abhavatmakam muktava mokshanatyavakara-nam). The Pratyavaya is to be taken away. Its mention is mere Arthavada. Moksa follows immediately on Karma. It is thus of the nature of Abha. Kumara's position is halting. It is a step from Prabhakara to Shankara.

Though thus there is a general agreement between Prabhakara and Kumara's views about the nature of Moksa, it is to be remembered that in the one case,

*The Marathi word याप means a white lie or bluff. Any talk of Atmajnana in the mouth of a person who regards the self as जन्म, is funny. The word याप is a later addition to the text by whomsoever it might have been suggested—Editor.
it is Pratyavāya-parihāra, while in the other case it is Duritakṣayadvārā paramesvaraprinartham. Kumārila recognises that Mimāṃsā before his time had altogether become atheistic (Lokāyatikṛta). Also he inclines towards recognising the utility of Vedanta, Cf. Nāstikyanirākārāṁurātmāsti tam bhāṣyakaṛdatra yuktyā, dr̥ḍhatvametadviṣayaśca bodhah prayāti vedāntaniśevanena. When Kumārila makes obeisance to Somārhadadhārin in his Mangala, Śloka-vārttika, first śloka, Nāmah Somārhadadhāriṇe, we can conclude: (i) that he was a Śivopāsaka, (ii) that he was a Paramesvaravādīn but he does not believe that God was the creator of the world; see Ganga Nath. Jha सङ्गाकार, Introduction, (iii) that he was a Śākta, Cf. Soma, (iv) that he had nevertheless his teachings grounded in Mimāṃsā as the half cup of Soma was directed to be drunk in Mimāṃsā teaching. In any case, he saw that the consummation of Mimāṃsā must be in Vedanta.

In the historical development of Mimāṃsā there is a passage from स्वर्गप्रवति (conception of स्वर्गप्रवति) to the conception of Mokṣa. Cf.

यन्न दु.केन संस्मृत्व न च वस्तुमतलयत्र ।
अभिलापोपनीतेन च तत्सुर्यः सङ्गाकारः।

Compare सङ्गाकार: for the conception of स्वर्गप्रवति.

VII. How Kumarila leads to Vedanta

(1) Bhedābheda leads to Abheda (Bheda, Bhedābheda, Abheda).
(2) Jñānaśakti leads to happiness, (Ajñāna, Jñānaśakti, Ānandamaya).
(3) Consciousness leads to self-consciousness, self-luminousness and self-revelation.
(4) Teleological ethics leads to the doctrine of bliss, and
(5) Viparita-khyāti leads to the doctrine of Adhyāsa or Vivarta.

The tradition related about Kumārila and Śaṅkara has got a great meaning underlying it.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Author       Book

Keith       Karma-Mimāṃsā Chap. I is historical containing among other things an account of Prabhākara and Kumārila. Chap. II is epistemological containing an account of स्वत : प्रामाण्य as well as an account of the various Pramāṇas comparatively with those of Nyāya. The account of अशौचित्ति, अनुपलब्धि may be read; but particularly the account of वाक्य or verbal testimony as the Vedas themselves play such an important part in the system. Chap. III contains the very celebrated criticism by Kumārila of Buddhist nihilism and idealism; also an account of the Mimāṃsā doctrine of categories comparatively with those of न्याय वैदिक. Chap. IV contains a very good account of a disproof of God and a proof of the souls. Chap. V deals with ritual interpretation and Chap. VI with Hindu Law (for this see Ganga Natha Jha, Prabhākara School).


Jha         Translation of Śloka-vārttika by Dr. Ganga Nath Jha (Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1900) with a very fine Introduction, by the author, of 45 pages on the “Pūrva-Mimāṃsā System”). Ślokavārttika (in verse)—I.i of Kumārila’s work is the Tarakapāda, given to metaphysics and epistemology. The excellent introduction of Ganga Natha Jha contains discussions of Dharma (Page iii); The means of knowing Dharma viz, Veda (Page v); The word as supreme Pramāṇa (Page vi), Six objections urged to the view along with answers thereto (Pp. vii and viii); Constructive arguments of Jaimini for the word (Page viii). Nature of Jñāna and स्वत : प्रामाण्यवाद (Pp. viii ff). The Apūrva (Page xv). The meaning of विद्या; अपूर्व विद्धि, निषयम विद्धि, परस्परत्वा विद्धि. (Pp. xviii and xix), Subsidiaries (Page xxii),
secondary actions and primary actions (Pp. xxiii to xxvi). Three kinds of primary actions नियः नैर्मलिक and काम्य (Pp. xxvi and xxvii). Arthavāda of four kinds—नित्य, प्राणिता पर्कृति and पुरुषाक्ष्य (P. xxxv). Three kinds of results: काव्य, प्रुषावर्ण and उम्मार्थ (P. xli), and इवारा. Categories, Mokṣa, Jñāna, Pramāṇya, Srṣṭi and Pralaya and Devatā (Pp. 32–34). In Ślokavārttika Dr. Jha discusses Kumārila more or less, as he discusses Prabhākara in the next work.

Jha ... "Mimāmsā Sūtras of Jaimini" translated by Ganga Nath Jha (Sacred Books of the Hindus Vol. X) with his own English commentary. Only Sūtras in Chapters 1 to 3 i.e. Śloka-Vārttika and Tantravārttika, the remaining 9 chaps. being Tup Tikā). The very brief introduction contains an account in English (P. ii) of the contents of the 12 Adhyāyas. The translation also contains headings to the different Adhikaraṇas of the first three Adhyāyas.


Ganga Nath Jha ... Translation of शास्त्रभाष्य 3 Vols. (Baroda).

Edgerton ... Mimānsā Nyāya Prakāśa or Āpadevi (Yale University Press 1929) regards Metaphysical and Epistemological aspects as less important, stresses ritual law.
CHAPTER SEVEN

POINTS IN GAUDAPADA'S PHILOSOPHY

1. Gauḍapāda, a real Vedāntist.
2. Gauḍapāda and Buddhism.
3. Doctrine of non-creation.
4. Illusionism.
5. Analysis of cuasality.
6. Absolutism.
7. The place of God.
8. The superconscious.
10. The status of morality.
11. The nature of illumination.
12. Prevarication about bliss.
13. Intuitionism.

Argument

1. That Gaudapāda is a real Vedāntist can be seen from the unity of his four Prakaraṇas; from his continued reference to AUM, as well as to the Amātra which leads to Jivanmukti; from the four states of consciousness; also from his doctrine of God as immanent in sweet reciprocation (Madhuvidyā). 2. Gauḍapāda adopts the same terminology and the same method of argumentation as the Buddhists and erects his absolutistic philosophy thereon. cf. Jñāneśvara and Mahānubhāvas. 3. His doctrine of non-creation is original even though he once regards creation even as an emanation (Svabhāva). 4. His doctrine of illusion is based upon the non-distinction between the waking state and the dream state as well as upon his theory of Kalpanā as in Yogavāśiṣṭha. He regards it is not necessary to sublate the dream state in the waking state and the waking state in the superconscious state: the waking state is a dream. cf. 'Imaginism' from a different point of view. 5. As regards causality he
maintains that time is an illusion as there are no relations of prior and posterior. Causation thus becomes impossible and an illusion. Nor does simultaneity involve causation, as the horns of a bull. Nor does he believe in the identity theory of cause and effect. 6. His absolute is defended from the stand-point of Neti as abolishing all difference, as well as from the product being identical with the substratum. Nor does Gauḍāpāda believe in the doctrine of grades or degrees of reality which is a mere compromise between monism and pluralism. But as in Gauḍāpāda there is no pluralism, there are also no grades of reality. 7. Still Gauḍāpāda has to make orthodox-wise a concession to God. 8. His belief in Reality is dependent upon the superconscious state. 9. Gauḍāpāda is again original in his doctrine of Asparsmayoga or the philosophy of non-contamination. 10. Every absolutist has to make some place for morality and so does Gauḍāpāda. 11. His doctrine of Vaiśāradya or illumination may involve a mystical element, but it is also intellectual and consists in the belief that all souls have been for ever in a state of illumination and liberation. 12. Once he regards bliss as identical with Reality, and, at another time, dissuades aspiring souls from merging themselves in bliss. Finally there is a usual conflict of intuitionism and intellectualism in Gauḍāpāda. 13. He uses Vijñāna in a different sense from the Vijñānavādins. His Vijñāna comprehends the trinity of knowledge, knower and known; and hence is identical with intuition. 14. While his intellectualism consists in the assertion that as the unmoving fire-brand produces no illusion, so does unmoving knowledge cease to produce the world of imagination. This is an intellectual ascent to Reality no doubt! Here, as elsewhere also with many authors, Vedānta seems to be infected with intellectualism.

**Gaudapada's philosophy**

**Points in detail**


and Nirvāṇa by the four Buddhistic schools, see Stcherbatsky. Moving, not moving etc. as in Aristotle. Reference to Buddhas and Buddha. “Buddha (in the singular) has not said that the knower becomes ultimately identical with knowledge and the known” (IV.99). छब्ब्दिविक र नया तां च विषयता instead of Buddha. “He alone is entitled to the name of Bhagavān who knows that by the clasping of any individual Dharma (Atman) misery yawns and happiness hides its face” (IV.82). Is this a criticism of the Buddha?

3. Nature of creation: neither enjoyment nor sport, but emanation. Doctrine of non-creation: non-creation in Sāmkhya, Jainism and Nyāya in the sense of eternal existence. “With them we have no quarrel, we heartily sym-pathise with them.” Ajāti in Buddhism, because no concatenation; in Vedanta, because delusion or semblance. Sāmkhya teaches Ajāti of the world in the sense of permanence, Gauḍāpāda teaches Ajāti in the sense of non-existence. Philosophers have proclaimed the doctrine of Jāti being afraid of Ajāti. They have maintained that things are (Sarvāsti-vādins). Reality on account of Upalambha and Samācāra. Criticism of Bādarāyāna, Nā bhāva upalabhī (cf. Śamkarism also). Upalambha and Samācāra are also found in Māyāhasti (IV.44). The enlightened or Buddhas have taken resource to Ajāti on account of the regress in the conception of causation.


5. Analysis of causality: neither cause nor effect: neither past nor future, hence no concatenation. Identity of cause and effect not tenable, (IV.12). Reciprocal causation involves infinite regress (IV.18). Also Bijānkura nyāya (IV.20), therefore no causality at all. No simultaneity. Horns of a bull are not causally related. No time relations as prior and posterior. “God stands above cause and effect”. ‘He who realises causelessness realises the sorrowless absolute’ (IV.78).

6. One without a second: Neti negates all difference. Unborn, sleepless, nameless, and formless. No metaphor in what we say. Advaita is the only reality and Dvaita is its differentiation. There is Advaita between Advaita and Dvaita. Vaiśāradya does not fall to the lot of those who are immersed in difference (Bhedā). The individual self is neither a part of nor a mode of the universal self (III.7). The description of a product as different from the primordial substance such as earth, fire, iron, etc., is only for the sake of comprehension or understanding. No grades of Reality (III.10). The Dvaitins fight with one another, but we fight with none. “There is no difference anywhere. God manifests himself in plurality by his powers” (III.24).

7. Reference to God or Deva. This Deva is Īsāna, Prabhu, Advaita. Genesis of the idea of Saguṇa and Nirguṇa Brahman. Praṇava is both Apara-Brahman
and Para-Brahman. (Atman God, Tanmaniṣā, his will cf. वचनेन सन्नवन्धियया). Same as Turyā.

