PORTUGUESE MAHRATTA RELATIONS
(Translation of the book "पोर्तुगीज-मराठे संबंध" by Dr. P. S. Pissurlencar)

Translator
Shri T. V. Parvate

MAHARASHTRA STATE BOARD FOR LITERATURE AND CULTURE, BOMBAY
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"पोर्तुगीज-मराठे संबंध"

By
Dr. P. S. Pissurlencar

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MAHARASHTRA STATE BOARD FOR LITERATURE AND CULTURE, BOMBAY
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FOREWORD

The State Board for Literature and Culture (Sahitya Sanskriti Mandal) has been set up by the Government of Maharashtra for the modernisation of the Marathi language and literature and for encouraging research and publication with a view to protecting the rich heritage Maharashtra has in the fields of literature, history, culture and fine arts. To attain this objective, the State Board has undertaken a manifold programme of literary activities, one of these being to initiate, assist or undertake schemes for editing, translating and publishing in Marathi, relevant important published or unpublished source material which will have a direct or indirect bearing on the history and culture of Maharashtra. The Board has also the scheme for the preparation and publication of the socio-political, cultural and literary history of Maharashtra.

The Board has made a valuable contribution in this direction by publishing a few important books, as its own publications. Professor N. R. Phatak’s translation of “Rise of the Maratha Power” by the late Justice M. G. Ranade, “Raigadachi Jeevankatha” by the late Professor S. V. Avalaskar, “Portuguese Source Papers” relating to Maratha History, Volume 3 translated by Shri S. S. Desai, from the original Portuguese collections, “A History of Maratha Navy and Merchantships” by Dr. B. K. Apte, and “History and Inscriptions of the Satavahanas and the Western Kshatrapas” by Dr. V. V. Mirashi are amongst such books. The Board has a plan of writing a comprehensive history of Maharashtra and also what may be called, the peoples’ history of Maharashtra. It has also undertaken the scheme for translation and publication of records relating to Maharatta History and available only in Portuguese, French, Urdu, Persian and the Rajasthani languages.
Since it is one of the objects of the Board to encourage writing history of Maharashtra and collect necessary material for the writing of such a history, it had requested Shri T. V. Parvate to translate Dr. P. S. Pisurlekar's Marathi book "Portuguese-Mahratta Relations" (original published by the University of Poona, in 1967). Shri Parvate is a journalist of eminence and an author of several important books in English and Marathi. This translation is of unique importance in the sense that it is based on original Portuguese and Mahratta sources and gives an entire picture of the relations between the Portuguese and the Mahrattas. We are sure that the book will be of great use to the scholars of history. The Board has great pleasure in releasing this volume.

S. S. BARLINGAY
Chairman
State Board for Literature and Culture
Bombay

42, Yashodhan,
Bombay 400 020
20th July 1983
TRANSLATOR'S THANKS-GIVING

It is one of the highly prized delights of my life that I was able to translate Dr. P. S. Pissurlencar’s Portuguese-Mahratta Relations from Marathi into English to the satisfaction of that eminent history research scholar. This translation has been awaiting publication by one publisher or other for the last over fifteen years. I am not unhappy that all these publishers were unable to bring it out for one reason or another, because I am firmly convinced that no worthier publisher that the Maharashtra State Board for Literature and Culture, could be found for a book of this kind. As the sub-title of Dr. Pissurlencar’s original Marathi book explains, it is the history of the Mahrattas as found recorded in the portuguese archives covering 450 years.

Dr. Pissurlencar’s qualifications for this were unequalled. He was Director of the Goa Archives for over twelve years and Honorary Professor of History and Director of the Historical Research Centre of the University of Bombay. Besides, he was Honorary D.Litt. of Lisbon University; Fellow of the Academy of Sciences of Lisbon and Portuguese Academy of History, Portugal; Sir Jadunath Sarkar Gold Medallist of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal and Campbell Memorial Gold Medallist of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bombay. When Dr. Pissurlencar asked me to do this translation he really did me a great honour and I must acknowledge this favour though it is inevitably posthumous.

It would have been better for all of us, had Dr. Pissurlencar been granted a few more years of life on this earth, so that he could see in print the English translation of his work brought out by the Sahitya Sanskriti Mandal of the Maharashtra State, but the Fates willed otherwise!

T. V. PARVATE
NOTE OF THE PUBLISHER IN ORIGINAL MARATHI EDITION

The University of Poona accepted the donation of Rs. 25,000 made by the Narasinha Chintaman Kelkar Smarak Nidhi and the Kelkar Smarak Vyakhyanmala was begun from 1954 and has been continued every year about the time of his death anniversary the expenses being covered by the interest accruing to the original donation. Till now Prof. T. S. Shejwalker, Shri Balacharya Madhavacharya Khuperkar, Shri S. N. Joshi, Prof. S. N. Banahatti, Prof. R. S. Joag, Prof. H. R. Divekar, Prof. B. G. Khaparde, Prof. Aravind Manguoolkar, Prof. D. B. Diskalkar, Prof. P. S. Pissurlencar, Prof. A. K. Priolkar, Prof. R. B. Athavale and Prof. R. S. Valimbe have delivered these Kelkar lectures.

Prof. Pissurlencar's seven lectures on Portuguese-Mahratta relations were delivered as the tenth of the series of Kelkar lectures in 1964 and they are now being published as a book. The University of Poona regrets that for one reason or another the publication of this book has been inordinately delayed and hopes that students of history will welcome this publication.

May 1967
University of Poona
Ganeshkhind, Poona 7

V. H. GOLE
Registrar
The University of Prince Edward Island's Islander Stadium is now open for public use. The stadium, located on the university's St. Dunstan's Campus, has been under construction for the past year and has been completed in time for the fall season. The new facility will provide a safe and comfortable environment for students, faculty, and the community to enjoy sporting events and other university activities.

V. H. Cole
Registrar
FOREWORD

My friend Dr. Pandurang Sakharam Pissurlencar agreed to deliver a series of lectures delivered every year under the auspices of the University of Poona in memory of the late Mr. N. C. Kelkar. Dr. Pissurlencar and myself have known each other for the last forty years. Dr. Pissurlencar took up service in the Goa Archives under Portuguese rule, when he was quite young. I was his guest once in those days when he arranged to let me have a good look at the huge records of the Portuguese Government, carefully preserved and protected behind the palace of the Governor-General of Portuguese India. I noticed a number of scientific methods that Dr. Pissurlencar had adopted for the safe and secure preservation of important documents in the records. I saw fifty bound volumes of papers treated by chemical paste in order to strengthen them and prolong their life. Dr. Pissurlencar was buried day and night in the study and meditation of those papers. After a mature study of the original sources obtaining in those uncommon records, Dr. Pissurlencar produced his voluminous work in Portuguese. He dedicated himself entirely to this work. Occasionally he has published stray articles and original papers in Marathi and read papers in English at learned historical gatherings. The Panaji records are predominantly full of sources in Portuguese. Records from the days the Portuguese set their foot on Indian shores are to be found in the Goa Archives. Europeans such as the English, French, Dutch and Portuguese have carefully put the dates on their papers and that greatly helps research workers. On the other hand, in our historical records in Marathi, except on the sanads, the dates often are set but not necessarily the year. This makes the task of determination of dates for the historical research worker, extremely arduous and not less tortuous and even careful workers land into inexcusable errors. The superiority of western sources from the view point of determining accuracy of dates is quite remarkable.
Dr. Pissurlencar has immortalised himself by the invaluable addition he has made to historical source material by his indefatigable industry and by his irredeemable obligations on students of history. The Portuguese Government conferred highest honours on him for his extraordinary achievements. Dr. Pissurlencar had the rare opportunity of studying original sources in Portugal, France, Italy and England. At the moment he has a rare collection of unpublished source material. He is quite adept in deciphering old Marathi documents in the Modi script also of which there are not a few in the Goa Archives. Dr. Pissurlencar has spent the whole of his life in the pursuit of the study of historical source material but his writings have been mostly in Portuguese. Most of our Mahratta research students, not being acquainted with that language, were denied the benefit of Dr. Pissurlencar’s vast fund of knowledge. The Portuguese rule has vanished now, but before that happened, the Portuguese rulers, in appreciation and recognition of Dr. Pissurlencar’s great services had prepared his bust for being kept in the Directorate of Archives (It has now been kept there). I keenly felt that after Dr. Pissurlencar had retired from service, he should oblige Mahratta research workers by imparting his knowledge to fellow research scholars and research students. In order at least partially to achieve that objective, I requested him to deliver a series of lectures on Portuguese-Mahratta relations, when I was Vice-Chancellor of the University of Poona. Although he was suffering from high blood pressure, he altered his first refusal and agreed to come when he was well enough to undertake the journey to Poona and stand the strain of delivering seven lectures and thus did me a great favour. He came to Poona with prepared lectures, under much physical and mental strain, because the rules of the University make it obligatory on every lecturer to do so.

Our mental experience in the matter of these lectures was very happy indeed. The curious Poona audience would not be content with his lectures in a closed hall of the University
and so they were arranged on the extensive lawn of the S. P. College and what was very delightfully welcome was that Dr. Pissurlencar too lost all sense of his physical weakness and enjoyed being emotionally one with the daily growing audience. He took a promise from me that I must contribute a foreword when the lectures would be published as a book. I am happy that I am able to keep the promise and in a way, to redeem the debt of his obligation of having acceded to my earnest appeal to deliver these lectures.

The book will show that Dr. Pissurlencar has not made a single statement that is no supported by documentary evidence. This is wholly in consonance with the creed of a genuine research scholar. Every page in the book, replete with foot-notes, is an evidence of this. Portuguese names occur with frequency and the book is interspersed with Portuguese quotations. In order that their accuracy should be assured, Dr. Pissurlencar himself checked all the proofs. Naturally this took much longer time than expected. I was also responsible for some delay. Dr. Pissurlencar occasionally feared that he would not see his lectures in print but we are all blessed with the publication in an agreeable way and I wish Dr. Pissurlencar success in all his plans and schemes.

Dr. Pissulencar discussed his subject in seven lectures, which are studded with new information, that was almost unknown to scholars on this side. Besides, its importance is limitless. Since this information represents the viewpoint of the Portuguese Government, a very large portion of it could not conceivably be known on this side. In what respects the Western powers were superior to indigenous powers has been faithfully depicted in this book. Dr. Pissurlencar has shown that the Portuguese were not only superior to us in armaments but even in medicine. Even in purely political contests, we have been weaker, disorganised and divided as can be concluded on the basis of Dr. Pissurlencar’s well-grounded information. These lectures will show that quite notable Mahratta celebrities did not hesitate to return
Bassein to Portugal which was conquered by Chimaji Appa at enormous cost in men and material and perhaps greater valour. Our hearts would be overwhelmed to see that highly placed princes and potentates and their consorts from Maharashtra conspired with the Portuguese against their Kith and kin. This book will often open our eyes wide and more often make us close them with shame. It will provide us with many new details, make us acquainted with several new names and shed a flood of light on various complicated affairs. In a word, we will have to modify what we consider standard history and accepted estimates of men and events. This book has the potentiality to make us write our history anew. It is impossible to forget the deep debt of obligation under which Dr. Pissurlencar has placed us by throwing altogether new light on Portuguese-Mahratta relations. That the University of Poona has had the good fortune and distinctive honour of publishing such a precious volume and while publishing it, the University did not show any niggardliness in embellishing it with necessary pictures and maps is certainly creditable to the University. My pleasure for having been the original cause of this effect is altogether indescribable, because no such well-documented and full monograph has appeared in any language so far and Dr. Pissurlencar did Marathi language the honour of writing the same in it. I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that every lover of Mahratta history and every close student of it must have this volume of Dr. Pissurlencar in his possession.

Poona 2
May 19, 1967,

DATTO VAMAN POTDAR
PREFACE BY THE AUTHOR

These lectures were given from March 23, 1964. Of the seven lectures six are published exactly as they were delivered. Part of the first lecture was delivered when the second lecture was delivered. At all these lectures, Mahamahopadhyaya Datto Vaman Potdar, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Poona, was in the chair. I have attempted to deal with all important events in connection with the Portuguese and the Mahrattas from the days of Shahaji to Bajirao II.

I have dealt with the subject extensively about 25 years ago in my books in Portuguese such as Portuguese e Maratas, Antigualhas, Assentos etc. and they have been used by such history research scholars as Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Dr. Surendra Nath Sen, Dr. Balkrishna, Dr. G. S. Sardesai, Shri D. V. Apte, Prof. Sharma, Dr. Boxer, Dr. Moraes, Shri Y. N. Kelkar and others. After these books were published the author had access to several manuscripts and rare books containing new information in Portugal and Paris in particular. These have been used for the purpose of these lectures.

Before I retired from the service of the Government of Goa, Daman and Diu as Director of Archives, I had classified the Persian, Marathi and Kannada documents and arranged them separately. I have in my possession microfilms and copies of the specially important of these documents. I could see some Marathi papers relating to the 17th and 18th Centuries in Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisbon, Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa and Biblioteca da Ajuda. I have with me microfilms of those documents also. I look forward to publish these documents with annotations in two or three parts. Preparations are also afoot to publish a revised edition of Portuguese e Maratas in which use will be made of the notes on the basis of unpublished material that I made during my stay in Lisbon. I am happy to see the turn that my study of nearly 50 years of Mahratta history is taking.
The new Gregorian Calendar came into vogue in Bassein Goa and other territories under Portuguese domination since October, 1583. But in the territories under the British, the old Julian Calendar held the field till 1752. That leads to difference of ten days before February 1700 and eleven days thereafter. In order to avoid confusion I have given both Portuguese and English dates according to the new Gregorian Calendar.

I am sincerely obliged to the University of Poona for having asked me to deliver these lectures. I am also obliged to Shri Potdar for having spared time to contribute a foreword to this volume. Shri Lakshmanrao Sardesai read the manuscript of the book and made some alterations regarding syntax. Shri Keshav V. P. Bhembre prepared the press copy and Shri T. V. Parvate went through the final proofs and made some suggestions for improvement of Marathi diction. I am beholden to all these friends. This book has been printed at the press of the University and the managers thereof have done a neat job of it.

Lastly I cannot help recalling at this hour that my departed wife often used to feel hurt that I did most of my writing in Portuguese and did not do any sizable writing in Marathi. She would have been happy to see a book of this size in Marathi but that was not to be.

Panaji-Goa
February 5, 1967

P. S. PISSURLENCAR
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ABBREVIATIONS OF REFERENCE SOURCES

GA. Goa Archives, Panaji, Goa.
AHU. Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisbon.
TT. Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon.
BNL. Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa, Lisbon.
BA. Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisbon.
BACL. Biblioteca da Academica das Ciências de Lisboa, Lisbon.
BPE. Biblioteca Publica de Evora, Evora, Portugal.
BUC. Biblioteca da Universidade de Coimbra, Coimbra, Portugal.
BPP. Biblioteca Publica do Porto, Oporto, Portugal.
BV. Biblioteca Vaticana, Rome.
ASJ. Archivum S. J. Rome, Italy.
BM. British Museum, London.
IO. Library of India Office, London.
BNM. Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid, Madrid.
CC. Corpo Cronologico (Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo).
FG. Fundo Geral (Biblioteca Nacional de Lisbon).
Ms. Manuscript.
Arquivo. Archivo Portuguez Oriental (Cunha Rivara)
APO. Arquivo Portuguez Oriental (Bragança Pereira).
Documentacao. Documentacao para a Historia das Missoes do Padroado Portâgues no oriente (Padre Dr. Silva Rego).
Documenta. Documenta Indica (Father J. Wicki, S. J.).
Assentos. Assentos do Conselho do Estado (Pissurlencar).
ADP. Agentes da Diplomacia Portuguesa na India (Pissurlencar).
PM. Portugueses e Maratas (Pissurlencar).
Roteiro. Roteiro dos Arquivos da India Portuguesa (Pissurlencar).
EFI. The English Factories in India (Foster).
Tratados. Colleção de Tratados e Concertos de Pazes (J. Biker).
MR. Monçoes do reino.
CPA. Cartas Patentes e Alvarás.
RV. Livro dos reis vizinhos.
CO. Cartas e Ordens.
RI. Regimentos e Instruções.
Epanaphora. Epanaphora Indica.
PD. Peshwa Daftar (Sardesai).
MS. Marathyanchya Itihasachin Sadhane (Rajwade).
SPSS. Shivakaleena Patra Sara Sangraha.
SCS. Shivacharitra Sahitya.
PRD. Purandare Daftar.
ALS. Aitihasik Lekha Sangraha (V. V. Khare).
BISM. Bharata Itihasa Samshodhaka Mandal.
APV. Aitihasik Patravyavahara (Sardesai, Kulkarni and Kale).
MP. Marathi Letters (Goa Archives).
MLPT. Old Portuguese Translations of Marathi letters (Goa Archives).
UK. Uttar Konkanantil Pracheen Gangateerastha Shukla Yajurvediya Brahman (Puntambekar).
PORTUGUESE-MAHARATTA RELATIONS

BY

P. S. PISSURLENCAR
CHAPTER I

SCOPE AND EXTENT OF SOURCE MATERIAL

In 1510, the Portuguese conquered the city of Goa from Ibrahim Adilkhan as a result of which the then Goa State extending from Kudal, now in Ratnagiri District, Maharashtra, to Chita-Kut, now in Mysore State, came under their sway. But they were not able to keep such an extensive territory in their hands for long.

By May 1511, the Portuguese had under their command only Tiswadi and some neighbouring islands and Adilkhan began to rule the rest of the territory of Goa Kingdom. In 1520, the Portuguese again captured Salcette, Bardez and other parts of the Goa Kingdom and they continued to rule these areas till April 1524, when Adilkhan re-captured them.

In 1543, Mealkhan (Mealcaio), a rival of Ibrahim Adilkhan, sought refuge with the Portuguese. To ensure that the Portuguese would not help him against the Bijapur Kingdom, Ibrahim Adilkhan made a present of Salcette and Bardez to the Portuguese. It was thus that, by January 1543, the Portuguese had secured possession, in addition to Tiswadi, of Salcette and Bardez in South Konkan.

In 1534, the Portuguese had gained the Bassein province from the Sultan of Gujrat. In 1535, they began to build the fortress of Diu. In 1556, the Portuguese Governor, Francisco Barreto, took Asheri and Manora fortresses and in 1559, the Portuguese Viceroy, Constantine de Braganza, captured the Fort of Daman.

By about 1580, the Portuguese were ruling Diu, Daman, the island of Bombay, Bassein and Chaul in North Konkan, Goa island, Salcette and Bardez, Nagapattam, and Mylapur on the Coromandel Coast, and Hughly and Satigaon in Bengal.

In 1632, the Moghul Emperor deprived the Portuguese of their possessions in Bengal. In 1653-54, Shivappa Nayak, of Bednur captured the Portuguese Forts in Karnatak. In 1658, the Dutch deprived them of Nagapattam. Kutubshah of Golconda took Mylapur in 1662 and in the following year 1663, the Dutch took all Portuguese possessions in Malabar.
In 1665, the Portuguese handed over the island of Bombay to the British. In 1739, the Mahattas captured Bassein and the surrounding areas and, in accordance with the treaty of 1740, the Portuguese handed over the Fort of Chaul to the Mahrattas. As a result of all this, the Portuguese were left with only Diu, Daman, Goa island, Salsette, Bardez and Anjadev island by about the middle of the 18th century.

In 1763, the Portuguese conquered Ponda Panchmahal from the Mahrattas, and in 1781 they took possession of Bhatagram and Satari (Sankhli) from the Savantvadikar Bhonsales. In 1783, they captured part of the Pernem Mahal from Savantvadi and the rest of it in 1788. In accordance with the treaty of 11th January 1780, with the Mahrattas, they secured the Nagar Haveli province.

The Portuguese established their mastery over the Indian Ocean in the 16th century and they prohibited the ships of other nations from plying in it without Portuguese permit. Later when the Dutch and the British came to India, their conflicts with the Portuguese gradually diminished Portuguese maritime power. Even so, during the regimes of the Moghuls, Adilshah, the Rajah of Bednur, and also Shivaji the Great and Sambhaji, it was customary for them to take Portuguese permits (cartazes) for navigation of their ships in the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese formally ended this practice in 1774 but it had fallen into disuse many years earlier. As a matter of fact, by 1721, even Portuguese ships from Daman and Bassein had to secure permits from Kanhoji Angria to ensure peaceful passage. Sambhaji Angria always insisted that Portuguese trading vessels take permits from him. Two frigates had to escort Portuguese trading vessels, lest Tulaji Angria molested them. The Portuguese fought several battles in the Indian Ocean. Their conflicts with the Mahrattas are recorded in Portuguese history.

From the beginning of the 16th century, the Portuguese came into political contact and conflict with the various indigenous ruling dynasties. The number of treaties and pacts they entered into with the Hindu and Muslim princes is very large. Between the Portuguese and the Mahrattas alone, no less than 25 pacts and treaties were concluded.
Portuguese chroniclers began to record events in India in connection with Portuguese activities in the 16th century. In 1528, Fernao Lopes de Castanheda, a Portuguese writer, came to Goa. He collected a good deal of material about events and incidents in which the Portuguese were involved, travelling all over Goa and other parts of India between 1528 and 1538. On his return to Portugal, he devoted twenty laborious years to producing his *Historia do Descobrimento e Conquista da India*. He died in 1559, after completing his work. His work recorded forty years of the history of the Portuguese in India since their first landing. The first seven parts of this volume were published in Coimbra in 1551-54; the eighth part in 1563. A copy of his manuscript of the ninth part was preserved in the collections of Father Maffei at Rome. All nine parts were published in a single edition at Coimbra between 1924-1933. The tenth part of Castanheda’s history is untraceable.

Gaspar Correia, another Portuguese writer, came to Goa sixteen years before Castanheda, i.e. in 1512. He was a Secretary to Afonso de Albuquerque and knew well a number of Portuguese Viceroyos. In 1547, under his supervision, a number of portraits of Portuguese Viceroyos were drawn by a Hindu artist for hanging in the old palace in Goa. These included portraits of Juan de Castro and his predecessors. From this it is obvious that he was in India for a long time. Gaspar Correia wrote in 1551 *Lendas da India alias Cronica dos Feitos da India* but he kept on improving on it till 1563. It consists of four parts and covers the history of the Portuguese in India till 1550. He died in about 1565. His work was published in 1858-1866.

Another well-known Portuguese chronicler is Joao de Barros. He never came to India but he nevertheless collected a considerable amount of information from India. In the 16th century, there was a big India office in Lisbon known as Casa da India. Barros held a high position in this office for a number of years and so had no difficulty in collecting information about the doings of the Portuguese in India. He was well patronised by the then Portuguese King.

Joao de Barros wrote *Decadas da Asia*. The first part of this work (Decada I) was published in 1552; the second (Decada II) in 1553. He intended the work to have four parts, but was unable to complete it and his account takes us only up to 1527. He died in 1570, but
had already prepared notes for writing the fourth part. Joao Baptista Lavanha made use of these notes and wrote the fourth part which was published in Madrid in 1615. In this Decada IV, the period 1527-1539 is covered.

On 25 February 1595, the King of Portugal ordered the founding of a record office in Goa Palace. The record office in Lisbon was called Torre do Tombo. The record office in Goa was named Torre do Tombo da India. A Portuguese savant, Diago do Couto (1542-1616) who had been in India since 1560, was appointed the Chief of this record office and was designated Guarda-Mor. He was besides entrusted with the task of continuing the work of Barros on Portuguese history in India. Diago do Couto was therefore also designated Cronista-Mor da India, Chief Choronicler of India. This type of designation was first given in Portugal in the 15th century when it was awarded to Fernao Lopes (1380-1460), a well-known historian. Since then, the office had acquired great dignity and prestige and a rich scholarly tradition.

Diago do Couto wrote Parts IV to XII of Decadas da Asia in Goa between 1597 and 1616. He started from Part IV because the Part IV prepared by Barros had not then been published. The result is that two versions of Part IV, on the same period, are now available. Couto has recorded events till 1599 in Decadas XII. He died in 1616 in Goa and the last part of the Decadas remained unfinished. He wrote only the first five books (livros). Couto’s Decadas was published between 1602 and 1736.

A manuscript copy of Couto’s Decada V, covering 1537-45, has been preserved in the library of Leyde. Marcus de Jong published this manuscript at Coimbra in 1937. Couto also has to his credit publications other than the Decadas. One such volume is Dialogo do Soldado Pratico Portuguese. He made a number of alterations in this work when it was published under the title Dialogo do Soldado Pratico. In these two books, he severely criticised contemporary Portuguese officials in Goa.

Sixteen years after the death Diago do Couto, Antonio Bocarro, who came to Goa in 1615 and was a man of learning, was appointed Cronista and Guarda-Mor in the Goa Records Office. He wrote Decada, afterwards called Decada XIII do Historia da India. It was
published in Lisbon in two parts in 1876. It covers the period 1612-
1617. Another important work by this author is his Livro das plantas
de todas as fortalezas, cidades e provoques do Estado da India Oriental.
It was written in 1635 and two well-preserved manuscripts of it are
available, one at Evora and the other in Madrid. Information on
further copies is to be found in Professor C. R. Boxer’s writings.12

Antonio Bocarro has given in this manuscript varied information
about Portuguese forts in India and elsewhere of those days. Cunha
Rivara had published in 1868-69 several chapters from Bocarro’s
Evora copy in his Cronista de Tisuari. Dr. Braganza Pereira got
unpublished chapters from the Evora MS. copied and, adding them to
the published chapters in Rivara’s book, published all in Archivo
Portugues Oriental in 1937-38. Since Pedro Barreto de Resende’s
blocks of the maps in his manuscript in the Bibliothque Nationale de
Paris have been appended to this, this work edited by Braganza Pereira
is considered useful. But there is inexcusable negligence in this
publication of Braganza Pereira as in several other portions of Archivo-
Portugues Oriental edited by him.

Professor C. R. Boxer of the University of London comments as
follows in connection with Braganza Pereira’s work:

Unfortunately this edition leaves a great deal to be desired, and
is in some respects worse than useless. The proofs were
evidently corrected very carelessly or not at all, so that the
text teems with misprints and misreadings. Moreover, the
notes provided by the editor make no attempt to clarify or
illuminate the text, but consist of a mass of miscellaneous docu-
ments... uncritically selected and printed without any order
or system.13

Contemporaneously with Antonio Bocarro, there was in Goa
a Portuguese scholar named Pedro Barreto de Resende who was
secretary to the Portuguese Viceroy, Conde de Linhares. He prepared
in 1646 a work called Livro de Estado da India Oriental, making use
of the description of Portuguese and other forts in the manuscripts of
Antonio Bocarro. In this work he gives brief biographical sketches of
the Portuguese Viceroys and Governors from the beginning to 1634
accompanied by 44 portraits in colour. Besides, there are coloured
ground plans of 66 forts with necessary descriptions and nine maps. A beautiful copy of this manuscript is to be found in the Biblioteca Nationale de Paris (Fonds Portugais). Another copy is in the collection of the British Museum, London (Sloane Ms. 197).

Barros, Diogo do Couto and Bocarro wrote about events before the rise of Mahratta power. Even so, their writings are indirectly useful for compiling the history of the Mahrattas. Diogo do Couto, for instance, has discussed the emergence of the Chauthai with ability. Bocarro has also given illuminating information on the subject. In the Paris manuscript, Resende pays high tribute to Conde de Linhares for having forcibly converted Brahmins from Salcette to Christianity. What is remarkable is that there is much difference between what Couto has recorded and what Ferista has written. Couto says that what he has written about Mealkhan was collected from that prince himself. Not only this, but what Ferista has written about Mealkhan appears to be wrong in the light of contemporary Portuguese sources of information. Information about the sons and grandsons of Mealkhan is to be found only in the correspondence of the Portuguese. The echoes of Mealkhan’s intrigues are noticeable in Shivaji-Portuguese relations 125 years later. What is very surprising is that the Mealkhan affair was mentioned by the Mahratta spokesmen when the treaty between Bajirao I and the Portuguese was being negotiated in 1737.

Those who succeeded Bocarro as curators at the Torre do Tombo da India at Goa did not do any worthwhile writing during the 17th and 18th centuries. But much information about the Mahrattas is available in the writings of other contemporary Portuguese writers.

Conde de Linhares ruled as Viceroy at Goa from 1629 to 1635. His Diario is an important source of historical information. But a good deal of it has been destroyed. A part of this Diario is preserved in the Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa and has been published. Conde de Linhares mentions Shahaji, Murari Pandit and other contemporary Mahratta sardars in his Diario and deals with them at some length.

In 1695, Cosme de Guarda, a Portuguese writer, wrote a biography of Shivaji. It was published in Lisbon in 1730. It has 168 pages. Dr. Surendranath Sen has published an English translation of this
book. Cosme de Guarda appears to be a Portuguese born at Mormugoa. This book is not of much historical value. A good deal of it is just gossip. Even so, what de Guarda says about the Desais of the Konkan has a sound historical basis. He mentions a battle between Shivaji and the Portuguese near Mormugoa and is supported by a contemporary record in the Goa Archives. His book gives an idea of what the Portuguese in Goa thought about Shivaji at the end of the 17th century.

While Cosme de Guarda wrote a biography of Shivaji, his contemporary Portuguese Padre, Francisco de Souza, wrote O Oriente Conquistado a Jesus Crisio Pelos padres de Companhia de Jesus da Província de Goa. This was passed by the Censor for publication in 1697, but it was actually published only in 1710 at Lisbon in two parts. This volume contains a description of Sambhaji's invasion of Goa in 1683.

Padre Leonardo Pais, a Goan Catholic priest, was the author of a book called Promtuario das Difinicoes Indicas published in Lisbon in 1713. Emperor Aurangzeb was alive when it was written. There is a clear mention in it that Akbar, Aurangzeb's son, camped at Bicholim. It is also said in this book that it was a great miracle that Conde de Alvorca should have returned safely to Goa after raising the siege of the fortress of Ponda in 1683. Francisco de Souza and Leonardo Pais were then staying in Goa.

In the 18th century, the Portuguese contacts and conflicts with their neighbours, the Chhatrapatis of Satara and Kolhapur, the Peshwas, the Angrias, the Bhonsales of Savantvadi, and the Dholaps, Saundekars and others grew intense. There were quite a few battles and skirmishes. Descriptions of these incidents were recorded in the Portuguese language. Some of them were published in Portugal and some are still lying there in manuscript form. The present author has in his possession photostat copies of some of these MSS. All these documents are important because the information contained in them is accurate as regards dates, which cannot be said about the Mahratta and English chronicles. Partisanship was, of course, inevitable and a historian has to be careful while making use of this material. We shall now deal with some such published sources.
There were wars between Kanhoji Angria and the Portuguese in 1713 and 1714. Descriptions of these are available in two accounts of the administration of the Portuguese Viceroy, Vasco Fernandes Cezar de Menezes, published in Lisbon. They are as follows:

Relação dos sucessos & gloriosas acções militares obradas no Estado da India Ordenadas, & dirigidas pelo Vice-Rei e Capitam General do mesmo Estado Vasco Fernandes Cezar de Menezes Em o anno passado de 1713 by Antonio Rodrigues de Costa, (Lisboa 1714) and Relação dos progressos das armas portuguesas no Estado da India no ano de 1714 sendo Vice-Rei, e Capitam General de mesmo Estado, Vasco Fernandes Cezar de Menezes, continuando os sucessos desde o anno 1713, referidos na Relação que se imprimiu no princípio do presente by Jose Freise de Monterroyo Mascarenhas (Lisboa 1716).

In 1726, the Portuguese besieged the Bicholim fort and conquered it from the Savantvadi Bhonsales on 27 May. A day to day account of this battle by an engineer, Andre Ribeiro Coutinho, was published in Lisbon in 1748. The Bicholim fort is well known in the history of Savantvadi. It was demolished later on and no trace of it is to be found at the site today.

A description of the fort of Bicholim is to be found in Andre Ribeiro Coutinho's book and in the report on Bicholim written by the Governor of Goa, Gilherme de Souza, in 1782. Khem Savant Bhonsala II built this fort. Subsequently, in 1725, Fond Savant repaired it with the help of two British engineers. The title of Andre Ribeiro Coutinho's book is Relações Diária da expugnação e rendimento da praça de Bicholim em 27 de Maio de 1726. There is also a manuscript on this subject in the library of Coimbra University (Manuscript No. 594).

Diogo da Costa published in 1741 in Lisbon a book of 24 pages on the Bassein Campaign called Relação das guerras da India desde o anno de 1736 ate o de 1740. Although this report may not be as valuable as other manuscripts in Portuguese on this subject, there is some information in it which cannot be had anywhere else. Therefore, it is a useful source of information on the history of the Mahrattas. The battles between the Portuguese and the Mahrattas at Dongri or Dharavi form an important phase of this Bassein campaign and
information about them in a contemporary source is found in a book by Ignacio Barbosa Machado called *Factos Políticos e Militares da Antiga e Nova Lusitania*. This book was published in Lisbon in 1745. The only contemporary Marathi source on this campaign consists of three minor registries in the Peshwa daily account book. Not one letter of the day is available. On the other hand, in Portuguese, there is a detailed letter written on 5 March, 1738 by General Antonio Cardim Frois.

During the course of the Bassin campaign, the Bhonsale of Savantvadi captured Bardez but it was re-captured from him by the Viceroy, Conde de Eriseir, in 1741. A full description of its recapture is contained in a book published in Lisbon in 1742, written by Jose Ferreira de Monterroya Mascarenhas: *Noticia de Viagem que fez segunda vez ao Estado da India o illustras Excell. Senhor Marquez do Lourical e primeiros progressos de seu Governo.*

In May 1742, Govindpant Thakur invaded Salsette. A detailed account of the battle that ensued between him and the Portuguese is available in two booklets published in Lisbon: *Relação das Victorias Alcançadas na India contra o enimigo Marata, sendo Vice-Rei daquele Estado o Illustissimo e Excellentissimo D. Luiz Carlos Inacio Xavier de Menezes* and *Relação e verdadeiras noticias das ultimas acoes Militares, ordenadas pelo Illustissimo e Excellentissimo senhor D. Luiz de Menezes, Marquez de Lourical, Vice-Rei e Capitao General de India e executadas por Manuel Soares Velho, General da Provincia da Bardez.* The first of these was published in 1743 and has fifteen pages. The other was published in 1747 and has twelve pages. There is one more book in Portuguese about the victory that Marquez de Lourical won over the Mahrattas: *Elogio de Francisco Xavier Mascarenhas, Cavalleiro professo da Ordem do Christo, Coronel que foi de um dos regimentos de Marinha e com antante da esquadra que no ano de 1740 foi para Estado da India com a patente de sargento mor de batalha (Lisboa 1742).* This was written by Francisco Jose Freire.

There is ample material in Portuguese regarding the skirmishes between the Portuguese and the Bhonsalas of Savantvadi during the reign of Marquez de Alorna (1744 to 1750). Jose-Freire de Monteiro wrote a series of six volumes on this topic called *Epanhaphora Indica* and published them in Lisbon between 1741 and 1753. There is also a good deal of information in this book about the
Angrias, the Peshwas and the Chhatrapatis. In view of this, it is not an exaggeration to say that it constitutes an excellent source of material on the history of the Mahrattas. It deserves to be fully translated into Marathi.

Another Portuguese writer-engineer, Manuel Antonio de Meireles, wrote a five-volume account of the victory of Marquez de Alorna over the Bhonsalas of Savantvadi. These volumes were published in Lisbon between 1747 and 1750. Besides these, some poems in Portuguese on the subject were also published in Lisbon in 1747. Engineer Meireles had participated personally in these skirmishes and his books therefore have an importance all their own.

In his _Relação de Conquista das Praças Alorna, Bicholim, Avaro, Morly, Satarem, Tiracol, e Rary, Engineer Meireles lists, at the end of the book on p. 51, the various ships from the Savantvadi armada that were captured by the Portuguese. There are three other books by Engineer Meireles which contain detailed accounts of the battles between the Savantvadi Bhonsalas and the Portuguese of which the titles are: (1) _Relação dos felizes sucessos da India desde 20 de Dezembro de 1746 até 28 do dito de 1747_, (2) _Relação dos felizes sucessos da India desde o primeiro de Janeiro até o ultimo de Dezembro de 1748_, (3) _Relação dos felizes sucessos da India desde Janeiro de 1749 até o de 1750._

The Marquez de Tavora succeeded the Marquez de Morna as Viceroy in 1750. There are three books on his rule. One of these was published in Lisbon in 1753 and another in 1754. The manuscript of the third book is in the Evora Library. The author of the book published in 1753 is Dr. Francisco Raymundo de Moraes Pereira and the book is _Annal Indico Lusitano_. This writer also published a book in 1752 about the voyage from Portugal to Goa of the Marquez de Tavora in which an account of the conflict between the Angria and Savantvadi Bhonsla is given. The title of the book is _Relação da Viagem que de Porto de Lisboa fizeram a India o Illustissimo e Excellentissimo Senhore Luiz Marquez de Tavora, ofrecida ao Illustissimo e Excellentissimo Senhor Luiz Bernardo de Tavora_. The book on the Marquez de Tavora published in 1754 was written by Dr. Baltazar Manuel de Chaves. The title of the book is _Annal Indico Historico 3a parte._
In the Biblioteca Nacional de Lisbon, there is an eight-page report on the conquest of Sadashivgad and Kurmagad (Shimpi) by Marquez de Tavora from the Saundekars. The title of the report is _Relação das Proezas e Victorias que na India Oriental tem conseguido o inexplicavel valor de Assis de Tavora, Marquez de Tavora, Conde de Alvor Vice-Rei e Capitão General dos Estado da India_. An eight page booklet, describing the reception given to the Vakil of the Saundekar who was sent to Goa after the Portuguese victory was published in Lisbon under the title, _Relação da Embaixada que o Sunda depois de vencida das armas Portuguezas mandou ao Marquez de Tavora_.

Conde de Alvor succeeded the Marquez de Tavora as Viceroy. De Alvor led an attack on Mardangad in 1756 and was killed in action. A detailed account of this assault is available in a book by Joseph Roger, published in Lisbon in 1757, under the title, _Relação dos Sucessos prosperos e infelizes do Illustrissimo e Excellentissimo Senhor Conde de Alva_.

An account of what followed this incident is available in an eight-page pamphlet published in Lisbon in 1759 written by a Portuguese settled in Goa, Jose da Silva Machado, entitled _Relação das successos da India e principio de felicissimo Governo do Illustrissimo e Excellentissimo Senhor Conde de Ega_. This book also contains information about the Savantvadi-Portuguese conflicts.

A number of actions took place between Savantvadi and the Portuguese during the latter half of the 18th century. A number of Portuguese accounts of these actions are available. Some of these are listed below:

1. _Relação verdadeira dos felizes successors da India e victorias que alcançaram as armas Portuguezas naquelle Estado em o ano de 1757, Lisboa 1753._

2. _Relação as noticia certa dos Estados da India. Reference os progressos das Armas Portuguezas na Azis como novamente tem tido varias contentas com o Bonsulo, Marata e Mogor....., Lisboa, 1756._

3. _Relacao Marcial do plausivel e afortunado sucesso, que nas partes da India tiveram as armas Portuguezas contra o Bonsulo nosso inimigo em o conflictio comele havido em o dia nove de Maio do ano passado de 1758._
(4) Breve noticia que se da ao publico para consolacao dos Portuguezes, dos sucessos, que acontecerao no Estado da nossa India, Desde o mez de Janeiro de 1759 ate o de 1760, Lisboa, 1760.

(5) Nova e Curiosa das batalhas que os Portuguezes deram na India, e das, grandes victorias que alcançaram contra o Bonsulo, Lisboa, 1785.

All the above-mentioned publications are now out of print but copies are preserved in the Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa and other libraries in Portugal. The present writer possesses copies of some of them.

In the 18th century, a number of reports on happenings in Goa were published and, in the middle of the 19th century, documents in the Goa Archives began to be noticed and studied. A learned Portuguese author, Cunha Rivara, was appointed to a high position in Goa in 1855. He had studied a number of historical manuscripts when he was Librarian and Curator of the Library at Evora. He was a great historicist. He gave new direction to historical research in Goa and started the era of studying historical documents. He found an enormous amount of material in the Goa records which could be used for constructing a connected history of the Portuguese in Goa. He published hundreds of documents.

Cunha Rivara was in Goa for 22 years. He brought to light from 1857 to 1877 a collection of historical letters in ten parts under the title Archivo Portugues Oriental. Besides making this collection, he conducted for three years a monthly periodical (1866-69) called Chronista do Tissuari which was devoted to historical topics. Although there is not a single paper pertaining to Mahratta history in Archivo Portugues Oriental, there are plenty of documents dealing with the Portuguese campaign of persecution of Hindus in the territory under their domination and in promotion of Roman Catholicism. This helps to illuminate the background of the Mahratta campaign for the conquest of Bassein. There is some description in Sashtichi Bakhar but the documents in Archivo Oriental and the manuscript Provisoes a favor da cristandade afford well-documented evidence of religious persecution by the Portuguese. Cunha Rivara published in Cronista
da Tissuary, in its 41st issue and onwards, the instruções given to Vice-Rei Conde de Ericeira by the King of Portugal, which throw a flood of light on Portuguese policies regarding the Mahrattas.

The Goa Government contemplated moving the seat of power from Old Goa to Mormugoa after the invasion of Goa by Sambhaji. Cunha Rivara wrote a series of articles on this subject in Cronista da Tissuary and brought to light some information regarding this invasion by Sambhaji. He also published in the Boletim do Governo between 1873 and 1875 the texts of the treaties and pacts (páginas de tratados) which the Portuguese entered into with the local kings. This involved much laborious work.

A Portuguese compiler, Julio Firmeino Judici Biker, incorporated in his Collecção de Tratados, a work in fourteen parts, all the treaties and pacts published by Cunha Rivara but nowhere gave credit to Rivara! This Biker material was published in Lisbon in 1881-1887. The texts of most of the treaties concluded between the Portuguese and the Mahrattas are to be found in this book, but he did not include any of the Marathi and other Indian-language documents.

Contemporaneously with Cunha Rivara, another savant, Filipe Nery Xavier, undertook important research work regarding the history of Goa. He was born in Lotulim in Goa. He published an annotated edition of the Instruções written by the Marquez de Alorna which contain much information about the Mahrattas. Dr. Surendranath Sen translated it in English from the third edition of Instruções and his translation has been published. There is much useful information in the notes entitled Bombaim and Bonsulo that Filipe Nery Xavier appended to the book Uma Viagem de Duas mil legoas by the Portuguese writer Borbuda. The substance of these notes is also found in Filipe Nery Xavier’s Esboço de um Diccionario Historico-Administrativo.

Some documents from the Goa records were published in the book, Os Portugueses no Oriente, by a Portuguese writer, Eduardo Balsemano. In the third part of this book, there are descriptions of the naval battles between the Mahrattas and the Portuguese. A detailed report on the attack on Mardangad in 1763 by Viceroy Conde de Ega and its demolition by the Viceroy is available in this book.
The Instruções of Viceroy Marquez de Alorna published by Filipe Nery Xavier as also the Instruções to the Governor of Goa given by Portugal’s Prime Minister, the Marquez de Pombal, in 1774 are worthy of perusal. An annotated edition of these was published in 1841 at Panjim by Claudio Langrange Monteiro de Barbuda. There is a Chapter on the Mahrattas in this volume. The full title of this volume is Instruções com que El-Rei D’Jose I Mandou passar ao Estado da India o Governador e Capitão General e o Arcebispo Primaz do Oriente, no ano de 1774.

A renowned Goan historical research worker, Professor Jose Antonio Ismael Gracias, making use of the Goa Archives, wrote, and published at Panjim in 1907, a book entitled, Uma Dona Portuguesa na Corte do Grao Mogol. It contains two letters about Kanhoji Angre written in the years 1715 and 1716. Gracias also wrote a series of articles in the periodical, O Oriente Portuguez, on the Mahratta campaign against Bassein. These were based on material in Portuguese in the Goa Archives. The title of this series of articles is ‘Os Ultimos Cinco Generais do Norte’.

Dr. Braganza Pereira, a Judge of the Panjim High Court (later called the Judicial Commissioner’s Court), selected about 1,500 letters from the Goa Archives and published them in 1939 and 1940 in five parts in Arquivo Portugues Oriental, tomo I Vol. III. The papers contained in these parts relate to the period from 1700 to 1739 and hundreds of them pertain to Mahratta-Portuguese relations. A preface to the first part extending over 193 pages quotes a number of letters on Mahratta-Portuguese relations. Thus, all these five parts are useful to students of Mahratta history. But, unfortunately, many letters abound in printing errors and inaccuracies. Great care has therefore to be exercised while making use of them. Professor C. R. Boxer of the University of London says about this book: ‘Edited (very carelessly) and riddled with misreadings and misprints, this series, nevertheless, contains many interesting documents . . . .’

Dr. Braganza Pereira also contributed a series of articles entitled Portugueses em Baçaim to the O Oriente Portuguesa in which there is some information about the Bassein campaign, culled from the Goa Archives.
Jeronimo Quadros studied historical documents of the Portuguese from Diu. He found there three letters regarding the Bassein campaign which he published in the O Oriente Portugues in May 1905. Antonio Francisco Moniz in his Noticias e Documentos para a Historia de Damao has published some papers in which echoes of the Mahrattas' doings in Gujarat are heard. Moniz selected a number of papers from the records of the Daman Municipality and published them in four parts in his book. Many of these letters relate to the history of the Mahrattas.

Lastly, with all humility, the present author must mention his own work in this field. He gained admission to the Goa Archives in 1919 with great difficulty. His intention was to study the relations between the Portuguese and the Mahrattas. For about three years, he studied only documents in Marathi. Since the manuscripts were not properly listed, he began to study such material in Portuguese as he could lay his hands on. In 1931, he was appointed Director of Archives in Goa and he then became quite free to carry on research and allow others to do so. The Portuguese Government recognised his services in bringing order and system to the directorate.²⁶

The following is a list of the books, tracts and essays by Pissurlekar in Portuguese:

2. 'A India em 1629' (Boletim do Instituto Vasco da Gama no. 7, 1930).
6. Portugueses e Maratas, IV Como se perdeu Baquim, 1932.
7. Portugueses e Maratas, V, Restauração de Bardez e Salcette, 1933.
(8) Portugueses e Maratas, VI, Tentativas para e Reconquista da Provincia do Norte, 1940.
(9) Maratas em Bocaim, 1935.
(12) O Enigma da Morte do Vice-Rei, Conde de Alva esclarecido a luz de Documentos Maratas, 1957 (Academia das Ciências de Lisboa, Letras, Memorias, t. VI Lisbon).
(13) Um Frade Capucho na Corte de Punem, 1934.
(15) Antigualhas, 1941.

All the books mentioned above have been written on the basis of published and unpublished material in Portuguese and other languages and they pertain to the period from the rise of Shahaji, Shivaji's father, to the last of the Peshwas. Some events and incidents touching Mahratta-Portuguese relations have still to see the light of day, particularly those about conflicts on the sea, but they will be published in due course. Extracts from the correspondence of the Portuguese envoys at the Mahratta Court at Poona such as Narayan Vithal Shenvi Dhume, Vithalrao Valavalikar, Lakshminarayan Valavalikar have been cited among other papers in the above-mentioned Agentes da Diplomacia Portuguesa na India, 1952. Several of the Portuguese and Latin letters about Mahratta history obtaining in Portugal, London, Paris and Rome, besides those in the Goa Archives, have been quoted in Assentos de Conselho do Estado, Vols. III, IV, V, 1955-1957. Portuguese records in the Bombay Secretariat and those in Lisbon, Evora, Coimbra, Madrid, Paris, and London have also been used. There is one Portuguese letter in the collection of the Bhurut Ithasa Samshodhaka Mandal of Poona, a copy of which has been published in
Agentes da Diplomacia Portuguesa na India. Some Dutch sources have also been exploited. Even so, it need hardly be said that some information still remains undiscovered and future historical research workers can work on it.

The main source-material on Mahratta-Portuguese relations is to be found in the 22 books of Livro dos reis vizinhos in the Goa Archives. Copies of all official Portuguese letters from 1619 to 1842 have been recorded in these books. They are letters written by the Portuguese to the neighbouring princes and potentates. In the second book of Livro do Segredo, there are copies of Portuguese letters written between 1711 and 1715. Among them are about thirty-five important letters about Kanhoji Angria.

There is in the Goa Archives a collection of 409 books relating to the period 1560-1880 known as Livros das Moncozes, in which there are many documents about the Mahrattas. The documentary material in the Goa Archives has been classified under different heads such as, Cartas e Orders (1609-1865), Cartas patentes e alvares (1557-1875), Regimentos e instruções (1564-1869) Livro da Provincia do Norte (1686-1720), Tombo de Damas (1592), Saguates (1598-1688) and Presas do Sul. This could be easily gathered from the present author’s Roteiro dos Arquivos da India Portuguesa, published at Panjim in 1955. This classification follows the tradition of the Goa Records Office which was established about 350 years ago as mentioned earlier.

There are over 3,000 letters in Marathi written to Portuguese officials by the Mahratta Court. Many of them are from Savantvadi and Saunde. Not one letter from Shivaji the Great is to be found among them. The original documents of the treaty between Shivaji and the Portuguese concluded in 1667 is now in Portugal. A photostat copy has been reproduced in the author’s Assentos do Conselho do Estado, Vol. 4. The text of this treaty was first published in 1926 by him in the Shivaji Souvenir. No letter from Sambhaji also is traceable among these letters. But some letters of his envoy, Sidoji Farjand, who came to Goa in December 1684 are available.27

Letters from Bajirao, Balaji Bajirao and Madhavrao have been published by the author in some Marathi periodicals.28 The author came across some important Marathi documents in the Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisboa, the Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisboa, and
the Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa. There is ample material touching on Mahratta history in these as well as in the Biblioteca de Evora and the library of the Coimbra University. There are letters in Portuguese in the Biblioteca Nationale, Paris, in ‘Lefond Portugais’ touching Shivaji-Portuguese relations. Even in the British Museum there are accounts of Portuguese-Mahratta contacts, particularly about the Portuguese victory over Savantvadi in 1746 (Additional No. 20907).

It has already been mentioned that some information about Shahaji is available in the Diario of Vice-Rei Conde de Linhares. Some is also to be found in the second part of Assentos do Conselho do Estado. There were 62 manuscripts in the Goa Archives known as Documentos remetidos da India, but they were sent to Portugal in 1777 and they are now kept in Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo in Lisbon. Some selected papers have been published in five parts under the title: Documentos Remetidos da India. There are some letters in the last part about some events touching Sir Jadunath Sarkar in the fifth issue of the Journal of the Hyderabad Archaeological Society for 1919-20. On comparing the English translation published by Sir Jadunath with the original Portuguese, the present author came across two small errors. On p. 15 the words should be ‘at ten o’clock at night’ (pelas des horas de noite) instead of ‘ten o’clock’, and on p. 17 ‘at seven to eight o’clock’ (as sete para as oito horas) instead of ‘at seven o’clock’. The writer of this report was presumably some Portuguese Franciscan padre resident in Goa.

The title of the second report is, Breve Resumo dos sucessos do Estado Portugueseh na India nos anos de 1682 e 1683. This report has not been published. It contains some information about the invasion of Ponda by Vice-Rei Conde de Alvora. The writer of this report probably was someone intimate with the Conde de Alvora. It bears the date 23 January, 1684.

Besides these two reports, there is one excellent source of material on Sambhaji-Portuguese conflict. It is the correspondence of the Secretary and the Vice-Rei, Dr. Luiz Gonsalves Couto, between 1681 and 1686. This is available in the Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisbon. A great deal of otherwise unrecorded information about Sambhaji is available in this correspondence.
How Sambhaji’s armada was destroyed is described in the account by Sambhajirao and Vitthojirao, Desais of Karwar, which they wrote for the then Vice-Rei of Goa. The original Marathi letter seems to have been lost, but a contemporary Portuguese version of it is available in the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon, in manuscript No. 4179. The present author has published two letters from Sambhaji’s envoy, Rangaji Lakshmimidhar, on pp. 98-102 in his Antigualhas, 1941, as also Portuguese material regarding Rajaram in his Portuguesese Maratas.

The Moghul power was established in the Konkan six years after Sambhaji’s invasion of Goa. A number of manuscripts relating to this period are to be found in the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon. Two manuscripts of these are of particular interest: Extracto das novas que vierao do Oriente (No. 647 in Collecao Pombalina); and Livro das Cartas que escrevo a S. Magestade o Senhor Dom Rodrigo da Costa .......... Governador e Capitao General da India nos anos de 1686, 1687, 1688 e das que S. Mageste escrevo ao Vice-Rei o Conde de Alvora em antecessor no governo e ao mesmo Sr. Governador e das respostas que jez a ellas.

After his release from Moghul captivity, Shahu began to lay claim to the Konkan territories which had been usurped by Savantvadi and Saunde princes. Information about this is found in the fifth part of Assentos do Concelho do Estado. Ramchandrapant Amatya attacked Siddi Yakut Khan and over-ran his territory. After Amatya’s return, the Siddi besieged Kolaba fort and captured fifty ships of the Angria. This information is available in a manuscript in the Biblioteca da Ajuda entitled Livro que Cartem Carzas do Governo de Almotace-Mor em Pernambuco, Bahia e India ao governo nella de Luis de Mendonça Furtado.