8. The superconscious (Amanibhāva). Reality experienced in the superconscious state. "In that state knowledge rests in itself having Ajāti as its counterpart". Apprehension of unity(?) in the superconscious state. The superconscious transcends both Laya and Vikṣepa. This is the unshakable Samādhi where all discourse comes to end; the fearless, where all anxiety ceases; hard to attain even by great Yogins.


11. Vaiśāradya or illumination सक्तिमाति etc. That is consummate illumination when the knowledge is attained (Vaiśāradya, that all souls have enjoyed tranquillity from the very beginning, that they have never been born, that they are by nature blissful, that they are all equal. (This contradicts the assertion सम्मान सम्मान वा नॉपपलिन्ति सिंहते) and that they are one. All souls are forever in a state of illumination (IV.92). Tattvamasi and not Tattvambhashavi. Against Buddhism.

12. Prevarication about Bliss. One should not partake of highest Bliss; (III.45) and Reality of the nature of Bliss (III.47).


14. Alātaśānti as the highest end is a negative conception. Alātaśānti: the unmoving firebrand does not produce any illusion, similarly unmoving knowledge produces no illusion (IV.48). Cessation of the world of imagination; not the realisation of the Absolute. Vedānta infected with Intellectualism.

VII. Was Gaudapada a Buddhist?

Gauḍapada in relation to Nāgārjuna. Instead of Gaudapāda having received his doctrine from Nāgārjuna, it is better to say that Nāgārjuna and Gauḍapāda were offshoots of the same sceptico-mystical tendency; just as six centuries later, Śriharsa and Śantaraksita were offshoots of the same logico-dialectical tendency. कौण्यो वा कारणं राज्ञ: etc. Time is the cause of the schools. Is a great man the creator of his time or the creature of his times? Or else we might say that Gauḍapāda erected his absolutistic philosophy on the basis supplied by the teachings of Nāgārjuna, just as Madhusudana later on erected his new absolutism on the basis supplied by Navya-Nyāya. For Nāgārjuna see Das Gupta. For Gauḍapāda see our Points. अज्ञाति स्वाप्पमें. Three stages of the Śunyavāda of Nāgārjuna: (i) Nothing Real, (ii) Buddha and Nirvāṇa

THE KĀRIKĀS OF GAUḌAPĀDA

The Kārikās of Gauḍapāda are divided into four sections:— (i) Āgama, (ii) Vaitathya, (iii) Advaita, (iv) Alātāśaṃti. There is unity among them. The first can not be dissociated from the rest and is said to be Vedāntic in character, while the last particularly is said to be Buddhistic in character. In fact Gauḍapāda uses only the terminology and the manner of argumentation of Nāgārjuna, but rears an Advaitic philosophy upon them.

I Āgama

9. Reference to God or Deva whose nature it is to create. Some people say that creation is for enjoyment, others say it is for pastime. Essentially however it is but the nature of God: Creation only flows from God.

10. This Deva is Iśāna, Prabhu and Advaita and he is the same as Turyā.

16. How the individual soul wakes up from his sleep of ignorance into the day of Advaita.

17. The world does not exist, if it had existed it would have come to an end. In reality there is only Advaita.

18. Even Kalpanā does not exist. The word is used only for the sake of discourse: उपदेशाद्वेय बादो न हेतु न विद्यते.

23. A, U and M lead respectively to Viśva, Taijasa and Prajñā; the Amātra which is the fourth, carries nowhere (Jivanmukti). This verse tells us how Gauḍapāda owes complete allegiance to the Vedāntic teachnig of the Māṇḍūky-upaniṣad.

25. One who concentrates his mind on Praṇava,—for Praṇava is the fearless Brahman—He who has his heart set for ever on Praṇava has no cause for fear anywhere or at any time.

26. Praṇava is both the Apara-Brahman and Para-Brahman, the lower Brahman and the higher Brahman.

28. Praṇava is the same as Iśvara who abides in the heart of all beings and fills the universe.

29. He alone deserves to be called a Muni who has known this Omkāra, which is all auspiciousness and in which all duality ceases.
II. THE FALSITY OF THE WORLD

1. All objects (Bhāvas) chariots, mountains, elephants etc., are unreal as in a dream. There is no difference between dream state and waking state:

स्वप्नजागरिते स्वाते हेकमातुमैतिष्मिनि: ।

2. The Atman God makes an imaginative construct of himself by his own power of illusion (Māyā) and hence knows difference.

12. Reference to the Rajjusarpa dṛṣṭānta. The Rajju appears like a snake in darkness.

17. The imagination of a snake ceases when the rope is known; similarly the world ceases when the Atman is known:

निष्टितायाय यथा रज्जवं विकल्पो विनिवृत्ते ।
रज्जुर्वेति वायते तददत्तवनिक्षयः । ११

18. It is the power of illusion of God himself by which he gets himself infatuated.

19. The world appears to the wise as a dream, or a sleight of hand or a castle in the sky:

स्वप्नमये यथा दृष्टे मन्यवनपरं यथा ।
तथा विशेषत्तदं दृष्टें वेदान्तोत्पु विचारणः । ११

32. There is neither destruction (Nirodha) nor creation, there is neither bondage nor freedom, there is neither aspirant nor one who has reached the goal. This in fact is what may be called Verity (Paramārthā). This is almost in the spirit of Nāgārjuna.

34. There is neither unity nor multiplicity

35. The one without a second is reached in the Nirvikalpa state. There the world-appearance ceases.

36. Recognising the falsity of the world (Vaitathya) one should devote oneself to the one Existence without a second (Advaita) and having reached this One, one should behave like a mad man.

III. ADVAITA

2. Doctrine of Ajāti or non-creation in Vedānta, because semblance:

अतो वच्चाः सत्यमात्रमात्सर्वनशालसमस्तं गतम् ।
यथा न शाश्वते किंचित्त्बायमाने समस्तः । ११

5. As the space inside a jar is not contaminated by dust or smoke, similarly the Atman is not contaminated by happiness or sorrow.

7. As the space inside a jar is neither a part of nor a mode of the universal space, so the individual self is neither a part of nor a mode of the universal self.

8. As the foolish people regard the sky as soiled by dust so do they regard the Atman as soiled by evil.

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10. All objects or collocations (Samghātāh) are like dreams produced by the self in illusion. There is no ground for either superiority or equality among them. No grades or degrees of Reality.

12. In the sweet interdependence of pairs of objects (Madhuvidyā) is the same Brahma reflected or immanent.

15. There is unity (Abheda) all round. The description of a product as distinct from the primordial substance, such as earth, iron or fire (मूलस्थितिः विस्मृतिः) is only for the sake of comprehension or understanding (उपायः सौजन्यस्य नासिक चेतः कर्मचन्द)।

16. Upāsanā has been taught with a sense of pity in order that the functions of the three Āśramas might be properly discharged.

17. Dvaitins fight with one another, but we fight with none:

स्वसिद्धान्तव्यवस्थामु: दैतिनो निष्कितता दुःखम्।
परस्परं दिक्कोलते दैयं न दिक्कोलते।।

18. Advaita is the only true reality. Dvaita is the differentiation of it. There is Advaita between Advaita and Davita.

24. There is no difference anywhere. God manifests himself in plurality by his powers. This is truly the Advaitic position.

26. Reference again to the Śruti, Neti Neti to negate all differences or plurality.

31. Difference is produced by consciousness, but when the super-conscious is reached there is unity all round.

35. In Suṣupti there is Laya, but this Laya is transcended in the super-conscious state. In that state there is the fearless light of illumination all round.

36. This is the unborn, the sleepless, the dreamless, the nameless, the formless. This is the omniscient. There is really no metaphor in what we say.

37. This is the unshakable and the fearless Samādhi where all discourse comes to an end where all anxiety ceases. It is peace and illumination all at once:

सत्येज्ञातस्य सत्यमेव ज्ञात:।
सत्येज्ञातस्य सत्यमेव ज्ञात:।।

38. There is neither taking nor giving in that state. Knowledge in that state rests in itself having Ajāti for its counterpart.

39. This is what we understand by Asparśayoga, a thing hard to attain even by great Yogins. For they verily see fear where they should not see any:

अस्तर्यात्मतः नाम दुर्बिंशः सत्यात्मकः।
गोपिनो विभवति हस्तमादयमेव भयदतिन।।

40. There is an end to all sorrow in that state and there is perpetual wakefulness and an unending peace.
41. As a drop of water can produce no surge in the ocean, so no emotion can disturb the consummate tranquillity of such a mind.

45. One should not taste of bliss in that state. By the force of intellect one should make one’s mind veer round the Atman:

\[
\text{नास्ताद्वयेवू सुन्दरं तत्व निःसंगः प्रज्ञा भवेत् ।}
\text{निष्क्रिया निष्क्रियाणाम केषन्तु ध्यानतः।}
\]

Śāṅkara says that Sukha is only Avidyā-kalpita.

46. Brahman is reached when both Laya and Viśeṣa are transcended when the mind becomes unshakable and ceases to give rise to any illusions.

\[
\text{यदा न वैयते चित्त न च विकिर्यते पुनः।}
\text{अन्युधिनन्दनमासं निष्क्रियं श्रव्दो तत्तदा।}
\]

47. That unshakable bliss or Nirvāṇa is itself Brahman:

\[
\text{स्वरूपं शाल्यतं सत्यार्थमम्यं सुप्रभुतमम्।}
\text{अजम्जेन जेयेन सर्वं परिशक्तेन।}
\]

This contradicts the statement in verse 45. Gauḍapāda uses the word Nirvāṇa in a befitting sense.

48. What ultimately remains as the truth is the doctrine of non-creation or Ājāti.

**IV ALĀTAŠĀNTI**

(The extinction of the fire-brand).

This conception of the extinction of the fire-brand is also familiar in Muslim Mysticism. cf. The Mujaid.

1. Some people understand Dwipadām varam to mean Buddha (Das Gupta). Śāṅkara understands by Dwipadām varam Puruṣottama. or Nārāyana. By Dharma Śāṅkara understands Atman. cf. also (IV 10). Dharma is also used elsewhere for attribute or object? Obeisance to that foremost among men who by his knowledge (Jñāna) establishes the identity between attributes (Dharma) and substance (Jñeya) or by intuition realises the identity between the individual souls and God.

2. This is the Asparśayoga which does not admit of discussion and which does not come into conflict with any other theory. See Asparśayoga above.

4. Even when dualists say (e.g. Sāṁkhyas or Buddhists) that the Bhūta is not born nor is the Abhūta born, they are advocating the doctrine of Ājāti or non-creation.

5. We heartily sympathise with them; with them we have no quarrel. Gauḍapāda in this verse says, he has no quarrel with those who maintain the doctrine of non-creation. The Jainas and Śāṁkhyas and the Naiyāyikas maintain Ājāti because they regard the world as eternal Gauḍapāda maintains Ājāti because the world is an illusion. The Baudhhas
maintain Ajāti because there is neither cause nor effect and hence no production. Unconnected particulars can not produce anything. Gauḍapāda maintains the doctrine of Ajāti, because his substance also is neither cause nor effect but is transcendent.

10. That the word Dharma means the soul may be determined from the expression जरामरणविनिमृत्तताः : I जरामरणविनिमृत्तताः : पदं मण्डल्यमाणमयम् । जरामरण मौनावाह मारात्मकता यताति ये which in Bhagavad-gitā is applied to souls in passages like these. Souls which are essentially free from old-age or death get themselves entangled in old-age or death on account of the will of God. Śāmkara understands by तन्विनां as तन्वावशिष्यत।

12. If you maintain an identity between Kārya and Kāraṇa you would have to regard the Kārya itself as uncreated. Gauḍapāda here seems to criticise the identity doctrine of cause and effect in the very manner of Bradley and support the illusionistic theory.