Vice-Rei Vasco Fernandes Cezar de Menezes was appointed Governor of Goa on 21 September, 1712. He came in particular contact with the Angrias. Mention has already been made of the two booklets about this Viceroy. There is a manuscript about this in the Biblioteca da Ajuda in which information about Angria-Portuguese conflicts is available. The title of this manuscript is: Relaçao de todos os successos que houve no tempo do governo de Excellentissimo Sr. Vasco Fernandes Cezar de Menezes, Vice-Rei e
Capitão General da India. All the happenings after the reign of this Viceroy till 1738 have been recorded in a manuscript now in the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon, which was written by the Vice-Rei Conde de Eriseir himself. The title of this manuscript (F. G. 465) is: Noticia da India desde o fim do Governo do Vice-Rei Vasco Fernandes Cezar até o fim do ano de 1738.

In this manuscript, Portuguese relations with Shahu, Angria, Savantvadi, the Siddi of Janjira, the Raja of Ramnagar, Saunde, etc. from 1717 onwards, are dealt with. Some things mentioned in it do not get mention anywhere else. It throws a considerable amount of light on the history of the Angrias. A number of important matters concerning the Mahrattas are dealt with in the Instruções left by Vice-Rei Conde de Eriseir to succeeding Viceroy's. These instruções are dated 22 October, 1720. A copy is available in the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon, and another copy in the Biblioteca, Evora. This manuscript contains information about Angria, the Siddi, the Chhatrapati of Kolhapur, Chhatrapati Shahu, the Bhonsale of Savantvadi, Dabhade, the Raja of Ramnagar and so we get a picture of how a Portuguese administrator viewed these figures.

The correspondence of Vice-Rei Francisco Josef de Sampayu e Castro between 1720 and 1723 is available in the library of the Academia das Ciencias. It provides information about Angria-Portuguese relations (manuscript No. 258). Similar papers are found in-manuscript No. 8548 in the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon. During the region of Vice-Rei Conde de Sandomel, the Mahrattas captured Bassein Fort and invaded Goa also. There are two detailed accounts of the Bassein campaign in Portuguese and the present author has made wide use of them in his Portuguese e Maratas.

The author came across two reports on Vyankatrao Ghorpade's invasion of Goa in the Biblioteca da Ajuda which are very valuable. Copy of one of these manuscripts (F. G. 660) is available in the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon. Its title is Relação Sumaria dos sucessos de Goa com a guerra do Marata, escrita com a individualção de algumas particulares circunstancias que nao a todos manifestas. Unfortunately, it has been written in a poor hand and the copy contains a number of errors. The original manuscript is probably in the Oratorian Convent in Old Goa. The writer of this report claims that he is revealing many unknown facts for the first time.
The second report was written by Bhagun Kamat Vagh, an interpreter in Portuguese employ. He knew a great deal about many then current happenings. He had participated, along with the Portuguese envoys, in pourparlers with the Mahrattas. Thanks to this report, we get first-hand information about how the Portuguese richly bribed Sardar Dadajirao Bhave Nargundkar to ensure that the Mahrattas quit Goa. It is not an exaggeration to say that it is first-class material on this subject. It is surprising that it has remained unpublished. The present author has a photostat copy.

There is yet another report on the discussions between Vyankatrao and Dadajirao on the one hand and the Portuguese on the other, concerning the conclusion of a treaty. This report by Antonio Carnero de Alcacona has been published.30.

What is remarkable is that, in the Marathi sources, nothing of value is available about this invasion of Goa which was proceeding while the Bassein campaign was in progress. On the contrary, what one meets with in Marathi on this topic is highly perverted as can be seen from the affair of Phondu Kamat.31 Curiously enough, very detailed accounts are available in the three reports in Portuguese just referred to. Rajwade, Sane, Vad, Sardesai and others have published a good deal of contemporary correspondence but none has been able to compile a connected account of the Bassein campaign with proper reference to dates. The Portuguese sources enable us to do this and connected Marathi material can also be better used on that basis. The present author was able to write about the Bassein campaign only because he had access to this material in Portuguese.

How the campaign of the Mahrattas in Salcette, affected Portugal and how the statesman there reacted to it can be gathered from some of the writings recorded there. There is in the Biblioteca da Ajudab a diary written by a wealthy and learned Portuguese gentleman, Don Francisco Xavier de Menezes, 4o Conde da Ericeira. There are in it some notes of the years 1731 to 1733. When the Mahrattas invaded Salcette in 1730 and captured some territory from the Portuguese and news about it reached Portugal, there arose a rumour that Goa itself was captured by the Mahrattas.32 The note of 6 November 1731 in this diary says that the Angria had captured three Portuguese ships. This diary was published in Biblos, Vol. XVIII, Tomo II, in 1743.
What great loss the Portuguese sustained as a consequence of the capture of Bassein by the Mahrattas is described in the report of the Vice-Rei Conde de Sandomel. This report is available in the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon (Manuscript No. 929). The correspondence of this Viceroy from 1733 to 1741 makes nine books preserved in the Academia das Ciencias, Lisbon (Manuscript Nos. 503-511). It gives valuable information about the Mahrattas, particularly the Angrias. The situation obtaining at the time of the arrival of Conde de Ericeira in Goa has been described very well by Conde de Sandomel in his letter dated 20 September 1741. It contains a day-to-day account of the invasion of Bardez by the Bhonsale of Savantvadi. This letter can be read in Documentos Comprovativos do Bosquejo dispossessoes Portuguesas no Oriente by Joaquim Pedro Celestino Soares.

The account of the invasion of Salsette by Sardar Govindpant Thakur on 12 May, 1742 is available in manuscript No. 677 in the library of the Coimbra University. Information about this invasion can also be gained from manuscript No. 465 (F. G.) entitled Noticias da India in the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon.

A detailed account of the battles between the Marquez de Alorna and the Bhonsale of Savantvadi is embodied in a contemporary report. This description is by a high Portuguese officer who had participated in these battles. It is manuscript No. 479 in the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon. Its title is Relação das victorias que na Asia alcantaram as armas Portuguesas Comandadas pelo Illustissimo e Excellentissimo Marquez de Castelo Novo Vice-Rei e Capitão Geral da India em 4 e 5 de Maio de 1746 e as vantajosas consequencias que se seguiu ao Estado, pielmente descrita por um oficial de infantaria que se achar nelas.

Whatever political steps were taken by the Chhatrapati of Satara, the Peshwa and the Bhonsala of Savantvadi after the Portuguese had invaded the fort of Redi have been fully described in a manuscript (51-9-8) available in the Biblioteca da Ajuda. The title of this manuscript is ‘Noticia do que foi sucedendo depois que o nosso Corpo se retirou da praça de Rari.’

There are three more important reports on this subject, the first covering events upto 28 December 1747, in the Biblioteca Nacional
(Caixa 13 No. 3). They provide information regarding the efforts made by Sadashivrao Bhau, cousin of the Peshwa, Nanasaheb, to reconquer the territory of Savantvadi taken by the Portuguese; why Sadashivrao Bhau did not succeed has also been dealt with. In the second report, information regarding Shahu’s efforts to induce the Portuguese to help Apaji Angre in 1748 is available. This account states that Apaji Angria was a son of Kanhoji Angria by his second wife. The third report contains information about happenings during the year 1749.

The first report states that Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur requested Chhatrapati Shahu to see to it that the daily worship of Saptakoteshwara at Narve, for which Shivaji the Great had awarded some land, which had fallen into disuse since Bhatagram was taken by the Portuguese, should be restarted.

The second report tells how the Savantvadi Bhonsala re-captured the fort of Masure, Bharatgad, from Angria, Tulaji Angria begged of the Portuguese to conclude a treaty with him and help him. The third report tells how Nanasaheb Peshwa carried on intrigues, with the help of Ramchandra Malhar, to capture the whole coastal tract from Kolaba to Anjedev.

In brief, these three reports (Successos da India nos anos de 1747-1750) throw considerable light on Mahratta history. The information contained in these reports corresponds in many respects with the information in the volume of Monteiro Mascarenhas known as Epanaphora India. Very probably, these reports were unpublished chapters of this valuable book.

The Jesuit, Father Francisco Alvares, has written two reports dealing with Mahratta intrigues in Karnatak. These two reports are: (1) Relação das guerras dos Turcos e Maratas no Reino de Madurey, and (2) Relação da guerra que fizerao os Maratas no Reino de Carnate, e Madurey desde o ano 1740. These manuscripts are in the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisboa (F. G. 4179). Francisco Alvares prepared these reports for the information of Vice-Rei Marquez de Castellinovo. One of them bears the date 16 September 1745.

This Jesuit writes that the people are mortally afraid of the Mahrattas not because of their bravery or valour, but because of their oppressive methods of plunder. (O grande medo que a pobre gente
concebe ao nome so de Marata nasce nao tanto de valor que estes mostrao nas suas emprezas . . . quando nascendas refindas traças que uzao nos improvizos coubos, e das cruiz tenancias que fazem para tirarem dinheiro, ainda que escondio . . . .). This padre also said that all the gold and silver of the area was passing into the hands of the Mahratta State. (Aquí dizem que a maior parte do ouro e prata desta India vai para nas terras do Marata).

The history of the reign of Vice-Rei Marquez de Tavora is given in two Portuguese books which have been already mentioned. There is one more book on this subject, yet unpublished, of which the manuscript is available in the Biblioteca Publica de Evora. Its title is: *Annal Indico Historicico do Feliz Governo do Illustrissimo e Excellentissimo Senhor Marquez de Tavora, Vice-Rei e Capitao General do Estado da India, 4° parte. Ano de 1753.* The present author possesses a photostat copy. There are two letters from the Marquez de Tavora and his wife to their sons in the Biblioteca Publica de Evora in which there is information regarding Mahratta politics and the skirmishes between the Portuguese and the Saundekar during the reign of this Vice-Rei. His wife pays compliments to Rani Tarabai of Kolhapur for her intelligence. She calls her a very intelligent woman, *Mulher Sumamente espiritiosa.* The well-known Portuguese literateur, Camilo Castello Branco, has published them in his *Noiclicos,* but the Hindu names in it have been erroneously printed. The present author has microfilm copies of the original letters.

Just as the Marquez de Alorna left behind him instructions for the guidance of his succeeding Viceroy, the Marquez de Tavora also left instructions for his successor, the Conde de Alva. These *instruções* bear the date 7 November 1664. He has said a good deal in them about Tulaji Angria, Nanaasheb Peshwa, the Chhatrapati of Kolhapur and the Bhonsala of Savantvadi. The manuscript is in the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon. The present author has a photostat copy.

The Portuguese were greatly concerned with Mahratta politics during the administration of the Marquez de Tavora. The Nizam of Hyderabad, Maharani Tarabai of Kolhapur, the Nawab of Savnur, Chhatrapati Sambhaji and Tulaji Angre formed a conspiracy against Peshwa Nanaasheb and demanded the help of the Portuguese against him. The present author has published most of the relevant papers in
Vol. VI of his *Portuguesas e Maratas*. A previously unpublished Portuguese letter from Muzaffar Jung of Hyderabad to the Viceroy of Goa, written in 1753, is in that volume. In the letter it was stated that if the Portuguese helped Tarabai against Balaji Bajirao alias Nanasaheb Peshwa, she was prepared to return Bassein to the Portuguese. But the author did not come across in the Goa records or in Portugal any Marathi letter from Tarabai to this effect. All the same, it is true that in the old index (Vol. II p. 90) of *Livro das Monções* there is a mention of Tarabai having asked for Portuguese help against Nanasaheb.  

Similarly, in a letter of the Governor of Goa, there is mention of Tarabai having appealed for such help against the Peshwa. There is a Portuguese translation of a letter to one Ismail Khan in the service of the Portuguese in Goa records. It can be gathered from that letter that Tarabai was secretly intriguing with the Portuguese through one Vithojirao Patole whom she had sent to Goa. This letter bears the date 25 October, 1756. It was translated on 25 December, 1756.

During the administration of Conde de Alva (1754-1756), the Peshwa attacked Tulaji Angria and invaded Vijaydurg with the help of the English. Tulaji sought the help of the Portuguese. Accordingly, the Conde de Alva sent the Portuguese Armada to his aid. Portuguese papers regarding this have been published in the *Collecção* of Biker.

Some correspondence of Vice-Rei Conde da Ega is found in manuscript No. 430 in the Archivo Ultramarino, Lisbon (*Cartas que o Illustissimo e Excellentissimo Conde da Ega Expedio desde o ano 1758 em que tomar posse do Governo do Estado da India aos Reis e mais Potentados vizinhos do Estado*). A good many letters from this manuscript appear to have been quoted in *Livro das Reis Vizinhos* in the Goa records. There are many letters written by the Marquez de Alorna and Conde da Ega to the King of Portugal about Portuguese intrigues with the Peshwa, the Angria, the Bhonsala of Savantvadi and the Raja of Saunde in manuscripts numbered 440, 448 and 449 in the records in the Arquivo Historico Ultramarino.

The Peshwa sought Portuguese help in 1760-61, during the administration of the Conde de Ega, to take Danda-Rajipuri and Kansa forts belonging to the Siddi of Janjira. Portuguese papers regarding this from the Goa records have been published in Biker’s *Collecção*,
Part VII. There are also some mostly unpublished letters about this in the Arquivo Historico Ultramarino some of them were published in the Arquivo das Coloniais for October 1930 and December 1931 by Dr. Mariano Saldanha, bearing numbers 34 and 38. There are some Marathi letters also, yet unpublished, about this campaign in the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon. One of them is from Vishnu Naik Prataprao Sardesai which sheds a flood of light on this affair. The present author has photostat copies. Only three letters in this connection have been published in Marathi. (Kavyetihasa Sangraha Letters, list 182, Peshwa Daftar, Part 24, pp. 261 and 262).

In 1761, the Third Battle of Panipat was fought. It is not surprising that its effects were felt on Portuguese policies. In 1763, the Conde de Ega conquered Mardangad near Ponda from the Mahrattas and demolished it immediately. Papers from Portuguese records regarding this have been published by Balcemao and Biker. In this campaign, Bispo Alicarnaço, alias Don Antonio Jose de Noronha, played an important part on behalf of the Portuguese. He effectively won over the Mahratta sardars in the fort by his espionage and gratification. Jivaji Vishram Sabnis, Dewan of Savantvadi, was himself in the pay of the Portuguese and he even gave them military help against the Mahrattas. All this is conclusively proved by the papers of Bispo de Alicarnaço. These papers are manuscript No. 172 (Pombalina) in the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon. This manuscript provides full information about the Portuguese assault on Mardangad. This writer knew the Mahrattas well in some respects. The manuscript of a book (Pombalina No. 308) he wrote is in the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon. Its title is Sistema Marcial Asiatico, politico, historico, genealogico, analitico, e miscelanico. This book contains a section on the Mahratta army and navy. It was written in 1772 and has 141 pages. The present author has a photostat copy.

Bispo de Alicarnaço was a skilful warrior. He was connected with Dupliex and Hyder Ali. He camped in Poona for some time to collect information about the Poona Court and spoke in terms of obtaining the return of Bassein to the Portuguese through peaceful negotiations.

The Mahrattas captured the Portuguese warship Santan in 1772 and made its Captain, Francisco de Costa Athide, captive in
Vijayadurg fort. Portuguese papers concerning negotiations in this behalf have been published. Later, because of preoccupations with Raghunathrao’s troubles, this warship was returned to the Portuguese. Some days later, the treaty regarding Nagar Haveli was concluded. The present author has published all correspondence in this behalf in the sixth part of his Portuguesas e Maratas. One paper from the Goa records in this behalf is still unpublished. It is in Livro de Damao, No. 10 (pp. 84-55). There is a list in this document of the terms that the Peshwa laid down in 1785 for the enjoyment of Nagar Haveli revenues.

The present author has also published documents in Antiguolhas regarding Portuguese policies and doings in connection with the Mahrattas, Hyder Ali and Tipu. The correspondence between 1790 and 1793 is available in manuscript No. 4401 in the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon. The title is: Negociações que decorreram desde o ano de 1790 a 1793 sendo governador e capitão-geral da India, Francisco de Cunha e Menezes, respeitantes a guerra dos Inglezes e seus aliados contra Tipu Sultano, rei de Sonda e praça de Piro.

The ‘Piro fortress’ is Sadashivgad. The Portuguese had usurped it by buying over Tipu’s officers. The Poona Court laid claim to this and carried on negotiations for two years. At last, with the consent of Nana Fadnavis, the Goa Government handed it over to Tipu.

The envoys of the Portuguese at the Poona Court kept the Goa Government informed about happenings there. There are hundreds of letters regarding this in the Goa records. On the basis of these, the Goa Government too, wrote despatches to Portugal and they thus also contain information about the Mahrattas. There is a letter in the Biblioteca Publica, Evora, written in 1744 by Pedro Vicente Vidal to the Conde de Unhao which mentions a battle between two frigates of the Portuguese and two galevats and nine pals of the Angria. In the same library, there are letters written to Father Manuel do Cenaculo Vilao-Boas, a learned Archbishop from Goa. Letter No. 3529, dated 2 May, 1776 says that five country craft under the protection of Portuguese naval force were captured by some galevetas of the Mahrattas.
Letter No. 3532 written by Fr. Luis do S. Jose Castel Branco on 15 December 1777 refers to the death of the impersonator of Sadashivrao Bhau Peshwa. The Portuguese believed that he was not an imposter. This view is also expressed in a report entitled Noticias do Reino, Situação, Forças e Consumos do Marata. This report was presumably prepared in 1778. The author has published this report in the 77th issue of 1959 of the Boletim do Instituto Vasco-da-Gama.

Letter No. 3535 dated 1 March 1779 says that the Mahrattas believe that the Portuguese would go to Bassein to recapture it. In another letter, No. 111 dated 23 March, 1795, there is mention of Khem Savant Bhonsala having invaded Ponda Mahal in September 1794.

Even this brief survey will indicate how rich a source of material on the history of the Mahrattas is in the Portuguese language. Historically it is very important because we learn about events, incidents and personages with dates given accurately. Besides, the writers were often scholars and men of letters. It is obvious, therefore, that the history of the Mahrattas will suffer from imperfections for want of study of this material in amplitude.

In conclusion, it would be in the fitness of things to say a few words about the Portuguese material regarding the historical geography of Maharashtra in general and the Konkan in particular.

At least three or four volumes in Portuguese written in the first half of the 16th century are worthy of study for their historical geography. One of them is Summa Oriental by Tome Pares. An English translation of this has been published by the Hakluyt Society. Tome Peres wrote his book between 1512 and 1515 in Malaya and India. The information about Goa incorporated in it was written in 1515. The other book is O Livro by Doarte Barbosa which was prepared in 1516. An English translation of this book is also available. There is in the Biblioteca Nacional, Lisbon, a manuscript (No. 9163) described as a book by Vasco da Gama. But there is not much difference between its contents and what Barbosa writes. It could be definitely said that it was prepared on the basis of the book by Barbosa. The present author has a photostat copy of this manuscript.
Don Joao de Castro has given in his book *Roteiro de Goa e Diu*, written about 1540, a description of the sea-coast from Goa to Diu. It was published in 1843. An appendix to this book was published in *Castro’s Cosmographia e Descriçao de Reino de Daguem*. This appendix covers the geography of the Deccan State and contains much valuable information about the Deccan and the Konkan. Its importance is increased by reason of the maps added to it which were drawn by Don Joao de Castro. The original maps are at present in the library of Coimbra University.

A manuscript entitled *Livro que trata das cousas da India e do Japao* which was formerly in the Library Elhaso, was published in 1957 at Coimbra. The chapter on Southern Konkan in it was written in 1548 and states that the northern limit of Southern Konkan is the Kharepatan River and the southern limit is the Chitakul River (Symtacor). Vaz Dourado prepared a map of India in Goa in 1571 where Cintacor is mentioned as Cintacola. It is obviously a corruption of Chitakul.

Some books published in the seventeenth century are also noteworthy in connection with the historical geography of Maharashtra. Of these, Bocarro’s *Fortalezas da India* and Pedro de Barreto Resende’s *Livro do Estado da India Oriental* have already been mentioned. Besides these, Dr. Avro’s de Costa’s *Tratado da Viagem da India Oriental* written in 1610-11 and preserved as manuscript No. 482 in the library at Porto and particularly *Relação do novo Caminho* written in 1663 by Padre Manoel Godinho are important. There is a manuscript No. R 202 in the Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid by Antonio Bocarro to which 52 maps have been appended. They are drawn by Joao Teixeira Albernaz I, a Portuguese. The title of this manuscript is: *Livro em que se relata o sitio de todas as fortalezas, Cidades e provocações do Estado da India Oriental*. Besides the map of India in 1571, Manoel Godinho Eredia prepared a book a map of India in 1571, Manoel Godinho Eredia prepared a book of maps in 1610 which is now in the Biblioteca Nacional, Rio de Janeiro. Eredia drew up a map of Goa under the Portuguese about 1616 which is in the Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid. Dr. Machado Figueira has in his collection in Lisbon, a book of maps (1615-1622). All of these have been published or are about to be published.
present author had an opportunity to see the book of maps in the possession of Dr. Machado Figueira in 1954, while he was in Lisbon.

In 1780, Gustav Adolfo Ereulis de Sermo, a military officer, prepared a coloured map of Goan territory then under the Portuguese and sent it to Lisbon. It has been preserved in Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisbon. One more map of Goa was sent to Portugal with a covering letter dated 12 February 1817 by Vice-Rei Conde de Rio Pardo which is now in Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisbon. There is also a map of Bombay Island and Bandra there. Maps of Malvan and Sadashivgad drawn in colour in 1790 are also there. Similarly, maps of the territory conquered from Savantvadi in 1746 by Vice-Rei Marquez de Castelo Novo and of territory between Terekhol and Redy fortresses drawn by Engineer Francisco Augusto Monteiro Cabral in 1817 as also maps of Sanquelim and Bicholim forts drawn by him in 1779 are preserved in the Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisbon. Joao Antonio Aguiar Pinto Sarmento, an engineer, prepared in 1782, a map of Daman and the territory around it. Under orders of the Governor of Goa, Frederico Gillerme de Souza, Manoel Furtado prepared a map of Goa in 1716 which is to be seen in the house of the Conde de Sabugose, Lisbon.

Maps of Ponda and Sadashivgad fortresses which were attacked by the Portuguese in 1763 and 1768 are preserved in the Biblioteca Publica de Evora. A map of Sadashivgad prepared in the 18th century (manuscript No. 553) is in the Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa.

A picture of Ponda fort during the Adilshahi days was drawn on a wall, which has been preserved in the Kunsthistoriches Museum, Vieno. A map of Goa and adjoining territory drawn by D’Orgeval in 1747 is included in Epanaphora Indica. The site of the battle between Bhosla of Savantvadi and the Marquez de Alorna has been shown in this map.

It is needless to enlarge on how important all these fortresses were in Mahratta history.
NOTES

(1) Pissurlencar, Colaboradores Hindus e Afonso de Albuquerque, 1941 p. 1; Tentatívias dos Portugueses para a ocupação do Concape, 1955.

Goa was captured by the Portuguese in 1510. That the southern border of the then Goa State (Reino de Goa) was Kalinadi can be gathered from such historical sources as Tome Peres (1515), Dovrte Barbosa (1516), Dom Joao Castro (Cosmographia 1540), Livro que tratadas cousas da India e Japan (1548), Letters of Albuquerque (1511), Commentarios do Grande A. de Albuquerque, Gaspar Correa, Castanahada, Barros, etc.

Kudal was within the northern border of Goa at this time. (Pissurlencar, Colaboradores, p. 16; Letter of Albuquerque dated 22 December 1510, Cartas de Afonso de Albuquerque, Vol. I p. 28.)


(3) According to Rober Sewell, Mealkhan was another name of Abdulla of Bijapur (A Forgotten Empire, 1962, p. 184). What is surprising is that Yusuf Khan himself says that his father was Mealkhan (B. N. P. Fond. Portugais).


(5) Dastak, i.e. permit, was called cartez by the Portuguese.


(7) Letter of the Viceroy of Goa dated 22 January, 1721 (Goa Archives, MR 86, fl. 696; Pissurlencar, Portugal nos Mares da India, in a Provincia, Nova-Goa, 5 April, 1926).

(8) Letter from Conde de Sandomel to Antonio Cardim Froice dated 15 January, 1934 (Goa Archives Livro de Chaul No. 1 fl. 4 V).

(9) Goa Viceroy's letter dated December 1744 to Cardeal da Motta (AHU, Ms 448, Conchelho Ultramarino).

(10) See Biker.


(14) BNP Fondo Portugais 1, fl. 68.


(17) Pissourlence, A Des Cendencias de Mealcaco.

(18) Viceroy of Goa’s letter dated 16 April, 1665 to Krishnaji Bhasker, Governor of Shivaji (Goa Archives, RV No. 2, ffs. 36 V-37); Viceroy Antonio do Melo Castros letter dated 4 June, 1665 to Francisco de Melo and Diogo de Melo (Goa Archives).


(20) Promituario, 1892, p. 83; e. o. Aurangza Mogor, que actualmente de Senhor de Todos os Reinos.

(21) Biker, Tratados, VIII, p. 175 (Governor’s letter of 21 February, 1782).

(22) Goa Archives, MR. 93B, ffs. 536-537 v. (Viceroy’s letter of 16 July, 1726).

(23) A.H.U., India avulos, maço 7.

(24) The names of the poems are:

(1) Poema heroico, historico, da glorioso e immortal Victoria que contra o inimigo Bonsulo alcançar o Illistrissimo e Excellentissimo Senhor D. Pedro Minguel de Almeida e Portugal, Marquez de Castello Novo, Vices-Rei da India etc. na tomada de Alorna, Bicholin e Sanquelim, no ano 1746, Lisboa, 1747.

(2) Poema heroico, ou metricos procesas de Marte, executadas pelo Illistrissimo e Excellentissimo Senhor Marquez de Castello Novo etc. na continuacao das conquistas das terras do Bonsulo ate a praça de Rarim, Lisboa 1747.

(3) Applausos metricos ao Excellentissimo Senhor D. Pedro Minguel de Almeida e Portugal, Marquez de Castello Novo etc. pelos felizes successos e victorias, que tem conseguido na India contra o inimigo Bonsulo, Lisboa, 1747.
Three poems by Joseph Luiz Coutinho on the same subject are available. The present author has one of them. It was published in Lisbon in 1750. Some more poems on the subject are preserved in the British Museum (Add. No. 20907).


(26) In 1951, the Portuguese Governor of Goa informed the Government of Portugal that, “Devido ao esforço inteligente, ininterrupto e pertinaz (de Pissurleimac), poder o Governo Geral deste Estado orgulhar-se de possuir um Arquivo Histórico que nos honra.” (Conselho do Governo do Estado da India, Acta no. 9, sessao de 12-6-1951). Pissurleimac, *Roteiro dos Arquivos da India Portuguesa*.


(28) Sahyadri, May 1940; Bharatamitra, Goa; Sardesai Smaraka Grantha; A D P I.

(29) The writer of *Breve Resumo* says that he came to know of the concessions and other benefits offered to the Portuguese by the Moghuls from the Vice-Rei (Cfr. e estes últimos offerencimentos do Mogol flou O Sr. Conde de my com os mais segredos (Vice-Rei).


(33) Letter from the Governor of Goa dated 23 January 1757 (Goa Archives MR 129, fl. 422).

(34) Goa Archives; Old Portuguese translation of Marathi letters; No. 881.

(35) A good many of these maps have been given in the Portuguese Government publication, *Portugalis Monumenia Carthographica*.


(37) A Portuguese artist prepared a manuscript between 1538 and 1546 which contained pictures of man and women from Goa and other parts of India. It is available in the Biblioteca Casana tens, Rome. (Father G. Schurhammer, S. J., *Desenlhos Orientais do tempo de S. Francis Xavier,* in *Garcia de Orta*, 1956. Pissurlemenar’s contribution to the September 1964 issue of Mandavi.).
CHAPTER II

DURING SHIVAJI’S TIME

While Shahaji, Shivaji’s father, was in the service of the Nizamshahi, his relations with the Portuguese were friendly. In a letter from Bijapur reproduced in the daily journal of the Portuguese Viceroy, Conde de Linhares, it is recorded that the annual income of Shahaji was 20,75,000 hons\(^1\) and that his private army consisted of 3,000 horsemen.\(^2\) In the same letter it is also mentioned that the son of Nizam Shah Murtuza was staying at Shahagad (Xihagadda), i.e. Shahaji’s own residence.

Within four days of 26 September 1636,\(^3\) Shahaji addressed a letter to the Portuguese Captain in charge of the Chaul fort. In this letter, Shahaji informed the captain that the eleven-year-old Nizamshah was in his custody and that he was stationed at Balaghat in the fort of Trimalvadi and that he was carrying on the governance of the Nizamshahi kingdom in the name of that boy-prince. Shahaji’s request was that the Portuguese should permit his family to stay in the Chaul fort in view of the fact that he had always maintained friendly relations with them and wanted to ensure the safety of his family which was always in jeopardy because of the enmity between him on the one hand and the Delhi Moghuls and Adilshahi kingdom of Bijapur on the other.

Shahaji had also added in this letter that, if the necessity arose, even he would seek shelter in Chaul fort and, in return, even cede some territory from the Nizamshahi kingdom to the Portuguese if they wanted it, since it was all in his power. The Portuguese did not comply with Shahaji’s request, as they feared this might arouse the hostility of Delhi and Bijapur. However, they informed Shahaji that if he wanted to remove his family to Danda-Rajpuri or some such place, they would secretly help him to do so.

Even after Shahaji entered the service of the Adilshahi, the Portuguese maintained friendly relations with him as is clear from a letter of the Portuguese Viceroy, Conde de Alvera, which mentioned the traditional friendship between Shahaji and the King of Portugal.\(^4\)
In 1654, Padre Gonsalo Martez was posted at Bijapur as Portuguese envoy. In the instrument of instructions given to him by the then Portuguese Governor, Don Braz de Castro, it was noted that Fateh Khan, Shahaji and Malik Yakut would side with the Portuguese in the Adilshahi court.5

Rajwade writes in his preface to the Radhamadhava-vilasachampu by Jayaram Pandey that Shahaji had invaded Goa in shaka 1576, Vaishakha Jyeshtha (page 93). Portuguese documents in the Goa Archives, however, show that this Adilshahi invasion of Salcette and Bardez was made on 12 August, 1654 under the command of Abdul Hakim. A number of Hindus and Catholics of prestige joined Abdul Hakim in this campaign. Among them was Kalu Shenvi Korgaonkar. Some gavkars of Hanjun, known as Porobs, also joined in this intrigue. The well-known Catholic Bishop of Bicholim, Don Molas de Castro, a Goan, was also one of the conspirators. But nowhere is Shahaji’s name mentioned in connection with this invasion.6

In 1657, Shahaji demanded of Ali Adilshah the Mahals of Bhatagram and Pernem in the vicinity of Bardez, then under Adilshahi domination, for his maintenance.7

The earliest Portuguese document in the Goa Archives which makes mention of Shivaji is dated 28 November, 1657. It is stated in it that Shahaji’s son had taken possession of Upper Chaul. The Portuguese Viceroy, in his letter to the king of Portugal dated 15 May, 1658 also mentions Shivaji as Shahaji’s son.8

In 1659, Shivaji laid the foundation of the Mahratta navy. The following reference occurs to the event in the Goa Archives: “A son of Shahaji, the rebel [militant] nobleman of the Adilshahi court has captured the territory around Chaul and Bassein and has become quite powerful. He has built some men-of-war in Bhimdi, Kalyan and Panvel, ports in Bassein Taluka. We are forced, therefore, to be cautious. To ensure that these men-of-war do not set sail, we have ordered the Portuguese Captain not to let them come out of these ports.”9

The Portuguese used to build their ships, armed and others, in several ports of Bassein Taluka. The frigate Santo Antonio de Thana equipped with 50 guns was one of those built in 1681 at Thana.10 At
the time there lived at Bassein some skilled Portuguese carpenters and
other artisans. Shivaji built his first twenty armed ships (sanguiceis)
with the help of two of these artisans, Roe Leitao Viegas and his
brother Fernao Leitao Viegas. Shivaji had declared that these ships
were built to meet the menace of the Siddi of Janjira. About 340
workmen, Portuguese and others, worked under the supervision of
Roe Viegas. Including their families, they were about 400 people.
There is a letter from Joao de Salazar de Vascocelos in the Arquivo
Historico Ultramarino in which it is said that the number of people
employed by Shivaji on ship-building were 300.\textsuperscript{11} It is also obvious
from the complaint that Raja Jaisingh made to the Portuguese that
there were some Portuguese men in Shivaji’s army.\textsuperscript{12} Not only this,
but there is evidence that the Portuguese Viceroy had by a procla-
mation made on 19 May, 1668, ordered all Portuguese nationals in the
service of the Delhi, Bijapur and Shivaji armies to return to
Portugal.\textsuperscript{13} Antonio de Melo de Castro made a frantic effort to
withdraw all the Portuguese from Shivaji’s service even before his
warships had been completed, because they would have been a source
of trouble not only to the Siddi but to the Portuguese also. As
a result of this, one day, all Portuguese in Shivaji’s service quit their
jobs and fled to Bombay and Bassein.\textsuperscript{14}

No information is available on what happened to these twenty men-
of-war, in the Portuguese Archives. They were, in all probability,
completed. No Portuguese document speaks of their having been
destroyed. In April or May 1662, the Governor of Goa says in
a letter that Ragho Ballal, Subedar of Dabhol, had requested him to
allow five warships (sanguiceis) and one pataxo interned in the
Karanja creek to go out to the sea. The Governor suggested to his
officers that they find some courageous person who would secretly
set these ships on fire.\textsuperscript{15} But there is no evidence of any such thing
having happened.

The Captain of Chaul wrote to the Governor of Goa in August 1664
that Shivaji was building 50 ships in Upper Chaul and that seven of
them were ready to set out to sea. The Portuguese adopted the policy
of not obstructing their passage in view of Shivaji’s ever-growing
power.\textsuperscript{19} In this way, Shivaji’s navy went on gaining strength to such
an extent and at such speed that Vice-Rei Conde de San Vincente was
constrained, at the end of 1667, to write to the King of Portugal: "I am afraid of Shivaji’s naval ships. We did not take sufficient preventive steps and so he has built many a fort on the Konkan Coast. Today he has several ships and they are large ones."\textsuperscript{17}

Shivaji’s fleet consisted mostly of galvetas.\textsuperscript{18} They were small but speedy—which gave them an advantage over the slow, large-sized Portuguese ships. Shivaji’s ships captured or looted trading ships from Malabar and other parts of India. A Portuguese biographer of Shivaji writes that his ships did not molest European warships.\textsuperscript{19}

Even in the days of Shivaji, the Portuguese considered themselves as supreme in the Indian Ocean. As has been said earlier, trading ships from the territories of Bijapur, Delhi and Shivaji were required to secure permits for plying from the Portuguese. For securing these permits (cartazes) a fee had to be paid and certain conditions had to be complied with. The Portuguese often found Shivaji’s ships without such permits and these ships were seized by them. Similarly, there were cases of Shivaji’s ships seizing trading vessels from Portuguese territory.\textsuperscript{20} But there were scarcely any armed engagements between the Portuguese and Mahratta fleets.

On one occasion, Shivaji’s fleet seized 121 trading ships from the Karnataka ports of Honavar, Manglore, Barcelor and Gangoli (Cambolim). Cosme de Guarda, Portuguese biographer of Shivaji recounts that the Portuguese Viceroy, Antonio de Melo de Castro, on hearing of this ordered his son, the Commodore of the Portuguese fleet in the Bay of Goa at this time, to secure the release of these ships.\textsuperscript{21} Shivaji had twenty-five ships, while de Castro had eight. Of the 25 Mahratta warships, 13 were in the vanguard of the convoy followed by the captured vessels and twelve warships covered the rear of the convoy. The two fleets met near Mormugao. Castro attacked the ships in the Mahratta vanguard and captured them. Those in the rear fled. Castro returned with the 13 captured warships and the trading ships to Goa. Shivaji sent an envoy to the Portuguese Viceroy to offer an apology for what had happened and asked for the return of his warships. The Portuguese granted his request.

There are some documents in the Goa Archives about this incident.\textsuperscript{22} There are some letters about it in the Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisboa, also. In a letter dated 16 April, 1665 from Antonio de
Melo de Castrá to Krishnaji Bhasker, Subedar of Shivaji, the Viceroy mentions that the captured ships were released but does not mention their number.\textsuperscript{26} In a letter dated 4 June 1665 preserved in the Goa archives, the same Viceroy wrote to his brother, Francisco de Melo and Diago de Melo who was in the service of the Moghul Emperor, to say that the number of ships captured by the Portuguese from the Mahrattas, was eleven.\textsuperscript{24} Dr. Surendranath Sen says that this battle between eight Portuguese ships and Shivaji's fleet must have been fought after Shivaji's invasion of Barcelor.\textsuperscript{25} The Viceroy's letter to Krishnaji Bhaskar also bears this out. That Shivaji's fleet came to Mormugoa and prevented the Portuguese warships from taking trading vessels loaded with rice to Goa is what the Viceroy says in his letter of 4 June 1665 to his brother.\textsuperscript{26} By November 1664, the news had spread that Shivaji's fleet would attack Basnur and other ports on the Karnatak Coast and the people there had become panicky. Shivappa Nayak of Iquory had taken from the Portuguese, during 1653-54, the ports of Gangoli, Barcelor, Honavar and Manglore. Narayan Mahalo was working as an intermediary between Shivappa Nayak and the Portuguese, negotiating for the return of these forts to the Portuguese and for this purpose an armed ships, the \textit{S. Jacinto}, had been despatched under the command of Don Manoel Lobo de Silveira to take possession of them.

This de Silveira wrote to the Viceroy in a letter dated 30 November 1664 from Gangoli that the people there were frightened because of the reported and impending invasion of Shivaji. If he did actually come, the people would run away and he would capture the whole coast. People from Mirjan, Ankola, Shiveshwar and Karwar were in panic and if Shivaji took these forts he would proceed to take the fort of Honavar also.\textsuperscript{27} When Shivaji looted Basroor, the \textit{S. Jacinto} was probably not there.

In a letter written to Raoji Somnath Subedar by Vice-Rei Conde de Melo Castro on 26 March 1665, there is a reference to a battleship of the Portuguese (navio) having been taken captive by Shivaji's fleet.\textsuperscript{28} One more Portuguese warship (pataxar) was taken captive by Shivaji's fleet in November 1670 while it was sailing for Surat from Daman. In retaliation, the Portuguese captured eleven unarmed Mahratta cargo
ships (barcos de carga) and took them to Bassein. Not only were the ships unarmed, but they were also empty and unimportant according to the Governor of Goa who wrote to this effect to the Captain of Bassein in a letter dated 13 December 1670.  

A letter from the Portuguese factory at Surat dated 17 December 1670 stated that the Portuguese had captured twelve Mahratta ships and this erroneous statement has been relied upon by Shivaji’s biographers. There is a letter in the Goa Archives of a Don, Aleico de Almeida who states therein that he had taken part twice in naval battles with Shivaji’s fleet. Once a battle was fought in the gulf of Kelshí (enseada de Quellocy) when three ships from Shivaji’s fleet were captured and on a second occasion, at the same place, a battle was fought involving eighteen Mahratta ships, three of which were captured and on a second occasion, at the same place, a battle was fought involving eighteen Mahratta ships, three of which were captured by the Portuguese. Which of these two battles the said de Almeida refers to is difficult to say. But it is a reliable statement based on certificates (certidões) of appropriate officers.

When Shivaji began to build up his fleet, it was, as has been stated before, for use against the Siddi of Danda-Rajpuri. In the Siddi-Shivaji conflicts, the Portuguese helped the Siddi. When Shivaji set some of his horsemen and infantry on the Siddi in July 1659, the Portuguese Captains at Chaul and Bassein supplied foodgrains to the Siddi and helped him in other ways also. Shivaji complained about this to the Vice-Rei. Because of this, the Portuguese decided from then on, to help the Siddi stealthily and not openly.

The Portuguese were well-disposed towards the Siddi and to persuade them openly to ally with him, the Siddi accepted Portuguese overlordship in 1667. In May 1669, Shivaji besieged Danda-Rajpuri. The Portuguese supplied ammunitions and foodgrains to the Siddi and met his other requirements surreptitiously and instructed the Captain of Chaul that, if the Siddi was prepared to hand over the Dada-Rajpuri fortress to the Portuguese, he should take possession of it.

On 10 February 1670, Shivaji entered into a pact of friendship with the Portuguese. One of the terms of the pact was that, since the Siddi had accepted the overlordship of the Portuguese, they were
under an obligation to protect him; but since this ran counter to the new friendship between the Portuguese and the Mahrattas, the Portuguese would use all their influence to mediate between the Siddi and Shivaji with a view to concluding a treaty between them to their mutual satisfaction. Vittalpant went to Goa as Shivaji’s envoy to finalise these arrangements.

In March 1671, news was received in Goa that Shivaji had laid siege to Danda-Rajpuri by land and sea and that there was a strong probability of the fort going over to Shivaji. If that happened, it would be a menace to Chaul. Though it would have been proper for the Portuguese to remain neutral in this conflict in view of the new treaty of friendship, the Portuguese Viceroy estimated the situation as dangerous for the Portuguese and decided to supply the Siddi with ammunition.38

In May the same year (1671), the Captain of Chaul informed the Portuguese Viceroy that, since Shivaji had besieged Danda-Rajpuri, the position of the Siddi had much worsened and that he was helping the Siddi in keeping with the Viceroy’s orders.39 The Captain also wrote that the Siddi had no money to pay his soldiers and that therefore he had returned to the Siddi the ransom he had paid which was credited to the Chaul treasury. In reply, the Portuguese Vicerory not only approved of this action, but also ordered the Captain of Chaul to pay the Siddi Rs. 2,000 in addition. He also instructed that ammunition should be secretly given to the Siddi and that if the Siddi was ready to hand over the fortress, it should be taken over. It was held by the Viceroy that if Shivaji captured Danda-Rajpuri, not only would Revdanda and Korlai (Morro) be endangered, but the whole western coast. The importance of this fort had been recognised by Portuguese statesmen right from the days of Afonso de Albuquerque.40 In a letter written from Chaul on 25 March 1677, the Portuguese Captain stated that Moropant Pingle, Shivaji’s Peshwa, was waiting in Upper Chaul with cavalry and infantry for Annejipant to join him with more troops. He administered the Konkan as far as Goa. Shivaji’s fleet was stationed at Nagao—there were ten warships (galvetas) and thirteen other ships.41

Joao Fuzeiro de Sande wrote in a letter from Chaul dated 2 May 1677, that the Peshwa was in the vicinity of Danda with Durat khan’s
(Daulat khan’s) fleet, that he had 9,000 troops, that he would lead an assault on Danda-Rajpuri and, further, that there was a rumour that the Siddi had gone over to him. If this was correct, the Siddi would hand over the fortress to the Peshwa.\textsuperscript{42} It is not known how the Portuguese in Goa reached to this but early in September 1679, the Viceroy received a letter from the Captain of Chaul in which he said that Shivaji was preparing to build a fort on Kennery (Khanderi-Underi) islands,\textsuperscript{48} and in pursuit of this project, 2,000 of his men had already gone over to Upper Chaul and 3,000 more would soon join them. He added that Shivaji had ordered that if the Portuguese obstructed his plans, they were to be resisted. In order to counter this move, the Siddi was preparing to build twelve galvetas.

The Governor called his Council together to consider this letter and decided to prevent Shivaji from building the Khanderi-Underi fort. But when he learnt that the English from Bombay were going to oppose Shivaji’s project, he decided to remain neutral. The English asked the Portuguese to join hands with them but they put forward the excuse of their having entered into a treaty of friendship with Shivaji and rejected the proposal. Still, the Portuguese assured help in the form of foodgrains etc.

Just as the Portuguese were inclined towards the Siddi as against Shivaji, they also helped the Adilshani of Bijapur as against Shivaji and, in any event, at least remained neutral between them. But they never sided with Shivaji. They were obliged to adopt this attitude to maintain balance of power. Besides, before Shivaji conquered the Konkan, Adilshah was the neighbour of the Portuguese.

In the Shivaji-Moghul conflict, the Portuguese secretly helped Shivaji, because they considered Delhi to be a greater menace. Since the days of Humayun, the Portuguese policy was that all powers in South India should resist Moghul aggression from the north.\textsuperscript{44}

At the end of May 1663, Shivaji went to Vengurla via Kudal. Adilshah’s havildars in Bhatagram (Bicholim) and Sanquelim (Satari) fled. Antonio de Melo de Castro, Vice-Rei of Goa, said that Shivaji would not attack Goa because he could not simultaneously fight Delhi, Bijapur and Goa, but if he did, he was prepared for it.\textsuperscript{45} When he learnt that Shivaji had gone to Vengurla, he sent Shivaji a letter dated 2, June 1663 congratulating him on his victory over Bijapur.\textsuperscript{46} He
sent it with Ramoji Shenvi Kothari. But Ramoji Kothari learnt on his way that Shivaji had gone back and so he also returned to Goa. Ramoji had previously lived at Bicholim and was well disposed towards Shivaji. Shivaji appointed Raoji Somnath Pandit as Subedar at Kudal.

Shivaji had intended to conquer the Konkan territory as far as Mirajan but he did not do so. At this time, Kudal, Pernem, Satari, Maneri and Bhatagram, which constituted Adilshahi territory, passed under him. The Mirjan river was generally regarded as the southern limit of the Konkan in Shivaji’s times. It is on record that Shivaji had told the Dutch officers at Vengurla that the Sultan of Bijapur had made a present of Kudal territory to him. In a letter of the Governor of Goa dated 7 January 1669, it is stated that, by a treaty of friendship, Adilshah had given the whole of Southern Konkan to Shivaji. Shivaji was laying claim to Salsette and Bardez then in the possession of the Portuguese on the ground that they were originally Adilshahi territory. Ibrahim Adilshah had given Salsette and Bardez to the Portuguese on certain conditions in 1543, thanks to Mealkhan. The Portuguese did not fully observe these conditions but did not give up possession of both territories. On this account, several battles were fought between the Portuguese and the Adilshahi. The last of these battles were fought in 1654 and 1659. Shivaji must have been posted with some information in this matter.

The letter of the Dutch factory at Vengurla, referred to earlier, states that Shivaji’s statement that Adilshah had made over the Kudal territory to him was untrue. On the contrary, Adilshah had ordered his Subedar at Ponda, Trimbak Kalu (Trumbeg Calo) to expel Shivaji from Kudal with the help of the four Desais, Lakham Savant, Keshav Naik, Khalu Shenvi and Chanda Rana. If Trimbak Kalu did not succeed, Bijapur was to send a large army to attack Shivaji. Of these Desais, Lakham Savant was of Kudal, Keshav Naik of Pernem, Khalu Shenvi of Bhatagram (Bicholim) and Chanda Rana was of Sanquelim (Satari).

Just before June 1664, Captain Aziz Khan of Adilshah defeated Shivaji’s troops at Kudal. Keshav Naik, Desai of Pernem and Keshav Prabhu fled for fear of Adilshah and sought asylum with the Portuguese. According to a letter of the Viceroy dated 10
December 1669, Mir Mahamed Kasim was Adilshah’s havaldar at Bicholim (Bhatagram), and at Sanquelim. From this letter, it would appear that between December 1663 and January 1664 Adilshah ruled over Bhatagram and Satari and not Shivaji.

In the middle of December 1664 Shivaji won a victory over Khavas Khan, Captain of Adilshah, near Kudal and forced him to flee up the ghat. On this occasion, Shivaji looted Bicholim and the border areas of Goa from Raibag to Sahapur. After this Shivaji’s writ ran again in the Konkan except in Ponda Panchmahal. Lakhm Savant of Kudal, Keshav Naik and Keshav Prabhu of Pernem, Khalu Shenvi of Bicholim, all Desais of Konkan, who fought Shivaji under the command of Khavas Khan took shelter with the Portuguese in different places. Of these Desais, Lakhm Savant fought Shivaji alongside Khavas Khan till the end and did not run away to Goa till 13 December 1664. Jedhe Shakkavali notes that this victory was won by Shivaji over Khavas Khan in October-November 1664, i.e. Shake 1586, in the month of Kartik, the name of the year being Krodha.

This victory of Shivaji is mentioned also in a letter of the Viceroy of Goa dated 7 January, 1665. It is clear from this that Shivaji had pushed Khavas khan up the ghat before this date. The flight of the Desais and the Bijapur Havaldar at Vengurla is mentioned in the Viceroy’s letter to Khavas Khan of 13 December, 1664. The Viceroy took it for granted that Khavas Khan had been till then in the Konkan. It appears, therefore, that because the Desais fled to Goa a few days before 13 December, Shivaji’s victory over Khavas Khan was won about the same date. Till this date, the Viceroy of Goa had no news of this victory.

The Viceroy was informed by Keshav Naik and Keshav Prabhu, Desais of Pernem, a day or two before 11 November 1664, that a skirmish had taken place between Shivaji and Khavas Khan. The Viceroy wrote a letter of welcome to Shivaji when he reached the neighbourhood of Goa on 25 November 1664. On 29 November, the Viceroy said in a meeting of padres that Shivaji had advanced with a large army and that Adilshah’s large force was also coming down the ghat. On 13 December, the Viceroy wrote a congratulatory letter to the envoy of Bijapur on the occasion of Khavas Khan’s victory over Shivaji. But this victory was shortlived. Shivaji routed
Khivas Khan soon after and sent him running up the ghat and established Mahratta authority over the Konkan.

Shivaji appointed Krishna Savant as Deshmukh of Kudal (11 November 1664). The Viceroy of Goa, Antonio de Melo de Castro informed the King of Portugal in his letter dated 7 January 1665 that Khivas Khan had approached Goa with 2000 horsemen and a large force of infantry, but Shivaji had put him to rout and pushed him up the ghat and liberated Konkan. Not only this, but Shivaji had pursued the enemy almost to the gates of the City of Bijapur.

On 5 December, 1664 Shivaji laid the foundation-stone of his sea-fortress, Sindhudurga. In the Shivaji chronicle by Chitragupta, it is stated that “a hundred skilled workmen who knew about the construction of sea forts were called for from the Portuguese” for the purpose. But there is no mention of any of their skilled workmen having helped Shivaji in any Portuguese document. Gaspar Correa writes (Lenda III, 639) that Adilkhan employed the services of Portuguese workmen for building the Belgaum Castle. Even the Firangi tower of Bijapur appears to have been built by the Portuguese as its name indicates but no contemporary document mentions that the Portuguese gave any help for the construction of Sindhurga at Malvan.

It has already been said that, as between the Moghuls and Shivaji, the Portuguese preferred to side with Shivaji. According to the Viceroy of Goa who informed the King of Portugal to that effect, when Shivaji returned with the Surat loot, he departed by the Portuguese border, because he wanted to take shelter with them if the need arose. The Viceroy had even expressed satisfaction that Shivaji came out of the raid unscathed. Because the Portuguese were sympathetic to Shivaji in the Surat affair, the Moghul captain, Lodi Khan, led an attack on Bassein territory, captured a number of villages and destroyed some. Finally, with great difficulty, the Portuguese entered into a treaty of friendship with Lodi Khan. Even when Raja Jayasingh invaded the Deccan, the Portuguese policy in the beginning was one of secretly helping Shivaji. The Portuguese had told him that, if it became necessary, he should come down to Goa and not seek shelter in Chaul. Later, after the Treaty of Purandar was concluded, the Portuguese had to change their policy for fear of the Moghuls and, on 17 November 1666, they made a treaty of friendship.
with them. It was obvious that it was made mainly to ensure that the Portuguese should give no quarter to Shivaji. The draft of this treaty was probably presented to the Viceroy of Goa by Kojya Allaudin, envoy of Raja Jayasingh, a few days before 17 November 1666.

In March 1666, Shivaji besieged the Pondla fort. The Portuguese thought it would be dangerous if the fort fell to Shivaji and so they secretly supplied ammunition to the fort and also arranged secretly to escort all the Konkan Desais who were partisans of Bijapur to the fort via the Chapora river. It would have been difficult for Bijapur to hold out in the Pondla Fort even for a week, but thanks to Portuguese help, the protagonists of Bijapur held out till Rustamjama came to their aid. Rustam came down the ghat and the siege was lifted. He also brought Kudal, Pernem, Pondla, Bhagagram (Bicholim) and Satari (Sanquelim) under Adilshahi control. Vice-Rei Antonio de Melo de Castro wrote to the Captain of Chaul on 8 March 1666 to say that Rustamjama had come down the ghat and that Shivaji would soon withdraw.

After the evacuation of Pondla, Shivaji proceeded to Agra to meet Aurangzib and was imprisoned by the Emperor. On 29 August 1666, he escaped from detention and, according to the Shivapur Yadi, reached Raigad on 11 December 1666. In the opinion of Sir Jamunath Sarkar, Shivaji reached Raigad within 25 days of his leaving Agra, i.e., on 23 September 1666. If that is so, neither Raja Jayasingh nor the Portuguese Viceroy knew about it till 17 November 1666. Had they heard the news, the Portuguese would certainly not have entered into a treaty with the Moghuls as they did at the time. From Jayasingh’s letter dated 25 November 1666 it is clear that he had no idea that Shivaji had returned.