14. Some regard the effect as prior to the cause, others regard the cause as prior to the effect. How can cause and effect entangle him, who stands above them?

16. Cause and effect can not be simultaneous. The horns of a bull are not causally related:

समभवे हेतुस्मृतोरेष्यति : तत्तत्वम् ।
 समस्तदा सांभवे यथाभासः संसारकथा विषाणादत् ।

18. If the cause can be proved from the effect and the effect from the cause, which would you say was prior? Regressus ad infinitum.

19. The Buddhas or the enlightened have taken recourse to the conception of Non-creation or Ajāti only on account of this regressus.

20. The analogy of Bija and Amkura involves the fallacy of Sādhyasama.

22. Neither from itself nor from another is an end produced. It is neither being nor not-being, nor again being and not-being together. (This manner of argumentation is really Buddhistic).

42. The enlightened or Buddhas have spoken about creation or Jāti being afraid to proclaim the doctrine of Ajāti. They have maintained that things are (for example, the Vaibhāṣikas). The argument by which they support this position are Upalambha and Samācāra; either you actually find the world or that morality must be supported. cf. the Sutra of Bādarāyāna, नामान्तर उपलब्धे : Gauḍapāda refers probably to this Sutra in his expression Upalambha. (Criticism of Bādarāyāna). cf III. 15:

मूलोद्ध्विषुपुलिकनाशी : मृदिवियाः चोहिष्टाद्यस्या ।
उपाद्य : सोशिवाराय नाति चेत : कथं चन ।।

44. Because Upalambha and Samācāra are found in Māyāhasthi also Gauḍapāda means to say that Upalambha and Samācāra are invalid arguments to prove the reality of the world.
45. Vijñāna is the only Reality. Gaṇḍāpadā is imitating probably the Vijñānavādins. Creation is an illusion, motion is an illusion, thinghood is an illusion. Objects do not exist, Vijñāna exists. There is no peace and no motion. There is one-ness and no creation.

47. The straight or the curve line described by the moving fire-brand or by a falling star are merely an appearance. Object and subject, receiver and giver, knower and known are only Vijñāna or knowledge and nothing else.

48. The unmoveing fire-brand does not produce any illusion. Unmoving knowledge similarly produces no illusion.

57. What appears to be created is only the force of Samvr̥ti. There is neither anything which is imperishable nor anything which is destructible.

73. Samvr̥ti is opposed to Paramārtha.

78. He who thus realises causelessness, takes leave of all sorrow and desire, and reaches the fearless goal.

81. This is the un-born, the sleepless and the dreamless illumination. The Atman shines once for all by the force of his nature or by the grace of the Almighty.

82. He alone is entitled to the name of Bhagavān who knows that by the clasping of any individual Dharma, misery yawns and happiness hides its face.

83. The fool perceives only the four-fold Āvaraṇa; Asti, Nāsti, Asti-nāsti and Nāsti-nāsti: moving, not-moving, both and neither. See Aristotle.

89. Omnicience proceeds when by intuition are realised the trinity of knowledge, knower and the known; when the fourth state, namely, Turya apprehends all the three previous states.

92. He alone reaches immortality whose forbearing comprehension includes the knowledge that all souls have been forever in a state of illumination. Ādi-Buddhāh.

93. That is consummate illumination when the knowledge is attained (Vaiśāradya) that all souls have enjoyed tranquillity from the very beginning, that they have never been born, that they are by nature blissful, that they are all equal and that they are one.

94. This Vaiśāradya does not fall to the lot of those who are immersed in difference.

99. Buddha has not said that the knower becomes ultimately identical with knowledge and the known.

100. Obeisance to that illumination which is hard to gaze at, which opens up the vista of equality and before which all duality comes to an end.
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RĀMĀNUJA

I. Introduction.

II. Class-Notes on Rāmānuja.

III. Rāmānujan Ontology.

IV. A Note on the Dhyānaniyogavādins.

V. Rāmānuja’s Criticisms of the Doctrine of Māyā.

I. Introduction

1. Biographical


2. Brahman or the Absolute = God + Self + World (भोक्ता भोग्यं प्रेक्षितार विनिष्क्रिया श्रास्त्रभुमत) but God particularly. Rāmānuja not definite as to whether God is identical with Brahman, or a part, though a major part of Brahman. cf. God or Iśvara as Cidacidviśiṣṭa. Trinity in unity. cf. the organic view of Pringle-Pattison. The Brahman Sugūla instead of Nirguṇa. No evil in Brahman.


(ii) Theological aspect: Nārāyana or Viṣṇu. Stress on Viṣṇupurāṇa, not Bhāgavata. Full of auspicious qualities. Bhagavān:

ऐत्थ्रयोष्ठ समप्रस्य वीर्यसः पण्ड-स्वर: विषयः
आय वैराज्योश्चैव वर्णां भग इतीरण ॥ १२

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(a) Four Vyūhas or forms of God: Śamkarśaṇa, Vāsudeva, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Jñāna, Bala, Aiśvarya, Virya, Śakti and Tejas; all six belonging to Vāsudeva and two each to the three others.

(b) Vibhavas are the ten Avatāras. Pancarātra + Nārāyana and Viṣṇu. No Rādhā.

(c) Avatāras or idols.

4. Self: Individuality, therefore reality. Atomic, therefore plurality. (Ane does not mean atomic, R.D.R.); (according to Śamkara soul not atomic). Mode (Prakāra), attribute or adjective (Viṣeṣaṇa) of God. Three views about the relation of subject and predicate. (i) The absolute, the only reality; the predicates are illusory (Bradley); (ii) The absolute, the only substance; predicates have only an adjectival existence (Bosanquet). In Rāmānuja the self and world are predicates. They cannot be both substantival and adjectival at once, as Rāmānuja would have them; (iii) A third view also possible. Subject and predicate both substances (Pluralism). The self a Karttī; in Śamkara, self not a doer; in Śāmkhya, Dṛṣṭa. Interpretation of Tattvamasi attributive. The self being an adjective (Viṣeṣaṇa) of God, not identical with Him. cf. the jar is white. If God is blissful and knower, the self is also blissful and knower, though on a smaller scale (Alpa). Subject of consciousness instead of consciousness itself. Consciousness is its attribute. No absorption, merging or annihilation (personal immortality). Similar and not same. परस्म शापमयीति. Self as controlled by God and as dependent on Him.

5. World: Reality against the illusionism of Śamkara. Criticisms of the Māyā doctrine. World like the self, a mode, attribute or an adjective of God. Doctrine of causality in Rāmānuja: Satkāryavāda or Purināvāda. Effect existing in cause. Arachnomorphism. Brahmapurināvāda. Creation is evolution as in Śāmkhya and not epigenesis as in Nyaya; destruction is involution. From subtle to gross and from gross to subtle.

6. The way to God:

(i) Karma, Jñāna and Bhakti. Navavidhā Bhakti of Bhāgavata. Karma produces Jñāna as in Śamkara. Bhakti is the result of Jñāna (contrast Śamkara). Bhakti is supreme. Bhakti in Rāmānuja takes the help of Yoga. Meditation, intuition. Stress on God-vision. Continuous meditation on the supreme soul. Śeṣa or an attribute of God; Ācāryābhimanayoga discussed in Arthapancaka. Vicarious suffering. Christian influence (R. G. B.). Mother takes medicine herself to cure the infant. Meditation stressed more than love (R. G. B.). Prapatti or self-surrender a rarified form of Bhakti. The first three orders can practise Bhakti. All the three along with the Śudras can practise Prapatti.

(ii) Definition of Prapatti or Šaraṇāgati:

(a) आनूकल्यस्य संकल्पः
(b) प्रातिकल्यस्य वर्जितम्
(c) रक्ष्यप्रतीति विवस्थः
(d) गोसूल्कवर्णः तथा
(e) आत्मनिषेधः
(f) कारणत्वं पद्विधा शरणागतः

*This refers to Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's book—Vaishnavism, Shaivism and Minor Religious Systems—Editor.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Man's effort</th>
<th>God's grace</th>
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<tr>
<td>(a) Monkey</td>
<td>(a) Cat (Kangaroo or even a cock a better illustration).</td>
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<td>(b) Prapatti must begin from the aspirant.</td>
<td>(b) Prapatti must begin from God.</td>
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<td>(c) Prapatti must come last</td>
<td>(c) Prapatti must come first</td>
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<td>(d) Self-assertiveness</td>
<td>(d) Self-abandonment</td>
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<td>(e) Depressed classes last (untouchability) (less liberal)</td>
<td>(e) Depressed classes first (Untouchability) (more liberal)</td>
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<td>(f) AUM omitted</td>
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II. Class-notes on Rāmānuja

1. Nyāya: first Nirvikālpaka Jñāna, then Savikalpaka; first, continuum, then differentiation. In Rāmānuja, no Nirvikālpaka; the Nirvikālpaka a psychological myth. Hence, also, Rāmānuja’s God is Saguṇa, with qualities and not Nirguṇa.

2. Realism: Reality of self, world and God. Reality also of the dream-object, the shell-silver, the rope-serpent, the yellow colour or the conch and of the watery particles of the mirage. Satkhyāti. Realistic theory of error. Other people do not see the conch yellow, because the yellowness is very faint and adequate only to the deranged vision of the jaundiced patient. Two kinds of illusion referred to by Rāmānuja: public and private, mirage for all and yellow colour for one, but no essential difference between the two.

3. Meaning of Viśiṣṭādvaita:
Quality depends upon substance, is inseparable from substance, but is not substance. Similarly the self and the world depend upon God, are inseparable from God being His body, but are not God. They are Prakāras or Viśeṣaṇas. Even Amśa can not be a good conception as it brings in the relation of part and whole. Analogy rather like that of substantive and adjective. For Tattvamasi cf. the lotus is blue. In Nyāya the substance and the quality are external to one another and not organically connected as in Rāmānuja. In Kumārila and Nimbārka there is Bhedabheda but in Rāmānuja there is no Abheda. Or again, the two terms lotus and blue have different meanings and yet refer to the same substance, (Prakāryadvaita).

4. Difference between Samavāya and Aprthaksiddhi: while Samavāya tries to unite what are supposed to be distinct, Aprthaksiddhi tries to separate what is supposed to be one (Hiriyanna Pp. 409 to 410).

5. Karma preparatory to Jñāna as in Śamkara, but obligatory even after Jñāna as against Śamkara. The Advaitic ideal of Karma-sanyāsa, therefore rejected by Rāmānuja. Tilak’s Karmayoga.
6. Prapatti open to all; Bhakti open to three classes only. Grace: Śaraṇāgati. Resignation in excelsis. A single moment of earnest sincerity is enough; but that moment would not come without continual experience. How can you reach the peak of the Everest without being on the top level for a long time? Social reform. No untouchability in spirit. Rāmānuja in his commentary on Bhagavad-gītā XVIII.66 says: "Sanātana Parivrajaka Māmakṣa śāraṇa gaja asks us to renounce Karmayoga, Jñānayoga and even Bhaktiyoga for Śaraṇāgati or Prapatti, thus establishing the complete supremacy of the way of resignation.

III. Rāmānujan Ontology

The Yatindramatadipikā is an excellent epitome of Rāmānujan ontology. In the first three chapters it discusses the three Prāmanas recognized by the Rāmānujan system, viz., Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Śabda and no other. From chapter four to chapter nine, both inclusive, it discusses the six Dravyas recognized by Rāmānuja and in the tenth chapter it discusses the ten Adravyas.