Vice-Rei Conde de San Vincente informed the King of Portugal about Shivaji’s escape from Agra in a letter dated 20 September 1667 in which he said that, “after escaping from Moghul detention, Shivaji travelled for 36 hours in fruit boxes which were closed. When he reached his native hilly country, he sent his troops to many places to collect loot. Adilshah sent an army of 40000 horsemen and a large number of infantry to intercept Shivaji. When this army descended from the ghat, Shivaji presented a large treasure to the
general, as a result of which he resorted to arson in his own master's territory and returned with plunder. This general had come as close as twelve miles from Goa and we therefore considered him a menace. Soon after the Bijapur army went back, Shivaji expeditiously came down to Konkan and gained even a larger treasure than he had parted with. Shivaji has subdued and brought under his control a number of Desais and he is now our neighbour at Ponda. His alacrity, valour, alertness and military foresight are of the order of Caesar and Alexander. He is omnipresent and has no definite place of residence.  

In the Vice-Rei's letter dated 10 November 1666 it was stated that a Bijapur general, one Haibatrao, had come down the ghat into the Konkan to fight Shivaji. On the same date, the Vice-Rei wrote a letter to Prataprao who had been appointed Subedar of the Konkan by Adilshaha. From the Vice-Rei's letter dated 26 November 1666 it would seem that Mian Abdul Mahomed, a Bijapur general, had come to the Konkan.

After his escape from Agra, Shivaji regained all the territory of Konkan that Adilshah had taken from him except Ponda, Jambavli Panchmahal and Goa which were held by the Portuguese. He had probably captured some villages around the Ponda fort. Lakham Savant, Keshav Naik and Keshav Prabhu, all Konkan Desais and protagonists of Bijapur, often encroached upon Shivaji's territory and terrorised the people. Often the Portuguese officers were in league with them.

These Desais received good treatment in Goa. On one occasion, Vice-Rei Conde de San Vincente had even threatened to punish the Rector of Colvale for having compelled the Pernem Desais to listen to a sermon. The Vice-Rei was very particular that they should not be molested on account of their religion. This sermon incident occurred on or about 12 October 1667. But it is obvious from Vergel de Plantas e Flores da Província da Madre de Deus dos Copuchos Reformados by Fr. Jacinto de Deus, published in Lisbon in 1690, that he was resolutely trying to convert to Christianity those Hindus who were resident in Bardez. Permission was granted to publish this book in 1680. It records that "In 1667, through the favour of Vice-Rei Conde de San Vincente, 7,000 Hindus from Bardez were
baptised; efforts to convert the remaining 3,000 to Christianity are being made and in all probability they will adopt the faith."

Similarly, Pais Dos Christaunce said in his statement made on 5 January 1678 that “But for Vice-Rei Conde de San Vincente’s untimely death, most of the Hindus in Goa island and Bardez would have become Christians, like those in Salçette.

This Viceroy had issued a notification on 21 September 1667 that all Hindus should quit the limits of Bardez within a period of two months. This notification is not to be found in the Goa Archives but the present author found it mentioned in manuscript No. 8538 in Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa, in 1954. Later, he also obtained a copy of it in Biblioteca Nationale de Paris. It was published by him first in Assentos de Conselho do Estado, Part IV (p. 560) in 1956. The reasons given by the Vice-Rei in this notification for the expulsion of Hindus were that their presence affected the loyalty of the Christians to their religion; that the Hindus had risen in revolt against the King of Portugal several times; and that, in 1654, when Abdul Hakim invaded Goa, many a Hindus turned traitor and joined the enemy against the Portuguese. Religious persecution of Hindus in Goa was, more or less, a normal feature for many years before the birth of Shivaji. The Hindu subjects of Aurangzeb had also to undergo similar religious persecution. Even in the Bijapur kingdom, the Hindus were, often enough, similarly mal-treated. How Goa under Portuguese rule became Christian is sufficiently known today, and need not be elaborately discussed here. The Hindus in Goa were accustomed to religious persecution by the Portuguese and were trying to wriggle out of their troubles somehow or other.

In the situation, the notification of expulsion issued in Bardez in 1667 was not a bolt from the blue for the Hindus. A similar notification had been issued by Vice-Rei Conde de Linhares against the Hindus of Salçette on 11 January 1633. The same had happened in the island of Goa in 1560. Cuios regio illus religio was an accepted principle in Goa policy and laws were promulgated in keeping with it. It meant: Whatever the religion of the ruler is the religion of the subjects.

While this was the state of things in Bardez, Narba Savant, a nephew of Lakham Savant, Desai of Kudal, one of those Desais who had come
to Goa, having taken fright at Shivaji's movements, went to Vengurla on 15 September 1667, caused a riot and molested the Dutch. He was accompanied by some Portuguese. The Dutch of Vengurla protested against this to the Portuguese and probably complained to Shivaji also.\textsuperscript{103} These Desais who were sheltered in Bardez often returned to their original seats of power (\textit{vatans}) and terrorised people in the neighbouring territory controlled by Shivaji. In order to capture them and also punish the Portuguese who had harboured them, Shivaji despatched an army of 1,000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry to Bardez on 19/20 November 1667.\textsuperscript{104}

For three days (20-22 November) Shivaji's troops plundered a number of villages and arrested hundreds of people.\textsuperscript{105} Among them were many women and children. A contemporary Dutch report says that they killed three padres and a number of Christians.\textsuperscript{106} On this occasion, Shivaji distributed some leaflets addressed to the people and some people followed the instructions therein. Such was the allegation of the Vice-Rei who appointed Dr. Francisco de Silva Fosch on 4 May 1668 to inquire into this. Of this there is evidence.\textsuperscript{107}

There is a report made by the Franciscan padres on this invasion of Bardez by Shivaji written in Goa in 1724 which is deposited in the Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa.\textsuperscript{108} The author believes that, though it was written many years afterwards, it was based on the records of the Franciscan Fathers. This report says:

"As the Portuguese had harboured Keshav Naik, a Desai, in the village of Colvale in Bardez, Shivaji invaded Bardez with a large army and went straight to Colvale in search of Keshav Naik. He cut to pieces many a Christian he came across on his way as revenge against the Portuguese who had given asylum to Keshav Naik. He killed Fr. Manoel de San Bernanden, Rector of Colvale, in order to frighten the Franciscan fathers and shut them in their residences. This padre was a Goa-born Portuguese. He came out of the church door to investigate on hearing hoarse shouts and, as soon as he was out of doors, he was put to death by a \textit{Cutelo}. Fr. Joao das Neville, a Portuguese padre, was his guest in the church. He had just then been appointed Commissario Geral. He was not aware what was going on outside and probably thought that some enemy was near by and so he too came out. He too was murdered, suffering 18 wounds."
The padre knelt on the ground, threw his hands up and stared heavenwards while receiving the strokes of the sword. The enemy then departed. His efforts were futile, because the Desai who was being traced was not found. For more than four days the dead bodies of the two padres and others were not removed as most of the Bardez people had fled and sought shelter in Reis Magos and Aguada forts."

As the Portuguese Viceroy had received news of the impending invasion of Bardez by Shivaji through his spies four days earlier, he had enough time to make arrangements for the protection of the Portuguese and Keshav Naik, Lakham Savant and other Desais who were then in Goa.

Vice-Rei Conde de San Vincente wrote to his secretary on 15 November 1667 that more of Shivaji’s troops and ships were marching towards Goa, according to tidings received by him, and so the fortress-keepers of Thivim and Caisuv (Chapora) should be instructed to be ready. Similar instructions should be given, he said, to the Ranes of Revade and Nanode, so that they too might be on the alert. They were to be instructed to prohibit entry of outsiders in their areas. The refugee Desais, he instructed, should also be asked to be prepared with their troops and Fernav Vaz de Sequeira was alerted and asked to keep his warships in readiness to meet Shivaji’s fleet if the need arose. The Ranes of Rewade, Nanode and Peirna, villages under Portuguese control on the outskirts of Bardez, were used by the Portuguese as bases against the Mahrattas. Some of these Ranes had embraced Christianity. Don Lucas de Lisboa Ranne and Don Lourenço de Lisboa Ranne are famous.

The Viceroy himself proceeded to meet the army of Shivaji and they came face to face on 22 November. In a letter addressed to the Goa city municipality on 29 December, 1667, the Viceroy said: there were several reasons for not leaving the city of Goa when I went to Bardez. When I fought the enemy I had only 84 Portuguese, including Fidalgos and Soldados. God willed that we should win a great victory, that our enemy should ignominiously retire from the battlefield and crave for a peace as we wanted it."

In a letter written to fortress-keeper of Raitur on 29 November, the Viceroy says, "Shivaji is begging for peace and he is going to return all that he has carried away from Bardez."
Vice-Rei Conde de San Vincente placed on record that the Dutch officers in India were ordered from Holland that they should ally with Adilshah and, since he had informed Shivaji about this, Shivaji did not raise any objection to entering into a treaty of friendship with the Portuguese. Besides, the Viceroy complained, Shivaji had allowed the Portuguese to open a factory at Dabhol. The negotiations for a treaty between Shivaji and the Portuguese began after 20 November, 1667. On 23 November, the Viceroy informed Shivaji that he too was anxious to make peace. On 24 November, the Viceroy wrote a reply to another letter from Shivaji and said that maintenance of peace between him and the Portuguese was in his (Shivaji’s) hands. On a request from Shivaji, on 24 November, the Viceroy sent Ramoji Shenvi Kothari to Shivaji as his envoy to carry on peace talks. He did so and returned immediately. He carried a letter from Shivaji to the Viceroy, who sent a reply on 27 November. Shivaji was then at Bicholim near Goa, and hence such speedy negotiations were possible.

Sakopant went to Goa as Shivaji’s envoy. It was with this envoy that the Viceroy concluded a treaty of friendship on 5 December 1667. When the envoy returned to Raigad, the Viceroy sent a Jesuit Padre, Gonzalo Martence with him. The treaty was endorsed by the Mahratta Government on 12 December (25 Jamadilakhar). The text of the treaty is both in Marathi and Portuguese. In the Portuguese version it is said that the treaty was endorsed on 5 December 1667. In the Marathi version, the date is mentioned as 6 December. The date in the Marathi version is wrong. The Marathi version says that there is both the emblem and the signature of Shivaji but in both the versions only the emblem of Shivaji is to be seen and not his signature. There is no positive proof of Shivaji being literate in the source materials, whether in Goa, Portugal or Paris. The author has not come across a single letter signed by him in the Goa Archives. Dr. Balkrishna has said that the Portuguese have recorded that Shivaji could read and write. But the two items of evidence given by him to establish Shivaji’s literacy are not conclusive or convincing. Signed (assinado) does not mean that the person concerned necessarily wrote in his own hand. Even if only the emblem was impressed, assinado was the word used for that function.

Sir Janunath Sarkar
says that the Marathi text of the treaty was written by Moro Pingale himself.116 But the many Portuguese words used in it, like Vice-Rei, Novembro, Padre and Dezembro, show that it was Ramoji Shenvi Kothari who probably wrote it out.

There is no mention whatever about the religious persecution of Hindus in the correspondence between the Mahrattas and the Portuguese concerning Shivaji’s invasion of Bardez. The Vice-Rei had given Gonsalo Martinez for his guidance a note of instructions (Instruções) when he went to Raigad as the Portuguese envoy with the text of the treaty. The note prescribed what matters he should touch on in his conversation with Shivaji. There is no mention in it of the problem of the Bardez Hindus. If Shivaji had any grievance or complaint in this behalf, its echoes should surely have been heard in this note of instructions.

There is only one point which has been continuously emphasised in the correspondence between the Viceroy and Shivaji since the beginning, i.e. from 23 November, viz. Shivaji’s complaint against the Desais of Kudal, Pernem and Bicholim who were living in Goa. Even in the treaty of 1667, the same subject has been handled. If there is no relation of cause and effect between the notification issued by Conde de San Vicente against the Bardez Hindus and Shivaji’s invasion of Bardez in 1667, why were the two padres and several Christians put to death? This question naturally arises but it is not difficult to answer it satisfactorily. Why the Mahrattas killed the padres is explained in the report of the Franciscan padres themselves which has been mentioned earlier.

There were hundreds of padres in Bardez at that time. Two of them were done to death because they were found out of doors.117 This action was not premeditated. There is no mention anywhere of Shivaji having ever attacked monasteries or the residences of Catholic priests. Padres often participated in battles as armed soldiers and therefore met with resistance from the enemy. That they were not non-violent preachers must not be lost sight of.118

The Portuguese have greatly admired R. Joao de Deos for having attacked the Mahrattas as a skilled marksman on the occasion of Sambhaji’s invasion of Goa.119 The Portuguese have also recorded that the Mahrattas considered Portuguese priests excellent soldiers.120
Besides, these padres were the leaders of the local Christians and their guidance was helpful in formulating the political policies of the Portuguese rulers. Not only that, but in those days the Christians believed that Portuguese rule was Christian rule. The Christians were the rulers and Hindus did not have this authority. In 1668, when a Hindu was appointed to a Government post in the city of Goa, the Vice-Rei himself came out strongly against this. Because he was not a Christian, the Hindu was relieved of the post. It was considered irreligious, that is against the Christian religion, that a Hindu should hold a Government office under the administration of the King of Portugal. The Portuguese rulers faithfully stood by the principle that a non-Christian should have no superiority whatsoever over a Christian.

In 1667, there remained only 3,000 Hindus in Bardez. This figure must have been reduced still further after the notification of Hindu expulsion issued by the Vice-Rei Conde de San Vincente. In a Portuguese document of 1722 it was said that a Hindu was then scarcely seen in Bardez. In this way the total Christianisation of Bardez had been almost accomplished in the times of Shivaji. In the chronicle of Sabhasad, Goa has been appropriately described as *Firangana*. It is no exaggeration to say that in those days Goa had become a prototype of Portugal. The Goan Catholics had not only adopted the religion of the rulers but also their language, customs and manners, mode of dress, names etc. Shivaji’s troops were in Bardez for three days. On 22 November, they left. Shivaji himself must have been there at that time. The Mahrattas captured many prisoners. Rich and highly placed people had already taken refuge in the Reis Magos or Aguada forts or the island of Goa. Those who were taken were mostly Christians. The Dutch of Vengurla recorded that among the captured were women and children. A reference to the capture of women and children is also found in the treaty of friendship concluded after this invasion.

After establishing that the invasion of Bardez had nothing to do with the expulsion notification issued by Vice-Rei Conde de San Vincente, it is proper to examine the basis on which the contrary view has gained ground. The basis of the belief is a letter from an Englishman in Goa dated 30 November, 1667.
It would appear that this letter is based on mere street gossip. Its contents are not supported either by any document in the Goa Archives nor any contemporary document. The Dutch officer in charge at Vengurla, Lenartz, wrote in a letter dated 28 November, 1667 that the object of Shivaji’s invasion of Bardez was exactly as the Franciscan padres have recorded.\textsuperscript{132} Even the English Factor of Surat, in a letter dated 22 January 1667, stated that Shivaji invaded Bardez on account of the Desais living in Goa.\textsuperscript{133} It must be taken into account that the view of the Dutch of Vengurla is very significant because they were in league with Shivaji in this affair.\textsuperscript{134}

The Vice-Rei had protested to the Dutch of Vengurla in this matter in a letter dated 1 December 1667. Conde de San Vincente wrote that Shivaji had expressed regret to him for having accepted ammunition from the Dutch and yielding to their pressure and invading Bardez,\textsuperscript{135} (c desculpar-se o dito Sivagi comigo de que para isso fora induzido por V. S.\textsuperscript{).} Although the Dutch contradicted the charge made in a letter of protest regarding the invasion of Bardez, the charge was, nevertheless, not baseless.\textsuperscript{136} The French traveller, Carre, was in Goa in 1668 and 1672 who said that Shivaji invaded Bardez because he was badly treated by the Portuguese.\textsuperscript{137} It is noteworthy that Carre has not mentioned religious persecution of the Hindus as the cause of Shivaji’s invasion of Bardez.

The present author does not consider it credible that Shivaji put four padres to death in Bardez for having refused to be converted to Hinduism as stated in the Englishman’s letter dated 30 November 1667. For there is no record to prove that in those days any European Christian was converted to Hinduism. There are several examples in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries of some converted Christians having been accepted back into Hinduism by a process of penance and purification, but they were originally Hindus.\textsuperscript{138} The case of Europeans is entirely different. So it seems that the account in this letter was the product of the imagination of someone unacquainted with the traditions, customs and manners of the Hindus.

It is clear from the contemporary writings of Diagode Couto,\textsuperscript{139} Fr. Paulo de Trindade,\textsuperscript{140} Padre Francisco de Souza\textsuperscript{141} and others that a European Christian was on the same footing as a Hindu untouchable
in the Hindu society of Shivaji's times. It was impossible to convert a European Christian to Hinduism in the seventeenth century. In a Portuguese epistle of 1690 it is stated that the lowest among the low caste Hindus would not be prepared to eat what the Vice-Rei ate sitting with him.\textsuperscript{142} It is well-known that when a Hindu was to be converted to Christianity, the first step in that direction was to compel him to eat beef.\textsuperscript{143}

The Franciscan padres have placed on record that the Mahrattas inflicted 18 wounds on one of the two padres killed at Colvale. Was not even one stroke of a sword enough to send him to the other world? But since he received so many wounds the natural inference is that there must have been a scuffle between the Mahratta soldiers and this padre and somebody might have sarcastically suggested to the Padre that he should become a Hindu. However, the most important point is that if the Padre had died for his religion, the Franciscan fathers would surely have noted him as a great martyr. Beyond all this, Shivaji’s policy of toleration of all religions is so well known.\textsuperscript{144}

The women who were captured during the invasion of Bardez were restored to the Vice-Rei of Goa after the treaty of friendship was concluded. As a matter of fact, women and children from enemy territory always received protection in times of war from Shivaji’s soldiers.\textsuperscript{145} Shivaji’s strict instruction to his army was, as stated by Sabhasad in his chronicle,\textsuperscript{146} that ‘in foreign territory no woman or child should be molested’.\textsuperscript{147} The Portuguese biographer of Shivaji, Cosme da Guarda, also testifies to this.\textsuperscript{148} There is no mention in the Portuguese records of the women captured during the Bardez invasion having been hurt or molested. On the contrary, the Portuguese Vice-Rei, Conde de San Vincente, informed the King of Portugal that Shivaji duly returned all the plunder and women and children that his troops had seized.\textsuperscript{149}

The Mahrattas carried the Christian women with them as captives because of the peculiar situation in Firangana. It may be that they were held as hostages for extorting money from their relatives. The Dutch records mention quite a different reason for this action,\textsuperscript{150} but it is not supported by Portuguese records. Thevenot, a French traveller, has recorded that Shivaji’s behaviour was similar in respect
of the daughter of Shaista Khan. Even if Thevenot’s information was inaccurate, it shows that Shivaji was held in esteem for his noble behaviour.151

The present author brought to light for the first time in 1927 the treaty concluded between Shivaji and the Portuguese in 1667.152 A fascimile was also published by him.153 In this treaty, consideration is first given to the Desais—Lakham Savant and Narba Savant of Kudal, Keshav Naik of Pernem and Mal Shenvi of Bicholim. Shivaji having complained against Lakham Savant and Keshav Naik, the Vice-Rei expelled them from Goa in June 1668. Shivaji showed them mercy.154 Lenartz, the Dutch Factor of Vengurla, wrote in his letter dated 28 November, 1667 that, after attacking Bardez, Shivaji went to Bicholim and negotiated a treaty with the Portuguese.155 In the original Portuguese text of the treaty, it is clearly stated that Shivaji personally took part in the invasion of Bardez.156 Even in the Marathi text it is said that Shivaji went to Bardez with his troops because the Desais were there.157 The Portuguese Vice-Rei says that Shivaji himself told the Vice-Rei that the Dutch Factor at Vengurla instigated him to invade Bardez.158 Padre Gonsal Martencce went to Raigad with the text of the treaty on behalf of the Portuguese when Shivaji gave them permission to open a factory at Dabhol.159 In accordance with the treaty, the Vice-Rei informed Shivaji that a jettor had been appointed at the Dabhol factory of the Portuguese in July, 1668.160

The Vice-Rei received news that a day or two before 20 March 1668 Shivaji was mobilising his troops with a view to leading an invasion on Goa.161 Accordingly the Portuguese made defensive preparations but this invasion did not come off. On 6 November, 1668, Conde de San Vincente died. A few days after his death, Shivaji had planned to invade Salsette and Bardez but, according to the acting Governor of Goa in his letter dated 7 January, 1669, as the Portuguese preparations were formidable, Shivaji did not pick a quarrel with them.162 Gifford and Chamberlain said in a letter from Karwar dated 26 December, 1668 that Shivaji had surreptitiously sent 400 to 500 of his people, on one pretext or another, in small batches into Goa territory. Gradually this number was to be doubled and one night they would have taken possession of a pass to enter Goa island
and capture it before giving any opportunity to the Portuguese troops to deploy. But Shivaji found on coming to Vengurla that his plan had been divulged, his men had been arrested, and the Portuguese were ready to meet him. He therefore changed his plans. In a letter dated 12 November, 1668, the English gave the news that Conde de San Vincente got information about Shivaji’s plans a few days before his death and therefore made inquiries with Shivaji’s envoy to Goa, and that, in fact the Vice-Rei slapped the envoy in the face two or three times and turned him and his people who had come to the city with him away. The Portuguese records nowhere say anything of this kind. Far from it, and on the contrary, the acting Portuguese Governor says in his letter dated 7 January, 1669 that Shivaji had informed him that he had intended in November 1668 to invade Salcette and Bardez after the 1667 invasion, but it was no longer his objective. This he did by sending an envoy to the Portuguese.

Shivaji carried out repairs on the temple of Saptakotishwara at Narve in Bhatagram in November 1668. An inscription in stone to that effect still stands at the entrance of the temple. This temple was originally in Diwadi island. Minguel Vaz, a Portuguese priest, demolished it in 1540 along with other temples. It was erected again beyond Diwadi before 1558. The Sanskrit pothi called Shri Shivarajyabhisheka Kalpaturu by Nischalapuri mentions the rebuilding of the temple of Saptakotishwara by Shivaji. Some information about this is available in the Nischayapatra given to an astrologer of Narve by Suryarao Desai of Bhatagram. It is commonly said that when Shivaji went to Narve to pay his respects to Saptakotishwara, he got the inspiration for putting the temple into proper condition. The city of Goa can be seen from Narve. What thoughts might have surged up in his mind when he saw this city of the Portuguese?

Shivaji’s coronation in 1674 was considered a great event all over Maharashtra. The English envoy, Oxendon, the interpreter of the English, Narayan Shenvi, and the Dutch merchant of Vengurla, Abrahamle Feber, have left descriptions of this event. But what is very surprising is that there is no Portuguese record, not even a few lines, of this event. Very probably documents regarding this must have disappeared or must have been destroyed. For this reason, no
correspondence between Shivaji and the Portuguese between 1669 to November 1677 is traceable in the Goa Archives Livros dos reis vizinhos, Nos. 2 and 3.

The year after the coronation, i.e. 1675, on 18 April, Shivaji laid siege to the fort of Ponda. The fort commander was one Mohamed Khan. When this fort was besieged in 1666, the Portuguese had helped its inmates to hold out. To ensure that this would not be repeated, Shivaji had taken a pledge from the Portuguese to remain neutral. Even the Portuguese envoy at the fortress was maintained secretly and, for that purpose, some men and grain supplies were clandestinely sent to Ponda. But the Mahrattas waylaid and arrested them. About 2,000 horsemen and 7,000 infantry of Shivaji were engaged in this siege.

While this siege was in progress, Shivaji’s men attacked the village of Chandar on 29 April, 1675 and plundered two or three houses and killed a servant of the Catholic Church (meirinho da igreja). These people happened to be there in pursuit of some Desais. On the same day, about two hundred of Shivaji’s horsemen led an assault on Cuncolem in Salcette and plundered many of the people in flight. They got away with Church ornaments also. These horsemen were led by a Bijapur Sardar, Ranamast Khan. When the Vice-Rei learnt about this aggression by the Mahrattas he ordered that Shivaji’s envoy be placed under arrest.

About 16 May, the fortress of Ponda fell to Shivaji. As a consequence of this, Antruj, Ashtaghar, Hemadbarse, Bali, Chandravadi and Kakode, corresponding to present-day Ponda, Sanguem, Quepem and Canacona, came under his administration. In the same month, Shivaji captured Shivshwar and Ankola forts and Karwar. Shivaji’s writ now ran in all of the Bijapur Konkan. Cosme de Guarda writes, “In this way Shivaji captured all the Bijapur territory below the ghat till the Mirjan river.” Ponda fort was repaired and, at its entrance, the idol of Ganapati was planted. The last of Bijapur’s fortress-keepers was Mahomed Khan. Shivaji appointed Trimbak Pandit in his place.

The ancestors of the Rajput house of Dharampur used to impose and recover chauthai from the people of Daman territory. On this account, the Portuguese called the prince of Dharampur Chauthiya
Raja. The Italian traveller Manucei has also called him by the same name. The oldest reference to this in the Portuguese records is found in a manuscript, *Cronic Dos Cucecuse Doreino de Gujarata*. This was written in 1535 and is deposited in the Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa. Detailed information about *chauthai* is found in a manuscript *Tombo de Damao* prepared in 1592 and now in the Goa Archives.

It is mentioned in the travelogue of Padre Manoel Godinho written in 1663 that the *chauth* tax (*pensao*) was being paid from the days prior to the occupation of Daman by the Portuguese to Chauthiya Raja. Godinho also says that the prince maintains a cavalry of 600. Useful information about this tax is also found in Garcia de Orta’s *Coloquios*, published in 1563 in Goa, *Decada VII* by Diogo do Couto and *Decada XIII* and *Livre das Fortalezas da India*, a historical work by Antonio Bocarro. Unpublished information on this topic has been given elsewhere by the present author.

*Chauthai* means a fourth part of the revenue. After the Sultans of Gujarat had conquered Daman, the people of Daman used to pay 25 per cent of the revenue from the villages to the Rajput princes (known as Sarset) in order that they should not molest them. After Daman passed to the Portuguese the Rajput princes continued to recover it from the people as they had done before. This led to brawls and skirmishes between the Portuguese and the forces of the Chauthiya Raja. Fernao de Miranda, Captain of Daman, to avoid all trouble, made an agreement with the Sarset prince, that ‘*chauthai*’ should not exceed 17 per cent of the total revenue and that the tax should be made over in cash to representatives of the Raja at Daman.

In 1670, in keeping with the agreement made with the Sarset prince, the ratio of *chauthai* in Mahim *pargana* was 12.50 per cent and in Tarapur *pargana* 14 per cent. The condition was laid down that, in exchange for this cess, the prince of Sarset should protect the people of these two *parganas* from the depredations of thieves and robbers. The prince of Sarset was the Raja of Ramnagar. As mentioned earlier, it was customary to call him Chauthiya Raja.

The Koli Raja of Jawhar rebelled against the Chauthiya Raja in 1670 and demanded of the Portuguese that the *chauthai* be paid to
him. The Portuguese did not do so. He therefore plundered and burnt several villages from Dahanu to Kalve Mahim. The Chauthiya Raja could nowhere obstruct his progress. The Portuguese therefore came down and agreed to pay chauthai to the Raja of Jawhar. Later, the Portuguese picked a quarrel with the Koli Raja with the help of the Raja of Ramnagar and burnt down a number of his villages. However, the Portuguese were unable to subdue the Koli Raja and they, therefore, through Manoel Furtado de Mendonça who was appointed Captain of Daman in December 1671, secretly requested Shivaji to punish him. Accordingly Moropant Pingle, the Peshwa of Shivaji, attacked Jawhar and put the Koli Raja to rout.\textsuperscript{189} Still, the Raja of Ramnagar did not surrender to Shivaji and continued his resistance. After having taken most of the territory of Ramnagar, Shivaji demanded the chauthai of Daman from the Portuguese but on the excuse that the whole of the Ramnagar raj had not been conquered, the Portuguese kept with them as deposit the chauthai from 1671 to 1677 and did not pay it either to Ramnagar or to Shivaji.\textsuperscript{190} Even so, the Portuguese have recorded, Shivaji did not molest Daman in any way.

In January 1677, Shivaji completed the conquest of Ramnagar and threatened the borders of Daman by posting troops to prevent any depredations by thieves or robbers. He then demanded chauthai from the Portuguese. The Daman Municipality resolved that the demand was just and fair and the Vice-Rei of Goa was informed accordingly.\textsuperscript{191} On 10 January, 1678, the Vice-Rei informed Shivaji by a letter that the chauthai would be paid after the Captains of Daman and Bassein had informed him about the capture of the Chauthiya Raja’s whole territory.\textsuperscript{192}

In a letter written to the General of Bassein, the Vice-Rei ordered that the chauthai should be recovered and an agreement should be made with Shivaji on the lines of the one with the Chauthiya Raja. But the Vice-Rei instructed the sum to be paid to Shivaji should be calculated only from the date on which his conquest of Ramnagar was completed; the arrears were not to be paid.\textsuperscript{193} For a long time, the correspondence regarding chauthai was continued between Shivaji and the Vice-roy. Shivaji’s envoys, Pitambar Shenvi, Jiwaji Shenvi and Ganesh Sheth, went to Goa and held talks with the Portuguese
Viceroy. The French traveller Carre has in his book given an account of the mission Shivaji sent to the Portuguese in 1672.

At the beginning of May 1677, Shivaji had sent his representative, Abaji Pant, to meet Don Manuel Lobo de Silveira and negotiate the question of chaouthai. The Portuguese agreed to pay the chaouthai for Daman according to past usage but on, one pretext or another, they did no pay the dues to the last. On the contrary, they paid, in several instalments, more than Rs. 13,000 secretly to the Prince of Ramnagar so that the Chauthiya Raja might continue his resistance to Shivaji. A manuscript in the Biblioteca da Ajuda puts down the revenue of chaouthai from Daman per year as 12,975 asurpees. Substracting 3,898 asurpees as the wages of the vatandors, the chauthiya Raja retained 9,077 asurpees, according to a record dated 4 June, 1683. From this, how much the Portuguese owed Shivaji on account of chaouthai from Daman can be estimated. The same manuscript has recorded that, by the end of 1681, the deposits with the Portuguese on account of chaouthai were of the order of 11,728 asurpees. So, till the end of the year, the Mahrattas did not get their chaouthai dues.

Mention is made of a tax called gavkhandi having been paid to Shivaji by the Portuguese from Tarapur and Sayban parganas of Bassein province in 1677. The Portuguese paid this tax also to the Chauthiya Raja. Two letters from the Mahrattas to Portuguese officers written on 16 August 1677 mention this demand. One of them is from Bayjipant. Chauthai and gavkhandi were different imposts.

In August 1678, the General of Bassein learnt that Shivaji had collected a large army near Kalyan and Bhivandi with a view to attacking Salcette. In 1679, the relations between the Portuguese and Shivaji deteriorated considerably. The Governor of Goa kept 5,000 infantry ready near Cuncolim Surmising that Shivaji would invade Salcette in Goa. Antonio de Pais de Sande was then the Governor. He was aware of Shivaji’s prowess and valour. He used to say that Shivaji was the Attila of India.

The Portuguese planned to lead an attack on Ponda before the Mahrattas invaded Goa. The Mahrattas, under the leadership of Mahadaji Anant, were ready for a fight. Just then came the news of
Shivaji’s passing away and the Mahratta troops that had gathered on the Goa border hastily withdrew and this conflict was averted. The Portuguese Governor Sande has said that Shivaji died on 13 April 1680. This date is in accordance with the new system and is ten days earlier than the English date. In a contemporary work in Portuguese in the Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa, it is recorded that Shivaji died of an ulcer (anthrax).

There is no mention of the age at which Shivaji died in Portuguese sources. The only mention of his age is the one made by Cosme de Guarda. He says that in 1660 Shivaji was 29 years old (Sendo pois este ano de 1660 . . . . se achava com 29 de idade). Jedhe Shakavali, Shivabharat and some other sources indicate that Shivaji was born in 1630. Guarda’s statement approximates to this indication. The figure 29 is not current in popular talk and so Guarda must have taken the trouble to find it out and record it.

Shivaji vigilantly watched the Portuguese in his declining years. The English, in a letter written from Rajapur to Bombay on 31 May 1675, mentioned that Shivaji had become the ruler of Karwar and that people expected him now to turn his attention to Goa. But there was no wisdom in fighting the Moghuls and the Portuguese simultaneously and for this reason Shivaji avoided a conflict with the Portuguese. The Vengurla Dutch have recorded that Shivaji hated the Portuguese. He always claimed Salcette and Bardez as his. The Portuguese also were afraid of him and considered him an enemy. The fact of the matter is that he did not have the time to expel the Portuguese from Konkan or, may be, he did not realise the urgency of it.

The Portuguese experienced a feeling of relief at Shivaji’s death. The then Governor of Goa has recorded: “This state is now free from anxiety. He was far more dangerous in peace than in war.” The Jesuit father Lainez says in his Latin book Defensio Indicaram Missionum, published in Rome in 1707, that, “The whole of India was in terror of Shivaji.”

The same feeling has found expression in the Shiva Bavani of poet Bhushan in his Hindi composition:

Oh Shivaji, the good son of Shahaji.
In terror of you the foreign residents (yavanās)
Of Bhelsa, Ujjain and Malva had to run away
As far as Shiraz, the Capital of Iran.
The residents of Gondvan, Telangan, Rohilkhand,
Karnatak and Firangana quake with fear.

Great Captains have lost courage and the doors of Bijapur
Golconda, Agra and Delhi forts open only once a fortnight and
not daily.
NOTES

(1) A hon is equal to Rs. 4.


(3) Pissurlencar, Assentos II, pp. 113-5.

(4) Pissurlencar, PM, I, Shivaji, p. 3n.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Pissurlencar, Assentos III, pp. 295, 296. 347, 348, 357, 366, 371, 372, 374, 375, 561. 562, 579, 583, 395, 631, and 633; Goa Archives: D. Francisco Lúiz Lobo’s petition dated 18 February 1658. Baltazar Mascarenhas, a Brahman Christian of Sirula (Shiroda) from Bardez was the first to inform the Government about this conspiracy. About Mateos de Castro, see Don Theodore Ghesquiere’s Mathieu de Castro (Louvain, 1937) and P. Carlo Cavallera, Matteo de Castro Mahtalo, Primo Vicario Apostolico dell’ India, Roma, 1936. There is information about this Bishop’s intrigues with the Dutch against the Portuguese in Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlandii Indicam, Vol. I (1596-1650). The letter of Bishop Mateos addressed to Brahman Christians of Goa in regard to this revolt is in the records of the Jesuits in Rome (Goa 40, fls. 373r-383v). The author has a photostat copy of this letter.

(7) Letter of Shahaji Raje (Shivaji Souvenir, p. 115). There is mention of Suryara, an ancestor of some Desais of Bhatagram, having gone to see Shahaji (G. S. Sardesai’s historical letters etc. p. 15). A letter written by the Portuguese Governor, Fernao de Albuquerque, to Suryarao, Desai of Bicholim, is available (Goa Archives, RV No. 1, fll. 58v). From the Kaulnama dated 27 November 1668, it would appear that the Desais of Bhatagram had contact with Shahaji (S. N. Joshi, Collection of letters of Shivaji’s times, Part III, p. 106).

(8) Goa Archives, MR 26, fl. 78.

(9) Goa Archives, MR 26, fl. 383v.

(10) C. R. Boxer, The Carreira da India, 1650-1750, reprinted from The Mariner’s Mirror Vol. 46, No. 1, February 1960, p. 53. The Portuguese called the ships built by Shivaji sanguiceps because such ships were built on the Sangameshwar river. These ships usually carried 20 armed men. (Diogo do Couto, Decada X, Parte I, p. 521). About 1590, a sardar named Maloji rose in revolt against Adilkhan and set up his fleet in Sangameshwar river. The Portuguese destroyed this fleet (Goa Archives, MR 3A, fl. 407v).

(11) “Trezentos soldados brancos e pretos” (300 Portuguese soldiers, white and black), AHV. India, avulsos (Caixa 25).

(13) BNL "Livro das Cartas que escrevo a S.M. o Sr. Don Rodrigo da Costa" fl. 25 (manuscript No. 8538).

(14) AHU. India avulsos (Caixa No. 25); Pissurlencar, Assentos IV, pp. 6,7.

(15) Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baçaim, pp. 2,3.

(16) Pissurlencar, Assentos IV, p. 141.

(17) Letter to the King of Portugal from Vice-Rei Conde de San Vincente, dated 20 September, 1667 (BNP, Fond Portugais, Ms. 33, fl. 129); Assentos IV, p. 189n.

(18) "Galleywats or gallivats, were large rowing-boats with two masts, of 40 to 70 tons, and carrying four to eight guns (Biddulph, The Pirates of Malabar, 1907, p. 92n.).

(19) Cosme de Guarda, Vida de Celebro Sivagy, 1730, p. 139.

(20) Goa Archives, RV Nos. 2 and 3 Dr. S. N. Sen, Preliminary Report on Historical Records of Goa.

(21) Guarda, Sevagy, p. 139-41.

(22) Goa Archives. Livro de consultas, No. 5: Serviços de D. Fernando de Castro: "... no reconhecer de uma armada do Sevagi que andava entre os Ilheos de Mormugao, que foi trazida a Goa, com os paranguees que tinha tomado .......

(23) Goa Archives, RV, No. 2, fls. 36v-37.

(24) Goa Archives, Papeis avulsos.


(26) Goa Archives: "O Sivagi se emsobrebeço de maneira pelo successo passado que se averevo a mandar por uma armada nos Ilheos de Mormugao a impedir os mantimentos que vinhaio para esta cidade."


(28) Goa Archives. RV, No. 2, fl. 27.

(29) Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baçaim, p. 9n.


(31) For instance, Dr. S. N. Sen, Military System of the Marathas, p. 186; Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Shivaji, 1952, p. 263.

(32) Goa Archives: "e na palleja que e nossa Armada teve com a do inimigo Sevagi em que lhe tomarao tres barcos de guerra da Enseada de Quellocy e ... na palleja que ouve com dezoito barcos do mesmo Sevagi na tomada de duas galleotas appataxadas .... "Livro de consultas, No. 2 fl. 97. (Requerimento dos servíços de Don Aleixo de Almeida fidalgo da Caza de V. Magestade).

(34) Pissurlencar, Assentos IV, pp. 5, 6.
(36) Goa Archives. Livro de Chaul, No. 1, fl. 35v.
(38) Pissurlencar, Assentos IV, pp. 214-16.
(41) Pissurlencar, Assentos IV, p. 555.
(42) Ibid, p. 556.
(44) Pissurlencar, Tentativas dos Portugueses para a ocupação do conçao; The attitude of the Portuguese towards Shivaji.
(45) Goa Archives, RV No. 2, fl. 17; Pissurlencar PM, I, p. 7n.
(46) Goa Archives, RV No. 2, fl. 14v.
(47) Goa Archives, RV No. 2, fl. 16v.; “por ser tão inclinado as cousas de V. S.” (Vice-Rei’s letter to Shivaji dated 2 June 1663, Pissurlencar, PM, I, p. 8.
(48) Collection of letters etc. of Shivaji’s times, Part I, No. 41, p. 231.
(49) A Portuguese Jesuit padre, Fernao de Ceirós lived in Goa for many years. He wrote a book in 1680 called, Conquista Temporal e Spiritual de Ceylão in which he says: “That the Natives call that tract of land below the Gane, Conceau, and the inhabitants Conceannis … But the most usual thing among these people, is to reckon Conceau from Banda, which is five leagues to the north of the bar of Goa, up to Mirzeo.” (English translation).
(51) Assentos, IV, p. 188.
(52) Collection of letters etc. of Shivaji’s times, Part I, No. 1221, p. 791.
(55) Collection of letters etc. of Shivaji’s times, Part I, No. 959.

(56) Assentos, IV, p. 137.

(57) Goa Archives, RV No. 2, fl. 16v: “por ser tão inclinado as cousas de V. S.” Vice-Rei’s letter to Keshav Naik and Keshav Prabhu dated 19 June 1663.

(58) Goa Archives, RV No. 2, fls. 21-21v.

(59) Goa Archives, RV No. 2, fl. 21v.

(60) Pissurlencar, Antiqualhas, pp. 108-16.

(61) BACL, Manuscript No. 58, p. 75; Sivagi entrou e roubou Surrate e no mez passado Bicholim e toda fronteira ate Raibag e Xapur (Letter dated 4 January, 1665).

(62) Lakham Savant used to stay at Candolim near Aguada, the Desais of Pernem at Colvale and those of Sanquelim and Bicholim at Panvel.

(63) Goa Archives, MR No. 31, fl. 20; Pissurlencar, Antiqualhas, p. 113.

(64) Goa Archives, RV No. 2, fl. 33; Pissurlencar, Antiqualhas, p. 114.


(66) Goa Archives: RV No. 2, fl. 31; Pissurlencar PM, I, p. 12.

(67) Goa Archives, RV No. 2, fl. 31v.

(68) Goa Archives, MR No. 31, fl. 244.

(69) Goa Archives, RV No. 2, fl. 32.

(70) Goa Archives, RV No. 2, fl. 31 (Viceroy’s letter to Krishna Savant dated 11 November 1664); Pissurlencar, Antiqualhas, p. 114.

(71) Goa Archives, No. 31, fl. 20; Pissurlencar, Antiqualhas, p. 113.


(73) Goa Archives, MR No. 30, fl. 143; Pissurlencar PM, I, p. 9.

(74) Goa Archives: MR No. 30, fl. 159; Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baqam, p. 4, 5.

(75) Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baqam, pp. 5-8; The Attitude of the Portuguese towards Shivaji.

(76) Pissurlencar, The Attitude of the Portuguese; Cosme de Guarda, Vida do Celebré Sevâng, pp. 143-144.

(77) Biker, Tratados, IV, pp. 125-6.

(78) The following clause occurs in the Moghul-Portuguese treaty; “The Portuguese should not give shelter to anyone who might rebel against the Moghul Emperor. If anyone did, it should be regarded as if he had risen in revolt against the King of Portugal.


(81) Goa Archives: *RV* No. 2, fls. 46v-47 (Viceroy's letter to Adilshah dated 9 October, 1666); *RV* No. 2, fls. 44-44v (Viceroy's letter to Rustomjama dated 5 May 1666).

(82) Goa Archives: *Livro de Chaul*, No. 1, fl. 12v.


(84) Rajasthani letter No. 56, from Parkaldas to Kalyandlas dated 18 November 1666 (Sarkar, *Shivaji's Visit to Aurangzeb at Agra*, p. 58).


(86) S. R. Sharma, *Maratha History Re-Examined*, p. 158.

(87) BNP, Fond Portugais, 33, fl. 129. "as astúcias, o valor, a actividade, e a prudencia militar deste homem se pode igolar com a dos Cesares e Alexandres. . . . he homem que esta em toda a parte e nao tem lugar certo em nenhuma."

(88) Goa Archives: *RV* No. 2, fl. 48.

(89) Goa Archives: *RV* No. 2, fl. 48v.

(90) Goa Archives: *RV* No. 2, fl. 49.

(91) Vice-Rei's letter to the King of Portugal dated 20 September 1667; "e (Shivaji) fica hoje muito nosso vizinho em Ponda". (BNP, Fond Portugais 33, fl. 129).

(92) Goa Archives CO No. 4 fl. 63v (Vice-Rei's letter to Reitor of Colvale dated 12 October 1667; *RV* No. 2, fl. 69 (Vice-Rei's letter to Keshav Naik, Desai of Pernem, dated 27 September, 1667).

(93) What Sarkar has written while commenting on the sentence 'com a favore do Vice Rey's is baseless. Those words refer to the frantic efforts made by the Viceroy to turn Bardez Hindus into Christians. Sir Janunath has written: The words, 'favour of the Viceroy' do not mean force but only the prohibition of the sale of Hindus as slaves to other than the Christian fathers who converted them' (Shivaji, 1952, p. 355). That Sir Janunath's conclusion is incorrect is clear in the light of the extract from *Vergel de Plantas e tores da Provincia da Madrerdê Deos dos Compuchos Reformados*.


(95) Goa Archives: *MR* No. 42, fl. 177.
(96) BNL, Livro das Cartas que escreveo a SM. o Sr. Don Rodrigo da Costa.

(97) J. Sarkar, A short history of Aurangzeb (Chapter VIII).

(98) Fernão da Miranda Henriques, Captain of Cheul, wrote in his letter dated 27 December, 1664 that Afliz Khan had ordered all Hindu temples in Upper Cheul to be demolished. (Goa Archives: MR 24, fl. 366) Dr. Balkrishna, Shivaji the Great, Part IV p. 172 (Muslim persecution of the Hindus).

(99) Pissurlencar, Roteiro, pp. 62-95; Assentos, 5 vols; Tombo Geral de Francisco Paes; C. Rivara, Archivo; Padre A. Silva Rego, Documentação; J. Wicki, Documenta Indica; Padre Sebastiao Gonçalves, Historia da Companhia de Jesus, etc.

(100) Pissurlencar, Antiquíduas, pp. 128-30; Assentos II, pp. 475, 476; A Bocarro Fortalezas da India (1635): “Conde de Linhares... Mandou lançar bandos que nenhum genito morasse nem tivesse fazendas nas ditas terras de Salsette, antes que se nao quizece fazer Christao, se foçe dellas dentro em tantos dias como em effetto se cumprio e se forao muitos.” The purport of this is that Hindus who did not wish to embrace Christianity should leave Salsette within a specified period. Accordingly, many people bid adieu to Salsette and the land they owned for all time.

In the Bibliotheque Nacionale de Paris, there is a certificate given to Conde de Linhares for this good deed by the Jesuit fathers. It is included in the manuscript by Barreto de Resende called Epilogo dos Vice-Reis. (BNP, Fond Portugais I, fl. 68).


(102) Pe A. de Silva Rego, Portuguese Colonization in the Sixteenth Century, 1959, p. 64.

In Shivaji’s times, most Hindus in the territory under the Portuguese had been converted to Christianity, though some Hindus still remained. For them, the old laws were in vogue. One of the most irksome of these laws was about orphans below fourteen. Even if the mother was alive such children were forcibly converted. So what Sir Janunath says must be dismissed as a half-truth (Shivaji, p. 354).

(103) Pissurlencar, Antiquíduas, p. 123.

(104) Ibid.

(105) The English in Surat recorded that, entering Bardez, Shivaji resorted to arson and carried away 1,300 captives. (Letters etc. of Shivaji’s Times, Part I, p. 333) Lenartz, the Dutch factor of Vengurla, said, in his letter dated 28 November, 1667, that Shivaji carried away 1,600 captives (Dr. Balkrishna, Shivaji I, p. 573).
(106) Dr. Balkrishna, *Shivaji the Great*, Vol. I, p. 575; After this Shivaji .... made all his soldiers (5,000 foot soldiers and 1,000 horsemen) bake dry wheat cakes for three days in this place and departed ....... and came on the 20th next (being Sunday when everybody was attending mass) to surprise Bardees ... He carried away 1,600 natives, mostly women and young girls. Besides he had several Christians put to death, among whom there were three priests.”

(107) BNL. Livro das cartas que escreveo a S. M. o Senhor Don Rodrigo da Costa, fl. 24v (manuscript No. 8538).

(108) Memorias para a historia eclesiastica de Goa e Missoes da Asia (BNL, Manuscript No. 177).


(110) Goa Archives : Livro das merces, 1638. fl. 62.

(111) Goa Archives : RV No. 2, fl. 66.

(112) BNP, Fond Portugais, 33, fl. 129v.

The date of the original letter is 20 September 1667. After this date at the end of the letter is the detailed report reproduced below. Obviously the information contained therein was written after the conclusion of the treaty of 5 December 1667. Vice-Rei Conde de San Vincente says :

Depois de ter dado a V. Magde, conta do Estado da Asia, chegou Correio de Glanda, para os ministros da Companhia, e como eu tenho entre elles pessoa de confiança, sobre o seguinte : Mandao ao seu geral que se venha a Cochin com a armada e (porque elles tem muitos navios) sera o numero delles a medida da sua necessidade, que sem romper com os Portugueses de todo, que faço as ostillidades possíveis em os navios que passarem ao sul.... que va pessoa a Idalxa sobre romper com os Portugueses, e que se arive a guerra do Canara, e de todas as outras partes com segredo, porem que descobertamente se nao faço ostillidades aos nossos barcos ....

Com este avizo despachey a procupar Sivagi que nao duvidou, em se agustar comigo, entre ao Capitul aççoes tivemos muitas duvidas, porque este homem; he assas cavilose; concluimos bem, e me da feitoria em Dabul (causa utilissima ao Estado) que ja tivemos e perdemos como o mais. O Idalxa esta muito com os olandezes, inda nao tive reposta sua ....


(115) Ibid. Also Pissurleacar, PM, I, pp. 32-4; *Antiquallias*, p. 91 (“.... O que esta assimado com os sellos de Sambhaji Raze e do Principe Sultao Acabar ....”).

(116) *Shivacharitrapradeepa* (Shivaji and Portuguese).

(117) A Dutch letter mentions the number of padres as three.

What great part the Franciscan padres played on the occasion of Sambhaji's invasion of Goa in 1684 is found in a letter they sent to the king of Portugal (MR, 52, fl. 120):

(Os religiosos da sua Ordem) assistiram com particular zelo e trabalho enquanto a guerra durou, obrando com grande valor, guarnecendo as muralhas, fazendo vigias, rondas e sentinelas, nas partes do maior risco, acodindo pontualmente aos feridos... animando a todos para defensã como sucedeu ao Pe. Frey Luis de S. Francisco e ao Pe. Manoel de S. Antonio no forte de Chapora que não entregou senão depois de um destes religiosos ser morto, no combate, de uma bala pela cabeça, depois de obrar prœzas e lever aviso a Goa a todo o risco......

(119) Padre Silva Rego, Documentação V. p. 444.

(120) Ibid., p. 447: "...... não cuidavam que os Battos dos Portugueses fossem tão bons soldados...."

(121) A learned Goan padre, Sebastiao Rego, author of a biography of Padre Jose Vaz in Portuguese, in a sermon delivered in 1745, declared that Catholics were the masters of Goa and the Hindus had no right to reside there. This sermon was published in Lisbon in 1759 under the title, Sermon da Santa Cruz dos Milagres.

(122) The following is an extract from a letter dated 5 February 1668 addressed to the Municipality of Goa by Vice-Rei Conde de San Vincente: "Sou informado que na Camara Geral de Goa assiste um genito; estranho muito e de hoje em diante se não permita tão torpe e abominável abuso" (Goa Archives, CO no. 4, fl. 71). (I understand that there is a Hindu in the employ of the Goa Municipality. This is very irregular. Hereafter, such mean and abominable practices should be discontinued).

(123) Goa Archives: Livro das provisões a favor da Cristianidade, fl. 49 v. (Pissurloancar, Roteiro, p. 69).


(125) Fr. Jacinto de Deos, Vergel de Plantas e Flores da Provincia da Madre de Deus, 1690, p. 20.

(126) Padre Silva Rego, Documentação, Vol. V, p. 406. The Vice-roy had informed the King of Portugal in a letter dated 10 January 1707 that very few Hindus had remained in Bardez (Goa Archives: MR No. 69, fl. 158).


(128) Dr. Balkrishna, Shivaji the Great, p. 573. "He (Shivaji) carried away 1,600 natives, most women and young girls....."

(129) The treaty mentions that all men, women and cattle that were seized in Bardez should be restored without compensation of even a rupee.
(130) Sir Janunath wrote that "three padres and some Indian Christians were beheaded by them, evidently in retaliation for the abduction and conversion of Shivaji’s subjects especially Brahmans" Shivaji, 1952, p. 352; Dr. Balkrishna, Shivaji, Vol. II, Part I, p. 507.

(131) Letters etc. of Shivaji’s Times, Part I, p. 331, No. 1186.

(132) Dr. Balkrishna, Shivaji, II, p. 573.

(133) English Records on Shivaji, 1931, p. 119.

(134) BNP : Fond Portugais, 33, fls. 200-201; Vice-Rei’s letter to the Vengurle Dutch (Goa Archives : RV No. 2, fl. 72v).

(135) Goa Archives : RV No. 2, fl. 73.

(136) BNP : Fond Portugais, 33, fl. 200.


Surendranath Sen has translated this thus: "he made inroads into the territories of the Portuguese who had given him offence; he wrested from them the island of Bardez and, after desolating the country, caused them great anxiety for Goa.” (Foreign Biographies of Shivaji, p. 206).

(138) Rivara, Archivo IV, p. 125; Pissurlekar, Assentos III, p. 476; letter from King of Portugal dated 5 March 1587 (Goa Archives ; MR 3A, fl. 275).

(139) Diogo de Couto, Decada V, pp. 396-7 (Coimbra, 1937) :

Quanto as Castas, o mor impedimento que ha na conversao destes gentios he a sapphirensa que guardao em suas castas .... E a primeira com quem mais guardam esta serimonia he com os Portugueses, porque comem vaca. E assim em falando com hum delles, ou tocando nelle, logo se vao purificar.


(142) “O mais vil e mizeravel gentio nao se assentara meza do Vice-Rei com obrigao de comer o que o Vice-Rei come.” (Goa Archives : MR No. 54, fl. 147).


(149) AHU, India, *avulsos* (Caixa 27); BNP, Fond Portugais, 33.

(150) Balkrishna, *Shivaji*, I, p. 573: “He carried 1,600 natives, mostly women and young girls, whom he sells to his soldiers.”

(151) Dr. Surendranath Sen, *Indian Travels of Thevenot and Careri*, p. 40. Thevenot writes, “He (Shivaji) carried off the General’s treasure and took his daughter, to whom he rendered all the honour he could. He commanded his men, under rigorous pains, not to do her the least hurt, but, on the contrary, to serve her with all respect; and being informed that her father was alive, he sent him word, that if he would send the sum which he demanded for her ransom, he would send him back his daughter safe and sound; which was punctually performed.”


(154) Pissurleancar, *Antiqualhas*, p. 131; Goa Archives: *RV* No. 2, fls. 87-87v.


The present author published the text of the treaty from the original in 1926. The celebrated Portuguese author, Cunha Rivara, had published it in *Boletim do Governo da India* previously but in his version there are some grievous errors. Biker copied Rivara once again (*Tratados* IV, p. 171). Dr. Bragança Pereira copied Rivara once again (*APO*, I, 3, 1, p. lix) and so they repeated the mistakes of Rivara.

Cunha Rivara wrote “desculpando-se da entrada que elle (Shivaji) e suas gentes fizeram em Bardez” in place of “desculpando-se da entrada que ignorando elle suas gentes fizeram em Bardez.” This led to complete misrepresentation and Bragança Pereira reached the conclusion that Shivaji had not personally gone to Bardez and that his troops attacked Bardez without clearance from him. Not only that, but Bragança even relied on a letter of the Karwar English factor dated 16 December 1668 (new style) and stated that the invasion of Bardez did not take place at all (*APO*, I, Vol. III, p. 1, p. lvi). It is actually quite unnecessary to point out that this letter refers to Shivaji in quite another connection.


(158) Viceroy’s letter dated 1 December, 1667 to the Dutch factor at Vengurla (Goa Archives: *RV* No. 2, fl. 72v).

(159) BNP, Fond Portugais 33 (Vice-Rei Conde de San Vincente to the King of Portugal).
(160) Goa Archives: RV No. 2, fl. 54.
(161) Goa Archives: Assentos IV, p. 190.
(162) Pissurlencar, PM, I, p. 27.
(165) Pissurlencar, PM, I, p. 27.
(166) Miguel Vaz demolished Hindu temples in Goa in 1540. (Pissurlencar, Tombo Geral de Francisco Paes, p. 67; Padre Silva Rego, Documentação, Vol. 8, p. 68—Padre Froísce’s letter dated 13 November 1560; Rego, Documentação, II, p. 103—Padre Miguel Vaz’s letter dated 6 January 1543 to the King of Portugal; Padre Lucena, Historia da Vida do Padre S. Francisco Xavier, 1600, p. 74).
(169) The letter written by Narayan Shenavi on 4 April 1674 was in Portuguese (JO Factory R Surat, Vol. 88, fls. 78-83).
(170) Pissurlencar, Antigualhas, p. 133.
(171) Ibid.
(172) The Mahrattas led an assault on Cuncolim and Chandar and killed a servant of the Catholic Church but nobody said that this was the result of the religious policy of the Portuguese.
(174) The English factor at Rajapur mentions in his letter dated 15 May 1675 that the Ponda fort was completely besieged by Shivaji and the English factor at Karwar says in his letter of 18 May, 1675 that Shivaji had captured the fort. From these letters, it would appear that the Mahrattas captured the fort about 16 May, 1675. Adilshah’s chronicle, Basatin e Salatin says that Ponda fort was captured by Shivaji on 15 Safar, 1086 (Pissurlencar, Antigualhas, p. 134) Dr. Balkrishna, Shivaji, Vol. II. Part I, pp. 139-40.
(175) Cosme da Guarda, Vida do Celebre Sevagy, p. 148; Dr. S. N. Sen, Foreign Biographies of Shivaji, p. 147.
(176) This beautiful, carved black-stone plate was found by the author buried around the Ponda fort about twelve years ago. It was deposited in the Goa Museum.
(177) Goa Archives; RV No. 2, fl. 3w.; Pissurlencar, PM, II, p. 4n. Riyasatkar Sardesai has written that Shivaji appointed one Dharmaji Nagnath
as Killedar (Shakakarta Shivaji, p. 169). The Goa Archives clearly show that he was appointed after Trimbak Pandit.

Portuguese material throws a bright light on the history of this fort. In 1535, it was a small fortress under the charge of a Thanedar. His troops consisted of about five hundred soldiers and some twenty to thirty horses. (Gaspar Correia, Lendas da Índia, Vol. IV, p. 601). In 1547, Governor Don Joao de Castro attacked it and burnt it. (Leonardo Nunes, (Cronica de D. Joao de Castro, pp. 167-8 ; Luis Keil, As Tapegarias de D. Joao de Castro, 1928). But Adilkhan built it again. The Governor of Goa, Francisco Barreto, attacked Ponda fort in December 1556 and demolished it. But Adilkhan once again reconstructed it (Padre Sebastiao Goncalves, Da Historia da Companhia de Jesus, Ms. BNL. fl. 79v).

(178) BNL, Ms. 299 F. G.
(179) Goa Archives, MS. No. 7599.
(180) Relação Lisboa, 1944, p. 24 : "Choutea, regulo que põe em camposiscenitos de cavalo. Tem este regulo nas terras de Damao certa pensão, a que chamam chouto, a qual se lhe pagava ainda antes de serem nossas."
(181) Coloquios, 1891, p. 119.
(183) Decada XIII, pp. 70, 248, 390, 675, 676 ; Fortalezas da India (Pissurlencar, PM, I, p. 40).
(184) Pissurlencar, Antigualhas, pp. 62-71 ; PM, I, pp. 39-50 ; Assentos IV, pp. 252-4, 556 ; "Shivaji and the Portuguese" (Shivacharitrapradeep), pp. 178-82.
(185) Goa Archives, Tombo de Damao.
(186) Boletim do Governo, 1873, p. 206 ; Antonio Bocarro, Decada XIII, p. 390.
(187) Diogo do Couto, Decada VII, p. ii
(188) BNL : Noticias da India (F. G. Ms. No. 465, fl. 299).
(189) BACL : MS. 58, fl. 235 ; Assentos IV, pp. 556-9).
(190) Pissurlencar, Antigualhas I, pp. 69-70 ; Assentos IV, p. 259.
(192) Goa Archives : RV No. 3, fl. 2.
(193) Goa Archives : Papeis avulsos.
(197) Governor Antonio Paes de Sandes’ letter dated 13 March 1679 to Bassin General Goao de Melo de Sampayo (Papeis avulsos); Pissurleocar, PM, I, pp. 47-9; Boletim da Filmoteca Ultramarina Portuguesa, No. 21 (1962); Antonio Paes de Sandes e Castro, Antonio Paes de Sande, pp. 163-5.

The letter of 13 March 1679 was published and is quoted here:—

Porquanto sou informado que o dinheiro do chouto que os vazadares e curumbins das aldeas do distrito de Damao pagavão a El-Rey Choutia, conforme aos consertos antigos, por defender as ditas aldeas dos ladraes, se tem cobrado por conta de fazenda real de seis anos a esta parte, pondesse em depozito em hum cofre no Collegio dos Padres da Companhia, para depois se dar a quem pertencer, em razao das guerras em que o Sivagi anda com o dito Rey, para senhorear suas terras, do qual dinheiro se tirarao por ordem do governo passado mais de treze mil rupias, por vezes, que se derao ao dito Choutia . . . .

(198) Ibid. Mention of secret payments by the Portuguese to Chouthia Raja is found for the first time, in the acting Governor’s letter dated 12 May, 1678. (Goa Archives: RV No. 3, ffs. 6-6v).

(199) BA: Cartas da India, fl. 246 (MS. 31-IX-1).

(200) Five rupees were equal to 12 assurpees or one asurpee (Xerafim) was equal to six annas and eight pies. But, generally, the Portuguese Court regarded a rupee equal as to two assurpees (Pissurleocar, PM IV, p. 168; V, p. 24).

(201) Pissurleocar, PM, p. 50; BACL: MS. 58, ffs. 201v-205, 280v; Assentos IV, pp. 294, 295, 559. Mention is made of the gavkhandi tax in a letter of Shivaji in 1657. The tax was a fixed cess per khandi of grain to be recovered from peasants in all villages (A. V. John and Aba Chandorkar, Shrishivasahiche Lekhandalankar, p. 31).

(202) BACL, MS. 58, p. 202. In August 1677, Bajajipant sought asylum with the Portuguese for himself and also for his wife and nephew because Shivaji had charged him with having conspired with the Raja of Kolvan to hand over the raj to him for a gratification (BACL: Livro do registo do 1º Conde de Assumar, MS. ffs. 280, 287).

(203) BACL: Livro do Registo do 1º Conde de Assumar, Vol. IV.

(204) Pissurleocar, PM, I, pp. 46-9.

(205) “e era tal a astucia, manha e valor, daquelle novo Attila da India” (Letter of Portuguese Governor Antonio Paes de Sande, No. 1951, p. 151; Pissurleocar, PM, I, p. 51).

(206) Pissurleocar, PM, I, pp. 48-9; Sande e Castro, Antonio Paes de Sande, pp. 163-5; BNL: Breve resumo dos successos do Estado Portuguez na India (MS. Caixa 201, No. 4).

(207) Pissurleocar, PM, I, p. 49.
(208) BNL: Breve resumo dos sucessos do Estado Portuguez na India (MS. Caixa 201, No. 4). “Sivagi morrer o hum antraz.”

(209) Cosme da Guarda, Vida e acções do famoso e felicissimo Sevagy, p. 52.


(211) “e que por hora estas diversões embarassavão ao Sivagi a que náo entendesse conosco” (Letter dated 15 November 1680—Antonio Paes de Sande, p. 152).

(212) Assentos IV, p. 258.

(213) Dr. Balkrishna, Shivaji, Vol. II, Part I, p. 173 “He is said to have demanded from the Portuguese in Goa the evacuation of 60 villages on the ground that they belonged to the castle of Ponda which had been taken by Shivaji the previous year”. Letters etc. of Shivaji’s Times, No. 1221: “On the ground of his mastery of Bijapur, Shivaji is claiming the island of Salcete also. The Portuguese are much afraid of him.” (Dutch Records, Vol. 29, p. 140).

(214) Assentos IV, p. 258; Dr. Balkrishna, Shivaji I, pp. 519, 545. The acting Governor of Goa wrote in a letter dated 19 July, 1669: “(Shivaji) como tao grande inimigo que he deste Estado” (Goa Archives: Papéis avulsos).

(215) “Com os reis vizinhos se acha este Estado em pax e com a morte do Sivagi livre do cuidado que dava este inimigo, mais para temer na pax que na guerra” (Governor Antonio Paes de Sande’s letter dated 24 January 1681, AHV: India avulsos).

(216) “Sevaji, qui mediocri loco natus in tantam potestatum virtute bellica excravit, ut totius Indicis terror foret.”

(217) Shivaji Souvenir (Shiva-bhavani).
CHAPTER III

DURING SAMBHAJI'S REIGN AND AFTER

After the death of Shivaji, while Sambhaji was at Panhala, he sent a letter to the Governor of Goa through his envoy, Ramoji Naik Thakur. The tone of the letter was friendly. The envoy reached Goa in May 1680. The Governor sent Sambhaji a friendly reply accompanied by a draft treaty of friendship with Raiji Pandit whom Sambhaji had appointed to maintain peace in the Konkan.

In May 1681, Sambhaji went to Bicholim. While he was there, the Portuguese Governor sent him a letter reminding him how the Portuguese had behaved with him after Shivaji’s death, when all was not well with Sambhaji, and requested him to enter into a permanent treaty of friendship without delay. Consequently, Yesaji Gambhirrao, Sambhaji’s envoy, went to Goa to negotiate such a treaty.

Yesaji Gambhirrao was at the Portuguese court for many days. Agreeing with Portuguese complaints against Moro Dadaji, Subedar of Bicholim, Sambhaji removed him from that post and appointed Jivaji Vinayak in his place. It was because of the pains Gambhirrao took in the matter that the Portuguese achieved their end. This happened about the end of December 1681.

Don Francisco de Tovar Conde de Alvora was the then Portuguese Vice-Rei at Goa.

At the beginning of 1682, Sambhaji took Anjediv (off Karwar) and made preparations to build a fort there. A reference is found to this in a letter to the Viceroy from Dr. Luis Gonçalves Couto, Secretary to the Viceroy, dated 29 April 1682. It is as follows: “An interpreter has just informed me that Sambhaji has sent stones and lime to Anjediv and has ordered that no money should be spared to erect a fort. Therefor, it would be undesirable to delay despatch of ships there.”

Two days earlier, on 27 April, the Viceroy held a meeting of his Councillors and decided that, since Sambhaji was making preparations to build a fort on Anjediv island and had already ordered plans and designs for the purpose and was collecting the necessary material, it would be proper to send their own men and material and erect
a Portuguese fort there and equip it with six guns. Besides, it was decided that some ships should be stationed there for the protection of the island.²

Anjediv island in the possession of the Mahrattas was a menace to Goa. Grains used to come to Goa by sea from Karnataka which was considered the granary of Goa.³ Just as Chaul was harassed after the Mahrattas had built a fort at ‘Hendrikendri’, Goa would be harassed if Sambhaji kept Anjediv under his control and built a fort there. Taking this into consideration, the Portuguese planned to keep Anjediv exclusively Portuguese. There was another reason for Portuguese intervention: Sambhaji had harboured the Arabs in his state and had even taken their help with a view to attacking the Siddi of Danda Rajpuri. In this way, Sambhaji-Arab friendship was gradually growing. The Viceroy had information that an Arab held the post of admiral in Sambhaji’s fleet.⁴ The Arabs were the enemies of the Portuguese, but since the days of Shivaji they had become friends of the Mahrattas.⁵ The Viceroy legitimately feared that Sambhaji would hand over Anjediv to the Arabs.⁶

On 5 May, the Portuguese approached Anjediv island and took possession of it. On 2 July, 1682, Captain Amaro Simois Pereira laid the foundation stone of the castle and within six months the castle was completed. There is a stone inscription to that effect in Portuguese on the island.⁷ Sambhaji protested against this through his envoy and the Subedar of Ankola.⁸ But the Portuguese replied that, since the island belonged to the Portuguese, Sambhaji had no authority in the matter. The fact is that, when Vasco da Gama came to India, the Portuguese had taken this island and had built a fort there in 1506. But the next year, they demolished it and the island became desolate. Occasionally, Portuguese ships replenished their water supply from there. That was their only connection with it during Shivaji’s times.

When Abraham Shipman came in 1662 to take over the island of Bombay from the Portuguese, he stayed on Anjediv with 500 of his men. He died there in 1664. When the English took possession of this island, the Portuguese did not raise any objection, but the Adilshahi officer, Rustamjama of Karwar, arrested Subedar Mohamed Khan for not having resisted the English occupation.⁹
Although the Viceroy was not prepared to enter into any talks with Sambhaiji in respect of Anjediv, Portuguese-Mahratta relations did not suffer on this account. On the contrary, when the Viceroy learnt from the envoy of the Mahrattas that a son had been born to Sambhaiji, he wrote him a congratulatory letter and sent an ornament as a present to the baby prince. The letter is dated 28 July, 1682. This son must have been Shahun. The Viceroy referred to him as Sambhaiji’s successor in this letter.

Sambhaiji informed the Viceroy that he had started gun-powder factories at Kudal and Bicholim and that he had given orders for the purchase of guns, sulphur, saltpeter etc. from Karnatak and Malabar. All these goods would be brought by sea and he requested that they should not be obstructed by the Portuguese fleet. The Viceroy complied and informed Sambhaiji accordingly in a letter dated 28 July 1682. Sambhaiji also took into consideration the complaints of the Portuguese and arrested Jivaji Vinayak and reappointed Moro Dadaji in his place. Although Sambhaiji was thus endeavouring to maintain friendly relations with the Portuguese, the treaty with them to negotiate which Yesaji Gambhirrao was kept as envoy with the Portuguese remained unconcluded. The Viceroy reminded Sambhaiji every now and then but the treaty was not made, whatever may be reasons therefore.

In 1682 (August) the Portuguese Viceroy learnt that the Moghul was marching against Sambhaiji after much preparation. The Viceroy instructed his officers at Cheul, Bassein and Daman that the Moghul army should be allowed to pass through Portuguese territory without any obstruction. In a letter to the King of Portugal dated 24 January, 1683, the Viceroy had said that the Moghul army had passed through Portuguese territory with permission. He also mentioned therein that, till then, Moghul behaviour had been good enough but nothing could be said about the future, because the Moghuls were untrustworthy.

On 20 January, 1683, Sheikh Mahomed, Aurangazeb’s envoy, came to Goa. He brought a letter from the Moghul Emperor to the Viceroy which was dated 20 June, 1682. This means that the Viceroy received it six months after it was written. Sheikh Mahomed told the Viceroy that the Emperor wished to declare war on Sambhaiji.
and he hoped the Portuguese would do likewise. He also made the request that the Moghuls should be allowed to purchase grain in Portuguese territory and that Moghul ships going from Surat to Bombay should not be molested by the Portuguese.

While the Viceroy agreed to comply with all the two latter requests of the Moghul Emperor, he expressed his inability to declare war on the Mahrattas because he was on terms of friendship with Sambhaji.

On 17 February, 1683, the Viceroy informed Ramchandra Pandit by a letter of the request made by the Moghul Emperor and suggested that Sambhaji should immediately conclude the much delayed treaty of permanent friendship. Yesaji Gambhirrao was the Mahratta envoy to the Portuguese and the Viceroy presumably informed him about his talks with Sheikh Mahomed, the Moghul envoy.  

The Portuguese allowed the Moghul army to pass through their territory in northern Konkan. In addition, when they learnt that the Mahrattas were building a fort at Parsik to impede the movements of Moghul ships to Kalyan and Bhivandi, the Portuguese took possession of the site and built a fort of their own there. This is an index of the Portuguese attitude to the Moghul.  

Sheikh Mahomed, the Moghul envoy, left Goa in April 1683. With him, the Viceroy sent his letter to the Moghul Emperor dated 12 April 1683. This long letter was in Portuguese. It throws light on the Viceroy's dual and equivocal political activities. He informed Aurangzeb that he had instructed his officers to allow the Moghul army to pass through Portuguese territory even before he received the Emperor's letter and in spite of Sambhaji's entreaties to the contrary. He further requested the Emperor that, in exchange of this assistance, the Moghul Emperor should make a present to the Portuguese of all territory from the Konkan that he would take by conquest. The Viceroy had some more expectations also. The Viceroy felt certain that in the Moghul-Mahratta combat, the Mahrattas would be certainly defeated and he planned to exploit this opportunity for getting South Konkan from the Moghuls. To join the whole of Southern Konkan to Goa was the long-cherished dream of the Portuguese and Vice-Rei Conde de Alvorá's policy in the matter was not different.

As the Portuguese allowed the Moghul army to pass through their territory in December 1682, the Mahrattas plundered and burnt many
villages from the north Konkan possessions of the Portuguese. They carried off many a ship and boat belonging to them and made two Portuguese Padres captive. In retaliation, the Portuguese seized some ships of Vengurla merchants that were fully loaded with rice from Karnatak and conveyed them to Goa. The Mahratta envoy at the Portuguese Court was placed under arrest and the Portuguese bombarded Cheul then in Mahratta possession. All these events took place in April and May 1683.

When it was suggested to the Viceroy on 4 May, 1683 that he should congratulate Sambhaji on his victory over the Moghuls at Kalyan, Conde de Alvora said: "Our relations with Sambhaji are now of a different character and there is no longer cause for such congratulation."¹⁸ From this utterance of the Viceroy, it is clear to what extent Mahratta-Portuguese relations had deteriorated. When the Moghul Prince Akbar asked the Viceroy through his envoy why, all of a sudden, the Mahratta envoy Yesaji Gambhirrao was arrested, Conde de Alvora replied that Sambhaji had gone to war against them without any previous warning, had arrested two Portuguese padres who were travelling in good faith through Mahratta territory, and that he also had information that a caravan carrying grain to the Portuguese would be waylaid. For this reason, the Mahratta envoy had been placed under the vigil of sentinels.¹⁹ However, a few days later, the Mahratta envoy was released and allowed to leave Goa.

Vice-Rei Conde de Alvora entertained the ambition of making Sambhaji captive. A fair takes place every year on Gokulashtami day at Narve in the month of Shravana. Thousands of people go there on that day for a holy dip in the Panchaganga river nearby. The island of Diwadi is situated on the southern bank of this river and on the northern bank is Narve in Bhatagram. Diwadi was then in Portuguese territory and Narve in Mahratta territory. The holy place, Narve, is beyond Diwadi.²⁰

On 12 August, 1683, the Viceroy learnt that Sambhaji was going to Narve for a holy dip in the river. An original letter of the Viceroy shows that the Portuguese planned to capture Sambhaji by a sudden attack.²¹ There is no trace among the Portuguese documents as to what transpired later.
On 22-23 July, 1683, the Mahrattas launched an assault on the Revdanda fort, but the Portuguese repulsed it. Don Manoel Lobo de Silveira was the general of Bassein at this time and had only one battalion of infantry. He therefore requested Siddi Yakutkhan of Janjira to help him. The Siddi immediately supplied 400 men. So, de Silveria's battalion and Siddi's 400 soldiers were taken by sea to Revdanda.  

The Mahrattas maintained the siege of Revdanda. On 16 December, 1683, the Viceroy wrote to the King of Portugal: "The Mahrattas have laid siege to Cheul also and this has lasted for about six months."  

An account of the conflict between Sambhaji and the Portuguese from 2 January, 1683 to 25 January, 1684 is available in the Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa, and its English version in the India Office, London. This account has been extensively used by Sir Jadunath Sarkar. This account states that on 10 August, 1683, Sambhaji's 2,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry laid siege to Cheul. On 18 August, they attempted to storm the fortress but the Portuguese repulsed the attack.  

The date, 10 August, mentioned above is according to the new style. Sir Jadunath's conclusion, therefore, is that the Mahrattas besieged Cheul on 31 July. But this date is not correct as is proved on the strength of the Surat English factor's letter of 31 July (old style). This letter states that "Raje Sambhaji has besieged Cheul with a big army and he is about to take it." So, this siege must have been laid a few days earlier. The letter of Vice-Rei Conde de Alvora of 16 December, 1683 mentioned earlier also supports this.  

The Portuguese records give 22-23 July, 1683 as the date of the siege and this cannot be incorrect. 22 July is a date according to the new style and it becomes 12 July according to old style. Although it is mentioned that 22 July 1683 is the date of the Mahratta attack on Cheul-Revdanda, yet it is the date of only the first attack. If it is agreed that Sambhaji's army besieged Cheul in June, the siege becomes one of six months' duration by December 1683. Even the Jedhe Shaka vali says that on 10 June (old style) Revdanda was besieged. Naturally, according to new style, the siege was laid on
20 June and on 22-23 July an assault on the fort was launched with a view to capturing it. Such a conclusion is logical and legitimate.28

The manuscript in Biblioteca Nacional da Lisboa mentioned earlier was prepared in Goa and its author must have been some Franciscan padre. Even then, it would be hazardous to say that all that he has recorded is correct. The Viceroy planned to attack Ponda in order to compel the Mahrattas to lift the siege of Cheul. Accordingly, the Viceroy camped with his army29 at Agaçaim on 27 October. One thousand two hundred and six Portuguese soldiers and 2,500 native Christian soldiers from Salçette accompanied him.30 That the Viceroy had taken six cannons with him is the information found in Relação Verdação, but in another contemporary report it is stated that there were 3,200 soldiers, 25 horsemen and four cannons.31 On 28 October, the Viceroy landed with this army at Durbate, an important port in Sambhaji’s Ponda Mahal. Dulha Nayak,32 the Desai of Ponda had secretly gone over to the Portuguese. He joined the Viceroy at Durbate with 70 soldiers. The Viceroy’s army reached Ponda on 7 November. On their way, they had a skirmish with 300 Mahratta soldiers.33 The Mahrattas put up a stout resistance but the bombardment broke open the inner defences of the fort. It was raining heavily at the time. The Viceroy did not expect the strong resistance that was put up by the Mahrattas.

As the Portuguese army was preparing to lead the last assault on the fort on 29 November, Sambhaji came to Ponda post haste from Rajapur and, within sight of the Portuguese, he sent 600 of his horsemen to the fort, protected by 800 others. Under such circumstances, the Viceroy thought that the Mahrattas would attack him from the rear and obstruct his line of retreat and so he lifted the siege and decided to return to Goa. The morale of the Portuguese army was affected and many, of them began to run away to Durbate port.34 In the Ponda battle, Yesaji Kank showed the greatest prowess. A vatan document of 1685 mentions this as also Sambhaji’s attack on the retreating Portuguese.35

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On 10 November 1683, the Viceroy lifted the siege and retreated with his army to Durbate. The Mahrattas completely routed the Portuguese by attacking them from a hill near the creak. Yesaji Kank suffered a number of injuries and died as a result in this battle. Many Portuguese and Goan Christians (Canaris) fought bravely and died here. In the report referred to earlier it is said that the Mahratta army consisted of 800 cavalry and 2,000 foot. The Viceroy was seriously wounded and twice narrowly escaped death. In this battle, most of the Portuguese soldiers were killed and the dead and wounded among the Goan Christians were more than 200.

On 12 November, at about 8 a.m. the Portuguese army returned to Goa. Vice-Rei Conde de Alvorca was much distressed and remained for four days in the Jesuit monastery in Old Goa by the side of the church of Bom Jesus. He did not see anybody during this period. In a letter to his king dated 16 December, 1683, he says: “I went to Ponda from Durbate and for nine days fought a great battle. The rains greatly obstructed our movements and Sambhaji got time to come to the help of the Ponda garrison. He gained control of the battlefield on the strength of his cavalry. We unanimously decided to retreat as there was no prospect of help. I retreated slowly while fighting went on. That required two days for covering two miles. I brought with me all the equipment and cannons.”

A contemporary Portuguese report says that Vice-Rei Conde de Alvorca retreated very skillfully. There is a manuscript, “Breve resumo dos Successos do Estado Portuguez na India nos anos de 1682 e 1683”, in the Biblioteca Nacional da Lisboa, which states the following as the reasons for Conde de Alvorca’s attack on Ponda: (1) to compel the Mahrattas to lift the siege of Cheul; (2) to gain the whole of Southern Konkan from Banda to Mirjan in order to facilitate the protection of Portuguese Goa i.e. the island of Goa, and Salsette and Bardez; (3) to bring the people of the Konkan under Portuguese rule which, the MS. states is what they desire as they were believed to be unhappy under what the MS. describes as Sambhaji’s oppressive rule; (4) to gain control of the considerable revenues of the Konkan; and (5) to take possession of the Konkan before the Moghul Emperor did.
Giving these as the reasons, the writer of the said manuscript says that what the Viceroy did was quite right but fortune did not favour him and, when he needed help from Portugal most, it did not arrive. In this way, a good opportunity for the King of Portugal to annex a new kingdom was lost. The writer of this report knew the policy of the Viceroy very well. Contemporary official correspondence confirms his view of the reasons for the conflict. The correspondence between Dr. Luis Gonsalves de Couto and Vice-Rei Conde de Alvora in Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisboa also throws good light on this affair.

Manucci says that the Viceroy attacked Ponda because he learnt that Sambhaji had stored much wealth in Ponda fort. This Italian traveller also writes that the spies of Sambhaji had spread this canard in order to mislead Conde de Alvora. But no Portuguese document supports this statement of Manucci. On the contrary the reasons of Conde de Alvora’s attack on Ponda are quite explicitly stated in the report referred to above.

Most of the Konkan Desais maintained friendly relations with the Portuguese during the Sambhaji-Portuguese conflicts in the Konkan. It has already been related that Dulba Desai of Ponda joined the Portuguese at Durbate in the midst of the battle. Keshav Desai of Pernem had been a protege of the Portuguese in Bardez from October 1680. The Desai of Bicholim had been living in Old Goa since the middle of 1683. Before that he lived in Panvel with his family. The Ranas of Sanquelim lived in Kumbharjua from 1682 onwards, Satroji Rane the vatandar of Revode, Nanode and Pirna was captured by the Mahrattas while he was fighting Sambhaji on behalf of the Portuguese.

There is mention in the letter of Dr. Luis Gonçalves de Couto dated 23 September, 1683 that Keshav Prabhu had informed the Viceroy that all the Desais, from Kudal to Ankola, would join the Portuguese in a war against Sambhaji because they were smarting under his oppression. Keshav Prabhu laid down only one condition, viz. that after Portuguese rule was established in Konkan, they should not demolish Hindu temples. Keshav Prabhu had not only supplied information about all Desais in the Konkan but also about all forts in the Konkan in Sambhaji’s possession, from Rajapur to Ankola.
The letter containing all this information is available in the Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisbon.

Like Keshav Prabhu, the Desais of Bicholim and Sanquelim were ready to ally with the Portuguese in a war against Sambhaji as is mentioned in another letter of Dr. Luís Gonçalves Couto. The date of this letter is 19 September, 1683. The Khem Savant of Kudal was also favourable to the Portuguese. That the Portuguese had induced him to join them against Sambhaji is clear from the letter of Dr. Couto dated 29 September, 1683. The Portuguese Vice-Rei's ambition was to conquer all Southern Konkan by enlisting the help of all these and other Desais from the Konkan. Before the Viceroy marched on Ponda, these Desai negotiations had been completed and the writer of Breve Resumo dos sucessos was well informed about them. This writer also said that the 700 horsemen who attacked the Portuguese were in the employ of Prince Akbar and that this Prince later said that he did not participate in the battle and that his maternal uncle had taken this cavalry unit to Ponda.

Prince Akbar was then probably living at Bicholim. The namajga that he built there still stands. Ishwardas says that the residences of Sambhaji and Akbar were in Bicholim. The Italian traveller Manucci was in Goa even before Sheikh Mahomed, Aurangzeb's envoy, reached there. As he knew Persian and the customs and manners of the Moghul Court he was of great service to the Portuguese. The Viceroy had praised him for his services. Even so Manucci was not aware of all that was going on between the Moghuls and the Mahrattas. Consequently, not all that he has said in his Storia do Mogor about the battles of Ponda can be regarded as correct.

The Viceroy himself has explained why the Portuguese met with failure in this battle. The heavy rains interfered with the movements of the army and Sambhaji gained time which worked in his favour. But contemporary documents show that there was a breach in the defence works of the fort as a result of bombardment by the Portuguese. This is confirmed by Kavi Kalash, Sambhaji's Minister, in a gift deed made in favour of the Mujavars of Pir Abdulla Khan in the fort. The deed says: "The Portuguese besieged the fort and greatly damaged it." In a letter written to Siddi Yakut Khan, dated 13 November, 1683, Vice-Rei Conde de Alvora informed him that
Sambhaji was aware that the fort would not be able to stand the Portuguese bombardment and he was therefore demolishing it.\textsuperscript{53}

The Karwar English wrote to their Surat Council on 6 December 1683, that Sambhaji had pulled down the Ponda fort and had built another nearby,\textsuperscript{54} named Mardangad. The Italian traveller, Gemelli Careri, who visited Goa in 1695, wrote: "Twelve years ago, Conde de Alvora attacked Ponda Fort and soon effected a great breach in its walls. [y fit en pen de temps une grande breche.]. So Sambhaji demolished the Ponda fort and used its stones and other material for building another called Mardangad."\textsuperscript{55}

Pierre Joseph D’Orleans, a French Jesuit padre, writes in his book, *Histoire de Sevaji et du son Successeur, nouveaux Conquerans dans les Indes*, published in Paris in 1688, that when Sambhaji reached Ponda, the fort was in a dilapidated condition owing to Portuguese bombardment (deja demiruinee). He had obtained his information from Goa.

Sambhaji did not lift the siege of Cheul-Revedanda on account of the Portuguese attack on Ponda. On the contrary, it continued under the command of the Peshwa. In addition, the Mahrattas conquered some Portuguese territory from Bassein and Daman to the north of Goa.\textsuperscript{56} The Viceroy’s expectation that Sambhaji would quit Ponda and proceed to Panhala without taking any action against the Portuguese was totally belied.\textsuperscript{57}

On 24 November, 1683,\textsuperscript{58} at eight o’clock at night, when the tide was low, some of Sambhaji’s men went to the island of Ju vem and captured the fort there. The Portuguese had named this island as San Estevam. This island is beyond Dhavaji, a village in Tiswadi, and at ebb-tide, it is not difficult to ford the creek and reach Goa. The Portuguese called this fort the Passo Seco. To protect it, the Portuguese had built a fort on the island and, on the Dhavaji side, a watch tower manned by armed sentinels. On one side of the island were Bhatagram and Ponda, Sambhaji’s possessions, and on the other, beyond the Mandovi river, was the fortification of Cidade de Goa.\textsuperscript{59} The tide was then rising. The padres armed themselves and ran to the fortification of the city and the Viceroy camped near Dhavaji from where the enemy was expected. He stayed there overnight.\textsuperscript{60} The
next day, on 25 November, at 6 a.m., the Viceroy, accompanied by by 400 soldiers, marched in the direction of Juvern island where Sambhaji's troops were awaiting him. A battle followed. Taking fright at the Mahratta horse, many Portuguese soldiers abandoned the Viceroy, came down the hill and ran to the bank of the river to save themselves. The Viceroy had a very narrow escape, but he was wounded. The tide in the river rose at this hour.

After the Mahrattas captured San Estevam, the Portuguese broke the bunds of the rice fields on the outskirts of Goa town. This inundated the fields with river water, thus in effect, increasing the width of the river. Many Portuguese were drowned in this flood water while trying to swim away to safety. It is believed that Sambhaji intended to attack Goa on this occasion but was prevented from doing so by the rising tide. In a record entitled, “Brief Story of Khando Ballal” it is said, “Goa was almost captured on that day, but the sea came to its rescue.” Very probably the reference is to this occasion. When the tide was rising Sambhaji’s own horse was being swept away, but Khando Ballal saved him without caring in the least for his own life.

Till 12 noon on 16 November, 1683, the Mahratta army remained on the island. Then, all of a sudden, the army hastily withdrew, leaving their guns and other equipment behind. Why they did this is enigmatic. The Portuguese had kept their fleet in readiness at Aguada, Reis Magos, Cabo and Mormugao under the protection of the respective forts. Portuguese ships were guarding Goa island round the clock and San Estevam was likely to be besieged by Portuguese fleet. The Viceroy had said as much.

In 1570, when Adilshah had attacked Goa with a large army, he had captured this island. The Portuguese fleet had at that time surrounded the island and destroyed the occupying force. Since then, the Portuguese called it the “island of the dead,” ilha dos mortos. The Mahrattas probably feared that they would be similarly surrounded by the Portuguese fleet whose movements they were watching and therefore hastily withdrew. No Marathi document speaks of the capture of this island by Sambhaji. Jedhe Shakavali speaks of “Kumbharjuve having been taken from the Portuguese in the month of Margashirsha”. But no Portuguese document mentions this event.
Had Sambhaji taken Kumbharjuve, it would certainly have been mentioned in *Relação Verdadeira, Breve Resumo dos Sessões, Oriente Conquistado*, Letters of Vice-Rei Conde de Alvora, or Manucci's account. Padre Francisco de Souza was a veritable Portuguese bard, but he has not said a word about the Victory of Kumbharjuve in his *Oriente Conquistado*. So it appears that the reference by Jedhe Shakkavali to Kumbharjuve is really a reference to Juvem or San Estevam. Since they are so near each other, such a mistake is very likely. In contemporary English sources, there is no mention of Sambhaji having taken Kumbharjuve except in the Karwar English factor's letter dated 6 December, 1683. This letter said that a small island near Kumbharjuve was captured by the Mahrattas but they gave it up because three-fourths of the island was surrounded by the Portugheusee fleet. This description applies to Juvem or St. Estevam.

Both Sambhaji and the Portuguese Viceroy had information that Shah Alam was coming to the aid of the Portuguese with a big army from Aurangabad. Sambhaji decided to make use of his army against the Portuguese before the Moghul army reached South Konkan. The Viceroy has said that Sambhaji attacked the Portuguese because he did not want to keep his army unemployed. On 11 December, 1683, Sambhaji's army attacked Bardez and Salcette. The writer of the report, *Breve Resumo Sessões*, recorded that, according to the information of the Portuguese Government, about 6,000 cavalry and eight to ten thousand infantry must have entered Bardez and Salcette. It is stated in *Relação Verdadeira* that Sambhaji's army that invaded Salcette consisted of one thousand horsemen and three thousand foot soldiers. Padre Francisco de Souza, a contemporary Portuguese chronicler, says that Sambhaji invaded Goa with 20,000 soldiers, four to five thousand cavalry and ten elephants. According to this account, on entering Bardez and Salcette, the Mahrattas resorted to plunder and arson, demolishing a number of Christian churches and the images therein, raping a number of Christian women, carrying off a number of men, women and children and presenting many of them to their soldiers. Some were sold in Vengurla harbour to some Arabs or to Dutch factors. The Portuguese protested to Sambhaji about this.

In his proclamation dated 13 December, 1683, the Viceroy said that the enemy has openly declared that no trace of the Portuguese
and Christians would be allowed to remain in Goa. The Portuguese successfully defended only Aguada, Reis-Magos and Raitur and Murgao forts against the onslaught of the Mahrattas. All their other forts were captured by the Mahrattas. Sambhaji removed 46 cannons from the forts in Bardez. Bishop Don Gaspar de Liao wrote in 1573 that native Christians fought the enemy like tigers with their Portuguese comrades but the Portuguese had a different experience at the time of this invasion by Sambhaji. Goan Christian soldiers were posted at Thivim fort. As soon as they got scent of the enemy, they abandoned their arms and fled. Some of them, according to the Portuguese, took up employment with the Hindu prince of Karnata. In a letter to the King of Portugal on 25 January, 1684, the Viceroy gave an account of Sambhaji’s invasion of Goa and said that the enemy was in Bardez and Salcette for 26 days. He had besieged the fort of Raitur for six days.

It is no wonder that François Martin, the French factor at Surat, had an adequate idea of how difficult the position of the Portuguese had become in their conflict with Sambhaji because there was correspondence between him and Conde de Alvora. He wrote that the situation in Goa was very difficult; the Viceroy did his best to resist the Mahrattas and prevent them from entering the island on which the city was situated. They were waiting, he wrote, for the Moghul help to arrive and entirely depended on it. "Ils (the Portuguese) etaient tres mal a Goa Le Vice-roi se soutenait autant que ses forces puvaient le lui permettre, empechant les ennemis d’entrer dans l’ile au la ville de Goa est situee. Tout le recours elait dans le secours du Mogol que les Portugais attendaient." On one occasion, the Mahrattas poisoned the water supply to Goa town at the source, Baigini spring. But the Naikwadi of Ponda, Ramaji Naik, quickly informed the Portuguese about this and averted a disaster, and the great danger. Curiously enough, Adilshah had also poisoned the water supply in 1570 when he had besieged Goa.

After having captured Salcette and Bardez, the Mahrattas were exerting to take the island of Goa also. The Viceroy feared that if things went on as they were going, Sambhaji would soon conquer the island of Goa. He went to the body of St. Francis Xavier, lying in the Bom Jesus Church in Old Goa, and placed his sceptre in the
dead saint's hand and prayed for his grace to avert the Mahratta menace. There was only one hope left for the Viceroy and that was the succour of the Moghul Emperor.

There is in the Goa Archives a letter from the Siddi of Janjira to the Viceroy of Goa dated 12 September, 1735 in which it is said that his predecessor had informed the Moghul that Goa was about to pass into the hands of Sambhaji and that, as a result, there was immediate Moghul help in the form of troops and the Mahrattas had to give up the siege of Goa.¹⁰

...When Sambhaji learnt that Shah Alam was approaching, he withdrew to Raigad on 2 January, 1684. Faced with the danger of the Moghul army, Sambhaji planned to make peace with the Portuguese through the mediation of Prince Akbar and appointed Kavi Kalash to carry on negotiations. Padre Francis de Souza has written on 3 January, 1684 that, “the Mahrattas sent four representatives to Dhavaji and prayed for peace. Three days later, the Portuguese envoy, Manuel Saraeve de Albuquerque, crossed the Mandovi to negotiate. The fighting then ceased. The Mahrattas lifted the siege of Raitur and left Bardez. The approach of the Moghul army caused a commotion in the Mahratta ranks. The Commander of Aguada drove the remnants of the enemy from Betim and Caisou and in this way the enemy occupied territory of Goa was liberated.” The information in Oriente Conquistado is supported in at least some respects by contemporary Government document.

A letter written by Dr. Luis Gonçalves de Couto to the Viceroy on 31 December, 1683 is in the Biblioteca da Ajudia.¹¹ In that letter he said; “I have written to Manuel Saraeve that he should be prepared to leave next Sunday. He wished to take Nicolav Manucci with him but he said he was not keeping well and so was unable to accompany Manuel. As a matter of fact, he did not wish to go as interpreter because previously he had acted as envoy. So if a Government interpreter can take his place (Lingua de Estado), I am completing the draft of the treaty and shall come to see you with it in the afternoon.” The Viceroy made the following remark on this letter: “You should order the feitore to purchase the presentation articles. It would have been better had Manucci gone with Manuel. But it will do if a Government interpreter (Lingua do Estado) also goes. But if
someone else is available he should not be sent, because I don’t find him straight.”

It is probable that the Viceroy did not find the Government interpreter trustworthy because he was a Hindu. The list of the presentation articles that the Portuguese envoy was to take with him is available. It reads as follows: “Three gold ornaments for the Shahzada (Akbar) if he is present to participate in the talks. Three gold ornaments for Sambhaji Raje. Two articles for Durgadas, one of them of gold and the other a tea set. Two for Sambhaji’s Secretary, which must be there. If necessary ten pieces of China for others (peças de China).”

There is no date on this list. But it has been registered immediately after 27 December 1683. If Manuel Saraeve left Goa on the first Sunday after 31 December, 1683, he must have left Goa on 2 January 1684. In that case, the date as given in Oriente Conquistado is wrong and the one given in Relação Verdadeira is right.

Manucci ultimately accompanied the Portuguese envoy in deference to the wishes of the Viceroy. Mention is made in Dr. Couto’s letter dated 31 December 1683 mentioned earlier that Manucci had once acted as Viceroy’s envoy at Sambhaji’s Court. Manucci himself has also written about it. From this it seems that the date of the arrival of Sambhaji’s representatives for negotiating a treaty between him and the Portuguese was 28 November, 1683 as given in Relação Verdadeira. Although Oriente Conquistado says that the Portuguese envoy, Manuel Saraeve de Albuquerque, crossed the river for negotiating the treaty, the Goa records mention in several places that he went to Ponda for this purpose.

Jedhe Shakavali recounts that Kavi Kalash, accompanied by Prince Akbar, went to the forest of Bhimgad and made peace with the Portuguese on Magh Shuddai. From this it is clear that on 17 January, 1684, the treaty between the Portuguese and the Mahrattas was concluded. But Breve Resuma dos sucessos says that Manuel Saraeve de Albuquerque reached Rasai on 13 January, 1684 and from there informed the Viceroy that the clauses of the treaty had been agreed to but it had not yet been signed because Moghul forces have already come down the ghat and camped in the Konkan. Receipt of
this letter is mentioned in the letter of Conde de Alvora dated 14 January 1684.

Shah Alam came down Ramghat on 7 January, 1684 and camped in the Konkan as is obvious from Jedhe Shakavali. It is also mentioned in Relação Verdadeira that he reached Bicholim on 15 January, 1684. It has been mentioned in the letter of the Viceroy of the same date that the Moghul army was only six miles away from Bicholim on 13 January. On 12 January, 1684, Syed Asadulla wrote to the Viceroy requesting him to send Dulba Naik, Sardesai of Ponda, to the Moghul camp. Bicholim is about four miles off Bhimgad and it therefore does not seem probable that Prince Akbar and Kavi Kalash stayed near that fort till 17 January. Besides, Shah Alam’s correspondence with the Viceroy had been going on from 12 January, so they might have thought it risky to camp near Bhimgad.

In the Viceroy’s letter dated 25 January, 1684 it is said that the treaty negotiations were in full swing but not concluded till then. So the Jedhe Shakavali record is not corroborated by Portuguese sources. But Prince Akbar is recorded as having gone to Bhimgad in Breve resuma dos successos. Later it is also recorded that the Moghuls besieged Bhimgad. Portuguese Government documents clearly show that some time after 25 January and before 4 February, the treaty between Sambhaji and the Portuguese was finalised.

There is no Portuguese record to show that the treaty negotiations even took place in Bhimgad forest. On the contrary, it is mentioned everywhere that the treaty was concluded at Ponda. Ponda is far away from Bicholim and it is not surprising that Akbar and Kavi Kalash considered Ponda more safe than Bhimgad. Shah Alam’s troops did not march towards Ponda till the very end. Even if negotiations for the treaty started in the forest of Bhimgad, they might have been postponed because of the Moghul attack. It seems that they had then not marched as far as Ponda and so the final negotiations must have been conducted in Mardangad fort. Many days before the treaty was concluded fighting had stopped and exchange of prisoners had also taken place.

The originals of all treaties and pacts were in the Goa Archives. Most of them are now in Lisbon. Portuguese versions of almost all the treaties made by the Portuguese with Indian rulers are obtainable
in the Biblioteca Nacional da Lisboa. But, unfortunately, a copy of the treaty concluded with Sambhaji in 1684 is not available there. There is no information about this treaty even in Biker’s Tratados, but there is no doubt that this treaty was concluded and that it bore the seals of Akbar and Sambhaji. The Viceroy’s letter to Joao de Sequeira de Faria, General of Bassein, dated 4 February, 1684 speaks of a copy of this treaty being despatched as an enclosure with it.

The substance of the treaty can be gathered from this letter of 4 February, as follows:

1. Sambhaji should return all the territory and forts captured by him, with guns and arms.
2. There should be a mutual exchange of ships and goods seized since the fighting began.
3. There should be a mutual exchange of prisoners.
4. Gavkhandi and Chauthai as was paid to the Chauthiya Raja by the Portuguese in Bassein territory should hereafter be paid to Sambhaji and he in turn should protect that territory.
5. There should be free trade and travel between the Mahratta and Portuguese territories.
6. The Portuguese should not afford Moghul ships laden with grain intended for Moghul troops the protection of Portuguese artillery on their forts. This clause would naturally not apply where there was no Portuguese artillery.

Some more items were presumably included in the treaty. One clause provided that the Desais who had rebelled against Sambhaji and had sought Portuguese asylum should be granted amnesty. One more clause prohibited Sambhaji from constructing any forts on Portuguese borders. The Viceroy knew well that Sambhaji agreed to this treaty only under the pressure of the circumstances created by Moghul aggression. As a matter of fact, Sambhaji’s Peshwa did not at all approve the treaty negotiated by Akbar and Kavi Kalash on behalf of Sambhaji. The Peshwa secretly hated Kavi Kalash and since it was at his instance that the treaty was made, the Peshwa desired that it should not be observed as has been recorded by a Portuguese nobleman. On 12 January, 1684, the Viceroy convened a meeting of his State Council and took the decision to remove the
capital from Goa to Marmugao fortress. The reasons given by the Viceroy for this move eminently show how very miserable the condition of the Portuguese was at this time. The Viceroy had no adequate idea of the Mahratta war strategy and their military strength before he met Sambhaji on the battlefield. The envoy of Akbar had told the Viceroy that Sambhaji’s legions were full of cowardly mercenaries and he imagined that his few disciplined soldiers would be more than a match for them. In the beginning of September 1683, the Viceroy received the first hints that Sambhaji was planning to march on Goa with a big force. It was his aged and learned secretary, Dr. Couto, who sent him *Asia Portuguesa*, a historical volume by Manuel Faria de Souza, and recommended to him that he read the description therein of the two sieges that Adilkhan of Bijapur had laid around Goa. The Viceroy returned this volume with thanks with a note to the effect that even if Sambhaji marched on Goa with all his strength he would be able to protect Goa, only Salcette and Bardez being far away, they might be invaded by the Mahrattas before help could reach there. Conde de Alvora was a brave and veteran soldier. He had participated in many a battle against Spain. Before he came out to Goa, he had been Governor of Angola.

The Viceroy learnt from personal experience that to protect Goa town against the Mahrattas was an impossibility. The Portuguese had a fine navy; Goa town was well fortified and, in several places, there were towers. There was an ammunition factory in the town and at the mouth of the Mandovi there were strong forts at Marmugao, Aguada, Reis Magos and Cabo. In spite of all this, he thought it expedient and absolutely necessary to remove his capital to Mormugao.

As soon as Shah Alam came down the Ramghat, Sambhaji was compelled to lift the siege of Goa. Ramghat is only 30 miles from Goa. On 12 January, 1684, the Secretary of Shah Alam sent a letter to the Viceroy in which it was said that the Portuguese had bravely withstood Sambhaji’s assault but nevertheless, if the Viceroy had any expectations of the Moghul he should send a messanger to Shah Alam so that he would see what he could do to help them. Shah Alam’s troops reached Bicholim on 15 January, 1684, as has been mentioned earlier. His army consisted of 40,000 horsemen, 60,000 foot, 1,900 elephants and 2,000 camels, according to the *Relação Verdadeira*. 
Manucci has recorded that there were 45,000 horsemen,\textsuperscript{165} while \textit{Oriente Conquistado} says that there were 70,000 horsemen and innumerable infantry.\textsuperscript{166} Khafi Khan mentions that there were only 20,000 horsemen.\textsuperscript{167}

Three days afterwards, on 18 January, 1684, Aurangzeb’s fleet presented itself opposite Aguada fortress at the mouth of the Mandovi. There were 101 ships in it. They had brought provisions for Shah Alam’s forces. The Moghuls burnt the town of Bicholim and razed to the ground the mansions of Akbar and Sambhaji.\textsuperscript{168} There was no castle at Bicholim at that time.\textsuperscript{109} According to Ishwardas, a biographer of Aurangzeb, it was a big township and the English, the French, the Dutch and the Portuguese had built palatial houses in it.\textsuperscript{110} In this town was a beautiful Catholic church built by the Goan Bishop, Don Mateos de Castro.\textsuperscript{111} Under the Subedar of Bicholim was the territory covered by Bhatagram, Sanquelim (Satari), Perneim, Maneri and Banda except the Kudal area.\textsuperscript{112} After completely demolishing the town of Bicholim, the Moghul army encamped on the banks of the river near Narve in Bhatagram. A \textit{Vatan} deed mentions that the Moghuls demolished a temple consecrated to Rama at Pilgaon and defiled and destroyed the idols.\textsuperscript{113} It is probable that the Moghuls also damaged other temples, including that of Saptakoteshwara in the Bhatagram area. In this campaign, the Moghuls also burnt Kudal and Banda (Savantvadi) and plundered Vengurla.

Shah Alam sent an envoy and a letter to Goa and asked for permission for the ships that had arrived from Surat to pass up the Mandovi to Narve. The Viceroy granted them permission to pass through the Caesuo river instead as he probably thought there was danger to Goa town if the Moghul fleet passed through the Mandovi.\textsuperscript{114} The Viceroy had already removed the guns from the fort of Chapora on the bank of Caesuo to some other place.\textsuperscript{115}

The ships that had come from Surat landed some cargo, including foodgrains, in Caesuo port and the rest in the port of Vengurla.\textsuperscript{116} A biographer of Aurangzeb, Bhimsen Bashampuri, says that these ships supplied grains to Shah Alam’s army twice \textsuperscript{117} (\textit{Nuksha-i-Dilkusha}). The Moghul envoy, Sheikh Mahomed, once again came to Goa and saw the Viceroy. He came with this Moghul armada.\textsuperscript{118}
The Viceroy sent his envoy, João Antonio Portogal, to Shah Alam on 23 January, 1684.\(^1\) Two days earlier, Shah Alam's army had left Bicholim.\(^2\) So the Portuguese envoy had to go to Vengurla. The Viceroy had given written instructions to the envoy before he left for the Moghul camp. But this document is not available in the Goa Archives or the Biblioteca da Ajuda. However, information on the principal points is available in the Viceroy’s letter to the Moghul Emperor dated 20 March, 1684. The Viceroy informed Shah Alam that he was prepared to continue the war against Sambhaji and requested him not to leave the Konkan before the end of the monsoon. He added, however, that he was in financial difficulties since the Mahrattas had inflicted damage to the extent of ten lakhs of rupees (20 lakh asurpis), and requested that the Moghul should pay this sum to him in compensation and also send him six hundred horses. The envoy also discussed some other minor matters with Shah Alam. *Breve resumo do sucessos* mentions that the Viceroy demanded territory from Banda to Mirjan.