The six Dravyas may be classified under two heads: Jaḍa and Ajaḍa. The Jaḍa Dravyas are Prakṛti and Kāla, Nature and time. The Ajaḍa Dravyas are four, viz., Pūrṇa-vibhūti, Dharmabhūta-jñāna, Jiva and Īśvara.

The Prakṛti of Rāmānuja is the same as that of the Sāmkhya, with the distinction that while in the Sāmkhya, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas are the constituents of Prakṛti, in Rāmānuja they are only attributes or qualities. Time as a separate Dravya in Rāmānuja implies two things: (i) The reality of the system, (ii) the reduction of space to time.

The Pūrṇa-vibhūti which is Śuddha Sattva, which in fact is different from the Sattva which is the attribute of Prakṛti, constitutes the substance of which the bodies of God and souls are made.

Dharmabhūta-jñāna is, as its name implies, Jñāna which is secondary to God and souls. It is peculiar that Jñāna should be recognised as a Dravya, when it is really also a Guṇa of God and souls. Neverthless there is this thing in common between Rāmānuja and Nyāya that this Jñāna would itself be known; but it is known in Rāmānuja by itself and not through another Jñāna as in Nyāya.

Of Jiva and Īśvara we have spoken elsewhere. Rāmānuja recognizes a relation Aprathakṣiddhi instead of the Samavāya of the Nyāyāyikas, and it consists of the non-separable existence of qualities or attributes from substance, that is, in the organic dependence of modes upon substance. The modes are the Prakāras and the substance is the Prakārin.

The word Viśeṣaṇa includes these Prakāras as well as the Adravyas which are ten in number.

The abolition of the distinction of Prakāra and Viśeṣaṇa is one of the chief peculiarities of the Rāmānujan system (Hiriyanna).
ten The Adrvyas are the three psychical qualities, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas; the five sensible qualities, Šaba, Sparśa, Rupa, Rasa, and Gandha and Samyoga and Śakti.

IV. A note on the Dhyānaniyogavādins:

Rāmānuja discusses the doctrine of this school of Contemplatives in his commentary on the Samanvayādikaraṇa, I. 1.4. The question is, what is the ultimate import of the Vedantic texts? The Mīmāṃsakas contend that their utility is for injunctions only, commendatory or prohibitory; they can not establish Brahman, the idea of which is already established. The Dhyānaniyogavādins contend that their utility is for a life of "meditation or contemplation" (Dhyāne niyogah). They say that the knowledge to be attained by the Vedantic texts is ancillary to a life of meditation by which alone we can realise God. The Advaitin maintains that the import of the texts is for the knowledge of the identity of the Brahman and the self. The Bhedābhedavādin school maintains that the import of the Vedāntic texts is to show the distinction and the non-distinction of the two at the same time. The Viśistādvaitin maintains along with the Advaitin that the import of the texts is for knowledge, but he regards the knowledge as subsidiary to devotion. The Dhyānaniyogavādin school seems to have some sympathy from Rāmānuja, the intuition or direct realisation of the one not being contradictory of the devotion or the self-surrender of the other, and both being the results of the knowledge to be attained by the Vedantic texts.

Class-notes on the above.

The help that Yoga renders to Vedānta.

Rāmānuja seems to be in sympathy with the Dhyānaniyogavādins. Intellect vs. intuition. Thought vs. meditation. Action produces knowledge and knowledge gives rise to Bhakti, (Rāmānuja); action produces knowledge and knowledge leads to the life of meditation (Dhyānaniyogavādins).

To Śāmkara Jñāna is the be-all and the end-all; to the Dhyānaniyogavādins it is preliminary to Dhyāna. The Mīmāṃsaka: the Veda is, and the Deva is not. The Word gives injunctions regarding Dhyāna (Dhyānaniyogavādins), not injunctions about Karma (Mīmāṃsaka). The knowledge produced by the Vedānta is abstract, says the Dhyānaniyogavādin.

The Dhyānaniyogavādin agrees with the Advaitin in saying that our aim should be the identification of the self with God, but while the Advaitin says that this is to be attained by knowledge, the Dhyānaniyogavādin says that it is to be achieved by meditaion. The Advaitin maintainins Jivan-mukti; the Dhyānaniyogavādin, Videhamukti.

Liberation before death, Jivanmukti; liberation at death, Videhamukti; liberation after death, Kramamukti. We must be liberated while living, and though living, says the Advaitin.

Two objections to Jivanmukti: (i) If one is liberated during life, his body must fall at once. (ii) If one is liberated, all must be liberated along with him (Sarvamukti).

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Death is not an event but a process; similarly, even when Jivanmukti is attained, the body may continue for some time.

Disembodiment of the self can not be effected by mere knowledge; it can be done only by meditation.

Summary of the Doctrines of the Dhyānaniyogavādins.

(Niyoga — charge, command, order, duty.)

1. The ultimate aim of the Vedantic text is to inculcate a life of meditation or contemplation, not a life of mere injunction.

2. They teach intuitional realisation which is concrete, not intellectual knowledge which is abstract. Mere knowledge can not destroy the actual sensory perceptions of phenomena; meditation would.

3. The Advaita conception of Jivanmukti is illogical, says the Dhyānaniyogavādin, and contrary to scripture as Āpastambha maintains. There is only Videhamukti. (This criticism of Jivanmukti is wrong because the scriptures uphold it: इत्युत्त्तप वद्यमानम्, and is logical, because even after the attainment of Jivanmukti the body may continue for a while by the force of Kārmika inertia. Desirelessness, destruction of ignorance, realisation of the self may all be the meanings of Jivanmukti, and particularly the last; and when this is attained liberation is attained. Nothing valuable might be achieved by liberation at death (Videhamukti); or enjoyment of bliss then; Kramamukti is merely a theological makeshift; nor need Jivanmukti invoke Sarvanukti, R.D.R.

4. There is really Abheda between the self and God, says the Dhyānaniyogavādin. Herein he agrees with the Advaitin. The Bhedābhedavādin maintains that there is both difference and non-difference between selves and God, as there is both difference and non-difference between individuals and the genus, or between the pot-ethers and the universal ether. This, says the Dhyānaniyogavādin, is wrong. There is only Abheda; and the Abheda can be experienced by contemplation only, and not, as the Advaitins say, by mere knowledge.

5. Self-realisation is attained when the unembodied condition of the soul is realised.

6. The object of meditation is real, say the Dhyānaniyogavādins, and not a mere mental concept as the Mimānsakas would say. There is no hallucination or delusion about it.

V. Rāmānuja's Criticisms of the Doctrine of Māyā.

1. आच्छाद्यालम्प्तिः

   Ignorance can not reside either in the self or in God. It can not reside in the self, because self-hood is itself projected by it; it can not reside in God who is supreme intelligence.

2. तिरोधायालम्प्तिः

   It is impossible that ignorance should have the power to eclipse the all-luminous Brahman.
3. स्वाभाविक: इन्द्रियांकार: नाम तत्त्वादित्त्वात्

Ignorance must be either real or unreal; if real, it cannot be an illusion; if unreal, it can not be an adjunct of Brahman.

4. अनिवर्तनीयत्वानुपरिपत्ति: इ

Ignorance can not be indefinable, because this itself would constitute its definition.

5. प्रमाणानुपरिपत्ति: इ

There are three criteria of truth according to Rāmānuja: (i) Pratyakṣa (ii) Anumāna, (iii) Šabda, (i) Pratyakṣa can not prove illusion for whatever Pratyakṣa points out is real; e.g. a dream-object is real, the shell-silver is real, the mirage is real and so on. It is here that Rāmānuja makes a distinction between the two aspects of error: public and private; mirage and jaundice. The fact that all so-called illusions have reality proves that there are no illusions at all. (ii) Inference can not prove unreality, because any illustrative example which it may call to its aid will be found defective. (iii) There is no authority in scripture for the existence of Avidyā.

6. निवन्दकानुपरिपत्ति: इ

The knowledge of the Advaitin is the knowledge of the attributeless Brahman which does not exist. What are the world and the selves except the attributes of God? An impossible knowledge of the attributeless Brahman, therefore, would not be competent to destroy ignorance. Or again, according to the Advaitin, knower, known and knowledge are an illusion. A knowledge of this kind would not be adequate to destroy illusion because it will require another knowledge to destroy itself. The regressus can be set at rest only by regarding knowledge, knower and known as verities.

7. निवृत्तनुपरिपत्ति: इ

The individual soul’s bondage or ignorance is determined by his Karma and is a concrete reality. It can not be destroyed by knowledge which is merely abstract.
CHAPTER NINE

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MADHVA

I. Introduction.
II. Metaphysical Affiliations.
III. The Law of Difference.
IV. Efficient and Material Causation.
V. Nature of God.
VI. Way to Liberation.
VII. The Nature of Liberation.
VIII. Interpretation of Mahāvākyas.

I. Introduction

1. Summary

Pāñcarātrasamhitā but no Vyūhas.

No Rādhā or Gopala-kṛṣṇa; Instead, Lakṣmi and Nārāyaṇā Criticism of Rāmānujās doctrine of the composite personality of God.

Vaiśeṣika categories accepted with some changes. God, the supreme substance or Dravya. God expressible by all words, pantheistic in character which is against Madhvism. Creation begins with the disturbance of the equilibrium of Prakṛti by God.

The category of difference. The law of correlations, fundamental in the universe; man-woman, merit-dem merit, Brahma-jiva, Brahma-Prakṛti and so on.

Five eternal differences between God, self and nature interse.

Lakṣmi possesses the same extension in time and space as does Viṣṇu.

God, efficient and not material cause which is Prakṛti. Attributes of God six; Bhagavān. Way to liberation; moral, spiritual and even intellectual virtues.

Paramātmabhakti when it becomes Sthira immediately leads to Mokṣa. Fear and love of God consequent upon the knowledge of His power and goodness.
Intellectual qualifications such as Bhedajñāna and reprobation of false doctrines necessary for liberation. Jiva not one with Brahman even in Mokṣa. Similarity not favoured by Madhva, dependence. Three classes of persons: (i) Fit for liberation, (ii) Always revolving (iii) Fit for perpetual darkness. Urdhvam gacchanti sattvasthāh etc. Mokṣa is attained by direct knowledge or perception of Hari. Three kinds of knowledge like lightning, like the sun, like reflection in a mirror. cf Yathādārśe tathatmani.

Interpretation of Mahāvākyas:
Tattvamasi (i) Tadiyah, (ii) Atattvam, (iii) Tattvam—real.
Ayamātmā Brahma, Atanaśilah Bramhaṇaśilah.
Ekamevādvitiyam Brahma, without parallel.
Sarvam khalvidam Brahma, all pervading.
Mṛtyoh.....Nāneva paśyati, many momentary cognitions.

II. Metaphysical Affiliations
1. Upaniṣads: Dvā suparṇa........Mundaka (III. 1.) Ajāmekām....

2. Śaṁkara: Criticism of Śaṁkara’s doctrine of the unreality of the world.

3. Rāmānuja: Criticism of Rāmānuja’s doctrine of the composite personality of God which lends to deprecate His independent majesty. Rāmānuja’s “composite personality” is a contradiction in terms.

4. Vaiśeṣika Categories like substance, quality etc. acknowledged with some modifications. God is supreme Substance. God expressible by all words, which is pantheistic in character, therefore against Madhvis.