There is a scrap of paper in the Viceroy’s hand in the correspondence of Dr. Couto and Conde de Alfora in the Biblioteca da Ajuda in which there is a demand for Konkan and Cheul territory from the Moghul.\(^3\) But there is no mention of this in the letter dated 20 March, 1684. From Vengurla, Shah Alam went up the Ramghat and Manucci accompanied him. After the Moghul army had left the Konkan after plundering and despoiling it, Prince Akbar’s two envoys called on the Viceroy in the first week of February 1684. They were Madaji Naik and Rai Kirtisingh. Conde de Alfora sent a letter and a present to Sambhaji with Madaji Naik and requested him to make arrangements to implement the treaty concluded in January. He assured him that he was prepared to abide by the conditions of the treaty. A fortnight later, Conde de Alfora sent Ramkrishna Naik Barve to Kavi Kalash for completing the treaty arrangements.\(^4\)

On 13 March, 1684, the Viceroy held a meeting of his Council and stated, citing illustrations, that the terms of the treaty were not being observed by Sambhaji.\(^5\) At the end of March, the Portuguese sent their envoy to Raigad. He was Fr. Antonio de Sao Joseph, an Augustine padre. Some Portuguese officers and Ramkrishna Naik
Barve, as interpreter, accompanied him. The present author has published an account of this embassy in an English article in 1936. A difference arose between Sambhaji and the Portuguese envoy over two matters not mentioned in the treaty. Sambhaji held that when the former Portuguese envoy, Manuel Saracce de Albuquerque, had seen him in connection with the treaty he had agreed that the Portuguese would give up Anjediv island and that the Viceroy would send his envoy to Sambhaji with a present of one lakh "hons."

While the Portuguese envoy was at Raigad, the Viceroy received a letter from Prince Akbar and two others from Durgadas and Gangadhar. These letters made the suggestion that Anjediv should be given up and a valuable present should be sent to Sambhaji. But the Portuguese refused to act on the suggestion and said that what was not mentioned in the terms of the treaty and was not acceptable. Finally, the Portuguese envoy and Kavi Kalash decided on 6 September that representatives of Sambhaji should go to Goa with Fr. Antonio de Sao Joseph and get a final reply from the Viceroy on these two points and meanwhile maintain the truce.

Fr. Antonio de Sao Joseph and party left Raigad in October and returned to Goa via Cheul the next month. Sambhaji's envoys did not accompany them. They reached Ponda at the end of December 1684. Their names were Rangaji Lakshmishdar and Sidhoji Farjand. Rangaji knew Portuguese. Two of his letters to Fr. Antonio are in this language. The letters of Sidhoji Farjand are in Marathi. On 29 December, 1684 their letters reached the Viceroy in Goa. These two envoys were accommodated by the Portuguese Government at the foot of the Monte in Goa town. They were informed that ships to Portugal would sail on 20 January, 1685 and that they should meet the Viceroy only after that and not before. There was some more exchanges of letters and the envoys were summoned to Goa town. The Maharrattas attacked Bardez on 23 February, 1685 after these envoys had arrived in Goa. In retaliation, the Portuguese Viceroy ordered a watch to be kept on them the next day. Rangaji Lakshmishdar protested to Fr. Antonio de Sao Joseph against this in his letters dated 11 April and 13 May, 1685. In his Portuguese letter, Rangaji said, 'You have brought us here from Rairi. If I had
taken you to Rairi like that and if you had been watched as we have been watched, I would have freed you within twenty-four hours and if that had become impossible I would have stood before the Chhatrapati like a recluse with my moustaches shaved off. Neither Sambhaji nor his illustrious father had ever broken a word pledged even to seditious and rebellious persons.”

Sidhoji Farjand who accompanied Rangaji Lakshmirdhar wrote in his Marathi letter to Fr. Antonio de Sao Joseph dated 10 March 1685 that Chhatrapati Sambhaji wanted the Portuguese to know that he wanted Anjediv island and a valuable present. The Viceroy had been appraised of it in a personal interview. There was nothing more to do. The Viceroy did not agree to either demand, so what was the use of their continuing to stay longer in Goa? They had come to Goa on trust and since there was nothing to do, it was not proper that they should live in Goa in misery. The letter sent by the Portuguese envoy, Manuel Saraeva, who went to Ponda to negotiate the treaty sent a letter to Kavi Kalash on 24 April, 1684 which throws a flood of light on this affair. In his opinion, controversy arose between the Mahrattas and the Portuguese because of an error made by a translator.

Manuel Saraeva de Albuquerque wrote to Kavi Kalash that he had not said that the Portuguese would give up Anjediv. What he had said was that he felt certain that the Portuguese would leave the island because of sickness and death (due to climate and hardships) and cited the example of the Portuguese and the English having done so before. About the present, he said that during the negotiations for the treaty nobody touches this point. Only Prince Akbar had once said that the Viceroy should send a present to Sambhaji and he in turn would send an elephant or something else to the Viceroy. When Akbar said this, Manuel said that the Viceroy was so magnanimous that he would voluntarily send a present and if he did not do that the envoy would do it on his own. The fact of the matter was that Sambhaji was not very keen about this treaty. The Portuguese had sustained considerable damage as a result of the war and they had no money in reserve. The Portuguese had recovered 40,000 asurpis as a mere war impost from Goa Hindus. It is no wonder then that the Mahratta envoys got a negative final reply from the Portuguese
on these points, to clear which they came all the way to Goa from Raigad.

Several Desais opposed to Sambhaji from Sanquelim, Bicholim, Pernem and Ponda were living in Goa at that time. Khem Savant of Kudal, Desais like Ram Dalvi, Tana Savant and Rudraji Rane and Yesoba Rane of Sanquelim had risen in revolt against Sambhaji and sent their families to Goa to live under Portuguese protection. Like these Konkan Desais, the Desais of Karwar also rebelled against Sambhaji, captured Karwar fort which was in the possession of the Mahrattas, and sent their families to Anjediv island.

The Desais of Karwar then made over Karwar fort and the territory around, from Bhatkal to the Avars river, to the Jagirdar of Saunde, who sent seven hundred soliders and captured all the territory from Cabo de Rama to Ankola without any opposition. The Moghul army had by this time come down the ghat. Utilising this opportunity, the Saunde prince also took possession of Sambhaji’s fleet which was stationed near Karwar. It consisted of sixty armed ships (galvetas) ten palls (palas) and two freshly built ships in Karwar river and 300 guns fitted on all these ships. The Karwar Desais counted these guns and made them over to a representative of the Saunde prince. They also gave him possession of Karwar fort and seven other forts of theirs: (1) Kholgad (Cabo da Rama), (2) Kurmagad, alias Simpigad. (3) Shiveshwar, (4-5) Kadre and Madhurgad, and (6-7) Ankola and Mahendragad.

Sambhajirao and Vithojirao, Desais of Karwar, probably mistakenly believed that the whole of Sambhaji’s fleet was stationed at Karwar. The Mahratta navy consisted of many more ships at that time. In the letter to Siddi Yakut Khan written by the Portuguese Viceroy on 13 November, 1683, it was mentioned that in the river of Negao, there were 76 galvetas (warships) belonging to Sambhaji.

In February 1685, the Moghul took the fort of Karwar from the Saunde prince. Moghul control was established over all the territory that the Saunde prince had received from the Karwar Desais. The Saunde prince became a subordinate of the Moghul and subsequently ruled over this territory in that capacity. The Desais of the South Konkan who had rebelled against Sambhaji and allied with the
Portuguese because Sambhaji retained a considerable part of their vatan revenue, as is apparent from their correspondence. The author believes that Sambhaji was compelled to do this on account of the war situation.

A report of the negotiations that the Desais of Sanqualim, Bicholim and Pernem had carried on with the Secretary of the Viceroy, Gonsalves Couto, against Sambhaji, is available.\textsuperscript{140} They said that they were ready to pay the Portuguese what they were formerly paying to Adilshah in whose time the usage was that two thirds of the revenue went to the Sultan and one-third was kept by the Desais. For example, the revenue of Bhatagram mahal was 22,000 honas, of which the Bijapur Sultan got 15,000 honas and the Desai 7,000.\textsuperscript{111} The revenue of Satari was 10,000 honas, of which the Desai got 3,000 and the Badshah 7,000.

To the last, no friendly relations were established between Sambhaji and the Viceroy of Goa.

\textbf{Dr. Luis Gonçalves Couto informed the Viceroy about Sambhaji’s campaign in north Konkan through a letter dispatched at the beginning of May 1684.}\textsuperscript{142} He said, “The enemy has evacuated Cheul, but has greatly harmed the Bassein area. He has taken Kalyan (Galian), Saivan and Manor and recaptured Asheri Fort. He is fighting for Karanja (Uran), Mahim and Tarapur and has taken possession of Bassein town as far as Bhadrapur. Antonio Teixeira de Machado is guarding Belapur and Antonio Camelo is guarding Salchette. The enemy has captured the keeper of Asheri fort. The soliders from there had fled to Tarapur where they were placed under arrest. Padre Antonio Vaz Riscad who has come from Bassein says that many of the people of the Portuguese are under detention among whom are men, women and children. Many of them have been maimed by cutting their hands, feet, noses, ears and they are all panicky. Wherever the enemy went he took possession of churches. He demolished the fort and church of Manor.” Viceroy Conde de Alvora wrote to the King of Portugal on 24 January, 1686 to say that, since Sambhaji did not implement the treaty he made with the Portuguese, he (the Viceroy) was obliged to carry on the war. For that purpose, he had allied with many of the Konkan Desais and instigated them to rebel against Sambhaji. Secret talks with them were going on for
many months and a pact was made with them on 8 February, 1685. Accordingly, on 12 February, 1685 \(^{143}\) they rose and, attacking simultaneously in many areas, collected much plunder.\(^ {144}\)

The secret pact mentioned above was made by the Viceroy with Khem Savant. Its main clauses are as follows:

1. Two parts of all the territory conquered from Banda to Ankola to be kept by the Portuguese and one by the Savant.
2. The Portuguese would help with their fleet, to whoever captured the territory from Kudal to Cheul. For this the Portuguese would get one-third and the conqueror two-thirds of the territory.
3. The Portuguese would lend such naval vessels to the Savant capable of fighting the enemy. Besides, the Portuguese would equip the ship loaned with men, arms and ammunition and ensure that they keep pace with the Savant’s moves on land.
4. Besides naval help, the Portuguese would supply ammunition free of charge to the Khem Savant.
5. Conde de Alvora would request the Moghul to employ the Desais in his service.
6. After success was achieved, whatever Konkan territory came under Portuguese rule, would have freedom of worship as under Muslim or Maharatta rule.
7. The Portuguese would not conciliate Sambhaji. The Savant would in no way harm the English, the French or the Dutch factories in Sambhaji’s territory.
8. Once the war began the Portuguese would give financial help to the Savant as a loan.

Two copies of this pact were made. One was signed by the Viceroy and the other by Ram Salvi Bhonsale and Devu Savant Bhonsle, representatives of Khem Savant. On this occasion, Mangoji Shenvi Laud and Vithoji Shenvi Karnik were present as interpreters respectively on behalf of the Portuguese and Khem Savant.

Though this pact was made between the Goa Portuguese and Khem Savant of Kudal, the Viceroy must have treated him as the leader of
all the Konkan Desais. Of all the Konkan Desais, the Khem Savant had the largest army. According to the information of Keshav Prabhu he had in his service 2,000 soldiers in 1684. The rebel Desais inflicted severe damage on Sambhaji and the Viceroy said in his letter dated 24 January, 1686 that, except in Ponda, Sambhaji had no authority anywhere in Goa. The Portuguese regained all the territory in north Konkan that Sambhaji had taken. On 27 August and 12 September, 1685, they captured Jivadan and Kamandurg (Givdana and Camandrugo) from the Mahrattas. They reconquered Asheri fort from Sambhaji in October 1687. The Mahrattas were prepared to be bribed and hand over this fort to the Portuguese but the Viceroy informed his king that he had conquered it.

On 11 May, 1686, the Viceroy directed the Captain of Cheul that small ships (embarcaçoens) from Sambhaji’s territory should be given permits to go out to sea at a fee of not more than four annas.

Dharmaji Nagnath was Sambhaji’s Subedar at Ponda. The Moghul captured it from him with the help of Konkan Desais like Dulba Naik and others at the beginning of 1689. Sarbajkhan was appointed Subedar of Mardangad by the Moghul. The Viceroy wrote his first letter to him on 10 January 1689.

On 13 August, 1688, the Viceroy permitted the Desais who were living in Goa, like Khem Savant, Ram Dalvi and Dulba Naik, to take up service with the Moghul. Accordingly, they left their families in Goa and went to see Bahadur Khan at Belgaum who received them with honour and employed them. A reference to their having left Goa is to be found in the Viceroy’s letter dated 27 October, 1688.

There is a manuscript No. 8538 dated 24 January, 1688 which is a copy of a letter written by the Governor of Goa to the King of Portugal in which it is said that “the condition today of the hostilities between Sambhaji and ourselves is the same as it was in the time of Conde de Alvora. Here live the Desais who are enemies of Sambhaji, who encroach on his territory and plunder it. This creates unrest in his territory which is of great advantage to us. I shall entertain them here as long as I consider their residence useful here.”

In January 1689, Nawab Bahadurkhan made over to Khem Savant the order of the Moghul Emperor conferring on him the Sardeshmukhi
of Kudal. The Viceroy congratulated him on this in a letter dated 14 February, 1689. One 3 June, 1690, the Moghul General, Abdul Raza Khan, recommended that the family of Khem Savant living in Bardez should be allowed to go to Kudal and the Portuguese gave the permission.

After the death of Sambhaji, while Chhatrapati Rajaram was on his way to Jinji in Karnatak, Bahadur Khan wrote to the Portuguese that it was gathered that Rajaram was running away to Karnatak. All routes to the Karnatak should, therefore, be guarded and, if he was found, he should be arrested, or killed. The Governor of Goa wrote back to say in his letter dated 12 May, 1689 that he had made complete arrangements to arrest Rajaram if he tried to pass through Goa but added that he did not expect him to do so. The Governor further said that on learning that Bahadur Khan had ordered Khem Savant to go to Kudal, he had immediately instructed him to see Bahadur Khan. But since it was then not twelve days since his mother died, he had asked his nephews, Bapu Desai and Mamba Savant, to go ahead with some troops, intending to see Bahadur Khan later.

Khem Savant was then living in Bardez. From there he went to Kudal with the Moghul army in June 1689 and conquered the Banda fort. Thus sway of the Moghul over Kudal was established. Sanquelim, Bicholim and Maneri had already come under his sway earlier. It is apparent from a letter of Yesaji Rane of Sanquelim dated 11 April, 1689 that he was guarding Sanquelim and Bicholim forts on behalf of the Moghuls.

There was quite a new spirit abroad among the people of Maharashtra after the execution of Sambhaji by Aurangzeb and it pervaded even the Desais near Goa. Many of them from Maneri, Sanquelim (Satari), Bicholim (Bhatagram), Ponda (Antruj) and Chandravadi were fired by the belief that the realm of the Chhatrapati was the resting place of the gods and Brahmans and they therefore enlisted in the army of Rajaram against the Moghul. But Khem Savant Bhansale and some others remained loyal to the Moghul.

The acting Governor of Goa informed the King of Portugal by a letter dated 10 January, 1691 that a number of Desais had abandoned the Moghul and joined Rajaram because they professed
the same religion. Besides, the Muslims were notorious for assaulting their women and demolishing their temples. On this occasion, Portuguese policy in regard to the Moghuls and the Mahrattas was equivocal. They played the parties against each other and deceived both. The fact of the matter was that the Portuguese were certain that Mahratta rule would be re-established in the Konkan and they therefore considered it more beneficial that Hindu rulers should be their neighbours than Muslim ones.\textsuperscript{162}

On the excuse that the Portuguese officials had helped the Mahrattas, the Moghul general, Matbarkhan, attacked Bassein territory from Bhimdi in 1692 and resorted to plunder and devastation. But the Governor of Goa sent an envoy to the Moghul court and secured an order from Aurangzeb that Matbarkhan should end hostilities and pay two lakh rupees as damages to the Portuguese.\textsuperscript{163}

While Rajaram was at Jinji, several Konkan Desais had joined Ramchandrapant Amatya and Santaji Ghorpade in their struggle against the Moghul. From the days of Sambhaji, the Mahrattas had taken an extremely hostile attitude towards the Portuguese and Raoji Shamraj’s battalion entered Bardez a few days before 15 November, 1694 and recovered Rs. 3 per head by force. The Viceroy complained about this and sent an envoy, Ramkrishna Naik Barve, to Raoji Shamraj.\textsuperscript{164} Earlier in 1694, a Portuguese nobleman, Antonio de Menezes, went to Achre port with three ships and resorted to arson. He demolished a Hindu temple there and burnt seven boats that were lying at anchor in the port.\textsuperscript{165} The effect of the Moghul-Mahratta conflict was noticed even at Mailapur, a town near Madras.\textsuperscript{166}

Under the Moghul, the influence of Khem Savant Bhonsale, from among the Konkan Desais, gradually increased. In the middle of 1695, he had eight armed ships (galvetas)\textsuperscript{167} and a number of cargo ships in his possession and he began to function as a pirate. In 1695, Jemilli Careri, the Italian traveller came to India. From his account it seems that Ponda, otherwise called Antruj Mahal, was under Moghul control and Jambauli Panchmahal was administered by the Prince of Saunde.\textsuperscript{168} Being a tributary of the Moghul, he used to pay him a fixed tribute every year and help in war.\textsuperscript{169} In 1701, Anjya Shenvi was appointed havaldar at Chandravadi.\textsuperscript{170} What is curious is that on
14 July, 1696, the Saunde prince acquired the sanad of Ankola, and five other mahals and four fortresses and four castles. Savai Sadashiv Naik of Saunde got the sanad deed on 20 May, 1702 wherein friendship and help were assured to him. Another sanad of 16 July, 1705 given to Savai Basavling Raje Sounde acknowledges that he had secured territory from the Moghul covering Supe, Chandravadi, Khejarbali, Hemadbarse, Ashtaghar and Kakoda for a tribute of Rs. 10,000 a year. Though Chhatrapati Rajaram awarded the Panchmahal as an inam to Saunde and his successors, this was only on paper because, at that time and for many years afterwards, Mahratta rule was non-existent in that area. The Prince of Saunde had all this on paper only to avoid being molested by the Mahrattas.

At the beginning of August, 1696, Khem Savant conquered the fort of Kudal. Rajaram’s army had also captured this fort in between. After this, Khem Savant besieged the fort of Vegurla then in Moghul possession. He called himself a sardar of the Moghul but did not recognise the authority of the Moghul Subedar of Ponda. In 1698, Khem Savant took Sanquelim and Bicholim forts and besieged the fort of Ponda. He would have captured it also but for the timely help given by the Portuguese to the Moghul Subedar of Ponda.

In the same year, Khem Savant conquered the mahal of Pernem. The Moghul had, in 1691, given this mahal as a jhagir to Nawab Bahadur Khan. The Portuguese Viceroy believed that this gift was a reward for the help the Nawab had given to the Moghul.

In February 1701, Khem Savant took Pargad and thus got possession of Maneri Mahal. Hari Gavas was then the Desai of Maneri. In this way Khem Savant became Sardesai of the five mahals of Kudal, Pernem, Bicholim (Bhatagram), Sanquelim (Satari) and Maneri.

In a letter dated 24 December, 1702, the Viceroy wrote to Portugal that though the Khem Savant was in the service of the Moghul, he often acted against his interests. Though, as against the Mahrattas, he had often helped the Moghul for his own benefit he had also often sided with elements hostile to the Moghul power. For the present, the Viceroy wrote, he is neutral. In 1696 the Khem Savant openly renounced Moghul suzerainty and even struck his own coinage in rupees in his own mint.
The Portuguese Captain of Cheul wrote in a letter dated 22 February, 1701:

Twenty thousand Mahrattas under the command of Ramchandra-pant attacked the territory of Siddi Yakutkhan of Janjira and plundered it. They were going to do likewise in Korlai but the Captain of Korlai bombarded them and they hastily retreated. The Mahrattas were in the Siddi’s territory for a month. After their return, the Siddi fleet besieged the Angria fort of Kolaba and carried off fifty warships (galvetas). He sent an army to encircle the fort by land also. He asked for ships to carry his army beyond the creek and I supplied them.\textsuperscript{182}

In October 1702, Rajaram’s army captured Ponda Mahal and besieged Mardangad.\textsuperscript{183} On this occasion the Prince of Saunde helped the Moghul with his army and the Portuguese with ammunition.\textsuperscript{184} The Viceroy of Goa, Caitano de Melo Castro, in his letter of 6 January, 1703 said that the Mahrattas had taken Ponda but the fort was still in Moghul hands but, for want of food supplies, they would soon have to surrender it.\textsuperscript{185} In this difficult situation, the Moghul asked for the help of Khem Savant Bhonsala \textsuperscript{186} and the Portuguese encouraged him to give it.\textsuperscript{187} Accordingly, this Kudalkar Desai marched with his army on Mardangad and captured it but did not hand it over to the Moghul.\textsuperscript{18}

At the beginning of June 1705, the Khem Savant surrendered Mardangad \textsuperscript{189} to the Moghul. In July he and the Portuguese joined in a battle and the Portuguese razed the Sardesai’s forts of Amon and Valvoi to the ground.\textsuperscript{190} In the battle for Amona, a Brazilian woman in male costume, Dona Maria Ursula de Abreu de Alencastre, fought bravely. In December, the Viceroy took Bicholim fort from Khem Savant and completely demolished it.\textsuperscript{191} He resorted to arson in Bicholim and six miles around. He said, with some flourish, that he had not left even one building in Bicholim standing.\textsuperscript{192} He held that he had to humble the Khem Savant to ensure that he would not become another Shivaji.\textsuperscript{193}

In 1706, the Moghul entered into a pact with the Prince of Saunde whereby Ponda Mahal (Antruj) was given to him and he was to pay
the Moghul an annual tribute of Rs. 80,000.\textsuperscript{194} The Portuguese Viceroy exerted his influence in this behalf because he did not want any strong ruler as Goa’s neighbour and for this reason he considered the prince of Saunde a good neighbour.\textsuperscript{195}

At this time, Mirza Nijmutiddin was the Moghul Foujdar at Ponda. After Aurangzeb’s death, for a bribe, he planned to hand over Ponda to Khem Savant. But the Portuguese helped the Saunde prince in time with troops and torpedoed his plan.\textsuperscript{196} Khem Savant had entered Ponda and taken possession of Mardangad but the Prince of Saunde, with Portuguese help, drove him out. Before returning it in May 1707, Khem Savant damaged the fort.\textsuperscript{197} In this way, Saundekar’s control over Ponda as a tributary of the Moghul was established. In contemporary Portuguese papers it is said the Moghul gave Ponda Mahal to the Prince of Saunde by khoti or permanent khoti (Arrendamento or arrendamento perpetuo) but in the firman (order) itself the word jagir must have been used.

The Prince of Saunde appointed Ramayya Nausu as sarsubedar of Ponda.\textsuperscript{198} On 16 July, 1705, as has been mentioned earlier, the prince also made a pact with the Mahrattas for the inam of the Panchmahals. In the battle with the Khem Savant, the Portuguese took possession of the Khorjuve and Panale islands and built forts on them.\textsuperscript{199}

After his release from the Moghul Court, Chhatrapati Shahu returned to Satara and, at the beginning of August 1708, he sent his envoy, Balaji Mahadeo, to Goa from Rangana. He wrote to the Portuguese Viceroy that he had received the Konkan territory as a jagir from the Moghul Emperor and so, to take possession of it, his army would descend the ghat. This, Balaji Mahadeo said, was necessary as, for some years, the Khem Savant had been in possession of this territory. Similarly, the Prince of Saunde was in possession of Ponda. Actually, Khem Savant was only a Desai of Kudal and Saundekar was prince of only Saunde. How were they concerned with other territories, the envoy argued. Shahu also demanded the return of Khorjuve and Panale.\textsuperscript{200}

The Viceroy of Goa informed his King about the strife between Shahu and Tarabai in his letter dated 10 December, 1708, saying that
both of them demand a treaty with the Portuguese. He remarked that Shahu was likely to get the upper hand because he had a large army and Tarabai’s supporters were going over to him. He would, he wrote, shape his conduct according as the circumstances demanded.201

The strife between Tarabai and Shahu ended with the recognition of the division of the Mahratta State between Kolhapur and Satara. Khem Savant declared his loyalty to Tarabai and secured Kudal, Banda, Bicholim, Pernem, Maneri and Sanquelim by way of vatan in 1708.202 The Prince of Saunde agreed to pay Shahu Rs. 25,000 a year for Ponda and Panchmahal.203

The Portuguese Viceroy, Conde de Ericeira, left the following for the guidance of his successor in 1720:

Shahu has secured from the Moghul Emperor, as his favour, the tenth part of the total income from all Konkan. In north Konkan Shahu’s general is Ramachandrapant. We must take care that the people in Portuguese territory do not secretly give the tenth of the revenue to Shahu. All these princes are very ambitious. Had they not quarreled among themselves, we would have been required to keep constantly armed and alert.

There is also mention in these instructions of 1720 about Ponda that the Saunde prince used to pay Rs. 80,000 a year to the Moghul. There is also a record of the Moghul having presented Ponda fortress and the adjoining villages to the Portuguese. In his letter dated 12 January, 1716, the Viceroy referred to a copy of the firman (order) of the Emperor in this behalf that he had received.204 But the Viceroy did not make use of it, because he did not aspire for any expansion of the state, and since Ponda was in possession of the Prince of Saunde, he did not fear any aggression.205

In this connection, the Viceroy in his letter dated 6 January, 1719 to the King of Portugal writes:

The Prince of Saunde is a tradesman and not a fighter like his people. So we consider him a good neighbour. If you are intent on any expansion of the state by taking the fort of Ponda and the adjoining villages, I shall await orders to that
effect and take possession of the territory. If we do so, the Moghul Emperor will not regret it, because he himself has given the firman. The Prince of Saunde will also not oppose it. General Hassan Ali Khan is demanding Rs. 80,000 for this firman. If we take Ponda, we need not pay him this sum.  

There is a record also that even in 1719, the Viceroy had made efforts to persuade the Moghul that Ponda Panchmahal should remain with the Prince of Saunde.
NOTES

(1) BA: Cartas da India, fl. 59 (MS 51-IX-1).
(2) Pissurlencar, PM, II, pp. 8-10.
(3) Padre Fernão de Queiroz Historia da vida do Venerável Irmão Pedro de Basto, 1689, p. 279: “aquele reyno he a nossa despensa.”
(4) Dr. Luís Gonçalves Couto’s letter to the Viceroy dated 29 August, 1683 (BA: 51-IX-1, Cartas da India, fl. 271).
(5) A letter from Captain Josef de melo Castro dated 23 February, 1679 is available in which he writes: “.... tive huma carta de Sevagy e a sustancia della, he que, no seu rio, nao faça mal aos Arabios, porque sao hospedes, e elle lhes hóode favorecer. A carta ainda coutem mais e maiores roncas ....” (Goa Archives: Papeis avulsos). The purport of this is: “I received Shivaji’s letter. The gist of what he says is that we should not molest the Arabs in the river. They are his guests and he is going to support them ....... There are more threats also in the letter.”
(6) Assentos IV, p. 389.
(7) The stone carving in Anjediv. (Teixeira de Aragão, Descrição das moedas, Vol. III, p. 261; Francisco Raymundo de Moraes Pereira, Annal Indico-Lusitano, Lisboa, 1753, p. 24). The Marhatta history scholar, Bendre, mentions in his Marathi biography of Sambhaji (p. 287), that on 5 May, 1682, the foundation of the fortification of Anjediv was laid ceremoniously, but this is incorrect.
(8) Pissurlencar, PM, II, p. 10.
(9) Collection of letters etc. of Shivaji’s times, Part I, p. 239.
(10) Pissurlencar, PM, II, p. 11.
(11) Ibid., p. 12.
(12) Ibid., p. 19.
(13) Ibid., p. 22.
(14) Ibid.
(15) BA: Cartas da India, fl. 224, Dr. Luís Gonçalves Couto’s letter dated 15 April, 1683.
(16) Pissurlencar, Tentativas dos Portugueses para a ocupação Concao.
(17) BNL: Breve resumo dos sucessos do Estado Portuguez na India nos annos de 1682, 1683, MS. fl. 34.
(18) BA: Cartas da India, MS. fl. 228.
(19) Ibid., p. 236.
(20) History of the Saptakoteshwar Devasthan by Jayvant V. S. Sardesai.
(21) BA: Cartas da India, MS. fl. 261.
(22) Pissurlencar, Antigualhas, pp. 71-2; Assentos IV, p. 156.
In a letter, a contemporary Portuguese officer stated that the first attack by the Mahrattas on the fort of Revdanda was launched on 23 July, 1682, at night. They simultaneously attacked the fortification of Revdanda town and Koralai fortress. "... (ate que na noite de 23 de Julho de 1682, cometendo o inimigo a escalla a dita fortaleza com grosso poder, e ao mesmo tempo os muros daquella cidade, e a fortaleza do Morro foi rebatido ... ")—Goa Archives: Livro de consultas, No. 2, fl. 94 V, Petition of Francisco de Costa.) The Portuguese used to call the Koralai fort Morro Cheul. The scholar Bendre refers to it as Morro fort (Sambhaji, p. 295).

(23) Goa Archives: MR No. 48, fl. 181; Pissurlencar, PM, II, p. 29 n.
(25) Pissurlencar, PM, II, p. 29.
(26) Sharma, Maratha History Re-Examined, p. 332.
(27) B. S. Bendre, Chhatrapati Sambhaji Maharaj, p. 293.
(29) The Portuguese called Agacim, San Lourenço.
(30) In Shivaji's times, the Portuguese called Goan Christians Canares (Pissurlencar's article in Mandavi for July 1964). Bendre interprets Canare as Kanadi, which is wrong (Sambhaji, p. 300).

(31) BNL: Caixa 201, No. 4. Breve resumo dos sucessos do Estado Português na Índia, nos annos de 1682, 1683, MS.
(32) In the original Portuguese the mention is as Durbanaique. This Ponde Desai's name was Dulba Naik (Pissurlencar, PM, II, p. 35). Bendre writes Dharmaji for Dulba which is wrong.
(33) Viceroy's letter to Siddi Yakut Khan dated 13 November 1683 (Pissurlencar, PM, II, p. 41). Orleans has written that Sambhaji lifted the siege of Cheul and he went towards Ponda, but this is wrong. (Bendre, Sambhaji, p. 307). Riyasatkar Sardesai also has given similar incorrect information (Sambhaji, p. 52). Bendre has said that Sambhaji went to Ponda from Rajapur, basing this statement on a letter dated 31 October, 1683 from the Bombay English (Sambhaji, p. 300) but his object, viz. taking the fort from Adilshah has been wrongly stated and the date seems to be wrong. It is well known that Shivaji had already taken the fort in 1675.

In 1683, Sambhaji's Subedar at Ponda was Dharmaji Nagnath (Pissurlencar, PM II, p. 4n); Dharmaji Nagnath's letters have been published in "Gomantakachya Itihasachi Sudhane" in Itihasa Sangraha. In the inscription at Adkolan, Ponda Mahal, of 1688, the name of Dharmaji Nagnath is found as the chief officer of the Subha (Pissurlencar, Inscrições Pre-Portuguesas de Gou, p. 71,
Bharat Itihasa Samshodhak Mandal, *Annual Report, Shake 1835*). Dharmaji Nagnath was a contemporary of Dulba Naik, Sardesai of Ponda.

(34) Durbale is a village in Ponda Mahal. It was not a province as Bendre writes (Sambhaji, p. 301).

(35) Shivaacharitra Sahitya, Khandha 2, No. 397, p. 399.

(36) Rajwade Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane, 15A 365.


(38) BNL: MS. Caixa 201, No. 4

(39) Pissurlencar, *Tentativas dos Portugueses para a occupacao do Concao*, Bendre (Sambhaji, p. 308) writes that the Viceroy of Goa led an assault on Ponda at the instance of the Moghuls. But there is no evidence to support this statement.

(40) BA, (Ms. 51-IX-1), *Cartas da India*.


(42) BNL, *Breve resumo dos sucessos da India, MS.*; *Relacao verdadeira, MS.*; *B.A, Cartas da India, MS.*; Padre Francisco de Souza, *Oriente Conquistado*; Pissurlencar, *PM*, II; *Prince Akbar and the Portuguese; Assentos, etc.*

(43) Goa Archives: Papeis diversos.

(44) BNL: MS. 8529, fl. 156. Satroji Rane’s letter to the King of Portugal dated 10 January, 1710.

(45) BA: *Cartas da India*.

In Conde de Alvora’s letter dated 12 April, 1683, there is information to the effect that he had allowed the Subedar of Sambhaji and the Desais to keep their families in the city of Goa (Goa Archives: RV No. 2, fl. 30; Pissurlencar, *PM*, II, p. 23).

(46) BNL, MS. It is written in *Breve resumo dos sucessos* that Akbar now denies having taken part in the battle and that not he but his maternal uncle went to Ponda with horsemen. The Moghul brought the battle to our doors and his son’s cavalry attacked us at Ponda. [Agroa (Akbar) se excusa com dizer que nao entrevira nisto mas o fosse elle o seu tio, irmao da maq que foi com esta cavallaria. O Mogor nos meteu a guerra em casa e a cavallaria do filho nos acometeu em ponda.]


In a letter dated 20 October, 1638, Sheikh Mahomed, Aurangzeb’s envoy, informed the Viceroy that Prince Akbar had purchased two ships in Goa and that he intended to leave Indian shores on a voyage. He requested that the Viceroy should see that he was not hindered. (BA; Ms. *Cartas da India*, fl. 312).

As a matter of fact, a ship was purchased for Prince Akbar for Rs. 10,000 in August 1683 from a Portuguese gentleman, Manoel Teixeira Franco, and...
another Rs. 2,000 were spent on repairs. Two smaller ships were also purchased by him at Vengurla. These were to accompany him with his servants and luggage. Akbar planned first to go to Bandra at the end of September and thence to proceed to Iran by sea. He later changed his plans. (BA's MS. Cartas da India; Pissurlencar, Prince Akbar and the Portuguese). The Portuguese believing that Akbar would succeed Aurangzeb, behaved humbly with him. The Goa Government kept in touch with him even after he went to Iran. (Goa Archives: RV No. 3, fl. 33).

Padre Leonardo Paes has recorded that, while Akbar was living in Bicholim, he had such a rich emerald necklace that, when he put it round his neck over his white coat, it assumed a green colour. (Promptuario, p. 17).


(49) Pissurlencar, PM, II, pp. 60, 16; Prince Akbar and the Portuguese.

(50) Ibid Bendre (Sambhaji, p. 308) says, Portuguese writer has not mentioned Manucci even once in his account of a whole year. Though Relação Verdadeira has not mentioned Manucci, other contemporary Portuguese writings do mention his achievements. (Pissurlencar, PM, II; Prince Akbar and the Portuguese. BA. MS. Cartas da India).

(51) Pissurlencar, PM, II, pp. 37, 41.

(52) Ibid., Supplement (Pissurlencar collection).

(53) Ibid., p. 41.

(54) “Some few days since the Rajah razed Pundah Castle and has built a Gurr neare the place in the roome of it; the reason is that his father was engaged for several months in taking it and could not damage it even so much as the Portuguese did in a few days . . . .” (The Factors at Karwar to the Council at Surat, dated 28 November 1683. F. R. Surat, Vol. 109, in I. Hyd. Archaeolog. Soc., 1919-20, p. 31).

(55) Gemelli Careri, Voyages du Tour du Monde, Paris 1727, pp. 159-60; Pissurlencar, Antiquailles, p. 72.

(56) Sarkar, Aurangzib, IV, p. 331.

(57) Viceroy's letter to Siddi Yakutkhan dated 13 November 1683 (Pissurlencar, PM, II, p. 43).

(58) Manucci writes that Sambhaji took Ju vem on 25 November 1683 (Storia do Mogor, Vol. II, pp. 272-5) but this date is incorrect as contemporary Portuguese sources show (See Relação verdadeira; Breve resumo dos sucessos; and Oriente Conquistado).

Riyasatkar Sardesai (Sambhaji, p. 53) gives 24 November 1683 as the date, but he has overlooked the fact that it is new-style date. The English date should be 14 November, 1683.

Bendre (Sambhaji, p. 309) calls Ju vem, i.e. St. Estevam, Kumbharjuve but these two are separate islands. Sardesai says Sambhaji took both but does not
give any authority (Sambhaji, p. 53). ‘Eslov’ is not a correct name. It should be Estevam (Portuguese) or Stephens (English).

(59) Manucci and the writer of “Relação verdadeira” says “at 10 o’clock at night” but “Breve resumo dos sucessos”, “Oriente Conquistado”, two contemporary Portuguese sources say “at eight o’clock” and at 10 the alarm-signal bell was rung.

(60) Bendre (Sambhaji, p. 309) calls Dhavji as Dongi (Dongtum) but there is no such place in Goa. The original Portuguese mentions ‘Daugim’ quite clearly (Pissurlencar, PM, II, p. 43). The English translation in the India office library, London, also gives ‘Dangim’ (The Journal of the Hyderabadi Arch. Soc., 1919-20, p. 16); only instead of ‘u’ there is ‘n’ Bendre’s reading is wrong.

(61) Goa Archives: MR 161E, fl. 1197: “.... O Conde Vice-Rei que esteve em perigo de ser prezo, se lhe nao acodia com um cavalo, em que se salvou, D. Rodrigo da Costa, certamente acontecia a maior desgraca .......” The purport of this is: The Viceroy was about to be captured. Had not Rodrigo da Costa rushed to his rescue with a horse, a major calamity would have occured.

(62) Miscellaneous Historical writings by Parasnis, Part II.


(64) The Vice-Rei’s letter to the King of Portugal dated 16 December 1683 (Goa Archives: MR 48, fl. 180).

(65) In a map of Goa island (1615-1622) drawn by Manuel Godinho de Eredia this ‘island of the dead’ (ilha dos mortos) has been shown in place of Juven. St. Estevam. The reason why it was so called is given in Desengano de Perdidos by Dr. Gaspar de Leao published in Goa in 1573.

There is much similarity between Ali Adilshah’s invasion of 1570 and Sambhaji’s invasion of 1683 so far as the military strategy of the assaults on Ponda are concerned. (Antonio Castilho, Commentario do Cerco de Goa e Cheal, Lisboa 1573 ; Antonio Pinto Pereira, Historia da India no tempo em que a governou o visorey Dom Luis de Ataide, Coimbra, 1616, Vol. II).

Sixty thousand foot, thirty-five thousand horse, two thousand elephants and artillery constituted the Adilshahi forces in the 1570 invasion, according to the Portuguese. (BNL, MS. 8570, Annaes, fls. 132-3 v) In the sixteenth century, the Portuguese army in Goa never exceeded 4,000 men. At the time of the battle additional soliders had been recruited locally. As the Portuguese had a strong navy, they could protect their possessions near the coast. Albuquerque (Cartes, I, p. 40), Don Joao de Castro (Cartas, p. 24), Bishop Don Gaspar de Liao (Desengano, p. 34) and others have written that 3,000 Portuguese soldiers would be enough to protect their possessions.

(66) Pissurlencar, PM, II, p. 47 n.
(67) Pissurlencar, Assentos, IV, p. 410 (....Sambage que por uao ter a gente ociosa nos investio).

(68) For example, the churches in Juem, Thivim and Colvale (Pissurlencar, PM, II, p. 46; Assentos IV, p. 429).

(69) Pissurlencar, PM, II, p. 49.

(70) Pissurlencar, Antigualhas, p. 79.

(71) Pissurlencar, Assentos IV, p. 572.

(72) ".... alem de serem estes (Christaos de terra) de sua natureza em nossa companhia pellejam como tigres .... " (D. Gaspar Leao, Desenganos de Perdidos, p. 34).

(73) Goa Archives : MR 54, fl. 55; Pissurlencar, Assentos IV, p. 413.

(74) Pissurlencar, PM, II, pp. 51-2..Bendre (Sambhaji, p. 316) has made use of the English translation of the account of Sambhaji's attacks on Bardez and Salcette from Relacao Verdadeira, available in the India Office, London. But many names are incorrect. For instance he uses Marmugao for both Margao (p. 315) and Murgao (p. 316) and there are more instances of incorrect pronunciation.


(76) Goa Archives : Petition of Ramoji Naikvadi. Ramoji related in his petition how he helped the Portuguese at the time of the seige even while he was in the service of Sambhaji (Boletim do Governo da India, 1684, p. 91).

(77) Diago do Couto, Decada VIII, p. 391.

(78) Pissurlencar, Assentos IV, pp. 422-3.

(79) Padre Francisco de Souza, O Oriente Conquistado, p. 400-2 (Bombay 1881).

(80) Goa Archives : Siddi Abdul Rehman’s letter to the Vice-roy in Portuguese (Papeis avulsos).

(81) BA : Cartas da India.

(82) The name of this Government interpreter in Goa was Vitboji Shenvi Bhende.

(83) Goa Archives : Livro de registo do dos alvaras, Cartas, etc. de diferentes feitorias 1682-1684 (MS. 2316).

(84) Dr. Luis Gonsalves de Couto’s letter dated 31 December 1683 (BA : Cartas da India).

(85) Pissurlencar, PM, II, p. 54; Assentos IV, p. 430; “A Portuguese Embassy to Raigad in 1684”, p. 11 (Proceedings of the All-India Modern History Congress, Poona, 1936).

(86) BA : Cartas da India, fl. 347.

(87) Ibid., p. 343.
(88) Ibid., p. 341.

(89) Pissurtlencar, PM, II, pp. 56-7.

(90) BNL : MS. Breve resumo dos sucessos “... ficavão as pazes ajustadas mas não assinadas por ter decidido do gate o exercito mogor e tambem se diz por causa certa que por esta mesma causa se lhe mandou instrucão a ir devager nestes consertos ...” The substance of this is that the treaty was agreed upon but not signed. It is asserted with certainty that, because the Moghul army had come down the Ramghat, the Portuguese envoys were advised that they should delay the conclusion of the treaty.

(91) BNL : MS. A 6-43. Tratados depazes antigos e modernos, de que se acharam documentos na Secretaria do estado da India.

(92) Portuguese envoy Manuel Sarave de Albuquerque’s letter dated 24 April 1684 to Kavi Kalash (Pissurtlencar, Antigualhas, p. 91). “...o que esta assinado com os sellos de Sambagi Raze e do Principe Sultao Achar ...”

(93) Pissurtlencar, PM, II, p. 57.

(94) Goa Archives : CPA No. 68.

(95) Mauimento in Portuguese means foodgrains etc., not ammunition.

(96) Goa Archives : RV No. 3, fl. 56, Viceroy’s letter to Narahari Pandit dated 26 March 1684.

(97) BNL, Breve resumo dos sucessos; Pissurtlencar, PM, II, p. 57.

(98) Pissurtlencar, PM, II, p. 53.


(101) BA s Cartas da India, fl. 269. Dr. Luis Gonçalves Carto’s letter dated 27 August 1683 and the Viceroy’s remarks of the same date.

(102) BA : Cartas da India, fl. 274.

(103) Pissurtlencar, Assentos IV, pp. 422-3.

(104) BA : Cartas da India, fl. 341 ; Couto’s letter dated 12 January 1684.


(107) Khafi Khan, II, p. 291.


(109) BA : Cartas da India, an account of the Konkan Desais.

(110) J. Sarkar, Aurangzib, IV, p. 304n.


(112) BA : Cartas da India, an account of the Konkan Desais.

(113) Pissurtlencar ; Goa Archives ; Bharatmira, Vol. 22, No. 3, March 1950.

(119) *BA*: Cartas da India, fl. 361.
(124) “*A Portuguese Embassy to Raigad in 1684*” (*All-India Modern History Congress Proceedings*, 1936).
(125) *BA*: Cartas da India, fl. 398.
(128) *BA*: Cartas da India, fl. 499. Dr. Luis Gonçalves, letter dated 29 December 1684; Sidhoji Farjand’s letter.
(130) *Ibid*.
(134) *Assentos* IV, p. 431: “a extrema necessidade em que se acheva o Estado de Dinheiro para suprir as despezas ....” (Government was hard-pressed for money for expenditure.)
(137) *BNL*: MS. 4179 F. G. A contemporary translation in Portuguese of the letter written in Marathi by Sambhajirao and Vitghirao Karwarkar Desai to the Viceroy. The present author was unable to lay his hands on the original.
(140) *BA*: Cartas da India, Pissurlencar, *Tentativas dos Portugueses para a ocupação do Conchao*. 
(141) The Goan Bishop Don Mateos de Castro of Bicholim said in his letter dated 22 December, 1653: “Raula Sinay, qui in singulos annos vigenti quartrnor mille xerariforum redditus colligit”. (Desai Raval Shenvi annually takes twelve thousand rupees, i.e. 24,000 arurpis.) ASG: MS. Goa 40, ffs. 384-5; Epistola exporbratoria ejusden episcopi chrysopolitani ....).

(142) BA: Cartas da India, fl. 412.

(143) Riyasatkar Sardesai (Sambhaji, p. 57) has given the date as it is without taking into consideration that it is in the new style. Dr. Bragança Pereira read "dez do proximo mez" in place of 'doze do proprio mez' and made a grievous error (APO, t I. Vol III, p. 1, p.).

(144) Goa Archives: MR, fl. 207-49v.

(145) BA: Cartas da India, fl. 301. Dr. Luis Gonçalves Couto's letter to the Viceroy dated 29 September 1683.

(146) AHU: India, avulsos, Caixa 33. Letter dated 13 November 1686.

(147) Pissurlencar, Antiguidades, p. 105; A Liga dos Portugueses com o Bounsul Contra Sambahi (Oriente Portugues, II, serie No. 2).

(148) AHU: India, avulsos, Caixa No. 34: "fez este sucesso mais gloriozo fio o nao custar a serra o dinheiro que se nos pedia para a entregarem .... " (Viceroy's letter to King of Portugal dated 24 January 1688).

(149) Goa Archives: Livro de Dio, No. 1.


(151) Goa Archives: RV No. 4, fl. 69.


(154) BNL, MS. 8538, Livro de Cartas que escreveo a S.M.o. Sr. D. Rodrigo da Costa, Governador da India, fl. 5v.

(155) Goa Archives: CO 5, II, 71.

(156) Pissurlencar, PM, III, p. 1; “Rajaram and the Portuguese” (Proceedings, Indian Historical Records Commission).

(157) Ibid.

(158) Goa Archives: RV No. 4, ffs. 76-7.

(159) Goa Archives: RV No. 4, fl. 74.

(160) Pissurlencar, PM, III, p. 3, supplement (Pissurlencar collection).

(161) Idem. p. 4: O que mais os incitou a isso foi por ser da sua casta da gentilidade, e não podermos tolerar as insolencias com que os mouros forçavam as mulheres gentias e profanavam os seus pagodes.” (Goa Archives: MR, 55B, ffs. 424-5).


(165) Goa Archives: *MR* 58, fl. 269. A Portuguese "Achava" refers to this incident.

(166) Goa Archives: *MR* 55 B, fl. 430 (Letter of acting Governor of Goa dated 22 January 1691).


(168) Dr. S. N. Sen, *Indian Travels of Thevenot and Careri* pp. 208-12.

(169) Careri writes: "Lord of some villages among the mountains, but tributary and subject to the Great Moghul, being obliged to serve him in his wars." (p. 212).

(170) Goa Archives: *RV* No. 5, fls. 44v, 47v.

(171) Shivacharitra Sahitya, Part III, pp. 87-8.


(173) Goa Archives: *RV* No. 6, fl. 41v.


(175) Goa Archives: *MR* 62, fl. 203. Vice-Rei Camara Coutinho says in his letter dated 19 January, 1701; "passado alguns meses depois da minha chegada se levantou quem se tem contra o Mogor ... este levantado se faz senhor de Bicholim e Sanquelim, que era do Mogor ...". The substance of this is: "After I came here, Khem Savant became hostile to the Mogul ... This rebel took possession of Bicholim and Sanquelim" (Goa Archives: *MR* 64, fl. 249). This Viceroy (Antonio Luiz Goncalves da Camara Coutinho) reached Goa on 14 September, 1698. From this it seems that the Khem Savant Bhonsla conquered Sanquelim (Satari) and Bicholim (Bhagagram) by the end of 1698.

(176) Goa Archives: *RV* No. 5, fls. 6v, 20.


(178) Goa Archives: *MR* 64, fl. 55.

(179) Goa Archives: *RV* No. 5, fl. 47.

(180) Goa Archives: *MR* 66, fl. 74.

(181) Goa Archives: *RV* No. 6, fl. 43.


(183) Goa Archives: *MR* 66, fl. 275.

(184) Goa Archives: *RV* No. 5, fls. 70, 76.

(185) Goa Archives: *MR* 66, fl. 275.

(186) Goa Archives: *RV* No. 5, fl. 75v.
(187) Goa Archives: RV No. 5, fl. 66v.
(188) Goa Archives: RV No. 5, fl. 97v.
(189) Ibid.
(190) Goa Archives: RV No. 5, fl. 98v.
(191) Goa Archives: RV No. 5, fl. 107.
(192) Goa Archives: MR 70, fl. 15.
(193) Goa Archives: MR 70, fl. 15; MR 69, fl. 42.

The Vice-Rei Caitano de Melo Castro, in his letter to the King of Portugal, dated 5 January 1706 said: "... se náo seguisse ter quebrado o orgulho deste levantado, que dissimulado podia vir a ser outro segundo Sivagi ..." (MR, 70, fl. 15).


(195) BNL, MS. 1455, Instruções que deixou o Conde da Ericeira (22 October 1720): "... o rey de Sunda he mais mercador que guerreiro, e por essa razao bom para vezinho ..." (Gist: "Since the Saunde prince is more of a tradesman than a warrior we prefer him as our neighbour.").

(196) Goa Archives: RI No. 9, fl. 42v; RV No. 6, fl. 116v (Viceroy's letter dated 27 May 1706). Pissurlecan, Assentos V, p. 213; ADP, p. 544.

(197) Goa Archives: RV 5, fl. 117v; RJ 9, fl. 42v.
(198) Goa Archives: RV 7, fl. 11v.
(199) Goa Archives: MR 72, fl. 419.
(200) Pissurlecan, Assentos V, pp. 236-41.
(201) Goa Archives: MR 72, fl. 7.


(203) Goa Archives: Marathi Correspondence.
(205) Goa Archives: MR 82, fl. 133.
(207) Goa Archives: RV 8, fl. 87 (Viceroy's letter dated 9 September 1719 to Nawab Bahadur Dil Khan).
CHAPTER IV

DURING PESHWA ADMINISTRATION I

Having gained the Konkan territory from the Moghul Emperor as a *jagir* for Chhatrapati Shahu, the Mahrattas considered it a rightful and legitimate act to recover tribute from the Portuguese also. Actually the Moghul Emperor never had any authority over this territory. But the powerful have always dictated to the weak. Vice-roi Marquez de Alorna said that since Chhatrapati Shahu of Satara and Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur had the Mahratta Kingdom divided between them and the Konkan passed to Sambhaji, the Mahrattas expected a tribute from Goa also. But this position was never accepted by the Portuguese, says the Viceroy, and so they did not pay the tribute.¹

When Shahu returned from the Moghul Court, he informed the Portuguese that he had gained the territory of Konkan as a *jagir* from the Emperor of Delhi.² His first Peshwa, Balaji Vishwanath, brought to Satara the *sannads of the sardeshmukhi* rights from the Moghul Court in 1719.³ In those days Conde de Ercieira was in charge of Portuguese India at Goa. He said that had Chhatrapati Shahu been more circumspect he would have taken possession of the whole of the Konkan as he conquered Kalyan and Bhimdi.⁴ But instead of paying attention to increasing his military power he made rapid progress in consumption of alcohol and so was not likely to make use of his great power. Had he the will to do so, the Conde said, he could have raised as big an army as he wanted.

In a contemporary Portuguese report the following description of Kalyan when Shahu took it appears: ⁶ "This town is really a fortress. There are twelve good towers and a deep moat." Ramchandra Mahadeo Chaskar took possession of Kalyan in 1719. The Portuguese called it Galian. Portuguese records show that Kalyan was the base of operations for the repeated Mahratta raids on the Bassein territory of the Portuguese.⁷ At least during the earlier raids, the planning and direction was in the hands of this Ramchandrapant⁸ This is supported also by the Chronicle of Salcette.
A Portuguese report on the conflict between the Mahrattas and the Portuguese in 1737 states:

After Kalyan was captured by the Mahrattas they stationed a big force there and their general demanded of the General of Bassein the *sardeshmukhi* dues. But the General replied that the right that the Mahrattas had secured applied only to the Moghul territory and had nothing to do with Portuguese possessions.

Bajirao I and the Portuguese came in contact for the first time at the end of 1721 when the English and the Portuguese had encircled Kolaba fort.

The Viceroy informed the King of Portugal by a letter dated 8 January 1718 that Kanhoji Angria was a very powerful and insolent enemy of the Portuguese who was the main cause of their Cheul trade becoming almost extinct. In those days it became impossible for Portuguese trading ships to ply in the northern sea without a permit from Angria and without paying his levy. He used to collect seven lakh rupees a year from the villages on the Bassein territory coast. In an account in Portuguese published in Lisbon in 1715, a writer compared Kanhoji to the notorious Barbaroxa.

The Portuguese attempted to capture Angria dead or alive in November 1720 by secretly sending a large squadron of warships and an army against him. But the plan miscarried and only 13 of the 65 ships heading towards Kolaba reached there in time. The Portuguese suffered greatly at the hands of Kanhoji. The English also looked upon him as their inveterate enemy. So the English and the Portuguese joined forces and marched on Kolaba. The Angria tried hard to prevent this combination. On 7 August 1721, he sent a letter to the Portuguese general at Bassein with a faithful servant, Syed Abdul Razak. In this letter he wrote that he had a force of 20,000 soldiers with him and that many more from the armies of his relatives would join him. Even Chhatrapati Shahu, like the English and the Portuguese, wanted to curb Kanhoji's growing power. Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur had even tried, with Portuguese aid, to capture Kanhoji's forts in 1716.