5. Paurāṇika Śāmkhya: Creation begins with the disturbance of the equilibrium of Prakṛti by God.

III. The Law of Difference
(a) Difference (pairs or correlatives), the law of nature: man-woman, merit-demerit, knowledge-ignorance, Brahmā-Jiva, Brahmā-Prakṛti, Niyamy-Niyāmaka, Jivas-Jaṇa, Bhoktā-Bhogya. Absolute realism.

(b) Five eternal differences: God and self, God and nature, Self and nature, self and self, natural object and natural object.

(c) God: Independence; one in many forms. Lakṣmi eternally different, but dependent though she possesses the same extension in time and space as does Viṣṇu. Jiva dependent, ignorant and other defects.

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IV. Efficient and Material Causation

Madhva denies that God is material cause. Therefore recognition of Prakṛiti as a heteros. Only efficient cause. Unintelligent world cannot be produced from intelligent God.

V. Nature of God


VI. Way to Liberation

The way of liberation consists of the attainment of moral, spiritual and even intellectual virtues. They are:

(a) Vairāgya, Śama, Dama, work without attachment, sympathy for inferiors, love to equals, reverence for superiors.

(b) Ācāryopāsanā [Guru and not books (books only in rare cases)], Paramātmabhakti when it becomes Sthira, immediately leads to Mokṣa, Īśvarārpaṇa and buddhi (resigning all works to God), Love or Fear of God consequent upon the knowledge of His power and goodness. Meditation on Bhagavat (Nidhiyāsanā).

(c) Intellectual qualifications: Bhedajñāna and reprobation of false doctrines.

VII. The Nature of Liberation

(1) Difference (Jiva not one with Brahman even in Mokṣa. Different in Samsāra, non-different in Mokṣa impossible) and similarity (Sāmya); (similarity is favoured by Rāmānuja and not by Madhva).

(2) Three classes of people (R. G. Bhandarkar)

Rṣis, holy people and menes belong to the first class, ordinary men to the second class; Demons, ghosts and wicked men to the third class. Īrdhvam gacchanti savasthāh etc. Bhagvad-gītā.

(3) Mokṣa is attainable by the direct knowledge or perception of Hari.

(4) Direct knowledge possible for all (?). Madhva prevaricates between two views viz. possible for all and possible for good souls only.

(5) Direct knowledge of men may be compared to the coruscation of lightning; that of gods to the steady brilliance of the sun, and that of Guruḍa to reflection; cf Yathādārse tathātmanī.

* (i) Fit for final Bliss, (ii) Always revolving through the circle of existences, (iii) Fit for darkness, Gods.

** The reference is to Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar’s book—Vaiṣṇavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems.
VIII. Interpretation of Mahavakyas

1. Tattvamasi: Tadiyah or tasya. Also Atattvamasi (Nagaraja Sarma) or Tattvamasi: Thou art real, तत्त्वं असि।

2. अयमात्म्या ब्रह्म (a) Atanasīlah (b) ब्रह्मणात्मः : (c) eulogy अथवा (Upacāra?) of Jiva (d) for the sake of meditation. (e) Pūrvapakṣa which is later refuted.

3. ब्रह्मात्मियो ब्रह्मां भवति। Similar to Brahman, almost like, Brahma iva.

4. एकमेवाविविद्यम्। Without a parallel.

5. एवं शतसु हर्दं ब्रह्म। All-pervading.

6. मृत्यो: . . . . . . . . . नामेव परिष्यति। Criticism of many momentary cognitions as opposed to one eternal knowledge; cf. Criticism of Buddhistic Asat in असद्भ इत्यद् आशीत् etc.
CHAPTER TEN

THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALLABHA

I. Introductory.
II. Foundations of Vallabha’s Philosophy.
III. Metaphysics.
IV. Vallabha and the Doctrine of Māyā.
V. Doctrine of Bhakti.

I. Introductory

Born in Telangana, 1479 A. D. Village Kāṅkarava; Kṛṣṇa-Yajurveda; Settled in Mathura, Vrindavana and Govardhana. Influence in Gujarat, Śrīnāthajī Sampradāya. Nābhājī in his Bhaktimālā said that Jñāneśvara, Nāmadeva and Vallabha were all disciples of one Viṣṇusvāmin, a Drāvida saint. Vallabha had seven grandsons who founded seven temples. The cult of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa. The cow, the trees, animals, the river Yamuna, brooks, birds, Gopas and Gopis are the forms of the associates of God. One perpendicular white mark on the forehead. Presentation of all things to God. “Moral rigidity culminating in indifference to worldly enjoyments and self-abnegation does not appear to be a characteristic of this school.” R. G. Bhandarkar, P. 82. The Bhāgavata like the Prasthānātraya cardianl in Vallabha’s teachings.

II. Foundations of Vallabha’s Philosophy

(i) Sphulinga and Pāvaka, (ii) Ģṛṇa-nābhī, (iii) The personal category possibly higher than the impersonal with Vallabha, cf. Puruṣottama is superior to Kṣara and even to Akṣara, superior to self and even to the Absolute. Bhagavad-gīta XV यस्मातु शर्मन।तत्तैः हृदशर्दर्विन्वी चोऽतम: = Kṣara = changing world, Akṣara = unchanging self. अश्वर्दर्विन्वी चोऽतम: = पुरुसंस्तम: involves Akṣara = Puruṣa = self. Puruṣottama is the highest self viz. the God. (If Akṣara means Brahman then alone would Vallabha be supported). One should not forget that Akṣara may mean Prakṛti. Also cf. Bhagavad-gīta XII ते प्राप्तवर्त्तन्ति मामेव, (iv) Doctrine of Amśa cf. अंशो नानात्मप्रतिवेदात्. Relation of Amśa and Amśin, (v) Conception of sport or Lilā. Origin of the conception of Lilā in Lokavatū lilākaivalyam. Sport, the alpha and the omega of Vallabha’s philosophy : physical and metaphysical,
The Brahman can manifest itself either in Jiva or Jaṭa through sport. The metaphysical significance of sport. ‘Difference’ manifested through sport and therefore not ultimately real. It is real in Nimbārka and Madhva. The category of identity, Śāmkara; similarity, Rāmānuja; difference, Madhva and sport, Vallabha.

III. Metaphysics

From the one primeval soul who was originally alone, were born (i)Īśvara (Śaśidānanda), (ii) Self (Sat-cit) and (iii) the world (Sat.). By his power He made Ānanda imperceptible in the second, and Ānanda and cit in the third. cf. Śāyaṇa in his introduction to Rgveda. The three qualities Sat, Cit and Ānanda are respectively treated in जनसाधिकरण 1.1.2; शेषाधिकरण 1.1.5; and आनन्दमयाधिकरण 1.1.6. in a consecutive order.

(a) The Absolute is God or Bhagavat. Abolition of the distinction between Saviśeṣa and Nirviśeṣa, i.e., distinct and non-distinct because both these exist in Brahman; breaking of the law of contradiction; opposites can co-exist in it. The Absolute or God is extraordinary or Jagad-vilākṣaṇa. The doctrine of Sarvam khalu-idad-Brahma means that all things are verily the Brahman. All things in every thing; the Ghaṭa is the Paṭa because both of them are Brahman. cf. the present-day scientific reduction of all things to one element. No limit to God’s omnipotence, may break the law of contradiction. Omnipotent, omniscient, possessed of an infinite number of attributes, e.g. Aśvarya and so on. It is Śuddha, i.e. never contaminated by Māyā. Spiritual realism. The vaunted spiritual realism not valid because, the three ultimate reals inconsistent with the one ultimate real.

(b) Jiva possesses Sat and Cit with Ānanda obscured. The world and the self are as real as Brahman and identical with it. They are both Brahmātmaka and Brahma-kārṇa. But they can not be both. Souls, fulgurations of the deity or scintillations, effluences or emanations. Self Ānū and yet like the fragrance of sandal moving outwards, pervades the whole body by its intelligence, Vyātireko gandhavat, Avirodhāh candanavat. cf. the presence of the self in Orion by its intelligence in James. The self non-different from Brahman and yet a part of it. Hence numerical plurality and qualitative identity. Tattvamasi literally true (Abhidhā), and not metaphorically (Lakṣaṇā) as in Śāmkara, Rāmānuja and Nimbārka. In Śāmkara jahad-ajahad-lakṣaṇā. cf. Vedāntasāra.

(c) Nature possesses only Sat, with Cit and Ānanda obscured. Identity of cause and effect. Causality is identity cf. Śāmkara. God is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe. cf. जूण्ण माति: तत्तुः; पूर्विको औपविको; पुरुष और कैलास.

In the third they are only an emanation; but Kēśaloma do not become Puruṣa again. Creation and destruction arachnic in character. (i) Āvirbhāva and Tirobhāva, (ii) Manifestation and disappearance and (iii) evolution and involution. Creation = expression in the form of product. Destruction = reduction to the form of cause.
IV. Vallabha and the Doctrine of Maya

No Mâyā in Vallabha, hence Šuddhādvaita. (a) Still Vallabha in his conception of disappearance or obscuration does recognise Mâyā. (b) So also in his doctrine of subjective reality (Pratiti) and objective un-reality of things (Svarūpa), he recognises Mâyā. (c) Also in his recognition of Avidyā or infatuation in Jiva. (d) Also Relativism. The Prapanca which is real appears in three different forms to three different kinds of persons. To the liberated, it appears as Brahma-dhāraman, to the philosopher as Brahma-dhāraman and Māyā-dhāraman: (ब्रह्मदर्मान् प्रमदर्मान्) to the ignorant it appears as Māyā-dhāraman alone. Relativity is unobjectivity and therefore unreality. (e) The apparent motion of the trees when it is really the boat which is moving. This, the same as superimposition (Adhyāsa): superimposition of motion where there is none.

V. Doctrine of Bhakti

Bhakti is superior to Jñāna, contrast Šamanaka. Two kinds of Bhakti, Maryādā bhakti and Puṣṭi bhakti: (i) limited and unlimited. (ii) Effort and grace. प्रभुविनयम् | Maryādā involves Śādhanā or effort on the part of the devotee. Puṣṭi involves grace (Anugraha). Grace of God may be enjoyed even in worldly life. Grace over grace arising. Puṣṭi-puṣṭi. Mahāpuṣṭi leads to the direct attainment of God. The Vrindavana on earth has an archetype in heaven. Goloka (Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā) higher than even Vaikunṭha (Viṣṇu and Lakṣmi). Puṣṭi has three stages: Preman, Āsakti and Vyasana. Sport or Lilā is superior even to Śāyujya, not to speak of other kinds of Mukti. लोकन्तु श्रीद्रवभवमयम् (iii) Maryādā may be utilitarian, Puṣṭi is altruistic where the Altar is God. (iv) Maryādā-bhakti is restricted to the three higher castes; Puṣṭi-bhakti is open to all persons, e.g. the open religion of Bergson. (v) Thus Maryādā-bhakti is ceremonial religion; Puṣṭi-bhakti is the religion of divine love.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NIMBÄRKA

I. Introductory.
II. God, Self, Nature.
III. Doctrine of Bhedabheda.
IV. Nimbärka and Rāmānuja: Similarity and difference.
V. Summary of Nimbärka's Doctrine (R.G.B.)

I. Introductory

Nimba, name of a village in Bezwada District. Nimba also the name of his father. Tailanga. Later resided in Vrindāvana. Influence in Vrajadesa (Mathura) and Bengal. His date not fixed, but he may be supposed to have come after Rāmānuja. Wrote two works: Vedānta-Pārijata-Saurabha, a commentary on Brahma-sūtras, and Daśaṇlokī, an epitome of his system. Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā instead of Nārāyaṇa and Lakṣmi of Rāmānuja. Vyūhas and Avatāras. Nimbärka, supposed to be an incarnation of the disc of Viṣṇu. Sanaka-Sampradāya. Followers wear a black mark inside two white lines on the forehead. Keśava Kāśmirin, a philosophical descendant. 30th in the list; wrote a Bhāsyā on the Vedānta Sūtras like Nimbärka himself.

II. God, Self and Nature

Three principles as in Rāmānuja: Cit, Acit and Iśvāra. Bhoktā, Bhogyam, Preritā.
(a) Iśvara—Doctrine of Antaryāmin or Niyantī. God, the abode of auspicious qualities as in Rāmānuja.
(b) The self is both agent and enjoyer 'even in the state of liberation'. The self Anū, as in Rāmānuja, and plural. Also Niyamya. Nimbärka talks of the Paratantra-kartrītva of the self, which is a contradiction in terms. Self is Prajnānaghana and Jñānamaya; both knowledge and knower; both Jñātā as well as Jñāna. Interpretation of ज्ञो ज्ञेय: synthesis of the interpretations of Śamkara and Rāmānuja. Dependence.

1 A summary of the account in Dr. R. G. Bhandarkar's book—Vaisnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems—Editor.
(c) Acit (matter is both Prākṛtika and Aprākṛtika. Prākṛtika matter constitutes the world; Aprākṛtika matter constitutes, as for example, the sun-like refugent body of God, his crown or his flute. God the material (Upādāna) and the efficient (Nimitta) cause of the world, as in Rāmānuja, Śankara or Vallabha. Upādāna, because the gross springs from the subtle (doctrine of Parināma). Nimitta, because God unites action with fruit.

III. Doctrine of Bhedabheda

Extreme similarity, says Nimbarka, leads to the conception of identity, as for example, of self and God." Extreme similarity implies not necessarily absolute identity but the non-preception of difference" (Ghate). (i) Identity and difference as between snake and the coil (Ahikunḍalavat): Bādarāyaṇa. This Sūtra is the foundation of Nimbarka’s philosophy of Bhedabheda, just as the Puruṣottama verse in the Bhagavad-gītā XV is the foundation of Vallabha’s philosophy. (ii) Kṛṣṇa calling himself Paramātman in the Bhagavad-gītā implies both identity and difference of self and God. (iii) The Cit and Acit are distinct from Brahman because their attributes are declared to be different from those of Brahman by Śruti; and they are non-different from Brahman because they are dependent on Him. The analogy of fire and its sparks is invalid: it implies part and whole. The sun and its light implies emanation. (iv) In Tattvamasi, the Tvaṃ is what is dependent on the Tatr: difference and non-difference at once. (v) Dharma and Dharmin, qualified and qualifier; both difference and non-difference between Dharma and Dharmin. (vi) The conception of Bhedabheda violates the law of contradiction.

IV. Nimbarka and Ramanuja: Similarity and Difference

(i) Three principles as in Rāmānuja: but the triune unity or composite personality of Rāmānuja rejected by Nimbarka. (ii) In Nimbarka Bheda and Abheda stand on the same level. On the other hand Rāmānuja stresses the Abheda more than the Bheda (while Nimbarka stresses Bheda more than Abheda). (iii) Nimbarka criticises Rāmānuja’s doctrines of Viśeṣaṇa and Prakāra. The self is the body and not the adjective or the attribute of God. (iv) Criticism of Māyā doctrine as in Rāmānuja. Superimposition implies that the thing superimposed exists somewhere. (v) Doctrine of Prapatti and its six elements borrowed from Rāmānuja. Natyaśāstra Bhakti, instrumental to Prapatti which is the highest. Feeling of enjoyment or bliss consequent on Bhakti. (vi) Greater inclination towards Yoga in Rāmānuja and towards Bhakti in Nimbarka.

V. Summary of Nimbarka’s doctrine

"These five things should be known by the devotees: (i) The nature of the being to be worshipped; (ii) The nature of the worshipper; (iii) The fruit of God’s grace; (iv) The feeling of enjoyment consequent on Bhakti or love; (v) Obstructions to the attainment of God. The first is the knowing of the nature of the supreme Being as existence, intelligence and joy (Saccidānanda), of his possessing a celestial body (non-material), of his dwelling in such places as the cow-settlement (Vraja), which is called the celestial city (Vyomapura), of his being the cause of all, omnipotent, tender, merciful, gracious towards his
devotees and so forth. The second consists in knowing the worshipper as an atom, possessing knowledge and joy, and as the servant of Krishna etc. The third is the self-surrender and the giving up of all actions except the service of God which results in self-surrender. The fourth arises from serenity, servitude, friendliness, affection and enthusiasm. These states of mind are consequent upon the peculiar relation to God of each individual, as affection was the feeling of Nanda, Vasudeva and Devaki, and enthusiasm of Radhā and Rukmini. (विषमोन्नति स्वरूप प्रेमिकाविकृति तथा चैव भक्तिं तद्वलयाः etc). The fifth are such as regarding the body as the soul, dependence on others than God and one's preceptor, indifference to the commands of God contained in the sacred books, worshipping other Gods, giving up one's own peculiar duties ingratitude spending one's life in a worthless manner, vilification of good men, and many others”. (R. G. Bhandarkar, p. 65).
CHAPTER TWELVE

THE VEDANTA AND WESTERN THOUGHT

Part I . . The Vedantic Philosophy:
Lecture 1—Vedanta in the Upaniṣads.
Lecture 2—Vedanta in the Bhāgavad-gītā.
Lecture 3—The Systems of the Vedanta.

Part II . . The Vedanta and Ancient Philosophy:
Lecture 4—Parmenides and Vedanta.
Lecture 5—Plato and Vedanta.
Lecture 6—Plotinus and Vedanta.

Part III . . The Vedanta and Modern Philosophy:
Lecture 7—Berkeley and Vedanta.
Lecture 8—Spinoza and Vedanta.
Lecture 9—Kant and Vedanta.

Part IV . . The Vedanta and Contemporary Philosophy:
Lecture 10—Vedanta and Personal Idealism.
Lecture 11—Vedanta and Absolute Idealism.
Lecture 12—Vedanta and Mysticism.

Detailed Synopsis

Lecture 1

For the source of all the systems of Indian Philosophy, and of Vedantic Philosophy in particular, we must go back to the Upaniṣads. Here are to be found the earliest forms of Sāmkhya and Yoga; here are to be found the germs of Buddhism and Jainism; of Śaivism and Mīmāṃsā; and of all the various Vedantic systems. Here are to be found various impersonalistic and personalistic theories of Cosmogony, which remind us of similar theories of Greek Philosophy; various doctrines of personal and impersonal immortality; various
theories of the moral ideal, such as self-realisation, beatificism, and supermoralism. Above all, there are to be found here the roots of all the later Vedantic systems, such as monism, qualified monism, and pluralism which rent the Indian Philosophical world in times to come.

Lecture 2

Next to the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavad-gitā has exercised a profound influence on the development of Vedantic thought. Even here, as in the Upaniṣads, the doctrines of Prakṛti and Purusa, of God and Appearance, have been advanced with a naïvete, which would reject the philosophical architectonics in favour of a direct mystical attainment of God. The doctrine of Karmayoga which is the central doctrine of the Bhagavad-gitā, is an advance upon earlier moral theories, and the aim of the Bhagavad-gitā is to teach a life of reconciliation between works and knowledge. In this lecture, an attempt will also be made to answer the objection that the theism of the Bhagavad-gitā was superlaid by a later interpolated pantheism, and it would be pointed out that theism and pantheism though they be contradictory as philosophical systems, may yet be reconciled in a mystical attainment of God.

Lecture 3

After the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavad-gitā, the Brahmasūtras supply us with the perennial bedrock of Vedantic philosophy. These Sūtras themselves, like the texts of the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavad-gitā, have been pressed into service by different systems of Vedantic thought, each trying to interpret them in its own way. Thus arise the various schools of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha and others. All these are at one in making an attack against non-Vedantic systems, such as Buddhism, Jainism and the rest as well as in their spiritual presentation of philosophy. Where they differ is about the nature of God and the self, and the reality of nature. An attempt will be made in the lecture to envisage a clue for the reconciliation of these different Vedantic systems in a doctrine of mystical realisation, which cancels none of these systems, and yet absorbs all of them giving to each an appointed place and level in the thought-evolution of the Vedanta.

Lecture 4

After having given an outline of the development of the Vedanta, we have now to compare it with the great systems of ancient, Modern, and Contemporary thought in the West, and see how it stands related with them. Parmenides is easily the greatest early philosopher, whose teachings can be compared with those of the Vedanta. His doctrine of Being and not-being adumbrates the Vedantic doctrine of reality and Māyā, and his identification of Being with Thought, the Vedantic conception of the unity of Sat and Cit. By an exhaustive consideration of Parmenides' Poem, as well as of the analogous teachings of Xenophanes, Zeno, and Melissos, we shall see how the Eleatic School is the earliest fore-runner of Vedantic thought in the West.
Lecture 5

Plato is evidently the greatest of the Greek Philosophers whose thought has a Vedantic significance. Though his Theory of Ideas is peculiarly Greek in character, the central conception of the theory, namely the Idea of the Good, and the emanation of the other Ideas therefrom, has a close parallel to the Idea of the Great Brahman in Vedantic philosophy, and the manner in which other things stand related to it. As the Idea of the Good is the only ultimate reality in Plato, similarly the Idea of the Great is the only ultimate reality in the Vedanta, all other things being merely appearance.

Lecture 6

The emanatory tendency in Plato is carried to its logical conclusion in Plotinus, whose mysticism almost faithfully represents the mysticism of the Vedanta. As opposed to creation and evolution, both Plotinus and Vedanta speak of emanation, God being the central effulgent light, which dissipates itself into existences of secondary and tertiary order, such as the self and nature. A practical appropriation of the Godhead is the aspiration of the one as of the other; and Plotinus represents the mystical side of Vedantism more faithfully than almost any other Philosopher of the West.

Lecture 7

When we come to Berkeley, we come to problems of epistemology and metaphysics. Berkeley’s Philosophy is a compound of sensationalism, idealism and spiritualism, and though sensationalism of the lowest type is conspicuous by its absence in Vedantism, it will be the business of the present lecture to consider to what extent idealism and spiritualism are present in Vedantic philosophy. And though Vedanta condemns an extreme idealism as of the Buddhistic school, we shall consider in this lecture to what extent the Vedanta is an idealistico-spiritualistic philosophy.

Lecture 8

Spinoza’s philosophy is a philosophy of God—intoxication, and Vedantism like Spinozism is often compared to a lion’s den to which all steps point, but from which none returns. Though, thus, Vedantism and Spinozism are at one in their presentation of the ultimate nature of substance, a guarantee of truth indirectly admitted by Spinoza to the modes in his scheme of psychophysical parallellism is absent in the Vedanta in its final doctrine of appearance.

Lecture 9

The problem of Appearance was tackled in another way by the German philosopher Kant, who made a distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal, giving to phenomena the things which are of phenomena, and to noumena the things which are of noumena. The distinction between phenomenal and noumenal is closely akin to the distinction between Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika of Vedantic philosophy, but where Kant failed and the Vedanta succeeded was in the problem of a first-hand apprehension of noumenal reality, which Kant in a vein of Spencerian agnosticism declared unknowable,
but which the Vedanta regarded as the only object of knowledge, because alone real. Here consciousness turns upon itself, making self-consciousness the only reality that exists.