In a manuscript entitled, "An account of the period from the end of the region of Viceroy Vasco Fernandes Cezar till the end of 1738
in India.” In the Biblioteca Nacional da Lisboa, it is recorded that, when the Portuguese and the English marched on Kolaba fort, Ramchandra Pant, the Governor of Kalyan, and Damaji Krishna, the Governor of Bhimdi, went to Koyna and met the Captain of Sabah engaged in the campaign against the Portuguese, and suggested to him, on behalf of Chhatrapati Shahu, that the Portuguese and Shahu’s forces should join hands to exterminate Kanhoji and share his territory. The Portuguese did not want a powerful neighbour like Chhatrapati Shahu and did not entertain the proposal.  

Later, Kanhoji became a tributary of Shahu and brought Bajirao Peshwa to his aid. On 30 December 1720, Bajirao stationed 7,000 cavalry at Alibag for the protection of the town. On 1 January 1722 Bajirao informed the Portuguese that he was the Prime Minister of Chhatrapati Shahu and that in that capacity he was in Alibag to get Kanhoji Angria to acknowledge the paramountcy of the Chhatrapati to which Kanhoji had agreed. He would, therefore, thereafter help Kanhoji. He also said that, for the protection of Kanhoji, he was ready to make war or peace with the Portuguese, whatever was necessary. If peace was acceptable to them, their friendship would be accepted. Knowing that he would be helpless before the Mahratta forces, the Viceroy agreed to enter into a treaty.

On 3 January talks commenced. The next day Bajirao sent his representative, Mahadaji Krishna, on a Portuguese ship and on 9 January a treaty of friendship between Bajirao Pandit and the Portuguese was concluded at Varsoli.

Vice-Rei Conde de Ericeira wrote in 1720: “Kanhoji became powerful because of negligence on the part of the Portuguese. In the days of Caitano Melo de Castro (October 1702 to October 1707) the Angria had only eight or ten armed ships and he used to live at Versova which was in Portuguese territory.” In 1721, Kanhoji’s fleet consisted of 6 palas with 16 to 18 cannons fitted on them, 30 galvetas and 6,000 sailors. The Viceroy further says.

Kanhoji has now become so inflated that he openly brags about easily capturing the Portuguese-owned Cheul and Karanja. But he has eyes on Goa. Thirty years ago he was a poor and humble nonentity. But within ten years, by his many manoeuvres, he has become the owner of Suvarnadurg and 22 forts are under his control.
An ex-Governor of the Portuguese who was sailing from Cheul to Bassein in a *pala* was attacked by Kanhoji on the seas, captured and ignominiously killed. Twenty-six Portuguese made captive by him were taken to Kolaba and beheaded.\(^9\) The name of the said Portuguese Governor was Gaspar Aranho de Lencastri.

In 1722, a treaty of friendship between the Portuguese and the Mahrattas was concluded but it did not last long. On 26, November 1723, at 9 a.m. Pilaji Jadhaorao, at the head of 40,000 horsemen, attacked Bassein territory on the pretext that it was part of the Mahratta State\(^{10}\) and marched as far as Gokhiri, near Bassein. By way of retaliation, the Portuguese plundered a number of villages in Mahratta territory. On 6, December 1723, Bajirao sent a letter to the General at Bassein, Luiz de Melo Castro, saying:

> If it is your desire that there should be friendly relations between us, release the peasants of Taloja that you have detained and there should be no failure to do so. If you are out to fight, say so frankly so that I can inform my forces accordingly. If you want peace, make it up with Pilaji Jadhaorao and send a trustworthy person from your side as envoy.\(^{21}\)

After receipt of this letter, the Portuguese made peace with Bajirao on 10 January 1724 by the treaty of Varsoli. It was concluded in a village called Kambe. The Mahrattas were represented by Ramchandra pant, Pilaji Jadhaorav and Dayalji Somavanshi and the Portuguese by Captain José Pereira de Vascocelos.\(^{22}\) On Mahratta insistence, a clause was included in the treaty to the effect that till May of that year (1724), the Portuguese would send a competent representative to Satara to confirm the treaty and that, till then, the Mahrattas would not cause any disturbance in Portuguese territory.

The Portuguese understood the inward intent of this clause. The statesmen in Goa conjectured that it was an attempt on the part of Bajirao to collect Sardeshmukhi or some fixed tribute for Bassein from the Portuguese and they therefore decided not to send any envoy to Shahu at Satara.\(^{23}\) That Bajirao was pressing for such an envoy, reinforcing his pressure with presents to the General at Bassein is apparent from the Peshwa’s letter dated 14 November 1724.\(^{24}\)

Siddi Yakt Khat Khan swooped on Kolaba with twelve *palas*, two frigates and a hundred other armed ships in 1724. But Kanhoji bought him
off with plenty of money and made peace with him. The same year, however, Kanhoji entered into a pact with Shahu to capture the fort of Raiiri from the Siddi and Chhatrapati Shahu sent 500 select cavalry to Angria’s help for this purpose. The Siddi got scent of this and made perfect preparations to defend the fort and the Mahrattas were compelled to abandon the project for some time.²⁵ Ten years later Raiiri i.e. Raigad was returned to the Mahrattas by the Siddi.

Among the Portuguese statesmens, Andre Ribeiro Coutinho, the officer at Bassein, counselled the Viceroy at Goa on 5 December 1728, that the Portuguese would not be able to withstand the powerful Mahrattas with their small army. It was advisable, therefore, he said, that the General of Bassein should make a small gift of Rs. 2,500 every year to the Chhatrapati, his Minister or some favourite of the Mahratta king and avoid the damage that the Portuguese had to suffer every year from Mahratta depredations in Daman territory.²⁶ The Portuguese used to pay gavkhandi to the Chauthiya Raja to avoid his plundering in Portuguese territory. He used to collect about 2,000 asurpis from Daman as gavkhandi and the Mahrattas knew it.

Though a treaty was concluded between the Portuguese and the Mahrattas on 10 January 1724, the Portuguese feared that the Mahrattas were intent on invading Bassein territory to recover tribute. This fear was not unfounded. Only six miles from Kalyan, near the fort of Saivan, Ramchandra pant had already encamped but matters did not proceed further. In May 1728, Pilaji Jadhaavrao plundered two Portuguese villages in the vicinity of Daman.²⁷ In retaliation, the General of Bassein attacked Kalyan in August and resorted to arson.²⁸ The Viceroy wrote that, as a result of this assault on Kalyan, Bajirao came down and made a treaty at Bassein, but this treaty is untraceable. In 1728, Ramchandra Chaskar died and his brother Krishnaji Mahadeo was appointed Subedar of Kalyan.

In 1729, Kanhoji Angria died.²⁹ That he probably died of wounds is suggested by the fact that, in the Viceroy’s letter dated 14 July 1729 to the General of Bassein, the following reference is found: ³⁰

Se o Angria morreo faru toda a diligencia possivel para mover os animos dos Capitaves das praças para que se sublevem e ajudara, e prometera ajudar aos que tal fizerem; se inao morreo e saroa me
avisarão com toda a brevidade. [If Angria is dead, his fort-captains should rebel and for this purpose you should exert and give the prospective rebels all help or assurance thereof. But if he is not dead and if his wound had healed, you should inform me immediately accordingly.]

No reply to this letter is to be found in the Goa Archives. The date of Kanhoji's death is also not mentioned in any of the letters there. In a manuscript in the Biblioteca Nacional da Lisboa the date 30 June 1729 (new style) is given as the date of his death and Dr. Surendranath Sen has accepted this, but it does not corroborate the date given in the Viceroy's letter dated 14 July 1729 mentioned earlier. Even the Marathi sources mention that Kanhoji died on 14 July 1729. A letter of the Goa Governor dated 30 August 1729 mentions that those Portuguese who were the Angraia's captives were released on the day of his death.

In May 1730, the Mahrattas invaded Bassein territory. Had the Bombay English not sent 700 soldiers to the aid of the Portuguese, Salcette island would have fallen to the Mahrattas. On this occasion, the Portuguese Viceroy had requested help in men and ammunition from the French Governor at Pondicherry also. In this war, the Portuguese strategy was to resort to arson in Mahratta territory, capture women and children and baptise them. The Viceroy thought this would deter the enemy and he would come to terms. On 20 March 1731, the Viceroy informed the King of Portugal that he had captured many women and children and had threatened to turn them into Christians because the Mahrattas considered this as most deplorable. But in his letter dated 4 April 1731, he had written to the chief executive of Bassein that the captured women should not be let out and only the canard should be spread that they had been made over to Pae de Christaos, a Catholic religious authority, for being converted. The children were also to be given in charge of that authority but they were not to be baptised until further orders were passed.

The Mahrattas started negotiations for a treaty in July. Bajirao sent his envoy to Goa with a letter requesting the Vicereoy to enter into a treaty of friendship. Before that, Pilaji Jadhaorao had taken the
Portuguese post of Kambe on 24 May 1731. In a letter written to the King of Portugal the Viceroy said:

The enemy has several times asked us for a treaty. The reason for this is not that he is afraid of us. He has other difficulties of his own which do not permit him to descend into the Konkan from the Deccan plateau. The Mahrattas are so powerful that they not only fight the Moghul but have made him restless. So unless God’s grace is on us, the Mahrattas will seriously threaten Bassein. In their negotiations for a treaty they never give up two conditions: one is that we should pay them the same tribute that we have been paying the Chaithiya Raja and Koli Raja, and the other is that we must allow the Hindus in Portuguese territory to build temples.

Bajirao was finally prevailed upon to give up these two conditions and on 10 February 1732, through Robert Coevan, Governor of Bombay, a treaty between the Mahrattas and the Portuguese was signed. While the negotiations for the treaty were in progress, Bajirao himself had encamped at Kalyan. What is noteworthy is that Robert Coevan has placed on record that, through a trustworthy person, he inspired the Subedar of Kalyan to seek this treaty and that otherwise, the Mahrattas did not care for it. After it was signed, Krishnaji Mahadeo was relieved of the office of Subedar. A Portuguese letter says that Krishnaji Mahadeo was tired of Bajirao and sought employment with the Moghul. Krishnaji was considered a friend of the Portuguese in Bassein. According to the Viceroy, Conde de Sandomela, the invasion of Bassein in 1730 was largely the result of the efforts of Ganesh Naik.

A member of this Naik family (Anzurkar) was arrested by the authorities of the Inquisition in Bassein and despatched to Goa. While there, he embraced Catholicism and was given a new name, Inacio de Santo Terej. He knew the Portuguese language. Viceroy Conde de Sandomela has said that he was a very cunning man and, having lived at his (the viceroy’s) house for a long time, he was even capable of forging a letter. Ganesh Naik incurred great favour with the Viceroy and one day fled, returning to north Konkan and getting reconverted to Hinduism. The Viceroy said that he became a great enemy of the Portuguese in later years. Some information about Ganesh Naik
is available in a letter in the Peshwa Daftar written to the Peshwa by Krishnaji Ram from Bombay. There is a letter in the Goa Archives written by Antaji Raghunath Kavle to the Viceroy in 1731 in which he has said that, wherever he might be, he would always be at the service of the Viceroy. There is another letter written to the Viceroy by Pilaji Jadhav on 28 September 1731, in which he describes Antaji Raghunath as dishonest.

Although a treaty was concluded between the Portuguese and the Maharattas in 1732, Bajirao did not expect it to last long. He had therefore fixed 13 March 1733 as the date for an assault on Salsette. At the beginning of the rainy season in 1733, Bajirao opened a campaign against the Siddi but was not able to crush him as he had the help of the Bombay English. The differences between the Siddi and the Maharattas ended through mediation by the Portuguese. At the end of the first campaign against the Siddi, Bajirao had informed the Dewan of Rajkot at Chaul on 8 June 1733, that he would attack Janjira of the Siddi. In 1734, the Maharattas forces again marched against the Siddi. With reference to this second campaign, the Portuguese Viceroy said in his letter to the Captain of Cheul on 5 November 1734:

I have received news that the Maharattas have marched against the Siddi. Bajirao has written to say that Shahu has once again ordered him to attack the Siddi. But he is prepared to make up with him if he agrees to cooperate with him to fight the Angria. Even the English and the Portuguese must co-operate with him as against the Angria. I think it is because it is not possible for the Maharattas to capture the Siddi’s Janjira that they desire to take Angria’s forts. Although we benefit by the extermination of the Angria, it will be more harmful to us that the Maharattas should take all ports on the coast. So, from our point of view it is desirable that the conflict between the Angria and the Maharattas should be long extended. We must be cautious and not let the Maharattas take the forts of the Angria. So, to all appearances, you should help Bajirao but take care to see that he does not destroy the Angria. I even suspect, that Bajirao has laid a trap to mislead the English and ourselves to ensure that we don’t help the Siddi and thus ease his task, of conquering the Siddi. In view of this, I warn you that, if
the Siddi is cornered, you should give him the help he requires. Similarly, let the Angria know what Bajirao has written to us about him, taking care to ensure that Bajirao does not get scent of this.

The Academy of Sciences, Lisbon, has in its collection a letter written by the Vice-Rei Conde de Sandomele on 19 January 1734 to the King of Portugal in which he says:

At the beginning of the rains, the Mahrattas bought over a high officer of the Siddi’s fleet and, with his help, captured a number of forts. They thus secured even the Siddi’s warships. But they have handed them over to the Angria. So now the Angria has more than twelve palas and about forty galvetas. Angria is one of our neighbours who is a danger to our trade.\textsuperscript{46}

At the end of November 1734, there arose a dispute between the Angria brothers, Sambhaji and Manaji. It seems from the letter the Viceroy wrote to Captain Caitano de Sousa Pereira on 13 December 1734 that his Captain of Cheul had a hand in instigating this fraternal quarrel.\textsuperscript{47} In fear of Sambhaji, Manaji took shelter with the Portuguese at Cheul. In this dispute, Bajirao who wanted a good port on the coast, sided with Manaji. Referring to this, Conde de Sandomele wrote that, in helping Manaji, Bajirao’s object was to exploit this opportunity for securing some good port of the Angrias and capturing the Kolaba fort itself.\textsuperscript{48}

With the help of Bajirao, Manaji captured the Rajkot at Cheul on 12 June 1732.\textsuperscript{49} This port had been taken by Sambhaji Angria about a year earlier from Tajuddin Ali Khan, Dewan of Cheul. The Captain of Cheul, Caitano de Sousa Pereira, had plotted for this port to pass from Manaji to this Dewan. With this in view, the Portuguese took in their possession an old mosque which was situated between Cheul and Rajkot while Manaji was at Cheul. Manaji did not like this. He left his Cheul camp and went to Rajkot on 2 January 1735 and attacked the mosque in Portuguese possession. Khandoji Mankar, Shankaraji Keshao and other Sardars of the Peshwa helped Manaji. On, behalf of Manaji, Bajirao wrote a letter of complaint to the Secretary of the Viceroy on 20 January 1735, which has been preserved in the Goa Archives. This Marathi letter states that the Viceroy had given Manaji a letter to the General of Bassein instructing him to cede some ground to the Mahrattas which letter was delivered to him.
But far from doing so, the Captain of Cheul had launched an operation for the capture of the Rajkot at Cheul. In view of the friendship between the Portuguese and the Mahrattas, Bajirao urged this should be ended at once by the Viceroy's order. However, he stated, if the Viceroy wanted this strife, the Captain of Cheul was serving well and in that case Bajirao also would act according to necessity. Bajirao concluded by saying that his envoy, Yesaji Rangaji, would negotiate further in this behalf. This envoy himself carried this letter of 20 January 1735.

The Portuguese desired that since Rajkot of Cheul was originally Tajuddin Ali Khan's it should be restored to him. But Bajirao not only objected to this, but also he was not ready to allow its demolition. The Portuguese did not want war with the Peshwa, because they feared his power. In this connection the opinion of the Viceroy Joao de Saldanha de Gama's opinion is noteworthy. In his letter dated 4 November 1730, he says, "Shahu's army today is so big that if the Moghuls did not back us it will be difficult to resist it on land." That Bajirao would invade Bassein was suggested to the Captain of Cheul, Caitan de Sousa Pereira, at the end of April 1735 by Lakshmibai Angria, widow of Kanhoji.

A few days before the skirmish between the Mahrattas and the Portuguese near the Cheul mosque in January 1735, Bajirao wrote to the General of Bassein, in keeping with the terms of the treaty of 1732, that some space should be given in Bassein to the traders of Kalyan and Bhimdi to construct a store-house godown. Far from doing so, he used the derogatory term Negro in respect of Bajirao. In those days, the Portuguese generally referred to the Hindus as "gentios" (uneducated) or negros (blackmen). From a letter written by Vassudev Joshi, Subedar of Kalyan on 8th of Ramzan, it is clear how enraged the Mahrattas were against the Portuguese at that time. This must have happened a few days before January 22, 1736.

Siddi Yakutkhan of Janjira wrote to the Viceroy on September 18, 1735 that Chhatrapati Shahu, in consonance with his long cherished desire to conquer the northern territory of the Portuguese, was about to send a big army and many Shenvis, Prabhus and such other Hindus from that area who were in league with him. Valentin de Gouveia,
Chief of Stores at Bassein, also wrote in his letter dated 2, November 1734 that it was learnt from very reliable sources that Chhatrapati Shahu was proceeding to Raigad with a big army to have himself coronated. There was rivalry between the widow of Daabhade and Bajirao as to who should exterminate the Siddi. Valentin Gouveia further added that all of them expected to be finished after the Siddi was done away with.\footnote{55}

Taking stock of this situation, the Portuguese agreed to keep Rajkot with Manaji and have the mosque demolished.\footnote{56} In a letter dated November 14, 1735, the Viceroy has said that Shahu had ordered Manaji to return Rajkot to Tajuddin Alikhan.\footnote{57} Bajirao did not succeed in his object of keeping the Kolaba fort in his possession, because, the General of Bassein writes that Manaji himself was opposed to it.\footnote{58} Bajirao only got Rajmachi and Kotia, both of which were hill forts. Bajirao defeated Sambhaji Angria and forced him to give Kolaba fort to Manaji. In April 1736, Siddi Sat attacked Manaji Angria Chimaji Appa, the Peshwa’s younger brother, defeated Siddi Sat at Kamarli, near Alibag. This ended the three-year campaign of the Mahrattas against the Siddi. As Bajirao was pre-occupied with the campaign against the Siddii, the Portuguese had an opportunity of building a castle at Thana. From 24 March 1733, Don Luiz Botelo was the General of Bassein. He quickly constructed the castle at Thana. On September 11, 1736, the Bombay English informed the Viceroy at Goa that Bajirao was making preparations to attack Thana and capture Salcette. The Viceroy informed Don Luiz Botelo about it in a letter dated 24 September 1736.

Lakshmibai Angria sent her Karbhari Bhanji Lakhmanji with a letter dated October 25, 1736 to see the Viceroy in Goa. What intrigue she was carrying on is not clear. She received only an oral reply from Goa.\footnote{59} She probably informed Goa about Bajirao’s movements in Salcette and Bassein. Six months afterwards, on April 6, 1737, on Saturday at 11 p.m. the Mahrattas captured a water-tower in Thana creek and entered Salcette.\footnote{60} On April 6 and 7, the Mahratta troops practically occupied the whole island. So the Portuguese had with them only Bandra, Versoa, Karanja or Uran and Bassein Castle. As the Bombay English sent help to the Portuguese at Bandra, it did not pass into Mahratta hands. At the time of the Mahratta invasion of
Thana, the General of Bassein, Don Luiz Botelo was in Thana. From there he went to Karanja and thereafter to Bassein.

On April 12, 1737, the news of Mahratta assault on Bassein reached Goa. On the same day, the Viceroy Conde de Sandomele ordered the General of Bassein that he should protect Dharavi with all his might. The importance of Dharavi as bastion of Bassein was as well known to the Mahrattas as to the Portuguese. In a letter No. 27 in part 16 of Peshwa Daftar it is said, "Dharavi is the nose of Bassein." On April 18, an army under Pedro de Melo was despatched to Bassein. The Viceroy dismissed General Don Luiz Botelo and appointed Antonio Cardim Froice in his place. He left Goa on May 18 and reached Bassein on May 23. Next day he took over from Botelo. A few days before Cardim reached Bassein, the Mahrattas had started building a fort on the Dongri Hill.

On May 26, 1737, Antonio Cardim attacked Dongri and turned out the Mahrattas from there. In his letter of May 28, 1737 he wrote, "I came to Bassein on May 23 and on May 26 I drove out the enemy from Dongri. I killed eighty of their men, exploded the fortress and beheaded their Captain." Antonio Cardim fancied that the Mahrattas would give rest to their troops during the rains. According to the Portuguese, about 25,000 soldiers were engaged in this campaign and it was difficult for them to move from place to place during the rains. But the Mahrattas sent select battalions on Bassein fort from Bahadurpur on June 9, 1737 in the early hours and attacked the fortification between Reis Magus and San Goncalo towers. The Portuguese say that 4000 men led this attack which lasted for half an hour. A number of men were killed. Next day, the Portuguese found three wounded men and 32 ascending frames. The Portuguese Chronicler, Diogo da Costa says that only two dead and five wounded were the casualties from the Portuguese side.  

The Mahrattas led on attack on the Bassein fort for the second time on September, 15, 1737. It was Sunday. About 2000 soldiers sealed the fortification. The assault lasted for an hour and a half but it was repulsed. As the Portuguese have recorded, 2000 Mahrattas were killed and 500 were wounded. But from the Shakavali in the Peshwa Daftar No. 359 in part 22 only about 500 were killed and about 500 were wounded. After the battle was over, the Portuguese found at
the base of the fortification 64 dead bodies and 44 scaling frames. Baji Bhivrao (Rethrekar) himself was wounded. The Portuguese sardar Pedro de Melo was also wounded. The Portuguese have written that several Mahratta Sardars fell in this battle.

The well-known historical research worker, Yeshwant Narsinha Kelkar has stated that the second attack of the Mahrattas on Bassein took place on July 8, 1737.\textsuperscript{63} It is true that in the Portuguese manuscript \textit{Relacao de Gerra} and \textit{successao de India} which the author has published, this date as of the first attack on Bassein has been mentioned, but Antonio Cardim himself in his letter dated August 29, 1737\textsuperscript{64} says that the enemy led an assault on Bassein Castle at night on June 9 but it proved futile. In his letter dated March 5, 1738\textsuperscript{65} he states that the Mahrattas had twice assaulted the Bassein fort. It is hardly necessary to say that Antonio Cardim's dates are more trustworthy than those given by chroniclers. Besides, the Goa Archives also support the dates given by Antonio Cardim.\textsuperscript{66}

Diogo de Costa who has written about the Bassein Campaign of the Mahrattas in his \textit{Relacao dos guerras de India} speaks of only these two attacks of June 9, 1737 and September 15, 1737. A manuscript (1487) in the library of the University at Coimbra contains the same information.

After the Mahrattas were repulsed twice from Bassein Castle, they besieged Mahim, Kelva and Shirgaon fortresses in October. Antonio Cardim states that the Mahrattas would have captured these forts but because he sent timely help to them, the enemy had to evacuate. (December 28, 1737 and January 27, 1738). Cardim had turned out the Mahrattas from Dongri i.e. Dharavi Hill on May 26, 1737., but on 30 November, 1737, 400 Hashams and 100 horsemen went up the top of the hill (aguada) and till February 1738, they established themselves there and fixed Cannons, thus obstructing the passage of ships in the fort of Bassein.

On 28, February 1738, Cardim once again attacked Dongri and routed the Mahrattas. In this skirmish, the Portuguese made captive 50 soldiers and their captain. The Portuguese found over 500 dead bodies of Mahrattas. Four Portuguese soldiers died and thirty were wounded on this occasion. One of them was a captain of footmen. Of the native soldiers of the Portuguese ten died and 20 were wounded.
Cardim wrote that he reconquered the Dharavi fortress only with the help of 200 Portuguese soldiers. Nearly were 400 Mahratta horsemen and 1000 footmen who had to witness this rout. On 9 March 1738, Chimaji attempted to take back Dongri hill from the Portuguese, but failed. He was very much hurt by this defeat. He wrote to Nanasahab, his nephew, 'Dharavi's iron has entered my heart and God knows it. What could be done? Nothing at the moment. Cardim in his letter, dated 5 March, 1738 said, “So far 12000 Mahrattas have died. Being numerous, they do not seem to be worried about it.”

The author has published the letters of Antonio Cardim and Pedro de Melo of December, 5. 1738 in Part V of Assentos do Conselho do Estado. These letters reveal how difficult the position of the Portuguese forces, engaged in this Bassein Campaign was. Antonio Cardim was a great general. Being well informed about the military power of the Mahrattas he demanded of the Viceroy that more troops should be sent to Bassein. But he had neither troops nor money to raise them. So Antonio Cardim resigned the Generalship of Bassein Castle.

On October 17, 1738, the Viceroy convened a meeting of his councillors and presented a list of the troops that were there in the vicinity of Bassein at the beginning of September 1738. It appears from this document that there were 897 soldiers of whom 521 were Portuguese and 376 native. Subtracting those on the sick list, there were only 755 soldiers. Besides these, 900 soldiers were engaged in the Bassein campaign. Of them 190 were on the Bassein Coast, 411 at Dongri, 77 in Ju vem, 144 at Mahim-Kelven and 78 at Karanja-Uran. From this authoritative information, it is clear that there were 3000 Mahrattas and under the command of Pilaji Jadhav, there were 7000 soldiers and 700 horsemen ready to go there. Such was the information of the Viceroy.

On 23 and 24 October 1738, troops from Portugal arrived in two ships. Among them were 478 Renoles but 145 of them were ill. So from Goa, it was possible to send only 480, men to Bassein. On November 1738, two frigates, three palas and three galveias left Goa for Bassein with these troops on board. On April 2, Martial Pedro de Mello was appointed General of Bassein. On December 4, 1738 he went to attack Reis fort in Thana. On December 8, a cannon shot
from the fort killed him. The Portuguese in Bassein received aid and supplies from sea from Goa and Daman. In order to stop this, Bajirao despatched in November 1738, 8,000 horsemen and 10,000 footmen under the command of Shankarajipant. The Mahratta armies marched towards Daman, captured Khattalvada, Umbargaon, Nargol and Dahanu and carried away standing crops. A Portuguese chronicler says that the Mahrattas even plundered the grain godowns near the fortifications of Daman. After such exploits in the neighbourhood of Daman, the Mahratta armies returned to Agashi and Bhadrapur. The Portuguese had kept Pardi in their possession so far but gave it up under orders of their superiors. Captain Domingos de Souza was then there.

After the death of Pedro de Mello, the Captain of the Bassein fort, Joao Xavier Pereira Pinto kept on the fight until Martinho de Silveira de Menezes took over as the General of Bassein province on 8, January 1739. He bravely kept on the struggle against the Mahrattas. The next day, the Mahrattas entered Mahim. Under the command of Chimaji Appa, Pilaji Jadhav and Shankarajipant, 8000 horsemen arrived in Bassein town. A day previously, 6000 Hashams of the Mahrattas had come. This army encircled Mahim Fort. There were 14 elephants, several horses and 12 camels in the Mahratta army as stated by the Portuguese Captain of Mahim on January 10, 1739.

In a statement made by leading persons in Mahim Fort describing the movements of the Mahrattas dated January 20, 1739 is available in Biblioteca Publica de Evora. The statement says, “The Mahrattas so furiously bombarded the fortifications through their 30 cannons that several breaches were caused. There are excellent foreign gunmen (Condestaveis) in the Mahratta army and they fling big boulders (morteiros) in the fort through their cannons. They were showering fire on the fort day and night. General Martiano de Silveira de Menezes sent a battalion from Bassein to aid Mahim. But in the face of the Mahratta firing, it took three days for it to enter the fort. This battalion consisted of only 50 Portuguese and 90 native soldiers. The ammunition they brought with them was consumed within two days. This fort has been holding out for a year and ten months and it is not possible to hold out longer. During the seige, the Mahrattas lost heavily in men and Shankarajipant’s brother Madojipant and forty-four
other leading Mahrattas were killed. Tonight the Mahrattas will explode the fort in a revengeful spirit for certain and therefore the Captain of the fort should open talks of peace, capitulate and save the lives of the people inside.”

The name of the Captain of Mahim was Antonio de Melo Pereira de Sousa. In deference to the statement of the inmates of the Fort, he opened surrender talks with Shankarajipant. Chimaji Appa was not then on the spot. The surrender deed was signed by the Captain and Shankaraji and the Mahrattas took possession of the fort on January 20, 1739. This treaty enjoins that in the name of Bajirao, the Portuguese should be allowed to depart with all their belongings but the minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Viceroy held on March 1, 1739 record that all the soldiers in Mahim were beheaded and the whole of the battalion that went from Bassein to the succour of Mahim was wholly chopped off by the Mahrattas.75 But in the letter from Martinho de Silveira dated February 18, 1739 it is stated that the enemy had kept all the Portuguese captives at Kalyan.76

After Mahim, the Mahrattas conquered Kelve and Shirgaon, two more Portuguese posts on January 21 and 22, 1739. Chimaji then proceeded with his army to Tarapore and laid siege to the fort. A Portuguese Chronicle says that Chimaji captured it on the seventh day but from a letter written by Chimaji himself, it appears that it was captured on 4 February 1739.77 The Portuguese chroniclers say that the Mahrattas had to sustain heavy damages in the fight for Tarapore. Baji Bhivrao Rethekar died in action. The Portuguese Captain of Tarapore Luiz Veleso Machado also died while fighting. There were many Portuguese women in the fort who were made captive but Chimaji gave them very decent treatment, according to a Portuguese chronicler.78 (Chimaji Apa os tratou com toda a decencia) Another writer has recorded that Chimaji Appa played the role of a perfect gentleman with the widow of Captain Luis Velezo.79 A story is current that Chimaji respectfully treated the wife of the General of Bassein and it has found place in even poetical compositions. The root of that story could be traced to this Tarapore incident.

Under the command of Haripant, 4000 Hashams and 500 cavalry were despatched from Tarapore to capture Asheri, which fell to the
Mahrattas without much effort on February 13 or 14. The Peshwa Shakavali says that Asheri was surrendered because the family of the Captain of Asheri were among the Tarapore Captives. Three days after, on 17 February, Chimaji went with his army to Bhadrapur which the Portuguese pronounced as Madrapur. Portuguese Chroniclers have said that the Mahratta army consisted of 25000 horsemen, 40000 footmen, 4000 mine-exploders, 5000 camels, 50 elephants and innumerable Pindaris. The Mahrattas formed advance-guards despite the fire the Portuguese were pouring from the towers of the castle. This was executed with such speed and discipline that the Chief Portuguese Engineer, Don Adriano de Gonvil was altogether amazed. A Portuguese chronicler says that the innumerable people's death from the cannonfire from the castle towers must be described as utter barbarism.\textsuperscript{80}

About this time, orders were given by the Viceroy to the General of Bassein, Martinho de Silveira that he should surrender all the forts in Bassein territory except Daman, Bassein, Diu, Revanda and Karanja (Uran). Accordingly, Pardi, Bandra, Versova and Dongri were given up for the Mahrattas to capture. On 20 February, they took possession of Versova. The Bombay English with Portuguese collaboration demolished Bandra fortifications on 5 April 1739. On 25 April, the Mahrattas captured Dongri. On 21 March, Manaji Angria had already taken possession of Karanja or Uran island. For the conquest of Uran, Manaji took 2000 men in his armada which comprised forty galvetas according to the description in Relação de Guerra manuscript in Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa. It was possible for the Portuguese to maintain the defence of Bassein after surrendering Dongri (Dharavi) but they did not have strength enough to defend Dongri. To the north of Bassein fort, the land side was free, but the Mahrattas had already established their sentinels there. All the three other sides were full of mud and sea water. Whatever was at all possible to be done to help Bassein was only by sea at grave risk.

In a meeting of the Councillors at Goa, one member expressed the opinion that even Bassein and Revdanda should be surrendered out of helplessness.\textsuperscript{81} In order to cut off all help from Goa to Bassein Salcete in Goa was invaded by Venkatrao Ghorpade under Bajirao’s orders on January 23, 1739. The Mahrattas occupied the whole of salcete except the two forts of Raitur and Mormugao. Dadajirao Bhave Nargundkar was Venkatrao’s colleague. On 5 March the Bhonsala Savant of
Savantavadi invaded Bardez and captured it. The Portuguese kept with them only Aguada and Reis Magus. On March 1, 1739 the Mahrrattas captured Ponda fort from the Prince of Saunde. This became a direct menace to Goa island. Under these circumstances, the Portuguese made a treaty of friendship with the Mahrrattas on May 6, 1739 at Rai. One clause in the treaty provided for making over the Bassein Castle to the Mahrrattas.

While these events were taking place in Goa, a severe battle was being fought in Bassein. On April 15, 1739, the General of Bassein, Martinho de Silveira, fell a victim to a bullet from the Mahrrattas while reconnoitring from the tower, Reme Deos. His place was taken by Caitano de Souza Pereira who kept on the fight. On 17 April 1739 he wrote a letter to the Viceroy in which he has showered panegyrics on the military acumen of the Mahrrattas. Another letter of his written on 17 August 1739 is also available which contains a detailed description of the battle of Bassein from April 17 to its fall on May 16. He says there were two lakh men engaged in the siege including soldiers and those behind them. During the last two days alone over 10000 of them must have lost their lives. In the letter of 17 April, he said that over 50000 soldiers were going to lead an assault on the fortifications of the Castle. Inside the Bassein Castle, there were 1200 Hindus. Caitano de Sousa Pereira turned out 1000 of them with the consent of the Viceroy, because it was feared that they might rebel. Besides, there was paucity of foodgrains.

The author came across a copy of the letter that Chimaji Appa had sent to Chhatrapati Shahu, in Goa Archives. The whole of this letter is very important. Appasaheb writes, “The Portuguese fought courageously like true soldiers. For four and a half hours, the Portuguese showered fire on us. The Mahrratta soldiers took in all this fire and bore it. It was the limit of forbearance. There was no such resistance before.” Because of the Mahrratta assault in this manner, the situation inside the castle deteriorated very much on May 13 and 14. During the course of the day on May 13, the Mahrrattas led eleven and on May 14 six severe attacks on San Sebastiao and Reme Deos towers. Between San Sebastiao and Cavaleiro towers, the explosions of mines by the Mahrrattas had made a breach. Four thousand Mahrrattas attempted to push through it. But the Portuguese fire made it futile.
On May 15 and 16, Caetano de Sousa Pereira conferred with his leading subordinates and came to the conclusion that it was impossible to defend the fort longer and on 16th May, the Portuguese flew the white flag, indicating surrender and appeal for peace. Pereira appointed Pedro de Rego Barreto de Gama e Castro to carry on peace talks with Chimaji Appa and a treaty was made on 16 May 1739, between the Mahrattas and the Portuguese. On May 23, the Portuguese left the castle to the accompaniment of band music and Chimaji took possession of it. He had written to Gangaji Naik Anjurkar at the beginning of the campaign of Bassein that the Portuguese were not very affluent people; when starved they would come to terms. It happened exactly like that. They were starved on every front. Supplies from Goa and Daman stopped and they had no alternative left, but to surrender the castle.

In the Bassein battle, the Portuguese lost 500 Portuguese and 350 native soldiers. Besides, quite many of them were beheaded according to the manuscript, sucessos do India in Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa. Reports of Cardim and Pereira show that 22000 Mahrattas lost their lives in this battle. Chhatrapati Shahu gave the same figure to Gordon. After the battle of Bassein only Diu, Daman and Revdanda remained with the Portuguese. This war went on for 25 months and a half. This Bassein campaign is an excellent illustration of the military strategy of the Mahrattas. The Portuguese have written about the valour of the Mahrattas that they exhibited in this campaign.

Viceroy Marquez de Alorna, in his letter written to the King of Portugal on 27 December 1745 says: 86

"A ultima perda da Provincia do Norte nao so diminuiu o Dominio e a renda do estado, mas tambem o credito e o respeito que nos tinha os vizinhos de que antes se nao fazia cazo, e nos erao, sumissos rebelarao-se contra nos e converterao-se em inimigos mais perigosos por estazem mais a porta, aproveitarao-se da nossa fraqueza para insultarnos, e intentarem expulsar-nos deste paiz, e ainda agora o Bonsulo nao perde de vista esta idea a nos suscita inimigos ao longe a procura contra nos a sua alianca."

The gist of this passage is that being compelled to give up their north Konkan territory, the Portuguese lost in power, prestige and revenue. The Asian people lost the confidence they had in the Portuguese and
the respect they had for them. Their neighbours like Savant-Bhonsle of Savantavadi and others who were afraid of them were busy making efforts to turn them out of India. People in Portugal were astonished to see that the Mahrattas observed the terms of the treaty loyally and well.\footnote{87}

_SashtiChi Bakhar_ describes how the Portuguese resorted to religious persecution of the Hindus and it conforms to a great extent to what obtains in Portuguese sources. Like the Christianisation of Tiswadi, Salcete and Bardez in Goa, the Christianisation of Bassein was effected on one and the same principle. “Cuins regio, illius religio” is that principle. It means the people of a kingdom have the same religion that its ruler professes. In Goa Archives, there is a manuscript entitled “Provisoes a favouro da Cristandade”. Its name previously was “Livoer do Pai de Cristaos”. There are authoritative copies of all laws passed from time to time for the dissemination of Catholicism among the people under Portuguese rule.\footnote{8} They afford a clear idea of how the Portuguese persecuted non-Christians. As a matter of fact such laws were in vogue in Portugal for many years intended for the Jews and the Mussalmans. Later on laws on the same pattern were made for Hindus and Muslims in Goa and Bassein. Probably, people in Bassein had to suffer even more rigorous persecution than people in Goa did. The vattandar in that Province had to submit a report of his efforts for the spread of Christianity among Hindus and Muslims in their respective villages.\footnote{80}

There is a letter in Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon which was written by Anji Naik (Anjurkar?) to the King of Portugal from Bassein on December 18, 1549.\footnote{90} From that letter and the Chronicle of Salcete and Bassein, the feelings of the Hindus in that territory can be gauged.\footnote{91} The Inquisition was established in Goa in 1560. It was really meant for Jews and Christians and not for the Hindus. But Pope Gregory XIII had promulgated a bull named _incipit Antiqua indocrum improbitos_ and on that authority the Inquisition applied it to Hindus also in some respects.\footnote{92} There is a manuscript called _Repertrio Geral_ in Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa in which are recorded the 3800 cases made by the Inquisition in Goa from 1565 to 1615; it is written by Joao Degaldo Figeira.\footnote{93} Many Hindu names appear in it. It is true that Hindu offenders were not burnt
They were either whipped or transported. The transportation had often to be served in such distant lands as Mozambique in Africa. In 1774 the Goa Inquisition was abolished when one Babu Shenvai of Uskai (Bardez) was serving transportation sentence along with a number of Christians. The Goa Inquisition caught hold of orphans below 14 and baptised them from 1645. Even the Viceroy was incapable of acting against the Inquisition. It brought under its administration even pregnant Hindu widows. In a letter dated April 19, 1737 addressed to Maiz de Santo Officio, the Viceroy says that one reason why the Hindus in Bassein allied with the Mahrattas was their persecution by the Inquisition. The Viceroy has further said that the Captain of Salcette Joao de Souza Ferras had informed him that if the Hindus in Bassein were left free to follow their religious practices as they were in Diu, far from cooperating with the Mahrattas, they would have turned them out of Bassein and therefore the maiz should consider this point well and give him the right counsel.

Of course, the Inquisition authorities were wholly indifferent to the conciliatory gesture of the Viceroy and they refused to alter the traditional practices of the Inquisition. There was one more important reason why the Salcete-Bassein Hindus allied with the Mahrattas. The Portuguese had immensely oppressed the people by levying harshly cesses on the people and at least in the early stages exploited rigorously the labourers while erecting the castle at Thana. Great discontent prevailed in Salcete on this account and they helped the Mahrattas to establish themselves in Salcete. In a letter written by Siddi Yakut Khan it is stated that Chhatrapati Shahu aspired for many years to capture Bassein territory. Some historians take the view that Baji Rao invaded Bassein in order to establish Mahrashtra Dharma. This view is supported by Sashtichi Bakhar and some contemporary Marathi documents. Damaji Gaikwad, Samsher Bahadur writes: The Portuguese persecuted Hindus. Therefore Appa Saheb invaded Bassein territory and captured one or two places. (Peshwa Daftar Part XVI, p. 135). Amritrao Shankar Dinkarrao also congratulates Chimaji Appa for having conquered Bassein in the following words: "Since success has been achieved in Bassein, the establishment of Hindu raj will be carried out (by you). (Peshwa Daftar, Part XVI. p. 136).}

There is a contemporary Marathi chronicle by Balaji Ganesh in
Bibliothe Nationale de Paris (Chronique de Shivadji, Ms. 661) in which the following sentence occurs: In the Bassein campaign twelve to fourteen Hashams died. Appa Saheb exerted his utmost to conquer Firangana and establish the rule of Hindu Dharma.

Yet, the Portuguese sources appear to make out that the Bassein campaign had not much to do with religious considerations. There was some cursory discussion about the Portuguese permitting Goa Hindus to observe their religious customs and traditions during peace negotiations between the Portuguese and the Mahrattas. The Mahrattas had made suggestions to the Portuguese to the effect that the Inquisition should exercise no authority over the Hindus and the 'Shendi tax' should not be imposed upon them. But they were not stressed later and in the treaty that was ultimately signed all clauses regarding religious concessions to the Hindus were dropped. Even the Viceroy has said that the Mahrattas did not show much keenness about Hindu religious matters during several discussions on treaties between the Mahrattas and the Portuguese.

According to Portuguese sources, the main reason behind the Bassein campaign was expansion of territory and through that to secure ports on the western coast. The contemporary manuscript (F. G. 1605) Relacao de guerra in Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa says: “In taking possession of Salcette the object is not only to exploit the fertile lands over there, but also perhaps to resort to piracy from Versova as base of operations. On the strength of the practice of this vocation, the notorious Angria became so rich and powerful.” Viceroy Conde de Sandoomele also held the same opinion. In his letter dated 20 November 1738 he ways; “For long I have thought that the object of the enemy in this fight is to secure a port on the coast and became powerful on the seas also.”

Having this at the back of his mind, Conde de Sandoomele intended to write on 27 January, 1739 the following letter to Chhatrapati Shahu. He says, “I believe that you have entered into this battle because you desire to have a port on the coast that will be suitable for commercial and allied interests of your State. If that is so, we shall have no objection to cede to you such a port and fort.” Even the English of Bombay did not hold a different opinion as to the objects of the aggression in Bassein and Salcette. The Governor of Bombay in his
letter dated September 23, 1737 has written. Their apparent chief aim has for a long time been getting a sea port for themselves . . . . and this view of acquiring a port or settlement of the sea coast must be considered as the principal motive that hath determined the Mahrattas to this invasion, though, perhaps, it may have been hastened by the well-grounded complaints of their Gentoo Brethren under the Portuguese Government who have been made frequent examples of the cruelty of the Inquisition which hath been exercised upon those unhappy subjects with equal severity, ignorance and superstition.” (Bombay to Company, October, 1737, Orme Mss. No. 124).

From a letter written by Yesaji Raghunath to Bajirao, it is clear that the Mahrattas desired to exercise power over the sea as they did on the land. Yesaji says, “Your glory spreads every day in all directions. But do you not aspire to own an area in Konkan and spread your glory in lower Konkan and the sea as it has spread up the ghauts?” The Portuguese statesman Bispu de Alicarnaco has written in 1712 that after capturing Bassein the Mahrattas have immediately started building warships at Arnala (Ilhas de Vacas) and they have their big armada there. A Portuguese chronicle mentions that the Mahrattas used to say on the strength of the sanad of Sardeshmukhi that the Moghul Emperor had given to Shahu in 1719 that the Mahrattas had the presogative of extending their authority in the Portuguese territory in Konkan.

A detailed description of the prowess of the Mahrattas in the Bassein campaign is to be found in Vasaichi Mohim by Y. N. Kelkar who made quite a generous use of the author’s two Portuguese books on this topic. But it will be proper to sum up in brief the information that became available to the author after Kelkar’s book was published.

First of all it must be noted that when Bajirao invaded Goa, it was not his intention to conquer that territory for all time. This conclusion is inescapable after the perusal of several Marathi chronicles. Bajirao was compelled to attack Goa in order to stop supplies of men and materials to Bassein by sea. According to the treaty of Warna, Goa territory fell in the orbit of the Chhatrapati of Kolhapur and so the Chhatrapati of Satara did not consider it right to meddle with Goa. Besides, Bajirao may have thought that the Portuguese would offer stiff resistance in Goa.
There is a letter in Goa Archives sent by Annahipant, envoy of the Prince of Saunde to the Secretary of the Viceroy, Dr. Luis Affonso Dantas on October 6, 1737 in which it is said, “I hear from up the ghauts that Bajirao is going to invade this territory. Savant Bhonsla is being instructed to be ready for this event in all respects. You may have learnt it from him or otherwise. Letters have also gone to the Prince of Saunde, though what they contain is not known. But what is he going to do by coming to this side? These things have happened before. Twenty-five thousand soldiers came from Bijapur. Shivaji and Sambhaji also tried their hands. What the effect of all this was is well known. So Bajirao will go the same way. There is a rumour that the Moghul is marching on him. God will save Goa and defeat the enemy.”

It is remarkable that these are the thoughts of a Hindu statesman who was a neighbour of Goa.

In a letter of Sardar Ramkrishna Chimnaji of Shahu’s Court, it is said, “Some people think that Goa is a more difficult place than Bassein. It is no use sending armies there, because the Portuguese will not pay. That is why no forces were sent on Goa. Bassein keeps strong, because help from Goa reaches there frequently. Forces were to be kept in Savant-Bhonsla’s territory and in Karnatak to exercise pressure. When Vyankatrao went and took over Salcete and Bardez, the Chhatrapati and others were surprised. They were encouraged to see that it was easier to take Goa than Bassein.”

A contemporary Portuguese report says that when Bajirao invaded Goa and conquered some territory, Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur was much incensed.\textsuperscript{113}

It is well known that many Hindus from Bassein allied with the Mahrattas during the Bassein Campaign. Portuguese sources mention that some Hindus in Goa also allied with the Mahrattas when Vyankatrao invaded Goa. But their names are not known.\textsuperscript{114}

Goan Hindus were originally with the Portuguese, but when they saw that the Mahrattas were the winning party they went over to them according to a charge made by the Chief of the Inquisition.\textsuperscript{115} But he was unable to produce any evidence in support of the charge. On the contrary, many a respectable Hindu, at least to all appearances, helped
the Portuguese to the last. Some of them were: Vyankati Kamat, Upya Kamat, Babulya Shenai Sukhtankar, Baburao Desai of Narve, Santu Shenai Dangi, Vitthoji Shenay Dhume, Bhagvan Kamat Vagh etc.¹¹⁶

One source that alleges that Goan Hindus had gone over to the Mahrattas during the invasion of Goa is a manuscript No. 4180 in Biblioteca Nacional da Lisboa. This was written by a learned Portuguese who was in Goa in 1744. It is said therein that a certain Hindu brought the Mahrattas in Goa in the battle of 1739 and he was sentenced to death. The name of this Hindu is not given in the manuscript and the author did not find it even after a vigorous search in Goa Archives. Another source is a Portuguese report on the Mahratta invasion of Goa which undoubtedly is a very valuable, authentic source. Its title is Relacao sumaria dos Successos de Goa com e guerra do Maratta. When Bhonsala of Savantvadi invaded Bardez, many people went over to him according to this report, but their names are not given.

The well-known Goan learned Padre, Sebastiao Rego gave a sermon in Goa in 1745 in which he said that Hindus in Goa assured Mahrattas that the Portuguese were unable to resist them and helped them to enter Bardez and Salcette. On top of this, people were then saying that the Hindus had conspired with the Mahrattas for making over Goa city to them. But even this writer depends only on rumour for support. From this sermon, the Padre’s prejudice against the Hindus is only laid bare.

As a matter of fact the Christians in Goa and especially the Padres like Sebastiao Rego, were very jealous of the Hindus. They believed that the Hindus of Goa, by and large, favoured the Mahrattas. They were also jealous of the wealth of the Hindu traders. Their expectation was that trade and commerce in Goa should be predominantly in Christian hands.¹¹⁷ These Padres held the view that the State of Goa rightfully belonged to the Christians and Hindus should not have even the right to live there.¹¹⁸ There was a Portuguese writer in Goa in 1725 who held that the decline of Goa began when the Hindus began to enjoy religious concessions in Goa.¹¹⁹

These Padres’ hatred for Hindus reached a saturation point when they saw that in the war of 1739, the Mahrattas were winning one
success after another over the Portuguese. The Chief of the Inquisition even brought a resolutin in the meeting of the State Concil held on 11 March 1739 that the wealth of all Hindus in Goa be consically and they be turned out of Goa. The inquisition had made a similar attempt before, though it was unsuccessful. Rumours were spread in those days that the Hindus were secretly in league with the Mahrattas. The Viceroy had kept under detention several leading Hindus in Mormugao fort on 10, March 1739 on the ground that they were likely to be persecuted and tortured by the Padres.

One such canard brought one rich Hindu trader in serious trouble. Phondu Kamat lived at Paneli near Goa. A canard spread in the town that 400 armed solders of the enemy were concealed in his mansion. This was on 8 March 1739. Taking advantage of this, many padres and their Christian followers raided Kamat’s mansion and plundered whatever they could lay their hands on. Viceroy Conde de Sandomene himself went there on horseback and in order to pacify the people, he placed under arrest Phondu Kamat and his brother-in-law Vithoji Naik Prataprao Sardesai. On inquiry, it was found that the charge against him was baseless. In place of 400 armed Mahrattas, only half a dozen of Vithoji Naik Sardesai’s soldiers were found. On the day this padre-led raid on Kamat’s house took place, some Christians also plundered many Hindu shops.

Some rioters insulted even Conde de Sandomene on this occasion and they did not hesitate to allege that he was in the pay of Hindus. Really speaking, even the Viceroy’s outlook on matters relating to Hindus and their religion was unsympathetic and harsh. The Portuguese were wholly uncousious of the principle of toleration in those days. An illustration would be in point in this connection. In 1735, A Hindu recluse came down the ghaut to bathe in the holy waters of Narve, but lost his way and came to Goa. The Portuguese arrested him and with the consent of Conde de Sandomele forcibly converted him to Christianity in the Bom Jesus Church at Goa. Illustrations of this kind can be multiplied with reference to Conde de Sandomele. Whatever that may be, it is clear from the case of Phondu Kamat, that he was against injustice being done.

On 23 January 1739, the Mahratta army under the command of Sardar Vyankatrao Ghorpade descended on Salcete through Digahi.
Ghat. He was accompanied by Dadajirao Bhave Nargundkar, Jiwaji Shinde and others. Vyankatrao was the brother-in-law of Bajirao and Chimaji. Dadajirao was the nephew of Ramrao Bhave. Ramrao had carried away a loot of over five lakh asurpis from Salcete in Goa on 25 April 1717. On this account he had earned a bad name in Goa. On behalf of Bajirao (Shahu) Vyankatrao Ghorpade and on behalf of Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur, Dadajirao Bhave were the leading men in this invasion of Goa.

The Viceroy had come to know about a month previously from Captain Inchbird of the Bombay English and Narsingrao, Captain of Mardangad that Vyankatrao Ghorpade would march on Goa. Besides, a Sardar of the Court of the Bhonsla of Savantvadi had informed the Viceroy that Bajirao had got the Bhonsla of Savantvadi and Sambhaji Angria to join him in this invasion of Goa. But the Portuguese had neither the men nor the money required for resisting this aggression. This is apparent from the statement that the Viceroy had made in the meeting of his Councillors on 17 October 1738. Viceroy Marquez de Lourical wrote on 20 September, 1741 that in the days of Conde de Sandomele there were only 1,156 paid soldiers.

A Portuguese report of those days says that the Mahratta army comprised 4,000 cavalry, 6,000 infantry and two thousand Pindaris. The biography of Shahu by Malhar Ramrao Chitnis says “Vyankatrao Narayan with 10,000 Hashams and equipment was sent.” Another Portuguese report says that there were 3,000 horsemen, 6,000 footmen and 2,000 unarmed Pindaris. In his letter to the Viceroy written in the beginning of February 1739, Nagu Savant Bhonsla says that the army consisted of from 5,000 to 6,000 horsemen and 2,000 footmen. Yet another contemporary report has it that there were 2,000 horsemen and 4000 footmen. This figure is more trustworthy, because the same has been given by Conde de Sandomele. A letter written by the Sardar of Ponda, Narsingrao on 23 January 1739 at 6 p.m. to the Viceroy is available in Goa Archives which says that he was informing the movements of the army to the Portuguese Government from the moment it camped at Khanapur. There was no worth while resistance to the Mahratta army. It took Margao on January 25 and camped near the town.
Tuku Naik, a captain of native soldiers in the fort of Cuncolim joined with his battalion the Mahratta army as soon as he learnt that the Mahrattas had captured the fort of Margao. The people in Ponda and specially the villagers of Marcaim gave every kind of help to Vyankatrao’s army. The brave Kharvis of Durbate assured Vyankatrao that they would help him to enter the island of Goa with alacrity. Not only this, but they captured an armed ship of the Portuguese (galia) in the early hours of 4 February in the Rasai river and made it over to the Mahrattas.