Lecture 10
In Hegel's hands, reality consists of this very self-consciousness, a circle of circles self-closed. It is interesting to see how both Hegelianism and Vedantism ramify into two different, though allied branches of thought, the monistic and the pluralistic, Śāṅkara and Rāmānuja in Vedantism have as analogues Bradley and Bosanquet, and Ward and Rashdall in European Philosophy. The same ineradicable plurality of selves, the same reality of nature, the same doctrine of personal immortality, and the same identification of God with the Absolute which we find in Rāmānuja, we also find in theories of personal idealism like those of Ward, and Rashdall.

Lecture 11
Of even greater interest is the comparison of absolute idealism as represented in Bradley and Bosanquet with that of Śāṅkara. The same annihilation of space and time, the same identity of cause and effect, the same phenomenal character of the world, the same doctrine of degrees of reality, the same subordination of God to the Absolute, which we meet with in Bradley, we find also in Śāṅkara. Would that Bradley were more of the mystic temperament than he was! Would that he sympathised with the practical way of God-realisation which the Vedanta advocated! He would then have been the veriest Śāṅkaraśārya of European philosophy!

Lecture 12
This leads us to the ultimate mystic consummation of the Vedanta. Vedanta is not mere intellectual doctrine but a practical appropriation of the God-head by suitable means. Inge and Underhill and Otto represent the mystical side of thought in Contemporary European philosophy. The truest Summum Bonum for the mystic is not liberation, either of the asymptotic or of the catastrophic kind, but the enjoyment of divine bliss here and now. Thus Vedantism may be seen to be like a multilateral diamond, which has its facets in the philosophies of Parmenides, Plato, and Plotinus, of Berkeley, Spinoza, and Kant, of Ward, Bradley, and Inge.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN

THE VEDANTA IN RELATION TO WESTERN THOUGHT

Lecture 1
The Upaniṣads and the Vedanta.—In the first lecture, an attempt will be made to find the perennial bed-rock of all later Vedantic Philosophy in the Upaniṣads themselves. Here are to be found the eternal problems of the relation of the Individual to the universal soul, of creation, of the Nature of God, and such others, which have supplied all later Vedantic Philosophy with an eternal basis upon which to build. The standpoint of the present Lecturer would be, as detailed in his “A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy” that the Upaniṣads supply the basis for speculation for various kinds of Vedantic systems, but that a supreme clue for the reconciliation of these could be found in a mystical interpretation of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, which would cancel none of these systems and yet absorb all of them, and give to each an appointed place in the thought-evolution of the Vedanta.

Lecture 2
The Bhagavad-gītā and the Vedanta.—Next to the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā has played an important part in the moulding of Vedantic Thought. Even here, as in the Upaniṣads, the doctrines of nature, of Puruṣa and Prakṛiti, of God, of Appearance, of the Relation of Theism to Pantheism, and such others have been advanced in a naive spirit, which would reject the philosophical architectonic in favour of a direct mystic attainment to God. The Doctrine of Karmayoga, as taught in the Bhagavadgītā, is really an advance upon any early moral theory, and the aim of the Bhagavadgītā is to teach the doctrine of reconciliation between divine attainment and the life of activism. An attempt will also be made in this lecture to probe into the real nature of Bhakti, and to answer the objection that the Theism of the Bhagavadgītā is incompatible with an interpolated pantheism, as it will be pointed out that theism and pantheism, even though they may be contradictory as philosophical systems, can yet be reconciled in a theory of mystic attainment to God.

Lecture 3
The Sāṁkhya and the Vedanta.—All the later Vedantic systems have joined hands in condemning the basal principles of Sāṁkhya philosophy, in spite of
the fact that they have all been much indebted to the doctrines of the Sāmkhya. An examination will be made in this lecture of the basal ideas of Sāmkhya Philosophy, the relation which these bear to the ideas of the Vedanta, together with the objections which the Vedantic systems have urged against them. A critical and philosophical evaluation of the doctrines of Sāmkhya philosophy is much needed, and it is possible that new light would be thrown upon it, especially in view of the fact that Buddhism in Sāmkhya philosophy is almost as Janus-faced as the Kantian "schema", and plays almost the same part in Sāmkhya philosophy as the "schema" plays in the Kantian.

Lecture 4

Buddhism and Vedantism.—The Vedantic Systems, in their criticisms, have generally not taken into account the early Pali Buddhism. It is only the later schools of the Hinayāna that have been refuted by the Vedantic writers, as also certain tenets of Mahāyānism. A detailed examination would be made in this lecture of the various doctrines of Buddhism from the Vedantic standpoint, and the value would be determined of the Buddhistic doctrine of the causal chain, of its doctrine of the non-ego, of its relation in its various forms of idea to reality, of its metaphysical denial of absolute existence, as well as, finally, of its doctrine of Nirvāṇa. In many of these respects, the Vedanta may be seen to be a good antithesis to the Buddhistic doctrine.

Lecture 5

The Vedantic Systems.—The architectonic systems of the Vedanta have all of them claimed descent from the Upaniṣads, interpreting the texts of the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā, and the Brahma-Sūtras in their own way. An attempt will be made in this chapter to find out what justification there is for the doctrines of Śankara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, and Vallabha in the texts themselves. Three points are note-worthy in a discussion of these Vedantic systems: (a) the common attack they make against the non-vedantic systems, such as the Vaiśeṣikas, the Buddhists, the Sāmkhyans, the Jainas, and so on; (b) the fundamental points of agreement of these systems; (c) the fundamental disagreements of these systems, which constitute a line of differentiation between them. An attempt will also be made to envisage a clue for the reconciliation of these different Vedantic systems in a doctrine of mystic realisation, giving to each its appointed place and level.

Lecture 6

The Vedantic Criterion.—We are now prepared to enter upon the details of Vedantic philosophy. The question of the criterion would be a fundamental one at the very outset. An attempt will be made in this lecture to contrast the Vedantic criterion of Anubhava with such other criteria familiar to students of contemporary European thought as the idealistic criterion of coherence, the realistic criterion of correspondence, the pragmatic criterion of satisfaction, and so on. At the same time, an inquiry would be instituted into how "Anubhava", the supreme criterion of the Vedanta, differs from such other criteria.
of the other systems of Indian Philosophy, namely those of perception, inference, belief and the rest. An inquiry would also be instituted into the psycho-metaphysical nature of Anubhava, and it would be shown how it blinks at intuition on the one hand, and beatification on the other. Finally, an examination would be made as to how far the elements of necessity and objectivity of the Kantian criterion pertain to this supreme criterion of Vedantic philosophy.

Lecture 7

The Problem of Nature.—Next comes the problem of nature. In the light of the three different theories of cosmogony familiar to European thought, viz. creation, emanation and evolution, an attempt will be made in this lecture to adjudge the value of the cosmogony of the Vedanta. The relation of the world to God will be thoroughly investigated, and an examination will be made of the doctrines of the fundamental reality or unreality of the world, citing parallels from Plato, Plotinus, Spinoza, Kant and Hegel. An attempt will be made to see whether the doctrines of the reality or unreality of the world in the Vedanta could be explained in the light of the theories which make a difference, in Śankarite fashion, between the Vyāvahārika and the Pāramārthika on the one hand, or, on the other, in Kantian fashion, between the phenomenal and the noumenal. The question would be raised how far the world of nature is a mere appearance.

Lecture 8

The Problem of the Self.—The central problem of all philosophy is the relation between the self and God. Here an examination would be made of the different doctrines held about the relation between the self and God by the various Vedantic thinkers. A numerical pluralism, it would be shown, is not inconsistent with a qualitative monism. The teachings of Śankara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha and others on the subject could be set on a par with those of Bradley, Bosanquet, Ward, Royce and others in European thought. So far as the question of transmigration is concerned, after citing parallels from Platonic philosophy, a discussion would be made of the doctrine that reincarnation is an illusion from the absolutistic standpoint. All the theories of the later Vedanta on the subject would also be requisitioned, wherein the self and God are regarded as adjectival and substantival existences (Avacchedavāda), or the category of part and whole is made applicable to the relation between them (Aṇāvāda), or the conception of the archetype and the image is introduced to explain their relation, (Bimbapatitibimba-vāda), or even where the self is regarded as merely an appearance before God (Ābhāsavāda).

Lecture 9

Doctrine of Appearance.—The doctrine of appearance affects both the existence of nature as of the self. Examination would be made of the theory that both these are appearances before God, and the inner meaning of the dream-analogy of the Brahma-Sūtras III. 2 would be brought to light. Opinions on the subject would at the same time be cited from various European philosophers,
such as Plato, Kant, Hegel, Bradley, and others. The objections, which Rāmānuja, Vallabha and Madhva raise against Śankara’s doctrine of appearance, would be examined, while it would be contended that though, in sensuous experience, the reality of the world could never be gainsaid, it is only in the ecstatic state that the doctrine of appearance would have sufficient vindication. Finally, the great moral value of the doctrine of the appearance, as apart from the metaphysical, would be brought to light.

Lecture 10

God and the Absolute in the Vedanta.—An attempt will be made in this lecture to focus together the various characterisations of Brahman as in the first chapter of the Brahma-Sūtras, and to deduce therefrom the nature of the supreme Godhead, while it will be shown that the categories of the personal and the impersonal are inapplicable to the supreme Godhead. An examination would also be made of the conceptions of God and the absolute in contemporary European thought, and a parallelism would be cited from the difference in the teachings of Rāmānuja and Śankara on this subject. Consideration would also be made of the theory that while God is a theological conception, the absolute is a philosophical conception of reality, and it would be established that there is no necessity for making that distinction between God and the absolute as is contended.

Lecture 11

The problem of Human Conduct.—It is difficult to characterise the Vedantic ethics in one word. The various theories of anti-hedonism, pessimism, supermoralism, beatificism, and self-realisation, which the Upaniṣads advocate, have each of them a place in the full scheme of Vedantic ethics; while it owes not a little to the activism of the Bhagavadgītā. In any case, the exuberant optimism of the Vedantic mystic is in decided contrast to the Buddhistic Nirvāṇa, if we interpret this latter in a negativistic, annihilationistic, sense. The realisation of the divine bliss for oneself and others is the be-all and the end-all of the Vedantic mystic, and to that end all these activities are directed.

Lecture 12

Mysticism in the Vedanta.—The question arises how this divine bliss is to be attained. The true Summum Bonum for the Vedantist is not liberation, whether of the asymptotic or of the catastrophic kind, but the enjoyment of divine bliss here and now. The part which meditation plays in this realisation would here be brought to light. A full-fledged life of mysticism, it would be contended, reconciles alike the claims of intellect, emotion, and action. It would be wrong to say that mere intellect or mere emotion or mere action leads to the realisation of this mystic bliss. One or other of these may be stressed no doubt; but all must be present in a greater or lesser degree to enable one to attain to that divine bliss. Jñāna, Bhakti, and Yoga would thus be shown to be not contradictory of each other, but only corroboratory. Vedantic mysticism is thus absolutely on a par with all real mysticism. They may speak different languages,
but the meaning is identical. The experience which made Christ and St. Paul, Plotinus and Augustine, Thomas A. Kempis and Eckhart, great mystics of the western world, is also the same experience which made Śankara and Jñāneśvara, Gaurāṅga and Manikkavacakagār, Kabir and Tukaram, the great mystics of the east. The essence of all Vedantism is mysticism, and it would be our business, time permitting, to expound what this mysticism is in a future work entitled “The Pathway to God”.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE PATHWAY TO GOD

(A study in the philosophy of Beatification)

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INTRODUCTION

Beatification ethically, psychologically, metaphysically, mystically considered. Philosophers must learn to mysticise, and mystics to philosophise. Many have sought the Pathway to God. Here is the Pathway. The present dynamic view, hitherto static. The present psychological view, hitherto intellectual. Oriental and occidental philosophy and mysticism.