Because of the co-operation of the people of Ponda, Vyankatrao captured Mardangad without firing a single shot. Govind Ram Thakur, Dewan of Vyankatrao, marched on Ponda at the head of 500 horsemen when Narsingrao, Captain of the fort himself, opened the gates of the Fort and surrendered himself and the fort to the Mahrattas. Immediately, the Mahrattas captured the fort of Usgaon. All this happened on 1 March 1739. A few days later, Vyankatrao took Sangem and Supem without any opposition and kept his army there.

The Portuguese were frightened out of their wits when they learnt that Ponda was captured by the Mahrattas. Ponda was next door to Goa and they feared that the Mahrattas would attack Goa town any moment. The canard spread in Goa that Vyankatrao had announced at Margao that after entering Goa he would ride in a palanquin to be carried over the shoulders of four Inquisitors which terrified them and he would set free all their prisoners according to a contemporary Portuguese report. The Mahrattas captured Salcete, but the Portuguese did not surrender the two forts of Raitur and Mormugao. At this time there was some intrigue going on between the Bhonsla of Savantvadi and the Portuguese.

On February 16, 1739, the Mahrattas besieged Raitur fort. On the same day, the Viceroy had thanked the Bhonsla of Savantvadi for having refused to co-operate. Ramchandra Savant and Jairam Savant were ruling at Savantvadi whose Karbhari was Deoba Vishram Sabnis, whom the Portuguese described as the Demosthenis of the Bhonsla. Deoba’s brother Minoo Shenvi was a trader at Divadi in Portuguese territory. He was a son-in-law of Santoppa Naik, who was a wealthy merchant of Goa. On this account, Minoo Shenvi and Deoba Vishram came in contact with the Portuguese Viceroy. At the
begining of March, the Bhonsla informed the Viceroy that Bajirao was pressing him to invade Bardez. So if the Portuguese desired peace with him, they should return Khorjuve and Pânale to him. Also the tribute of one thousandst asurpis that he was paying to the Portuguese should be remitted. Besides, the expenditure that he had incurred for two months to protect Bardez from Bajirao's army should be given to him by the Portuguese. These conditions were not acceptable to the Portuguese and on 5 March 1739 the Bhonsla invaded Bardez and captured it in deference to the wishes of the Peshwa.

The sons of Vishram Sabnis had informed Minoo Shenvi, in advance that this invasion was expected and they had given even the precise timing and Minoo Shenvi duly kept the Portuguese posted with it. One Portuguese account says that even after the Portuguese had this information, it was not possible for them to protect Bardez, because a number of people of Bardez had already gone over to the Savantvadi camp and so those Goan soldiers who were in the neighbourhood of Kamurla made way for the Mahrattas to enter Bardez. The Portuguese decided only to guard Aguada and Reis Magus and give up the rest of Bardez. It is no wonder that there was great commotion in Goa because Bardez and Salcete had passed on to the Mahrattas and Ponda was already in their hands except the Raitur, Marmugao, Aguada and Reis Magus forts.

On March 8, 1739, all women and children in Goa and the nuns in the Monic monastery were removed to Mormugao fort. On the Mahrattas entering Salcete, many Christian families went to Goa island with all their valuables. They feared that the Mahrattas would enter Goa also and everybody tried to run to Mormugao. In a letter written to Chimaji Appa, Dadajirao Bhave said: "We are after Goa also. But all have fled away and only desolate houses have remained. We shall act as all of us will decide." Many cattle from Goa had fled to the coast. Vyankatrao wrote to the Captain of Sidhudurg that they should be taken away as loot but Raghaji Thorat did not carry out the suggestion of Vyankatrao, out of a desire to show fraternal sympathy with the Portuguese.

People in Goa recalled the days of the invasion of Sambhaji in 1683, but their hope then was that help from the Moghul would come. No help from Portugal was possible. So the Viceroy requested
help from the Pondicherry French and the Bombay English.\textsuperscript{147} On February 27, 1739, a Dutch armada came near Goa. The Viceroy offered to give the Dutch the Cheul fort and asked their help against the Mahrattas but the Dutch declined the offer.\textsuperscript{148}

From January 27, 1739, the Portuguese were eager to enter into a treaty with the Mahrattas. The Viceroy tried for it in various ways before Vyankatrao came to Goa. He tried to establish contact directly with Chhatrapati Shahu, through Naro Ram Mantri but he was convinced that no treaty was possible without Bajirao's consent\textsuperscript{149} and so he at last beseeched Vyankatrao for a treaty on 8 March 1739. The whole account of this treaty is very instructive and though Marathi documents do not give much information, the Portuguese records are regular and consistent. This research throws a flood of light on the character of Sardar Dadajirao Bhave Nargundkar and what is surprising is that several Marathi letters of Dadajirao and his son Bhaskarrao support the inferences that can be drawn from the Portuguese papers.\textsuperscript{150}

A number of rich Hindu merchants lived in Goa. Several of them were greatly attached to the Portuguese. Because their connections were with Brazil, Macao, Mozambique and other Portuguese colonies, they earned rich profits. Portuguese records of those days clearly show that well known Hindu business men like Phoudu Kamat supplied information regarding the Mahrattas to the Portuguese and offered other help.\textsuperscript{151} High officials of the Portuguese also maintained cordial relations with them. The Viceroy hatched the project of postponing the battle by trying to bribe some sardars of the Mahrattas through these Hindu merchants. Before that he made arrangements to despatch supplies of food and arms and men to Raitur so that the Captain could maintain his resistance. Sardar Dadajirao was very obliging to the Portuguese in this matter and a bribe of 70,000 asturpis was fixed for him and 12,000 were immediately paid to him as first instalment through Vyankati Kamat, a rich Hindu merchant. This intrigue was managed through Mahadaji Shenvi, Karbhari of Dadajirao. Mahadaji Shenvi was related to Babulya Shenvi Sukhtankar. The Portuguese used him to win over Dadajirao.

A manuscript in Portuguese, purporting to be a report on the invasion of Goa by Vyankatrao, says that Vyankati Kamat was called to Agshi (Agacim) and sent to the Mahratta camp. After returning from there
he said that he made an agreement with Madu Shenvi and Dadajirao that Dadajirao should resort to delaying tactics in regard to assault on Raitur and till the treaty negotiation started he should allow the Portuguese to send help to the fort. For this assistance he should be paid 70,000 *asurpis* of which 12,000 should be paid forthwith. Of this sum Dadaji should keep 10,000 and 2,000 should be paid to his Karbhar, Madu (Madhavaji) Shenvi. They were compelled to do this under the pressure of a very difficult situation.\textsuperscript{153}

The same report says further: “The garrison of Raitur held out for many days in the hope that a treaty was in the offing. All the same, the threat of an assault was there all the time. One attack was made but it was not forceful. Dadajirao told the Portuguese envoy assuredly that the assault was made without his consent and he raised obstruction in order that it might not be effective. He also gave the assurance that the army under his command would not raise impediments in the way of the Portuguese who were carrying aid to the Raitur garrison. There was paucity of grain in the fort.” \textsuperscript{154}

Portuguese records show that Sardar Dadajirao Bhave had accepted bribes from the Portuguese and established fraternal relations with them. The working of Dadaji’s mind can also be followed on the basis of some of his letters. In a letter written to the Portuguese Viceroy Marquez de Louriçala.\textsuperscript{155}

In a letter written to Chimaji Appa in 1739 Dadaji wrote that the Portuguese were sinners and they must be destroyed.\textsuperscript{156} The same Dadaji wrote to the Viceroy Marquez de Louriçala that the Portuguese were good for conversation, honest in word and action, true to the word once given. That was the intelligence he received as soon as he came down the ghat and therefore decided to save Goa. In another letter to the same Viceroy in February 1742 he says that the Viceroy had to pay attention to all directions. Goa was recently saved. He only desired to be more and more serviceable. He had also sent a letter to the Secretary saying that he had saved Goa. Until he was murdered in 1742 \textsuperscript{157} his fraternising with the Portuguese went on as could be verified from correspondence in Goa Archives.

Dadaji’s son Bhaskar Rao wrote to Vitthoji Shenvi Dhume that his father had cultivated a special kind of friendship with the Portuguese in Goa over all others. The Portuguese were very good-natured, true
to their word and their action conformed with it and very brave too. They could not be compared with any others on this earth. His father always impressed this on his mind and he found that out by personal experience. This Bhaskar Rao, in another letter to the Secretary, tells him that his father had served Goa and gained Goa’s favour. In yet another letter he said his father earned the enmity of others but he fraternised with the Portuguese. He also told Bhaskar Rao that he had cultivated the friendship of the Portuguese and they would be helpful to him (Bhaskar Rao). The author can multiply extracts on these lines to any length.

At the beginning, Vyankati Kamat went to see Dadajirao on behalf of the Portuguese for the treaty talks. Later Dadaji asked the Viceroy to send some influential Portuguese to continue the talks and so Antonio Carneiro de Alcântara and Jose Pedro Emao were nominated by the Portuguese. On March 11, 1739 these Portuguese Fidalgos, Bhagoon Kamat Vagh, Vyankati Kamat and Upya Kamat with their retinue went to Kelshi on the bank of the Zuari. On reaching Kelshi, Dhondobara, Govindpant Thakur and Mahadaji Shenvi went to receive the Portuguese envoys. The Mahratta sardars had with them 50 horsemen, one elephant and 150 armed men. A reception was given to them in the residence of the Jesuits. The same evening, the Portuguese returned to Goa.

The next day on March 12, they met Sardar Vyankatrao in his tent at Rai. Two chairs were placed in the tent for the Portuguese envoys. Near them sat Vyankatrao, Dadajirao and Sambhaji Shinde. On a bench nearby Sayaji Gujar and Manaji Paigude had their seats allocated. On the same bench Govindpant Thakur and Mahadaji Shenvi on one side and Venkati Kamat and Upya Kamat were given seats. On either side of the envoys, the interpreters and others from their retinue stood up. In this initial interview, representatives of both sides made short speeches after which the Portuguese envoys appealed for a truce. Vyankatrao agreed to one day’s truce and the Portuguese envoys left.

After three days, a message was sent to the Portuguese envoys by Vyankatrao that a trusted Portuguese representative and an interpreter should see him. Accordingly Bhagoon Kamat Vagh, Joao Lobo, Vyankati Kamat and Babulya Shenvi Sukhtanker called upon
Vyankatrao. Govindpant Thakur told them that Bajirao was an enemy of the Portuguese and he had humbled the Moghul by his military power. The Moghul Empire included also Adilshahi and Nizamshahi. The Portuguese had usurped the territory that they had in their possession from Bijapur Adilshahi. Bajirao had already conquered Thana, Bassein as well as Salcete and Bardez. Only Goa had remained to be taken and he could do so without much effort. After saying all this Govindpant Thakur informed the Portuguese representatives that there was no hope for the Portuguese to regain any of the conquered territory and added that if the Portuguese wanted to keep the Goa island with them they should pay the balance of 60 years in gold at the rate of three khandis a year which they had agreed to pay Chhatrapati Sambhaji. Besides they must also allow the Hindus in Goa to build temples. The Inquisition should have no authority over them and the Shendi cess should be abolished.¹³⁰

In reply, Joao Lobo, the Portuguese representative said that Salcete and Bardez were not usurped but were presented to the Portuguese King by Mealkhan. Govindpant retorted that the Portuguese had deceived Bijapur and in the same way put Bahadurshah to death by unfaithful conduct at Bassein and that is why the place was known after his name as Bahadurpura. Vyankati Kamat said that there was no written documentary proof about the Portuguese having agreed to give three Khandis of gold every year to Sambhaji. Next day, Govindpant Thakur wrote out the conditions of peace and handed over to Bhagoon Vagh, the interpreter. The Portuguese envoy, Alcaçova was amazed to see the Portuguese translation of the conditions but said nothing.

Vagh wrote, “Two Portuguese envoys met Sardar Dadajirao accompanied by Upya Kmat. I do not know what transpired between them. But one day, Dadajirao sent word to the envoys that they should see him.¹⁶⁰ A copy of the letter that Viceroy Conde de Sandomele wrote to Dadajirao on March 11, 1739 is in Goa Archives. It says “Although Bajirao wants to take Portuguese territory, Mahadaji Vithal has told us that Dadajirao wants to maintain peace and so I have sent Antonio Carneiro de Alcaçova for discussing terms of the treaty.”¹⁶¹ The other Portuguese envoy Jose Pedro Emaous fell ill but Alcaçova continued the talks. He met Dadaji and carried on discussion with
Mahadaji Shenvi. Mahadaji wrote down his conditions and gave the paper to Alcaçova.

The Portuguese envoy sent both the documents of conditions, one from Govindpant Thakur and the other from Mahadaji Shenvi to the Viceroy on March 18, 1739 and consideration was given to them in the meeting of the State Council on March 23, 1739. This meeting decided that though the text of the treaty speaks of a treaty between Bajirao and the Viceroy, Bajirao was a servant of Chhatrapati Shahu and so the treaty should be between Shahu and the Viceroy or Bajirao as the authorised agent of Shahu and the Viceroy, because even the treaty of 1722 was made under the authority of Shahu. But the Portuguese Viceroy soon learnt the high position and authority of Bajirao.

Shivaji Devji, a close friend of Naroram Mantri reached Goa as from Chhatrapati Shahu on March 27, 1739. He brought letters to the Viceroy and asked the Viceroy to send envoys to Satara. Shivaji Deoji also brought an order from Shahu on Vyankatrao asking him to postpone fighting but the Viceroy knew that it was of no avail. In a manuscript purporting to be an account of Bajirao’s invasion of Goa, it is said, “Everyone knows that Bajirao does not carry out the orders of Shahu and his Sardars Vyankatrao and Dadajirao are so indifferent to Shahu’s name appearing in the treaty document. So they will not attach any importance to the Chhatrapati’s order.”

Even while knowing what the effect of Shahu’s order would be, the Viceroy respectfully sent Shivaji Deoji to the Mahratta camp in Salcete. The report referred to above says that though Shivaji Deoji was not given the right reception, the Chhatrapati’s letter was useful to a certain extent and the Portuguese envoy was not detained by Vyankatrao till the treaty was signed. Being aware of the true situation, the Portuguese statesmen did not think it fit to run to Shahu for a treaty. So they took much time to send a reply to Shahu with Shivaji Deoji who had come from Satara and wanted to return without delay. In this connection Shivaji Deoji writes to the Secretary to the Viceroy on 6 April, 1739 that it was 25 days since he left Satara and eleven since he reached Goa. He was asked to return post-haste. Even after two meetings nothing seemed to result. He could not stay
longer. If the Chhatrapati had any idea that such would be the state of things, he would not have sent him at all to Goa.

It is obvious from a letter written by Dadajirao on April 14, 1739 that Raitur was about to fall to the Mahrattas. The Portuguese also knew that the Mahrattas would easily take it. The Goa Government was anxious to make a treaty before that happened. One of the conditions made by Govindpant Thakur was that Hindus in Portuguese territory should have the same religious freedom that they had in Savantvadi and no shendi cess should be levied on them. Even among the conditions of Mahadaji Shenvi the condition of religious freedom and exemption from the authority of the Inquisition was there. On 2 April, 1739, Mahadaji Shenvi presented fresh conditions on behalf of Vyankatrao and Dadajirao to the Portuguese envoys. Even these fresh conditions contained these old conditions regarding religious freedom. But the Portuguese made clear that the Viceroy had no power to meddle with the existing religious practices and so these conditions were beyond discussion.

The shendi cess was imposed on the Hindus by the Portuguese from the beginning of 1705 like the Jijiya imposed by the Moghuls. On 14 August, 1732 it was decided that not only the Hindus, but all non-Christians should pay that levy. The income from this tax was about 7,000 asurpis. It has already been pointed out that the Inquisition not only exercised authority on the Catholics but even the Hindus had to suffer much persecution from it. At last, conceding the Portuguese say on this point, Vyankatrao and Dadajirao concluded a treaty with Portuguese envoys on behalf of Bajirao on 2 May, 1739. This treaty does not mention Chhatrapati Shahu’s name anywhere.

It was agreed that seven lakh rupees should be paid by the Portuguese towards expenses of the Mahratta army camping in Goa. As soon as the treaty was duly signed and impressed, two respectable Portuguese should come with the first instalment of two lakhs to the Mahratta camp, after which the army in Bardez should depart. Until the second instalment of three lakhs, to be paid within a week was actually paid, two Portuguese men should be detained as hostages in the camp. This might be in the form of cash, gold and flannel. The balance of two lakhs should be paid afterwards, but till the payment was made two Portuguese should remain as security with the
Mahrattas. The author found this treaty in Goa Archives which he has already published in Portuguese e Maratas as supplement to part IV.149

Although the Portuguese were to pay Rs. 7 lakhs, it was secretly agreed that Rs. one lakh in addition should be paid to Mahratta sardars. Dadajirao had taken care that it should be an underhand deal.370 So it would be improper to call it state expenditure. While fixing this tribute of Rs. 8 lakhs, the talks that were carried on by the Mahrattas and the Portuguese have been narrate by Bhagoon Kamat. He says, “After the preliminary conversation was over, Vyankati Kamat and Upya Kamat said that the amount of money must be settled. Envoy Alcoçova said that he had accepted a ring of fraternity from Dadajirao; so he should name the figure in view of Goa’s condition. Dadaji mentioned eleven lakhs. Vagh said that it was a little too much. At last Vyankati Kamat, Upya Kamat, Babulya Shenvi and Mahadaji Shenvi went aside, discussed among themselves in a low tone and decided that Rs. 7 lakhs should be given by the Portuguese openly and Rs. one lakh clandestinely. The sum was written in Marathi (Hindavi) language on paper. The interpreter translated all that in Portuguese and envoy Alcoçova said that he would communicate the proceedings to the Viceroy.

On May 2, 1739 another draft treaty was prepared. Its Portuguese version is in Goa Archives and the Marathi version has been published by Krishnaji Purandare from the Purandare daftar. It is also published in Y. N. Kelkar’s Vasaichi Mohim. Two principal conditions in it are: (1) Forty per cent of the revenue from Salcete and Bardez should be given to Bajirao by the Portuguese (2) Khorjuve and Panale should be returned to Bhonsla-Savant by the Portuguese. Bhonsla should stop paying to the Portuguese one thousand asurpis according to the pact made through Siva Bhat.

On 6 May, 1739, Vyankatrao and Dadajirao made an independent in regard to Bassein with treaty Alcaçova and Jose Pedro Emaons. This has been produced in Portuguese e Maratas and by Y. N. Kelkar in Vasaichi Mohim. The manuscript Successos da India no Governo do Conde de Sandomele says that the Portuguese had to pay a penalty of Rs. 50,000 for their fraternising with Dadajirao. In the report
made by Bhagoon Kamat Vagh, a Portuguese version of the receipt of Rs. 50,000 that Dadajirao took is available for perusal.

As a matter of fact, it was the Hindu merchants of Goa who were compelled to pay this fine under compulsion for the most part. The Portuguese raised with very great difficulty Rs. 2 lakhs towards the first instalment of the tribute for paying to Vyankatrao and Dadajirao. The army in Salcete and Bardez ought to have decamped thereafter. But that did not happen. The Bhonsla-Savant did not approve of the treaty made by Vyankatrao and Dadaji and kept his army in Bardez. Vyankatrao withdrew his army from Salcete on May 21 and the siege of Raitur had already been evacuated.

The Mahratta army for the most part went up the ghauts. Vyankatrao camped at Sanguem with a small army, where he received Chimaji Appa’s letter of having captured Bassein. So Vyankatrao went home. Before leaving Goa, he made arrangements regarding the forts in Sanguem, Ponda and Usgaon. Dadaji was camping in Cuncolim. He tried in person to persuade Bhonsla-Savant to evacuate Bardez in accordance with the treaty of Rai but he failed. So Dadajirao returned the two Portuguese men who were kept as sureties to Alcaçova after meeting him at Pilgaon, near Bicholim. He gave orders for taking some money from Alcaçova and return it to the Portuguese. On July 19, 1739, the Mahrattas handed over Margao fort to the Portuguese. As soon as the Mahrattas left, the Portuguese demolished the fort. The Mahrattas did not give up Cuncolim village and fort and Asolnem under orders of Bajirao.

The Viceroy had sent Santu Shenvi Dangi, a Goan disciple of Brahmendra Swami to Satara with Shivaji Deoji who had come as Shahu’s emissary. He realised there that it was not possible to succeed in treaty talks in Satara Court against the wishes of Bajirao. So Santu Shenvi went to Poona and met Bajirao. Bajirao said that he was ready to make a treaty and sent a letter to the Viceroy with Santu Shenvi Dangi in which he claimed 40 per cent of the Salcete revenue and Daman and Cheul fortresses.

Chhatrapati Sambhaji was incensed to see that Bajirao had found a foothold in Goa’s Salcete and Ponda Panchmahal and insisted that Bajirao should give up their possession. The author found a number
of letters in the Goa Archives in this connection and he has extracted some of them in Portuguese e Maratas, Assentos do Conselho do Estado (Part V) and Agentes da Diplomacia Portuguesa na India. In Assentos he has even published a photostat copy of one of them. Sambhaji's policy can well be understood from these.

In a letter sent at the end of 1739 by Sambhaji to the Viceroy in which he himself has complained that although Bajirao invaded Salcete and Bardez and gave Goa so much trouble, the Viceroy did not write about it to Sambhaji. Although Bajirao had told him (Sambhaji) that he would take good care of Ponda and serve him (Sambhaji), he had no intention of taking his service but to keep it with Goa and in order that Bajirao's botheration should stop thereafter, Hindurao Ghorpade was being sent with an army. He (Sambhaji) was determined to keep Goa with the Portuguese as before.177

On November 4, 1739, Sambhaji wrote to Vyankati Kamat and Upya Kamat to the same effect viz. that Hindurao Ghorpade was being sent to Ponda and that Sambhaji was at Maraz for the time being and would soon be going to Goa. He had informed the Viceroy also about it and details were given to Ramchandra Babaji. Hindurao Ghorpade was maternal uncle of the wife of Nagu Savant Bhonsala who was on friendly terms with the Portuguese to such an extent that he had informed the Portuguese that he would fight on their side with the Peshwa during Vyankatrao's invasion of Salcete178 As from several other Mahratta Sardars, the Portuguese used to receive information about the Mahrattas from Nagu Savant also. In a letter written at the beginning of February 1739 to the Viceroy of Goa, Nagu Savant pledged complete loyalty and friendship to the Portuguese because he said it was traditional. He expressed his condolence for events in Salcete. He pointed out that the intent of the Mahrattas was to capture all Northern territory from the Portuguese. He referred to Hindurao's arrival in Goa and offered military help to Goa in consort with him. He also said in the letter that about 2000 Mussalman soldiers could be recruited.

Not only the court of Chhatrapati Sambhaji but even some Sardars of Chhatrapati Shahu's Court like Naroram Mantri, Ramkrishna Chimaji and others were favourably inclined towards the Portuguese.
Ramkrishna Chimaji had informed the Portuguese that if they resolutely resisted the Mahrattas, they would have a winning counter at the treaty talks. In a letter he said that the Portuguese should hold out with determination so that people like him would be in a strong position to speak in their favour at Shahu’s court.\footnote{179} Even Shahu himself felt that Goa should remain with the Portuguese.\footnote{180}

Sambhaji wanted the help of the Portuguese to take Ponda from Bajirao, but the Viceroy considered that to keep Ponda with Sambhaji was as dangerous to Goa as to keep it with Shahu and so he offered the help of only some ammunition to Sambhaji and nothing more according to a Portuguese report.\footnote{161} It has already been mentioned that Bhonsala-Savant was not prepared to accept the treaty made between Vyankatrao and Dadajirao on the one hand and the Portuguese on the other at Rai.

At the beginning of Vyankatrao’s invasion of Goa, Bhonsala-Savant was on friendly terms with the Portuguese. His Karbhari kept himself in touch with the Portuguese through correspondence. Even in the midst of the battle, he wrote to the Viceroy and those letters are in Goa Archives. Jairam Savant Bhonsala and Ramchandra Savant Bhonsala Sardesai, in a letter to the Viceroy dated April 13, 1739 say that the Portuguese were traditional friends. The Savant took Bardez in order to preserve it for the Portuguese without the help of the Mahrattas. He did not differentiate between his control and Portuguese control and the Portuguese should understand for certain that Bardez would not be given to the Mahrattas. He then asked for expenses of the army to be paid and assured that Bardez would be kept with him only until Vyankatrao went up the ghauts and then made over to the Portuguese.\footnote{182}

On behalf of the Bhonsala-Savant, Deoba Shenvi Sabnis, Jivaji Shenvi Sabnis, Yesu Shenvi Havaldar and Jivaji Pundalik informed the Viceroy that the aggression of the Peshwa on Portuguese territory was not acceptable to them and they were waiting for the departure of the Mahrattas from there.\footnote{183} Consideration was given to the points raised by the Bhonsala-Savant in the treaty made at Rai between Vyankatrao and the Portuguese. But Jairam Savant Bhonsala and Ramchandra Savant Bhonsala planned to make an independent treaty with the Portuguese on his own points. Accordingly he mentioned two
fresh conditions in the letter he sent to the Viceroy. They were: the point of religious freedom for Hindus should be conceded if it is not already there in the treaty made with Vyankatrao and cash for expenditure should be given. The Portuguese accepted neither of the conditions.

On 27, December 1739, Nago Savant Bhonsala appeared all of a sudden in the morning at Narve with 350 horsemen and 1000 footmen. It was agreed between the Portuguese and Nagu Savant that they should pay him 20,000 asurpis and he should stay in one of the villages near Bicholim with 4,000 soliders, because the Portuguese intended to give him the gadi of Savantvadi. But it was not possible for Nagu Savant to hold his own against the 4,000 soldiers of Ramchandra Savant and Jairam Savant. In the meanwhile the Portuguese learnt that Naroram Mantri was arriving from Miraj at Kavle to pay his respects to his family deity. He was accompanied by 500 horsemen, 800 footmen, 1000 oxen and some camels to carry their luggage. The Portuguese have recorded that there were three elephants and six palanquins for the family.

Naroram came to Bicholim from Savantvadi. Jairam and Ramchandra Savant accompanied him as far as there. Naroram sent some of his soliders to fight Nagu Savant on their request. Naroram’s and Nagu’s men had a skirmish for a day and a half at Narve. The Portuguese and Naroram intervened and Nagu Savant was allowed to depart with his men. He started for the ghaut on March 7. After Naroram reached Kavle, the Viceroy sent Pedro de Geddies de Magaleice on 12 January 1740 with presents to see him. Afterwards Vithoji Shenvi Dhume, a Saraswat merchant was appointed in place of Magaleice to carry on treaty talks. Bhagoon Kamat Vagh and Shivaji Desai also were sent with Dhume to Kavle.

Although Naroram was favourably inclined towards the Portuguese he was not prepared to help them against the wishes of Bajirao. In this connection, the Viceroy, in his letter to the King of Portugal on February 9, 1740 says, "Since everybody is aware of the importance of Bajirao, no project can reach its fruition without the consent of Bajirao, or against his wishes." Naroram went to Bicholim from Kavle. On 3 February, 1740 he learnt there that the Angria had captured two palas and two galias of the Portuguese and decided that the times were against the Portuguese and so it was not advisable for
him to use his good offices in their favour and went home. After Naroram Mantri left for Satara, the Viceroy sent Vithoji Shenvi Dhume and Bhagoon Kamat Vagh to Bhonsala-Savants (Jairam and Ramchandra) and entered into a treaty with them at Bicholim on 28 February, 1740. The Portuguese did not take into consideration the question of religious freedom for Hindus even on this occasion. In terms of this treaty, Bhonsala-Savant ceded Bardez and Panalem to the Portuguese and the Portuguese gave him Khorjuvem and Peerna.

On 12, March the Portuguese took possession of Bardez. It is needless to say that they had to grease the palms of Naroram Mantri for the help he gave. Naroram even volunteered to work as Agent of the Portuguese at the court of Shahu, but the Viceroy had fully realised that nothing could be of avail to them against Bajirao's wishes. Viceroy Conde de Sandomele was trying through the Governor of Bombay that the Mahrattas should give up Cuncolim and Assolanem in Salcete. The reply that Bajirao gave in connection with the treaty for that purpose was received in Goa on 30, January 1740. Three out of the twelve points made by Bajirao in his letter to the Governor of Bombay were: (1) The forts of Revdanda and Korlai should be given as agreed before (2) The Portuguese should aid the Mahrattas in the event of a conflict with the Angria (3) Maharashtra Dharma should be freely followed by Hindus in Salcete, Bardez and Goa. While negotiations for a treaty with Bajirao were in progress, the Subedar of the Mahrattas at Ponda sent an army under the command of Haripant in Salcete with 500 horsemen and 600 footmen and plundered it with a view to recovering 40 per cent of the revenue. In order that there should be no more promiscuous plundering, the leading men in Salcete entered into an agreement with the Mahrattas to pay up 40,000 asurpis in four instalments. This was done without the permission of the Portuguese Government but the Viceroy wrote on 30 March, 1740 that he had to overtook that irregularity, even though Bajirao had agreed that since treaty negotiations were in progress he would not send his army to that side. Bajirao died on May 9, 1740, Vaishakh, Shuddha 13, Sunday, Shake 1662.

After the death of Bajirao, a treaty was made between his son Balaji Bajirao alias Nanasaheb and the Portuguese at Poona on 18, September 1740. Don Francisco Baurot de Galenflux on behalf of the Viceroy
and Captain Inchbird on behalf of the Governor of Bombay were present on the occasion. Captain Inchbird had carried on talks for a treaty on behalf of the Governor of Bombay in favour of the Portuguese. With reference to that, the Governor of Bombay wrote to the Viceroy at Goa that, "The Mahrattas were so puffed up with pride that while talking to the Captain they spoke in terms of only rooting out the Portuguese from Goa." The Bhonsla-Savant had sent Narba Shenvi Chitnis on his behalf to participate in the treaty negotiations. This treaty was published by Parasnis in his Taha va Karamadar on pages 30-32 which contained some minor errors. After making due corrections, the author published it again on the basis of the original in Goa Archives.

Even in this treaty there is no reference to the religious question of Hindus in Salcete, Bardez and Goa, even when Chimaji Appa and other Mahratta statesmen were well aware of what persecution the Hindus had to suffer at the hands of the Portuguese. But the Portuguese were very firm on this point. The Portuguese Viceroy has said, "No one has any right to speak on this point in the territory of the Portuguese in India. This right is enjoyed only by the King of Portugal. Besides, it can scarcely be said that Hindus in Goa, Salcete and Bardez are not happy. Because Portuguese laws apply only to those Hindus who live in their territory. No one compels the Hindus to live in their state. They live there in peace because of the conveniences and concessions they get for their trade, commerce and business."

From one letter of the Viceroy, it has to be gathered that the subject of religious freedom for Hindus did not find place in the treaty because Chimaji Appa and members of the Peshwa Court did not care very much about it. Viceroy Conde de Sandomele writes as follows to the Governor of Bombay on 11, May 1740: "It does not appear likely that the Mahrattas will lay much stress on the point of religious freedom for Hindus in Goa. Last year, Vyankatrao did not include any clause in the treaty he made with us. Even the draft treaty that Bajirao sent with Santu Shenvi Dangi did not contain a word about it. Naroram in his talks with us never mentioned it. Bajirao and Chimaji mentioned it during the treaty negotiations with Bhonsala-Savant but neglected it in the end. Taking into consideration this experience, I do not think the Mahrattas will object to the treaty on

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this point, when it is of such immense advantage to them otherwise." 196

In terms of this treaty, the Portuguese got a remission of Rs. 5 lakhs. Similarly, the 40 per cent of the revenue which was to be paid to the Mahrattas from Salcete and Bardez according to the last treaty was remitted to the Portuguese. The Viceroy said that what was very important was that as a result of these concessions the Vahivatdars of the Mahrattas were prohibited to enter Bardez and Salcete. Cuncolim and Assolanem were returned to the Portuguese. The Mahrattas got Revdanda and Korlai (Morro) instead. Besides the Mahrattas handed over one pargana below the fortress of Daman for its upkeep to the Portuguese. When the Portuguese envoy said that the income of one pargana should not be enough for the maintenance of Daman, Chimaji Appa retorted, ‘I really wished like Bajirao to turn the Portuguese out of India. But I have not done so only to oblige the English." 197

There is one more important clause in this treaty. It is to the effect that in the event of a conflict with the Angria, the Portuguese should aid the Mahrattas with their armada. It was the policy of Bajirao, Chimaji and Nanasheb to break the Angria and make him their subordinate. For this they needed the help of the Portuguese. Their policy also was to humble the Portuguese and recover tribute from them and the Angria had realised that for this purpose they wanted to subordinate the Angria to the Mahrattas. Manaji Angria tried hard to prevent the Portuguese from handing over Revdanda and Korlai to the Mahrattas. He had even written to the Viceroy that if the Portuguese kept the forts with them, he would bear the expenditure for their maintenance.198

Through the mediation of Captain Inchbird, the Mahrattas handed over Cuncolim and Assolanem to the Portuguese on 25 November, 1740.199 In exchange, the Portuguese handed over Revdanda, Cheul and Korlai (Morro de Cheul) to the Mahrattas. The island of Uran (Karanja) was already taken by Manaji with the help of local Hindus on March 21, 1739.200 Dr. S. N. Sen has written that the Peshwa took Revdanda (Cheul) and Korlai (Morro) in September 1740 in his possession.201 Riysatkar Sardesai also has said so.202 But contemporary Portuguese papers show that both the forts were not in the
Peshwa's hands before December 5 or 6 of 1740.\textsuperscript{203} In the Adhikari Shakavali published in \textit{Angre Kalina Ashtagar} (p. 17) it is said that the flag of Chimaji Ballal was unfurled on Revdanda and Korlai forts on 19 December, 1740.

When the Portuguese went to Cuncolim to take possession of the Cuncolim fort from its Captain Ramaji Pandit, the army of Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur had besieged Mardangad. Naro Chimaji was the Subedar of this fort appointed by Bajirao. A translation in Portuguese of a letter as well as the original written on 27 November, 1740 by Naro Chimnaji is available. He writes therein that the army of the enemy i.e. Sambhaji of Kolhapur had come but on learning that Bajirao had come to Kittur with 10,000 army, it fled away. He then asked for the arms and luggage in Cuncolim and armada at Assolnem should be properly preserved for taking away when convenient. He has also asked for the receipt of Cuncolim fort having been handed over. From the tone of this letter it would appear that the Subedar of Ponda was on friendly terms with the Portuguese. But the Portuguese really desired that it should pass on to the Prince of Saunde, because the Peshwa as neighbour was considered dangerous by the Portuguese.

It would be appropriate to say a word about Vyankati Kamat. This Hindu merchant took much trouble for a treaty on behalf of the Portuguese. Even then the Viceroy detained him in Mormugao fort and ordered him to pay Rs. 10,000 within ten days for the war fund and he was informed that he would be held guilty of sedition and treated accordingly if he did not pay up.\textsuperscript{204}
NOTES

(1) F. N. Xavier, *Instrução do Marquez de Alorna*, 1903, p. 29.
   Dr. S. N. Sen, *Studies in Mahratta History*, p. 207.


(4) *BNL*, MS. 1455 F. G., “Instrução que deixau o Conde da Ericeira”.

(5) “se o dito Raja tivesse mais espirito seria senhor de to-das ellas”.


(7) Pissurlencar, *PM, IV*; *Maratas em Baçalm; A Campanha Luso—Marata de Baçalm; Bajirao and the Portuguese* (Sahyadri, 1940, No. 5).

(8) Goa Archives: MR 90, fl. 76: “Ramchondra Panta, por quem se fulminam todas estas maquinas . . . .”

(9) *BNL*, MS. 1605 F. G. “Relaçaõ da guerra”.

(10) Goa Archives: MR 83, fl. 62.

(11) *AHU*, India, Avulsos, Caixa 18, Viceroy’s letter to the King of Portugal dated 22 January 1721.

(12) “Justamente o podemos comparar com o celebre Barbarossa, que em outros tempos se fez tão temido em Europa nas costas do mar mediterraneo”. *(Relaçaõ dos sucessos e gloriosas acçoes militares obradas no Estado da India, ordenadas e dirigidas pelo Vice-Rei Vasco Fernandes Cezar de Menezes em o anno passado de 1713, p. 19).*


(14) *BNL*, MS. 465, “Noticias da India desde o fim do governo do Vice-Rei Vasco Fernandes Cezar . . . .”


(16) *BNL*, MS. 8548, F. G., fl. 284 *BACL*, MS. 258. (in this manuscript the figure given is 25,000).

(17) *BNL*, MS. 1455, F. G., *Instrução que deixou o Conde da Ericeira Dom Luiz de Menezes, Vice-Rey e Capito-Geral da India a Fraicsico Joze Sampayo e Castro (22 October 1720).*


(19) *Ibid*: “ha menos de trinta anos se conheco no Norte este mesmo inimigo sendo vil e pobre e exerçitando o ministerio de criado e servidor de
outrò gentio . . . " There is a Marathi bakhar in the Biblioteca Nationale de Paris called Chronique de Sivadjy which provides similar information; “Kanhoji Angre was a servant of Sidoji Gujar at Suvarnadurga. When Sidoji Gujar went to Chandl with Rajaram Saheb, Kanoji captured Suvarnadurga and Vijayadurg by force. Rajaram conferred on him the title Sarkhel.” (BNP. Fond Indien, MS. 661). This bakhar has obviously been wrongly named by the keepers of the library.

(20) Goa Archives : MR 89 B, fl. 417; Pissurlencar, A Campanha Luso-Marata de Baçaim, pp. 8, 16.


(22) Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baçaim, pp. 12, 14.

(23) Ibid., pp. 18, 20.


(25) BNL. MS. 465 F. G., “Noticias da India”.

(26) Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baçaim, p. 20.

(27) Ibid., p. 22.


(29) S. N. Joshi, Angre Shakavali, p. 21.

(30) Goa Archives. “Livro de Baçaim”, No. 5, fl. 52v.

(31) BNL. MS. 465, “Noticias da India desde o fim do governo do Vice-Rey Vasco Fernandes Cesar de Menezes, fl. 142.

(32) Dr. S. N. Sen, Military System of the Marathas.

(33) Angre Shakavali, p. 21.

(34) Goa Archives : “Livro de Baçaim”, 5, fl. 5.


(36) Ibid., p. 44.

(37) Edmond Gaudart, Catalogue des Manuscrits des Anciennes Archives de l’Inde Française, 1922.

(38) Goa Archives : “Baçaim 5”, fl. 128; Pantambekar, Uttar Konkan, p. 60.


(40) Goa Archives : RV 9, fl. 52 : “Para Custangi Rao Mahadeo assistente na Provincia Chassa do dominio del-Rei Magor, havendo sido antes governador de Galiana do qual governo sahio desgostoso de seu cunhado Baji Rao, e passou para o serviço do Mogor”.

(41) Pissurlencar, A Campanha Luso-Marata de Baçaim, p. 9.


(44) Goa Archives: Marathi Documents, No. 2649.

(45) Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baçaim, p. 49.

(46) BACL. MS. "Livros do governo do Vice-Rey da India, Conde de Sandomel", Vol. II, fl. 156.


(48) Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baçaim (Viceroy’s letter to King of Portugal dated 25 January 1735).

(49) Goa Archives: MR 102 B, f. s. 634v-635v. (Don Luiz Batelo’s letter dated 15 July 1732): “o Angria no principio do mez passado atacou a caza forte do Divao de Chaul, e com effeito a tomou a doze do dito mez.”

(50) Yesaji Rangaji, Bajirao’s envoy, went to Goa with the letter from Bajirao dated 20 January 1735. The Viceroy bade him farewell on 18 March 1735 (Goa Archives: CO. 19, fl. 144v).

(51) Goa Archives: "Livro de Chaul", 1, fl. 31 v. Pissurlencar, Maratas em Baçaim, p. 54 n.

(52) Pissurlencar, P. M. IV, p. 15; A Campanha Luso-Marata, p. 27.

(53) C. R. Boxer, Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire, Chapter II, Assentos, IV, p. 578; v. p. 17.

(54) Peshwa, Daftar, Part 16, p. 12.

(55) Pissurlencar, A Campanha Luso-Marata de Bacaim, p. 33.


(57) Pissurlencar, Maratas em Bacaim, p. 56.


(59) Ibid, p. 56.

(60) Goa Archives: RV 9, fl. 9.

(61) Pissurlencar, PM, IV Maratas em Bacaim; A Campanha Luso-Marata de Bacaim; Assentos V. Don Luiz Botelho himself informed the fort keeper at Diu in his letter dated April 19, 1737 that the Mahattas entered Salcette at 11 p.m. (O Oriente Portugal, 1905, p. 221).

(62) Diogo da Costa, Relacan das guerras da India, Lisboa, 1741.

(63) Pissurlencar, Maratas em Bacaim, p. 63; Assentos V, p. 448.

(64) Y. N. Kelkar, Vasaichi Mohim, p. 47.


(66) AHV. India, avulsos, Maco 7: “O qual (inimigo marata) dando dous assaltos e esta Praca . . . .” (Cardim Froices letter dated March 5, 1738).


(68) BVC, MS. 1487, Rellacan dos sucessos da India vinda neste anno de 1740 e capitullacoes que se fizerao com a cidade de Goa.
(69) Antonio Cardim's letter dated March 5, 1738; Peshwa Daftar part 22 Shakavali.
(70) Peshwa Daftar, part 34, p. 92.
(71) Pissurlencar, Assentos, V, p. 463.
(72) Pissurlencar, PM. IV, p. 61.
(73) Ibid, page 68.
(74) Pissurlencar, Maratas em Bacaum, p. 65.
(75) BPE, Cod CIX/1-38 fxs. 236-248.
(76) Pissurlencar, Assentos, V, 485-486.
(79) Pissurlencar, PM. IV, p. 66.
(80) Ibid.
(81) Pissurlencar, Maratas em Bacaum p. 66: "... a que antes se deve chamar barbaridade ..."
(82) Pissurlencar, Assentos V, p. 496.
(84) The two letters dated April 17, 1739 and August 17, 1739 written by Caitano de Sousa Pereira are published in the fourth part of the periodical O Oriente Portuguez.
(86) Rajwade, Marathbyachya Itihastchi Sadhane, Part VI, p. 229.
(87) BVC. MS. 148, Conta que mandou o Marquez de Alorna, fl. 28.
(88) Bharat Itihasa Samshodhak Mandal, Viceroy's letter in Portuguese dated 3 April 1746 to Balaji Bajirao; Pissurlencar, PM, VI, p. 9.
(89) Pissurlencar, Roteiro, p. 62-95.
(90) Goa Archives : Livro de Certidoes, No. 4 (1672-1694).
(91) Pe Dr. Silva Rego, Documentacao IV, p. 450. 461. Anju Naik says: "E despoys que vyerà os frades à estas terras de Bacaum, como chegarao logo mandarao dyrribar os pagodes e as mysquitas dos mouros ... foi este num grande escandalô para elles ... e lhes nao deyxam fazer nenhun modo das suas festas". The meaning is that after the padres came to Bassein, they demolished temples of Hindus and mosques of Mussalmans. They deemed it a great calamity. The padres do not allow them to observe their holy days in any way.
(92) Some Catholic historians say that there was no compulsory proselytisation in Goa or Bassein but contemporary documents can be cited to the contrary. Cunha Rivara, Padre Silva Rego, Padre Wicki and other Catholic historians have published quite many documents. The author has also written much about this. In 1561, Catholics of different schools gathered together in the Viceroy's residence and expressed the view that compulsory proselytisation was not irreligious. (Rego, Documentacao VIII, p. 301-302. Wicki Documentacao V. P. 67).


(94) BNL. MS. 203.

(95) Dellon, Narracao da Inquisicao de Goa, p. 116 (Portuguese translation); Petition of the Hindu people of Goa, Salcete and Bardez (Goa Archives, MR 93 B. fl. 821-822). Pissurlencar, ADP, p. 63-66. It is stated in Sashichi Bakhar that Rupaji Bhalerao and others were put in oil-clothes and burnt but they must have been sentenced to transportation (G. G. Naik, Sashichi Bakhar p. 24).

(96) Goa Archives : MR 152 A, fls. 154 v.

(97) Pissurlencar, Assentos V. p. 543.

(98) Pissurlencar, ADP p. 64, 65.


A Portuguese officer in his evidence given on December 19, 1729 says: "Nao sei o regimento, que a Inquisition tem para conhecer de culpas de homens que nunca farao Catholics, e vejo sim que pella extensiva quantidade de prezos desta qualidade esta despouvada toda a Provincia do Norte" (Goa Archives MR 98 fl. 7). The purport of this is: I do not know by what law the Inquisition obtains authority to inquire into the offences of those who were never Catholics. The whole of northern territory has become desolate because of the prisoners the Inquisition keeps.

(100) BNL. Successos da India no Governo no Conde de Sandomele, fls. 3-5. Pissurlencar, PM. IV, p. 15. Goa Archives : Bacaim, Livro 6, fl. 76, 91.

(101) Pissurlencar, A Companhia Luso-Marata, p. 27.


(103) Pissurlencar, A Companhia Luso-Marata p. 18.


(106) Dr. A. G. Pawar, English Records on the conquest of Salcette by the Mahrattas in 1737 in Bombay University Journal, July, 1942.
(107) Peshwa Daftar, part 33, p. 142.  
(108) BNL. Ms. 308. Bispo de Halicarnasso, Systema Marcial Asiatico, fl. 80v.  
(109) Pissurlecanr, PM IV p. 4, 82.  
(110) BNP. Ms. 661, Chronique de Sivadj, Roi des Mahorrassas. The name of the chronicle is a misnomer but it says, “In order to restrict the activities from Goa, Vyankatrao Ghorpade was sent with a force of 1000.”  
(111) Pissurlecanr, Assentos V, p. 454: “O intento de vir o inimigo a estas terras de Salcette e Bardez he com o fim de nos fazer diversao para que se nao mande socorro para a Norte.” This means that the object of the enemy in invading Salcette and Bardez is that because of this aggression we should not be in a position to send help to Bassein. Naga Savant Bhonsala informed the Viceroy to the same effect in his letter dated February 7, 1739—Goa Archives: Portuguese translations of Marathi letters.  
(112) BNL Ms. 660 F. G. Relacao Sumaria do successos de Goa com a guerra de Marata, ffs 99v.  
(113) Pissurlecanr, Mahratta Invasions on Goa—Sardesai Memorial Volume.  
(114) BNL. Ms. 560 F. G. Relacao Sumaria dos successos de Goa. ffs. 99v.  
(115) BNL. Ms. 4180, Arbitrio para no Estado da India haver dinheiro para sua Conservacao (Assentos v. p. 528). Padre Sebastias Rego (Sermao de Santa Cruz dos Milagres, Lisboa 1759) : “…… Os gentios facilitaram as inimigo Marata a entrada de Salcette. Indo-o buscar nao terras do Sunda, e segurande-lhe, que podia invadir a provincia sem temor de resistencia. Os gentios introduziram o inimigo Bonsul no mesmo tempo na provincia de Bardez, e estavam confederados para lhe entregarem esta Cidade (Goa) como publicamente se fallou.” (p. 330 2nd Ed).  
(116) Pissurlecanr, Assentos V, p. 528.  
(117) Pissurlecanr, ADP. Introduction.  
(118) Unsuccessful attempts were even made in order to keep the trade in Goa chiefly in Christian hands by legislation.  
(119) In 1745, Padre Sebastiao Rego has said, : “Nao necessitando pois Goa dos gentios, estes sao os que mais necessitam de Goa…….
O que tudo e tao certo, que se S. Magestade or denasse, que aquelles que nao professassem a lei de Christo nao morassem nos seus dominios, em breve tempo todo este gentilismo se reduziria as gremio da igreja…….
O que se praticou ja em Hespanha e Portugal com os mouros e judeus e em outras partes do christianismo, onde se nao permite domicilio firme aos infeis. “ (Lisboa 1759) ”.  

The gist of this is that Goa does not need Hindus. It is the Hindus who need Goa. As a matter of fact had the King of Portugal promulgated an order that those who were not Christians should not live in this state, all Hindus would have embraced Christianity in a short while. It was so done in the case of Mussalmans and Jews in Spain, Portugual and other Christian States. No non-Christian is allowed to live there permanently.)
The Chief of the San Tomas Catholic Monastery informed Government on 10 January 1728, that: “O meu parecer.... era uzar S. Mag.... mandando que todos os gentios moradores nas terras deste seu Estado, ou se convertao a fe de Christo, ou sayam das ditas terras.” (Goa Archives: MR 94, fl. 121) The meaning of this is: I am of the view that Government should declare that those Hindus who live in this state should either embrace Christianity or depart from here.)

(120) BPP. Ms. 818, Estado do Estado da India, fl. 1.
(121) Pissurlencar, Assentos V, p. 530.
(123) Pissurlencar, PM. IV, p. 98; BNL. Relâcao sumaria dos sucessos de Goa com e guerra do marata.
(124) Goa Archives: Co 24, fl. 166.
(125) BNL. Ms. Relâcao Sumaria; Goa Archives Co. 25, fl. 168v. Pissurlencar Assentos V, p. 531; PM. IV, p. 97-98.
(126) BNL. Ms. Relâcam sumaria dos sucessos de Goa.
(127) Goa Archives: Co 19, fis 198, 200. (Viceroy's letter dated 5-9-1735 to Jesuit official Padre Joao Marquis). The conversion of this recluse was a topic of enormous public discussion. The account of the conversion of this recluse was published with illustrations in Lisboa in 1737. (Bernarddo Fernandes Gayo, Feliz Noticia da conversam de him joque que na caza professa do bom Jesus de Goa rebeco o Santo Bantismo em 8 de Setembro de 1735. Lisboa 1737).
(128) The Mahratta army came down the Digi ghaut and entered Salcete via Sangem. Kusman and Palavde, Hanuman Ghaut, Ram Ghaut and the Digi Ghaut were the mountain passes used by armies for descending in South Konkan.
(129) Pissurlencar, Assentos V, p. 308n.
(130) BNL. Ms. Relâcam Sumaria.
(131) Pissurlencar, Assentos V, p. 472.
(132) Ibid., p. 463-470.
(133) Pissurlencar, Assentos V, p. 580n.
(134) BNL. Ms. 1605, Relâcao da guerra que o inimigo Marata fez....
(135) Biography of Shahu Maharaj by Chitnis, 1924, p. 98.
(136) Goa Archives; Portuguese translation of Marathi documents.
(137) BNL. Ms. 929, Successos da India no governo do Conde de Sandomil.
(138) BNL. Ms. 660, Relâcao sumaria dos sucessos de Goa.
(140) BNL. Ms. Relâcao Sumaria dos sucessos de Goa.
(141) Ibid.,

(142) Pissurlencar, Assentos V, p. 513.

(143) BNL. Ms. Relacao sumaria, fls. 68v. : "Entende-se que os Inquisidores se achavam muito intimidados de terem ouvido que vencatta Rão dizia em Salcete que havia de andar no seu palanquim sobre quatro Inquisidores."

(144) Epanaphora Indica, Parte V, p. 37; Pissurlencar, Assentos V, p. 671.

(145) BNL. Ms. Relacao sumaria dos sucessos de Goa: "Os filhos de Vissaramo mostraram fidelidade ao Estado, porque com certeza, por carta escripta a seu irmão Minu, avizaram ao Secretario das partes por onde o assalto se dispunha, e também o tempo para ele detriminado, de que tudo foi logo o General avizado ..."

*Pissurlencar, Roteiro do Arquivos, Introduction.


(147) Goa Archives : Marathi papers No. 2070.


(149) Pissurlencar : P. M. IV, p. 88.

(150) BNL. Ms. Relacao sumaria dos sucessos de Goa; Pissurlencar, PM, IV, p. 84.

(151) Pissurlencar, Mahratta Invasion of Goa, p. 25, 26.

(152) BNL. Ms. Relacao sumaria dos sucessos de Goa: "... porque Fondu Camotim, alem deser muito intececeado na conservacao dos Portuguezes, e no grande comercio, que a sua casa, por sy e por seus avos, tivera sempre nas naos do Reino, constavalle a elle (secretario) o summo affecto e cuidado com que, despois de principiada a guerra, concorria muitas vezes em sua casa a comunicar lhe quais quer noticias que tivesse e a dar-lhe, com grande zello os arbitrios, que tinha por convenientes para e defensa e para a seguranca, e que por elle mesmo e por sey cunhado o Dessai Vitogi Naíque tinha mandado muitas espias confidentes seus, cujas noticias foram sempre as mais certas ..."

(153) Ibid: “Com principio de feiras a dinheiro.”

(154) BNL. Ms. Relacao sumaria dos sucessos de Goa, fls 34v. “... foi venecatì chamado a S. Lourenço, e despedido para o exercito, do qual volou dizendo que tinha ajustado com os ditos Madu Sinay e Dada Rau, favorecer este aos Portuguezes, dilatando as operacoes e assaltos contra Rachol, e facilitando a introdução dos socorros ate se entrar em ajusto de faz; e que por principio do premio de setenta mil xerafinas, que lhe tinha prometido para esta confederacao, se lhe dessem logo doze mil, dez para elle e dois para o dito seu Divao, Madu Sinay O aperto das cousas fez parecer conveniente este partido ... .