Mysticism has been hitherto regarded to have no philosophy; Philosophy of mysticism.


Practical, psychological point: metaphysics based on experience. The starting point—psychological.
CHAPTER 1

The Mystical Criterion

1. The standpoint—Psychological.
   Descartes: Self-consciousness. Correspondence, coherence, satisfaction, Beatification: degrees of Truth.
   Kant: objectivity and universality.
   Being universal though individual, continuity, growth.
   [Continuity and growth make the Being Individual though it is Universal].
   Musical faculty, mathematical faculty, intuitive faculty.
   Intuition akin to genius (scientific) but substantive.
   The sensuous and the ecstatic to be discussed here? The consciousness of God.
   Nature of ecstatic "Consciousness".


3. The neo-realism aims at the emancipation of metaphysics from the clutches of epistemology: they are wholly impatient of the epistemological problem.

4. How far the Kantian universality, necessity and objectivity pertain to the criterion of Anubhava.

5. Coherence, correspondence, satisfaction vs. Anubhava, which blinks at intuition on the one hand and beatification on the other.


CHAPTER 2

Religion and Religions

Meaning of religion: definitions:
Religion and morality (Identical to Kant) Practical attainment to God.
   Attitude not ceremonial nor system of beliefs and practices.
Religion and art ...
Religion and Science ...
Religion and Philosophy ...
   (details) Philosophy, the art of living.
Psychological basis of Religion ...
Religions and Religion ...
   (detail)
The religious attitude ...
History of Religions; Philosophy of Religion: Zoroastrianism, Hinduism, Mohammedanism, Sufism, Confucianism, Christianity, Bahaiism.

Mystical Religion.

Agnosticism and rationalism in Religion.

2. The different religions have an ethnic, localized, temporal significance; true religion is universal and for eternity.

3. Mystical Experience—the unifying principle of religions.

4. The religious feeling is a composite feeling made up of awe/wonder, hope, dependence, comfort, peace, joy and rapture.

5. Religion and Philosophy:
   Bradley: "There is a fundamental inconsistency in religion."
   "God personal; Absolute superpersonal" "God an appearance of the Absolute." "The absolute is related to nothing; God to the Universe." "God has no meaning outside religious consciousness."

   "There can be little conflict between science and religion as between the logarithmic table and the phenomenon known as falling in love, or between the axioms of Euclid and Sonnets of Shakespeare. The provinces are different." Edwards. This is wrong. Provinces identical; but difference of aspects. Hypothesis identical; experiment identical—R.D.R. Science teaches how to wonder, religion tries to highten it.

7. Religion and Art:
   Art is the quest for the ideal of beauty, whether in painting, architecture, music, sculpture or poetry. Art consecrates itself to the service of religion.


9. Max Mullar's definition of religion as "Perception of the Infinite". Schleiermacher: " Feeling on dependence on God".
   Kant: "Religion as moral consciousness", the recognition of all our duties as divine commandments.
   Mathew Arnold: Religion is "Morality touched with emotion".
   Hoffding: Religion is "Faith in the conservation of values."
CHAPTER 3

The Problem of God

A. 1. Uselessness of the so-called arguments for God's existence.
2. Doctrine of a Finite God.
3. A dreamer.
5. Personal and impersonal. Herakleitos; Super-personal.
7. Ecstatic analogy, thought of all thoughts.
9. Impulse in God; grace at various stages; mercy, creation, realisation and justice.
10. Doctrine of flux.
12. Relation to self and nature.
13. Fills all space and time.
14. Mystery of ultimate nature of God.
15. Historical conception of God.

B. 1. Grace for relief from sin. For intuitional experience, for the perfection of experience.
2. Reconciliation of theism and pan-theism in mysticism.
3. Doctrine of a finite God, suggested by Mill and developed by W. James, H. G. Wells, Schiller, Rashdall.
   See Ward—Realm of Ends. pp. 443 to 444, and Pringel Pattison—The idea of God.
4. God and the Absolute identical; personal and impersonal conceptions of ultimate reality; Theological and philosophical conceptions.
5. The impulse in spirit: grace due to it; Buddhi in Sāmkhya philosophy, Creation due to it.
6. The arguments for the existence of God—all invalid. The mystical proof, wanted, spiritual experience.

CHAPTER 4

The Problem of Nature

A. 1. The attitude of naturalism; creation, emanation, evolution.
2. Einstein's theory of Relativity.
4. Evolution, Spencerian and Bergsonian.
5. Humanise nature and not naturalise man.
6. A crude, dark, unmoral stuff.
7. Garment of Gods—created by and for God.
8. Arachnomorphism; of the substance of God.
9. Spinoza; nature and spirit.
10. Doctrine of appearance; Kant, Śankara, sensuous and esstatic.
11. The tree of unreality.
12. Phenomenal and noumenal.

2. Appearance affects both self and nature.
3. The moral as apart from the metaphysical. The doctrine of appearance.
4. Appearance justified; psychologically as apart from metaphysics as in Kant or Śankara.
6. A true theory of evolution must humanise nature and not naturalise man.

CHAPTER 5

The Problem of the Self

A. 1. Reconciliation of monism and pluralism.
3. Ecstatic state appealed to, as the resolver of doubts.
5. Buddhistic doctrine of non-ego.
6. Reincarnation, an illusion; Plato’s arguments.
7. Mystery.
8. Doctrine of sheaths.
10. McTaggart.
11. Centre of experience.
12. Kant: Unity of apperception; logical unity.
14. Doctrine of flux; Bergson.
15. The ecstatic state puts a stop to flux.

B. 1. Transmigration to explain inequalities of creation.
2. Reconciliation of Monism and Pluralism in an ecstatic doctrine.

4. The sensuous reality but the ecstatic unreality of selves.

5. Reincarnation, an illusion from the absolutistic stand-point as well as from the psychological stand-point (of ecstasy).

6. Self and God—Adjectival and substantival
   Part and whole
   Image and archetype
   Appearance and reality.

7. Numerical pluralism not inconsistent with qualitative monism.

CHAPTER 6

The Ethical Ideal

    2. Super-moralism.
    4. Loyalty.
    5. Summum Bonum.
    6. Doctrine of Nirvāṇa.
    7. Exuberant optimism Vs. pessimism.
       The pessimistic caravansarai on the way to the palace of God.
    8. Ethics passes into mysticism.
   10. The reality of morality in sensuous state.
   11. Evil.
   12. Mystical realisation of God.
   13. Activism.
   15. Love of God—the supreme virtue.

B. 1. The ethics of loyalty.
       Existence of evil.
    3. Transmutation of instincts and emotions.
    4. Levels :
       Pleasure (animal); happiness (men); beatification (God).
    5. Mystical experience as the supreme end of life.
7. The philosophy of values.

CHAPTER 7

The Beginnings of the Pilgrimage

A. 1. Agnosticism, suffering, pain, the problem of the life-after. Miracles, no-test.
2. Conversion.
3. Purgation.
5. Meeting of the Guru—Grace from Guru as from God.
6. Moral qualifications; path of discipleship.
7. Asceticism.
8. Discipline.
9. Devotion like a fountain—The part of Eros.
11. Repentance, humility.

B. 1. The spirit must rise like a fountain to God. Bhakti.
2. Pain a sacrament; Job.
5. The use of hypothesis in spiritual life.
6. Evaluation of prayer: "To whom shall I pray?" Prayer aims at an external aim; meditation on internal bliss.
7. Purgation a continual process—Dante's view.
8. The part which Eros plays in mysticism.
9. Intuition awakened through the perfected mystics, hence the necessity of the Guru.

CHAPTER 8

The Vicissitudes of the Mystic Path

A. 1. Illumination: Platonic doctrine of forms.
2. Super-sensuous perception: vision, audition, etc.
3. Pathology.
4. Central initiation e.g. tears: sensuous language, super-sensuous experience.
6. Continual sense of moral imperfection.
7. Contrast between actual and ideal.
8. Mystical adolescence: surrender, Christ.
9. Step to higher things.

B. 1. The artistic nature of spiritual experience: the symphony and illumination.
2. The vision of dreams, imagination, intuition.
3. Everlasting No. Center of indifference. Tormented like a fish out of waters. Forsaken for God. No pursuit of God if God were known as impotent. God is dead. Internal wall. Chains of greatness, taken to be possession of spirit. Fate stronger than God. No power in God or God's name. God a pennyless beggar. Shamed to be called of God.
4. "Him verily seen and fully feeling, Him spiritually hearing and Him deliberately smelling and Him sweetly swallowing"—Julian of Norwich.
   "Our normal consciousness is so committed to a dependence on the senses that the fruits of intuition itself are instinctively referred to them by the mystics"—Evelyn Underhill. (Kabir's poems XXXII)
5. Adolescence, mystical—the dangers and pitfalls of.
6. Surrender—the way to final realisation: Christ, Job, Suso. The psychology of surrender. Atonement of subject and object.

CHAPTER 9
Unitive victory

A. 1. The beatification of the self.
2. The psychological analysis of the ecstasy and trance.
3. Timelessness.
4. Plotinus, Porphyry.
5. The category of the Holy.
6. Asymptotic approximation to divinity.
10. Deification and marriage.

B. 1. In ecstatic experience, subject and object, are one.
2. Images for unitive life (Dante).


CHAPTER 10

A Vision of Theopolicy

A. 1. The productiveness of spiritual experience; self perpetuation.
    2. Types of mysticism; activistic, emotional, intellectual.
    3. The Kingdom of Ends.
    4. Plato's Republic.
    5. The City of God—Augustine.
    8. The philosopher, the poet, the artist, the physician, the scientist. Jñāna Bhakti Karma (one predominates).

B. 1. The activistic teachings of the Bhagvad-gītā.
    2. The felicity of spiritual experience.
       Mystics—the parents of a new spiritual race.
    3. Europe—only Christianity.
       Asia—merely Mohamedanism.
       India—Christianity, Mohamedanism, Hinduism;
       "The Birth-place of a Universal Religion."

---EX--
On reading Professor Ranade's articles on Greek Philosophy, Shri Aurobindo Ghosh wrote: "The perfect writer and Scholar... possesses in a superlative degree the rare gift of easy and yet adequate exposition and leaves us charmed... enlightened and satisfied. A complete history of Greek Philosophy by this perfect writer and scholar would be a priceless gain".

Realising the book Pathway to God in Hindi Literature at Rashtrapati Bhavan, Dr. Rajendra Prasad said: "So the philosophy which we have inherited from the past now lives in Professor Ranade".

Releasing the book Paramartha Sopan, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Said: Dr. Ranade lived philosophy and was touched by the grace of God. My life is richer for having known him".
If a full exposition of a problem from the pen of a master is delightful, suggestions from him for further research are challenging. In addition to his critical estimates of different philosophical systems, we have in the last chapter of this book, Professor Ranade's sketch of a contemplated work—The Pathway to God. It provides ample food for thought to whomsoever wishing to launch upon a deep study of philosophy and religion. There are in this work such flashes as: 'We find in Mīmāṃsā a lame moralism and a lamer theism'. Or, 'the doctrine of degrees of reality is a mere compromise between monism and pluralism'. Professor Ranade envisages a clue for the reconciliation of the different Vedantic systems in a doctrine of mystical realisation which cancels none of these and yet absorbs all of them giving to each an appointed place and level in the thought evolution of the Vedanta. If one wants to know how mysticism gives a synoptic view of life, one should turn to this book.