(155) “... A esperança da negociacao da paz alentou muitos dias os defensores de Rachol sem embargo de que os inimigos continuavam sempre as suas obras, eo ameasso dos assaltos chegando a dar lhe segundo com pouco
vigor e Dadagi Rao afirmava aos Ministros conferentes que fora sem seu beneplácito e que elle impedira a ser mais vigoroso, e prometeo tambem que e gente do seu partido nao faria opposicao, a qual estava ja falta de man- timentos ....” (BNL. Ms Relacao sumario dos sucessos de Goa).

(156) Goa Archives : Marathi documents.


(158) In a letter written by Keshaoapant to the Secretary to Goa Government in connection with Dadajirao’s murder it is said “The wife of Ramrao was killed by deceit and it was planned that his brother Yogirao and son Bhaskarrao were also to be killed, but they escaped.” (Goa Archives : Marathi documents).

This letter is without date but its Portuguese translation was made on April 4, 1743 (Goa Archives : Translations of Marathi letters) Sardessai’s Dynasties of Historical Families.

(159) Pissurlencar, ADP., p. 226n.

(160) BPA. Portuguese report of Bhagoon Kamat Vagh.

(161) Ibid.

(162) Goa Archives. RV (1737-1740), fls. IIIv-112: sem embargo do empenho com que se acha o felicissimo e ilustre Rao Pardano contra as terras Portuguesas .... quer VM. pelo que lhe tem significado o dito Madagi Vitala que haja sucesso .......

(163) Pissurlencar, Assentos V, p. 335-337.

(164) Pissurlencar, Bajirao and Portuguese, (Sahyadri, May 1940).

(165) BNL. Ms. Relacao sumario dos sucessos de Goa: “... e nao serao attendedas as ditas ordens, principalmente sendo ja constante a desobediencia de Bagi Rao a Xau Raja, e o pouco caso que faziam os ditos Cabos do nome do dito Xau, nao gerendo que fosse nomeado em papel algum da dita negociação.

(166) Portuguese translation of Dadajirao’s letter is in Goa Archives wherein it is said : .... Quanto a materia de Goa esta parece acabar ou para se defirir; as fachin as de Rachol estao ja adiantadas ate a borda da cava que so resta para se dar asalto e conseguida esta dilligencia terey sobido o Gatte .......” The meaning is : Goa business is about to end. Assault on Rachol has reached as far as the ditch. Only assault now remains. This finished, I shall proceed up the Ghausts.”

(167) Pissurlencar, Assentos V, p. 542-545.

(168) Ibid, p. 545.

(169) Ibid, p. 536.

(170) Portugueses e Maratas, Part IV Kelkar’s Vasaichi Mohim contains this, but it became necessary to publish it again as it contained an error.

(172) Pissurlencar PM, IV, p. 130. 

(173) BNL. Ms Relacao summaria dos sucessos de Goa says while the Hindu merchants were being taken to Mormugao fort on March 10, their eyes were closed by a bandage in the gate and they were told that they would not be allowed to go home unless they paid seven lakh asurpis as war tribute. They were also threatened that if they did not pay this sum stones would be placed on their heads. 

(174) BNL. Ms. Relacao Sumaria dos sucessos de Goa. 

(175) Ibid: "Dava Santu Sinai por motivo de passar a Punem a experiencia de que na Corte de Xau nao se podia concluir ajuste algum sem o beneplacito de Bagi Rao."

(176) BNL. Relacao sumaria dos sucessos de Goa. 

(177) Ibid, "Sambagi Raja escandalizou-se de que Bagi Rao se Intrometesse a conquistar terras da sua jurisdiccao, a que lhes pagavam tributo ...." There are many letters in Goa Archives which support this information in Portuguese. For instance Rangaji Narajan’s letter dated 9-11-1739 (Marathi letters No. 522. Pissurlencar, PM. V, p. 45). 


(179) Goa Archives: Marathi documents. 

(180) Ibid, 

(181) Pissurlencar, ADP. p. 214. 

(182) BNL. Ms. Relacao sumaria dos sucessos de Goa. 

(183) Goa Archives: Marathi documents. 

(184) Goa Archives: Papeis Avuslos. 

(185) Pissurlencar, PM, IV, Appendix. 

(186) BNL Sucessos da India no governo do Conde de Sandomil says that Nagoba Savant came to Narve on December 23, 1739. 

(187) Pissurlencar, PM, V. P. 21n. 

(188) Goa Archives: Co 26, fls. 146. 

(189) Pissurlencar, PM. V. 18n. " .... a grande attencao que todos tem a Bagi Rau, muito dificulta qualquer conclusao que nao seja a seu gosto a com o sey beneplacito .... "

(190) BNL. Ms. Relacao sumaria dos sucessos de Goa. The Viceroy’s letter dated February 2, 1740 says that that the Angria had captured two palas and two gatias (BACL, Ms. 511, fls. 94 v). 

(191) Goa Archives: MR. 113, fl. 37 Viceroy’s letter to Governor of Bombay dated 30-3-1740. 

(192) BACL. Ms. Correspondencia do Vice-Rei Conde de Sandomele, Vol. VIII, fls. 74 : “A soberba dos maratas chagou a tais extremos que, em di scuso das conferencias tidas com o dito capitao, nao falacam em menos que penetrar dentro de Goa com rezolucao de estirpar a raiz ....”. 


(194) Dr. V. G. Dighe, Peshwa Bajirao I and Mahratta Expansion, p. 215.
CHAPTER V

DURING NANASAHEB’S REGIME

In 1740, Balaji Bajirao alias Nanasaheb Peshwa made a treaty with the Portuguese at Poona but the Bhonsala Savant of Savantvadi did not like it. Jairam Savant was well aware of the worsened condition of the Portuguese. He decided that before any help from Portugal reached Goa, he should attack Bardez and capture it. He was of the view that with Mahratta help he could even capture Salcete and Goa island. His councillors said that while formally one Portuguese soldier was more than a match for ten of the Savant, the position then was that one soldier of the Savant was too much for 100 Portuguese.

Jairam Savant fitted up a small armada and began to practise piracy on the sea. With the help of some Portuguese renegades he raised a disciplined battalion of his own soldiers. Vitthoji Shenvi Dhume of Kumarijuvem and Vitthoji Naik Prataprao Sardesai used to keep the Viceroy informed about the activities of the Savant-Bhonsala. Documents in Goa Archives clearly demonstrate that the Portuguese were trying hard to save themselves by working against the Bhonsala-Savant.

Ghanashyam Narayan Mantri of Satara had given his daughter in marriage to the son of Vitthoji Dhume who was a rich merchant. Because of this relationship he had contact with important Mahratta Sardars. Letters written by such influential persons as Chhatrapati Sambhaji, Naroram Mantri, Bhonsala-Savant, Bhaskar Dadaji, Sadashiv Rao alias Bhausahaeb, (the peshwa’s cousin) are available. It was because Dhume informed the Viceroy in advance that Bhonsala-Savant was attacking Aguada, that the Viceroy could resist the attack and the Bhonsala-Savant could not take it. Jairam Savant wanted to take Aguada before he invaded Bardez but Dhume’s intrigue foiled his project. Jose Francisco de Azavedo, a renegade Portuguese captain had counselled Savant how to capture Aguada and Goa Island. The Viceroy writes that Savant was induced to fight the Portuguese, because of this.

On February 21, 1741, Jairam Savant invaded Bardez and captured it in one day, except the forts of Aguada and Reis Magus. Near Aldona, he slaughtered four Companhias of the Portuguese. Immediately afterwards he was planning to enter Goa island through the creek
of Kumarjuve. For this purpose, he had kept men and boats ready on the other side of Goa island in concealment and collected over 1500 soldiers at Bicholim but in the nick of time, the English armada came near Aguada and the Portuguese could protect Goa island with its help. The Portuguese armed ships had gone far from Goa and the Savant wished to utilise this opportunity for capturing Goa. But their days were not still numbered.

On 18 May 1741, Conde de Sandomele was replaced by Marquez de Louriçal as Viceroy. While leaving Portugal, he brought with him cannons of a new kind, sufficient ammunition and 2000 soldiers. But only 912 reached Goa hale and hearty. The rest of them died during the voyage which lasted about a year. The Viceroy had brought 16 cannons of the new style. Their speciality was that they made 20 reports a minute. To work them 240 men were required but they did the work of 3,000 soldiers.

This cannon was discovered by Frederick Weinholtz and so it was named after him. What is very remarkable is that Tulaji Angria had also manufactured a gun like this. Marcquez de Tavora came to know about this in September 1750. One Portuguese gunner had deserted Goa and accepted a job under Tulaji whom this gunner gave information about these new style guns. On June 13, 1741, the Portuguese invaded Bardez under the command of General Manuel Suvarisvelu and routed the Bhonsala in one day before the onslaught of these new guns and the Savant had to surrender. For the protection of Colvale fortress, the Savant fought very valiantly but he had to surrender that fort also to these new cannons.

Under these circumstances the Savant pleaded with the Peshwa for his help but the Portuguese drew his attention to the treaty made in Poona on September 18, 1740 and in accord with it, the Peshwa showed readiness to help the Portuguese against the Savant. The following clause appears in the treaty: “There is a treaty between you and the Savant. You should abide by it. If the Savant acts against it, we shall help you. If you act against the treaty, we shall help him.” At last, once again, there was a treaty between the Savant and the Portuguese on 11 September 1741. In terms of it, the Savant had to surrender Khorjuve and Panale to the Portuguese. He had also to give up agricultural lands in Mayen and Araba in the vicinity.
of the fort of Khorjuvem. He had also to return the village of Peerna which he had secured in terms of the treaty of Bicholim. The Portuguese received some more land also.

Two humiliating clauses in the treaty were that Sawant-Bhonsala should pay a tribute of 1,000 *asurpis* a year to the Portuguese and pay 15,000 *asurpis* as damages for the harm done to the churches and forts in Bardez. In a word the Savant-Bhonsla lost everything he had earned by the treaty at Bicholim and over and above he had to part with some lands. Portuguese translation of a letter that Dadajirao Bhave wrote to the Secretary of the Government of Goa is there in Goa Archives. It is dated 16 April 1741. Dadajirao says in it that after ships from Portugal arrive the Portuguese will force the Savant to vacate Bardez in four days and enforce their rule. His prognostication came true with a vengeance. Even four days were not required. The Portuguese did all that in a single day on the strength of the new guns.

Nagu Savant Bhonsale was transported with joy at the victory of the Portuguese. Writing to the Secretary of the Government of Goa he says: “I am very highly pleased to hear that you have captured Bardez and regained Khorjuvem from the enemy. It is all very fine. We want the Estado (Goa) to flourish.” This letter bears no date but it was translated in Portuguese on 9 July 1741. Sambhaji Angria also felt that a treaty of friendship with the Portuguese would be desirable after the Viceroy Marquez de Lourecal had won this victory over Bhonsala-Savant of Savantvadi. So he wrote a letter to the Viceroy on 12 November 1741 and suggested that if he desired to take back Bassein from the Mahrattas he should be informed accordingly so that he could arrange everything secretly.

The Viceroy sent a reply to Sambhaji Angria on 2 December, 1741 reciprocating the desire for a treaty and peace on the sea between them. In January next, Sambhaji died. In a contemporary Portuguese document the death is mentioned to have taken place on 22 January 1742. The Viceroy writes that there were four palas, one galia and fifty *galvetas* in the Peshwa’s armada. In May 1742, Govind Ram Thakur attacked Salcete in Goa. A warning to that effect was received by the Portuguese from Dadajirao Bhave previously. A translation in Portuguese of the letter Dadaji wrote to the Secretary of the
Goa is available. It was done on 30 May 1742. He says therein, "Under orders from the Chhatrapati Sambhaji, Govindpant had invited you for talks but you did not respond to it. He is coming down the ghat and the Portuguese should, therefore, take better care of their forts and fortification of the island of Goa. Nagoo Savant also had cautioned the Portuguese to the same effect. He said Govind Thakur would create confusion in Salcete."

Govindpant Thakur, a former sardar of the Peshwas, had accepted service at Sambhaji's court. He came down the ghat in Sanguem on 12 May 1742. After the death of the Peshwa, Sardar Naropant and Sardar Annaji Prabhu had taken Sanguem and Ponda fortresses from the Prince of Saunde on behalf of Sambhaji. Govindpant had 3,000 horsemen and 3,000 footmen and some elephants. When Govindpant reached Sanguem, Annaji Prabhu was at Mardangad. Govindpant sent for him, handcuffed him and placed him under arrest till the fort of Sanguem was delivered to him. Seeing that he had a strong army, Annaji Prabhu surrendered Sanguem to him and agreed to deliver Ponda fort also. Annaji Prabhu then stayed in Ponda fort. Govindpant informed the Viceroy from Sanguem that an appropriate person should be sent to him to hold talks with him. Portuguese translation of Govindpant's letter done on 15-5-1742 is available.

As Govindpant received no reply from the Portuguese, he proceeded to Salcete and camped there on 16 May 1742 and demanded Rs. 20,000 as the arrears of tribute from the time of Conde de Sandomele. For fourteen days, he stayed in Salcete without any opposition. Then he hastily went to Sanguem. Under orders of the Peshwa, Sanguem and Ponda fortresses were to be given to the Prince of Sanguem. Saundekar's General Kalaphaya had already taken possession of Mardangad. But Sardar Annaji Prabhu drove out the Saunde Prince from there with the help of Bhonsala-Savant and took possession of Sanguem and Mardangad forts from Ponda Panchmahal. When it was known that Annaji Prabhu was under arrest, about 800 of his men and principal officers accepted service under the Portuguese.

On 8 June 1742, Friday, the Portuguese attacked the army of Govindpant at Sanguem and after a fight for three hours took the fortress and demolished it. Govindpant was defeated and he fled up the ghat. The Portuguese army consisted of 600 Europeans, 1500
natives and two new style cannons. The army was under the command of Manuel Soares Velen. He has left a vivid description of the battle in which he says that he beheaded a number of them, the right hands of some were cut off and tied to their necks and they were then let off. On 9 June one thousand soliders under the command of Kalappaya of Saunde came to the aid of the Portuguese. They were sent in advance and the Portuguese army followed them to Ponda on 11 June. Annaji Prabhu was in the fort there. But he had no more than one hundred men and some ammunition. He did not hesitate for long. The next day he opened the gate of the fort and surrendered himself to the Portuguese. He even ordered for the surrender of Supem fort.

The Portuguese were going to demolish the Ponda fort but Kalappaya insisted that it should be given to him in tact. In this way the fort again passed on to the Saunde Prince, (12 June 1742). The Portuguese kept Annaji with his two comrades Sabaji and Narayan Prabhu in Aguada. He was there for 28 days. Later he fled away from there.

Viceroy Marquez de Louricál died on 12 June 1742. Goa’s administration was then in charge of acting Governors. One of them Don Luiz Caimxo de Almeida kept contact with the Captains of Thana and Bassein forts. He had informed the King of Portugal in a letter dated 28 January 1743 that both of them were prepared to hand over the forts to the Portuguese if each of them was given a bribe of one lakh of rupees but he was instructed from Portugal that to do anything like that was fraught with dangerous consequences. In September 1744, the new Viceroy Marquez de Castello Novo came to Goa.

In a letter written on 3 November 1744, to the Secretario do Estado, this Viceroy says, “The people of Bassein are eager to get out of the jaws of the Mahrattas. I am getting numerous letters from the local people to relieve them from the Mahratta oppression.” While two Portuguese frigates (N. S. de Oliveira and N. S. de Penha de Franca) with a caravan of 21 ships were proceeding to the North, the armada of the Angria attacked them. This armada contained nine palas and two galvetas. For six days the Portuguese and the Angria fought, but at last the Mahrattas retreated according to Pedro Vicente Vidal in a letter dated 24 November 1744.
In a letter dated February 11, 1745, this Viceroy writes to Portugal: “The Angria of Kolaba has sent an envoy to me. Although he has come here only on a goodwill visit, the reason behind his despatch here is different. He has brought a secret message of his master that if I wish to take back Karanja (Uran) and Bassein from the Mahrattas he is prepared to help me in that venture. His reason is that the proximity of the Peshwa is irksome to him. Had I another 2000 disciplined soldiers, I would have attacked Bassein myself. The people there are waiting for us to go there. I receive letters from every ship that comes here to free the people there from Mahratta shackles. Besides this, I feel certain that Chhatrapati Shahu himself is jealous of the army of the Peshwa Nanasaheb and he will not help the Peshwa against us.”

In a letter written on March 8, 1745, the Viceroy wrote to Portugal: “We lost an opportunity this year of regaining the northern territory of Bassein. How much do I regret this! There is very little army there at present. Not only the Christians but also Hindus from Bassein write to me that I should free them from Mahratta bondage. Even some Mahratta sardars have informed me that if we go there with an army, they would turn round, give up the service of the Mahrattas and join us as our employees.”

The author came across a letter written by Marquez de Castello Novo to the King of Portugal on 27 December 1745 in the library of the Coimbra University. The Viceroy says in this letter that he had maintained contact with the Court of Satara during the whole of the preceding rainy season and therefore felt confident that he would receive no molestation from the Mahrattas. The Viceroy further wrote: “I have come to know that Chhatrapati Shahu is jealous of the strong army of the Peshwa and some members of his court are against the Peshwa Nanasaheb. So if we demanded our northern province of Bassein, they will not mind it. But in view of the customs and manners of these people this important business cannot be put through without spending considerable money. Yet I am incessantly trying but I have no idea how far I shall succeed.”

The opinion of Caitano de Sousa Pereira who became well known in the Bassein campaign is worth bearing in mind in this connection.
He has said, "The Mahratta captains of Thana and Bassein say that they are willing to hand over the forts to the Portuguese for a price, but it is all a fraud. They only use it as a device to find out how the Portuguese mind works in this matter. As a matter of fact, military action is the only way of recapturing Bassein. For that purpose besides 600 Portuguese soldiers, one thousand native soldiers and a good armada are-quire enough."37

Sardar Ramchandra Malhar had come to Kavale on January 20, 1746 for the festival of Magh 5. He had with him 75 camels, 800 horses and some infantry.38 The Goa Government looked askance at this episode. Ramchandra Malhar was a Mahajan of the Shanta Durga temple and he had spent a good deal of money there. He had also built one extension of the temple (alpendre). Therefore the Goa Government was perplexed as to what suggestions it should make to the Price of Saunde in regard to him. The Goa Government knew that Ramchandra Malhar was an influential person at Shahu's Court and he might have to batch some plot against the Portuguese on the pretext of paying a visit to his family deity. The Portuguese have recorded a number of ancedotes about Ramchandra Malhar.39 One of them is that Ramchandra Malhar was a resident of Savantvadi. The Savant gave him such a severe thrashing for an insignificant mistake that he left his home, went up the ghat and sought employment under Bajirao Peshwa. He was intelligent, smart and good-natured. He prospered there and earned much wealth. He was not without enemies, who poisoned Bajirao's ears against him. Bajirao thought that he might have become rich at the cost of Government and so one day he made a call at his place, all of a sudden, and expressed a desire to have a look at his treasure. Ramchandra was not frightened at all. He handed over the keys of his treasure to Bajirao and took him to the strong room where Ramchandra's wealth was stored. After inspecting it Bajirao said that he was in need of it for a big campaign. Ramchandra smilingly welcomed the suggestion and said that he would be very pleased to keep it at his disposal. He regarded that wealth as his master's and so long as the master favoured him, he would never be in want of anything. Bajirao was surprised at his attitude and did not touch it at all. He was satisfied with his loyalty and made over his children to him for their education.
Ramchandra served Bajirao and his son Nanasaheb loyally for many years and earned much wealth. He was loyal even to the Savant-Bhonsla and helped him on many occasions to the extent of Rs. one and half lakh.

In April 1746, the Viceroy planned an invasion of Savantvadi and asked the help of the Prince of Saunde for that purpose. Saunde and Savantvadi were inveterate enemies and so the Viceroy received a ready response from Saunde. On May 5, 1746 the Viceroy conquered Alorna, part of Savantvadi. The Portuguese opened the solid gates of the fort with the help of Petardos. The use of Petardos was made by the Portuguese in 1741 in the war against Savantvadi and since then that Portuguese word has passed in the Marathi language for constant use. The Viceroy has written that Subedar Goma Savant of the Alorna fort fought valiantly in this battle. Seeing that the Viceroy was proceeding from Alorna to the fort of Bicholim on May 18, he damaged the fort, burnt Bicholim and fled away. The Portuguese captured Bicholim on the same day and started repairs of the fort and issued a proclamation in Marathi (na lingua do pays) and thereby ordered the Desais and guokurs of that Mahal to resume their work in their respective villages.

For some days past, the Desais of Maneri, Sanquelim and Keri had begun friendly correspondence with the Portuguese. But out of fear of the Bhonsala-Savant, they could not muster up courage to join the Portuguese openly and they wanted to pretend that they went over under duress. Taking note of this, the Portuguese sent their troops on Sanquelim. The men of Sanquelim, Desais and the Portuguese engaged there in a skirmish, but the Portuguese did not damage the fort and the city, under instructions of the Viceroy because they had to secure the sympathy of the Desais who were brave men. The Campaign against the Savant was stopped in the rainy season, but during this period intrigues with the Ranes of Sanquelim and Keri went on.

Some ancestor of the Ranes of Sanquelim had killed a monkey while hunting about 70 years ago. On that account, probably at the instance of Savantvadi, the Ranes were under social ostracism. When Chhatrapati Sambhaji came to Ponda in 1684, there was a move to admit them to the caste again but as the Chhatrapati had to leave
hastily on account of the invasion of the Moghuls, the problem of the Ranes was hanging fire. For this reason Satroji Rane was on inimical terms with the Savant-Bhonsla. The Viceroy assured the Ranes that he would see to it that they were admitted to their caste for social intercourse.\textsuperscript{44} He gave some more assurances also to Satroji Rane and his colleagues, the Desais. One of them was that religious freedom would be given to Hindus in the territory that the Portuguese would take and they would not demolish the temples of the Hindus.\textsuperscript{46} There was much discontent among the Desais at this time because the Savant had issued orders to recover a watercess of 40,000 rupees from the Desais. This is also one of the reasons why the Desais and Ranes joined the Portuguese.

At last on October 21, 1746, the Ranes of Sanquelim, Gavas of Maneri, Raghunath Prabhu of Bicholim, Kushtoba Desai of Advai and others turned their backs on the Savant and succumbed to Portuguese rule. Not only this, but Satroji Rane captured Avado, Morle and Satarem forts of the Savant and handed them over to the Portuguese in token of their loyalty to them.\textsuperscript{46} On November 10 the Viceroy presented himself with his armada in the bay of Culion and on November 23, he launched an attack of Terekhol fort and captured it. On this occasion, the Portuguese captured or destroyed most of the Savant's armada which had in it ten palas fitted with 15 to 20 guns, 17 galvetas, three bateus one armed manchua and four parangues. There were several boats also.\textsuperscript{47}

On December 3, 1746, the Portuguese captured the fort of Redi. The Savant-Bhonsala often charged the Portuguese for having deceitfully captured it from them.\textsuperscript{48} From a letter written by Jairam Savant Bhonsla and Ramchandra Savant Bhonsala to the Viceroy on July 12, 1748, some more information regarding the conflict between the Bhonsala-Savant and the Portuguese becomes available.\textsuperscript{49} This letter recounts the principal stages of the battle and says that the fort of Redi was made over to the Portuguese for some days only as security pending settlement of peace at Redi itself on the condition that the people and ryots of Redi would be left undisturbed, but now it was usurped. From the language of this letter it is apparent that the Portuguese seized the Redi fort by force and fraud.
It became obligatory on the Peshwa to mediate on behalf of the Savant with the Portuguese. He appointed Mahipatrao Chanda as envoy who reached Goa a few days before November 11, 1746. Even after staying in Goa for several days, no hope of a treaty with Bhonsla from the Portuguese was in sight. So the Peshwa sent his cousin Sadashivrao with a large army to Karnataka. In a letter written to Pilajirao Jadhav on December 11, 1746 a reference is made to Sadashivrao’s invasion. This letter says, “The Portuguese have picked up a quarrel with the Bhonsala of Savantvadi who has been in our service for long. He must be helped. So arrangement has been made to send troops there. It was decided to send Sadashivrao there with an army. If the Portuguese pursues the Savant, 2000 should be sent there.” A description of Sadashivrao’s invasion is available in Goa Archives and it shows how terrified the Portuguese were of that invasion.

The henchmen of the Portuguese were at the Mahratta court as well as in Sadashivrao’s army who kept the Portuguese biographer of Vice-Rei Marquez de Castello Novo informed. He has said that the Viceroy daily received messages about the movements of the Mahrattas and even these sardars who had to participate in the battle also sent cautions to the Portuguese. In particular, the prince of Saunde was very anxious for the Portuguese because he always thought that the farther the Peshwa army was from Ponda Panchmahal the better it was for him. The Sarsubedar of Ponda appointed by the prince of Saunde, Kushta Rao says in a letter to the Secretary of the Goa Government written on 27-1-1751 that the army of Sadashivrao was coming down the ghat but the men of Saunde and the Portuguese closed Digi and Tinai ghats and did not allow it to come down as a result of which the territory of Ponda and Goa remained in peace.

The letter written by Kushtarao on 14-4-1751 says that “the Bhonsala had managed to get Sadashivrao to invade Salcete and he even came as far as Supem. Marquez de Alorna beckoned to us and we did not allow him to come down the ghat. He went back with his 40,000 and Jairam Savant thus looked small. In this way saunde and Goa were saved.” What conciliatory and monetory remedies, Kushta Rao employed to prevent Sadashivrao from coming down on Goa have been dilated upon in a letter that Jeevan Naik Hangal
wrote to Kushta Rao dated March 8, 1747. Portuguese translation of this Marathi letter is in Goa Archives.

This Sardar Hangal met Sadasivrao at Khanapur when Bhausaheb told him that he wanted to invade Goa and for that purpose he wanted to keep in his possession Mardangad; so the prince of Saunde should hand it over to him for one year. Besides he should help with his men to get his men down the ghat. On behalf of the prince of Saunde, he offered a lakh of rupees to Bhausaheb and requested him not to go down the Ghat in that year. This Sardar Hangal also assured Bhausaheb that the Prince of Saunde has observed the agreement with Chhatrapati Shahu made forty years ago of paying Rs. 21,000 a year as tribute and he would observe it in future. He bribed many Mahratta sardars also.

The Karbhari of Saunde carried on the talks in the Camp of Bhausaheb Peshwa on March 8, 1747 when he said that he had to recover tribute from Goa and take back the forts of the Bhonsala of Savantvadi which the Portuguese had forcibly taken; for that purpose he wanted Mardangad in his possession for a year. But he was obliged to act according to the orders of Chhatrapati Shahu. So instead of that year he would come next year to Goa, when he would require Mardangad for a year. So the Prince of Saunde should not delay this delivery of the fort as soon as he got instructions to do so from the Chhatrapati. Bhausaheb took half of the amount of tribute from the Prince of Saunde and decamped from Supem on March 10, 1747.56

Marquez de Castello Novo, in his letter to the King of Portugal, written on 30 December 1747 has said,56 “It was published that the Peshwa’s force of 30,000 horsemen and innumerable footmen was coming down on Goa under the command of Bhausaheb. When I knew that it was to march on Salcete I had closed all the mountain passes and raised impediments in the way by felling trees, so that its course should be obstructed. The very name of the Mahrattas frightens people in Asia and so the people of Supem ran helter-skelter when they knew that Bhausaheb was coming. The men of Saunde and Ranes had kept watch to stop the coming army but they also fled away. Our men also were going to do likewise but I gave strict orders to their superiors to behead them in that event. Some months ago
Nanasheb had sent Mahipatrao Chanda as envoy to me. I delayed my reply and he kept waiting. He asked me to make a treaty with the Savant. Some time later Bhausaheb asked me to send back Mahipatrao and suggested that the Mahratta army was coming on Goa to compel me to make peace with the Savant. Besides, he also wanted to find out if we had any designs on North Konkan and Bassein. Bhausaheb again wrote to me that Savant was a tributary of the Peshwa and so the forts and territory that I have taken from him should be returned to him and for that I should send to his Camp a respectable Portuguese envoy to negotiate a suitable treaty. I prayed for time without sending him any reply. At the same time I sent an emissary to Satara and convinced Nanasheb that we had no designs on Bassein. The Mahrattas knew that I was ready for battle. They also knew that people in Salsete had already fled away and so there was no point in plundering Salsete. After waiting for many days, Bhausaheb decamped from Supem and went to the border of Karnataka. After I knew where he was going I sent his man to him and gave him a letter, saying that if the Bhonsla wanted a treaty, he should send an envoy to Goa and a draft treaty. If the envoy of Nanasheb is present at that time, he would be a welcome.”

From this Portuguese report it becomes apparent that for two reasons, Bhausaheb did not invade Goa. One was that he had not with him big cannons and other means necessary for capturing forts in Goa and it was not easy to get the diet in Konkan that their animals required. Rudrappa Halvi, General of the Kittur Sardesai, wrote a congratulatory letter to the Viceroy on October 8, 1747, because of the Portuguese victory over Savant which is in Goa Archives. He says that when Bhausaheb met him he told him that his army would be harassed after going down the ghat and therefore he changed his plan. Pedro Vicente Vidal, the Portuguese General writes in a letter to Viceroy Marquez de Alorna: “I believe that the enemy will not come down the ghat. If he does so, he will have to repent, because he will not get even a seer of rice for his army or grass for his horses. We have burnt all the hay in the theatre of war and collected all possible foodgrains.” The fact of the matter was that the Peshwa had no suitable opportunity to engage in a battle with the Portuguese. Besides the Mahrattas also knew that once a battle began, it would
linger on like the campaign in Bassein. Nanasaheb has written in a letter dated March 5, 1747, to Ramchandra Baba: "The Portuguese are dishonest and must be uprooted but it is not possible just now."

Although the Peshwa could not help Savant with an army, he was given monetary help from time to time.

The Portuguese Viceroy writes on January 28, 1749 to the King of Portugal: "Nana fears Nizam. I know that while sending money and refusing military help to Savant, Nana pleaded that he had to keep an army ready to resist the Nizam. That is why probably last year and this year, he did not pester us with an invasion." Besides Nana always had the suspicion that the Portuguese would try to reconquer Bassein. On December 7, 1746, Nanasaheb wrote to Ramchandra Baba: "The Portuguese and the French have combined. The French have taken two English forts in Arcot territory, Madras and Pondicherry. The French are coming with 20 ships to Goa. All Europeans are alike. They are unpredictable. Pilaji Jadhao Rao has been sent to Konkan as a precautionary measure. Bombay is named, but where they will land is not known. We have taken precautionary steps to guard our posts. What happens later will be communicated to you. This year, the Portuguese seem to be stiff. Why worry as long as Gods' grace is there."

As a matter of fact there was no united action between the French and the Portuguese. After the French had taken Madras from the English, they thought that the French would invade Bombay also and if such a calamity overtook the English, they wanted the assistance of the Peshwa and so they had spread the remour that the French and Portuguese had joined hands. The Viceroy has said that by giving such information the English led the Peshwa to believe that the Franco-Portuguese would take Bombay and with French help, the Portuguese would re-capture Bassein. Believing in all this, Nanasaheb sent 25,000 cavalry to Salcete.

In a letter written to Joao de Sousa Ferraz on February 13, 1747, the Viceroy has said, "The Angria this year is perpetrating atrocities on the whole coast with his nine palas and sixty galvetas and if the concerned European nations did not act in time, they would have to face the consequent calamities. While we were at Redi, the Angria attacked the Manglore port, resorted to arson at Panale and captured
a number of Dutch ships that were laden with spices and copper. I have presently received a letter from the agent of the Mangalore factory in which he says that three English trading ships had anchored in Telicherry port. They had come from Bengal. They lifted all the cargo and stored it near the fort and had made preparations to meet the possible attack of the Angria at night in his own ports and elsewhere. He has now become so insolent that none can face him as far as Kanyakumari. You should speak to the Governor of Bombay confidentially in this matter and if he is prepared to move forward, we shall make our plans in this rainy season so that by summer all preparations would be made.” Tulaji Angria invaded Mangalore on December 8, 1746. He was there for 26 hours.65

In September 1748, a Portuguese armada came to Goa with troops. Only 752 soldiers came. But their captains and military equipment was excellent. The Portuguese naval movements were made only in November and December every year. So the Viceroy decided to press into service this assistance by attacking the Bhonsla and invaded the fort of Nevti on December 2, 1748. On this occasion, a Muslim Captain in the Portuguese service showed great valour and hoisted the Portuguese flag on the fort.66 Panegyrics have been showered on this Muslim hero by Portuguese writers. The well-informed author of Epanaphora Indica has described him as second Certorio. This Muslim warrior was formerly in the service of Sambhaji Angre, Haripant Phadke, Saundekar, Savantvadkar etc.

While the Viceroy was in the Nevti port he learnt that the Bhonsala was building ships in Karli river and for their protection he had erected cannons on the banks of the river. When Ismailkhan knew about this he went to Karli river with the permission of the Viceroy and burnt away all the ships of the Bhonsala. The Subedar of Malvan had sent an emissary to the Viceroy while he was at Nevti on a goodwill visit. When the Portuguese armada was in front of Malvan fort, the Subedar returned three galvetas of the Portuguese that he had captured. After taking possession of Nevti, the Viceroy went to Vengurla with his armada, where there was a Dutch fort. The Bhonsla had repaired and expanded it. Before the Viceroy reached Vengurla, the Bhonsala dismantled part of it and left it. The Viceroy was in a hurry to return to Goa. So he caused some damage to the port and left for Goa.
Congratulating the Viceroy on his victory over the Bhonsala-Savant, the Minister of Saunde prince, Krishna Rao wrote to the Viceroy on December 22, 1748 in superlative terms. He said they were praying for the safety and success and return of the Viceroy all the while and their happiness was boundless at his safe return to Goa. Although the Bhonsala was meeting with reverses continually in the war with the Portuguese, he did not give up courage and he did not surrender to the enemy, but kept on the fight. He had many enemies. The Prince of Saunde always helped the Portuguese against him. Nagoo Savant also rejoiced in the success of the Portuguese and the defeat of the Savant. As he was the sardar of Chhatrapati Sambhaji at least he ought to have a soft corner for the Bhonsla, but even he sided with the Portuguese to destroy the Bhonsla in 1748. With this end in view the Chhatrapati of Kolhapur had even sent his envoy to Goa at the end of 1747. Even at the court of Chhatrapati Shahu, the Viceroy was carrying on intrigues against the Bhonsla through his henchmen. Tulaji Angria regarded him as his enemy and asked for Portuguese help to destroy him. In the face of such odds against him, only Peshwa Nanasahib was his stand-by. But in those days so many important problems were before the Peshwa that he was unable to send any big army to his aid but his moral and monetary support to the Bhonsla was always there.

The Portuguese destroyed the armada of the Bhonsla. He tried to build it anew in Karli river but failed. The Bhonsla was exhausted under the severe pressure of the Portuguese. In spite of all this he captured Tulaji Angria’s Mudagad in February 1748. Jairam Savant Bhonsala and Ramchandra Savant Bhonsala state in a letter written to the Viceroy on April 5, 1748 that “Penetrating as far as Anjanvel-Govalkot, we captured Mudagad which the Angria had built newly. After returning we received honours and monetary help from the Chhatrapati. More help has also been promised.” Later in 1749, the Bhonsla captured Angria's fort of Masure. Cònde de Castello Novo has written that Tulaji Angria had taken this fort from the Bhonsala. He bought over some men in the fort and attacked it suddenly. The people inside fought for five days but had to surrender for want of water. Tulaji went to their help with troops but it had already been surrendered and Tulaji had to return.
At the end of March, Tulaji sought Portuguese help in order to recapture the fort from the Bhonsala and sent Subedar Rudraji Dhubal as his envoy to negotiate terms. Dhubal had talks with the Portuguese and returned to Vijaydurg. Hope was given to him, but the Portuguese did not want to help the Angria against the Bhonsla. After the rainy season, Tulaji led an assault on Manglore with six palas and 50 galvetas and plundered the town. He even plundered the Portuguese factory there and they got an excuse for refusing help to the Angria. The Bhonsala tried hard to induce the Ranes of Sanquelim and other Desais to join him again and forsake the Portuguese. He even was prepared to admit Satroji Rane to social intercourse.

This story is given in Epanaphora Indica. It is also stated in it that Bhonsla’s Karbhar Deoba Shervi succeeded in this effort because Hari Gavas, Desai of Maneri and Raghunath Prabhu, Desai of Sanque-lim were moved and Satroji Rane himself informed the Portuguese that he would have to break with the Portuguese under the orders of the Peshwa. From a letter which Bhaskarao Bhave had written to the Portuguese on May 11, 1748, it appears that the Bhonsla was secretly influencing in various ways the Ranes and Desais. He has insisted that no one should come to know that he was an informant of the Portuguese and averred that he regarded the Portuguese as the greatest of all powers, pointing out that the Bhonsla, the Ranes and the Desais were plotting to hand over Goa to the Peshwa. He has said that muros, i.e., fortifications of Bardez and passos in the river were in their hands, but should be watched. Mardangad was to be handed over to the Peshwa so that the Portuguese should camp there and suggesting this he concludes with humility that whatever was of benefit should be considered and the rest left out of account. This Bhaskarao was in the Peshwa's army and in that capacity he used to get several clues of policy. He faithfully but secretly let them out to the Portuguese. There are several letters of his in Goa Archives.

The Bhonsla was very sullen over the Portuguese usurpation of Redi fort and he tried many remedies to regain it. In July 1747 he tried to win over captain Raghjuri Naik who was a Portuguese protege and even the time of handing over the fort to the Bhonsla was fixed. But Rama Kamat, a local merchant went to Goa and informed the Viceroy about it. Pokya Naik, a subordinate of Raghjori, also gave similar
information to Goa. An inquiry into Raghujir's conduct was held, his
guilt established and he was hanged.80 Pokya Naik and Rama Kamat
were rewarded by money grants.81 In August 1747 again, the Bhonsla
made one more effort to regain Redi. He managed to sell dried fish
which was treated with poisoned salt to the soldiers in the fort. They
used it and fell ill. The Bhonsla led an assault in this situation but
had to retreat under Portuguese fire.82

The Chhatrapati of Satara planned in 1748 to appoint Apaji Angria
in place of Tulaji Angria in Vijadurga and in order that the Portuguese
should co-operate with him in this plan he sent Dom Antonio Jose
Henriques who was at the Satara Court to talk to the Viceroy about
it. When Tulaji came to know about it, he arranged to have Apaji
murdered some days before May 14, 1748.83 A contemporary Portu-
guese historian has written that Kanhoji Angria had two married wives.
He had a number of mistresses also. He had two sons by his first wife,
Sekhoji and Sambhaji. The second wife also had two sons and one of
them was Apaji.

In March 1749, Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur went to Sindhudurg when he informed the Portuguese through Tukoji Shyamji and
Maloji Malad that he wished to act as mediator between the Bhonsala
and the Portuguese, but the Portuguese were not prepared for it, becausethe stand of the Kolhapur Chhatrapati was that all the fortresses
of the Bhonsala that the Portuguese had captured should be returned
to him and they should close the strife.84 Next year in April the
Chhatrapati sent an envoy to the Viceroy Marquez de Alorna and
suggested that the Portuguese should fly the Chhatrapati's flag on those
forts, but the Portuguese replied that they could fly only the flag of
the King of Portugal on all the forts they had captured from the
Bhonsala.85

In 1749, the Portuguese learnt that it was being resolved in Poona
that the contract of recovering the revenue of the territory of Bhonsla
was being entrusted to the Peshwa's Sardar, Malhar Ramchandra. The
Portuguese did not want this. So they instructed Dom Antonio Jose
Henriques who was at Shahu's Court to impress on Shahu's mind that
by such a measure the Peshwa's power would increase and the
Chhatrapati's power would diminish.86 In a letter written to the Peshwa
in December 1748, Ramchandra Malhar said that people from Bicholim,
Sanquelim and Belgaum wished ardently that the Peshwa’s flag should fly in these areas. The reign of Viceroy Marquez do Castello Novo ended on September 27, 1750. After he had taken the Bhonsla’s Halorna fort, the King had conferred on him the title Marquez of Alorna. Marquez de Tavora was appointed in his place. The instructions that Marquez the Alorna left for his guidance are well-known. In his reign, many important events in Mahratta history happened.

In 1751 March, the Portuguese sentenced to death a spy who was sent by Shankarajipant from Bassein to Goa. Great efforts were made to induce him to embrace Christianity in order to be kept alive but he preferred death to conversion. On March 25, 1751, Captain Ismail Khan of the Portuguese captured three armed manchuaes of Hiroji Naik who was in the service of the Bhonsla.

There is a manuscript entitled Journal de L’armée conduite par M. Bussy in Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris in which there is mention of some Goan Christians (Canaries) having been sent from Goa to meet Bussy at the beginning of 1752. The purpose of this step can be gathered from Bussy et l’Inde Francaise by Alfred Martineu. He writes that Dupleix had suggested to the Portuguese Viceroy that the Portuguese should help Bussy and Salabat Jung and in exchange regain Bassein. The author has published in part VI of Portuguese e Maratas the documents available in Goa Archives from which it is obvious that in this league against the Peshwa Nanasaheb Bussy, Salabatjung, Tarabai of Kolhapur and Tulaji Angria had combined. The biographer of Marquez de Tavora has said that Tarabai had joined this conspiracy against the Peshwa because he gave her very unsympathetic treatment. Marquez de Tavora had informed Bussy and Salabat Jung in a letter dated November 30, 1751 that he was prepared to join them. The Goa Christians mentioned before must have gone to Bussy’s camp with this letter.

On January 10, 1752, the Viceroy writes to the King of Portugal that “a serious conflict having arisen between the Peshwa and Tarabai, she has gathered in her camp Salabat Jung and all Maratha Sardars of her caste and so the Peshwa’s end seems to have come near.” In a letter written two days after this, the Viceroy says, “I have written
to Tarabai and her reply also has come. She had asked for some ammunition. I sent her a present and said for sending the ammunition she wanted there would have to be a treaty and if such a treaty is made, not only ammunition but military assistance could be given. She has not replied to this letter but our correspondence continues.”

In a letter to Tulaji Angria on February 8, 1752, the Viceroy said that if he gave a little military help, he would start with his armada to get back Bassein ad Salcette. But soon afterwards, the Peshwa stole a march over Tarabai, Bussy and Salabat Jung. In a letter written on February 3, 1753 to Portugal, the Viceroy says, “Just as last year, Salabat Jung successfully fought against Nana, Salabat Jung should have done this year. Had he done so and had we been able to ally with him, I would have easily regained Bassein. But due to unforeseen political developments, I had to set aside the idea of taking Bassein and carry on the campaign of capturing the territory of Saunde prince as far as Ankola and for this the help from Portugal is needed.”

The policy of Marquez de Tavora was that the Portuguese should extend their state boundary in South Konkan by capturing the territory between the river of Aronde and the river of Sadashivgad. He was of the opinion that if the three mountain passes of Dighi, Ram and Hanuman were in Portuguese possession, it would never be difficult to protect Goa from Mahratta depredations. In a battle with the prince of Saunde, Marquez de Tavora conquered Sadashivgad and Kurmagad and the fort of Korve in November 1752. In January next year, his army entered and pillaged a number of villages. But he did not touch the Shiva temple on Chandreshwar Hill, because he feared that if he demolished this important temple, Hindus would not fail to demolish churches.

In a manuscript entitled *Annal Indico Historico* in Biblioteca Publica de Evora, the following information is available: “Letters have come from Vijayadurga which indicate that on January 3, 1753 two armed ships of the Dutch, *Nans* and Chalupa were going from the South to Surat. Each ship was equipped with 60 canons and ample stocks of ammunition. The main ship was named *Winnemum* and its captain was one Filipe. The other was named *Viced* and its captain was Simon Root. The name of the Chalupa was *Lamence*. Angria’s armada was in sound condition at Vijayadurg, which contained three
big palas and nine small ones. There were 3,000 sailor-soldiers on these 12 ships. On January 4, these ships set sails. Three of these big and three small ships attacked the main ship of the Dutch. The Dutch replied by their guns and hand-grenades but by the explosion of its ammunition stock it was wholly consumed. This caused breakage of the three ships of the Angria, one of which was big and the other two small. The Dutch themselves destroyed their second ship. The Angria captured only their chalupa. Seventyfive men on board that ship were taken to Vijayadurg. The Dutch had to bear a loss of 400 lakhs of rupees. Three hundred of Angria's men died and 400 were wounded, most of whom will not survive. The Angria took his six palas to Vijayadurg which have been greatly damaged by the Dutch bombardment and are being hastily repaired. So the Angria has left with him for piracy one big pala, six small palas and 125 other small craft. On account of this unfortunate Dutch event, the battle that our armed ship Mizecordeia fought with Angre's ten palas and elven galvetas in Calicut port in 1752 is considered very significant."

On September 20, 1754, Conde de Alva replaced Marquez de Tavora as Viceroy. Tavora also has left instructions for the guidance of his successor on November 7, 1754 in which he has given the names of some spies who supplied him with political news. Among them is one Joao Gomes de Almada. It was through him that the Portuguese spies in Bombay were paid. This Almada also sent money to Joao Galvao’s family at Bassein. The Mahrattas had put to death Joao Galvao for spying. For this reason, under orders of the King of Portugal, the Portuguese had taken responsibility for looking after his family. This Joao Galvao is mentioned in Peshwa Daftar.91

The other spy mentioned by Tavora is Don Antonio Jose Eirices. He stayed as a physician to the Chhatrapati Shahu and was ingratiated in his favour. He came in contact there with many respectable men and was much esteemed by Shahu. He often sent important news despatches to Alorna and Tavora. He was a Portuguese from Bassein, hailed from a high family and was gay by temperament.

There was one Hindu also who supplied news to Goa from the Mahratta camp. His name was Goraksha Shenvi. He hailed from Thorle Juve in Goa. Later he took up service with the Portuguese. The Portuguese envoy at the Mahratta Court, Vithal Goraksha
Valavalkar was the son of this spy. One more Hindu spy mentioned by Tavora was one Mulshi Shenvi who lived at Kittur up the Ghat. There was a captain of spies appointed in Salcete by the Portuguese. He was designated Capitao de spiao and under him all Portuguese spies worked.

Several of the opinions of Marquez de Tavora on the Mahrattas are noteworthy. About the Mahratta army, he has said, “The army of the Mahrattas is disorganised (desordenada) and so even 7000 or 8000 disciplined soldiers are enough to fight a lakh of them.”

About the intention of Nanasaheb to dislodge Tulaji Angria and to take over Vijaydurg, Marquez de Tavora says: “We had in our army a Muslim soldier, originally a native of Bicholim. After the capture of Bassein by the Mahrattas he served a number of princes and lastly got a job with the French. He was appointed as Jamadar. Later when the French and Salabat Jung made common cause, this man came to prominence by his valour. He called himself Nawab Mazzafar Khan or Muzzafar Jung. He left the French and joined Nanasaheb Peshwa and won his favour. At the beginning of this rainy season he informed me that Nanasaheb has appointed him Chief of the navy (General de armada) and entrusted to him the business of destroying Tulaji Angria and capturing Vijayadurg. So the Viceroy should help him with his counsel and armada. I have told Muzzafar Khan that this is the best time to attack Tulaji, because with the same intention the Dutch are coming with a big armada. As I gave him no hope about military help, he wrote to me again after three months and even induced Nanasaheb to write to me. These two letters were so written that they took it for granted that I was going to help him. Muzzafar Khan asked for 1500 guns and 25 khandis of ammunition. I made the messenger who brought these letters wait for several days and told him that unless ships from Portugal arrived and I had my King’s orders, I could do nothing. After these ships arrived I informed Nanasaheb and Muzzafar Khan that my reign is over and a new Viceroy is coming to take my place. I believe Nanasaheb has postponed the campaign against Tulaji, since no news about happenings in Vijayadurg has come so far.”

The enmity between Tulaji Angria and the Peshwa was widely known. That is why he showed sympathy with Peshwa’s enemies.
When the Peshwa marched on Karnatak, Tulaji made overtures to the Nawab of Savnur. Correspondence on this topic is in Goa Archives. It contains a letter from Muzaffarkhan. He says in it that Tulaji was ready to fight with the Peshwa with great alacrity. Muzaffarkhan has informed the Portuguese that he had received a letter from Tarabai who had written to Muraroo and intended to write to the Viceroy also. Muzaffarkhan asked in the same letter 1500 guns, ammunition worth Rs. 1,000 and other material to be sent to Savnur. Goa sold ammunition and guns to Savnur and in February 1756, sent Captain Antonio Gonçalves, a guner also to Savnur.96

The Peshwa wanted the help of Portuguese armada against Tulaji Angria in accordance with the treaty of Poona in 1740 between them but since he had no hope of getting such help, he took the help of the English. Tulaji agreed to give the Portuguese two lakhs of rupees and got their military help. The treaty on this subject was made in Goa on November 5, 1755 between the Portuguese Viceroy Conde de Alva and Kanopant and Ramjirao Rane on behalf of Tulaji. According to this treaty the Portuguese army was to be stationed at Vijayadurga for the protection of that fort only.97 But Tulaji sent one Portuguese battalion to Kharepatan to fight the Peshwa’s army. On December 11, the two armies met and a severe battle was fought. The Peshwa and the English had already protested to the Viceroy for the Portuguese having helped Tulaji. When a crisis developed at Kharepatan, the Portuguese army returned to Goa without loss of time.

On February 12, 1756 most of Tulaji’s armada was consumed to ashes. It was agreed between the Peshwa and the English at Suvarnadurg on March 19, 1755 that the captured ships of Tulaji should be distributed between the English and the Peshwa fifty fifty. That might have been done this time also but the Peshwa had probably no idea that the armada would be totally destroyed. The English bombarded the fort on February 12. The English have recorded and G. S. Sardesai has also said it that one cannon ball from Watson’s armada fell on the ships of the Angria and all his ships were burnt down.98 But the Viceroy in his letter to the King of Portugal dated January 22, 1757, says that Tulaji Angria himself set fire to his armada and destroyed it.99 No supporting documents to the Viceroy’s statement are found.
Col. John Biddulph has written that this armada contained three palas equipped with 20 cannons, nine palas having 12 to 16 guns and 13 galvetas having six to ten guns, besides some smaller ships. On February 13, the English took possession of Vijayadurg and had to hand it over to the Peshwa in October. Khandoji Mankar was the chief of the Peshwa army to whom Tulaji surrendered himself. Tulaji was kept in prison till he died. Raghoji, a son of Tulaji, escaped from jail and joined Haidar Ah's armada in 1771.

Some people hold the view that because NanaSaheb destroyed Tulaji's armada, it led to a menace to Mahratta power. But the then Viceroy held the opposite view. Bajirao himself had formulated the policy of subordinating the Angria to him. He had planned to take English and Portuguese help for that end in view. It will be no exaggeration to say that what Bajirao had planned, his son brought into execution. Tulaji was an enemy of the Peshwas and did not even care for Chhatrapati Shahu. Not only that but he had no scruples in making common cause with whosoever was the enemy of the Peshwa, whether, they were Mussalmans or the Portuguese.

In May 1749, Sardar Rudraji Dhulap went to Goa and delivered Tulaji's message to the Viceroy. It was to the effect that whoever was a Maratha was against him and so he did not want to seek their friendship. He therefore sought permanent friendship and alliance with the Portuguese. Next year Tulaji sent Ismailji Nakhava to Goa with the object of getting Goa's help against Bhonsla-Savant, saying that he was the common enemy of the Portuguese and the Angria and therefore they should unite and finish him. In their unity lay God's graceful hand and then he did not care for others. The Viceroy has said that Tulaji was a rustic, a cruel man who did not care for a pledged word and given to drinking. He further writes that when his mother told him that the Portuguese army should be employed only for the protection of Vijayadurg fort, he gave her such severe thrashing that she was on the point of death.

Tulaji's armada was destroyed, but the Peshwa founded a new armada in its place. He did not remove Rudraji Dhulap, the Subedar in Tulaji's armada but appointed him at Vijayadurg in charge of the new armada. Writing about this on January 31, 1763, the Viceroy has said: "The proximity of the Mahrattas at Vijayadurg has proved
to be detrimental to the interests of this State and particularly its trade. Rudraji Dhulap, the former Chief of Tulaji's armada went to Poona two years ago and secured the monopoly of piracy on this coast. If his course of activities continues as at present, I think another Angria will soon arise." Viceroy Conde de Alva was cut to the quick to see that owing to Anglo-Mahratta opposition, the Portuguese army which had gone to help Tulaji had to return. There was some criticism of the Viceroy in Goa and in Portugal in this connection, because this help given to Tulaji was in contravention of the Mahratta-Portuguese treaty made in Goa in 1740. Besides the Portuguese in Goa were not in a position to stand before a powerful opponent like the Peshwa. The Portuguese learnt some lessons to their cost from the Mahratta invasions.

The Portuguese had clearly read the policy of the Peshwas in their conflict with the Bhonsla. From the days of Bajirao it was the desire of the Peshwas to keep Ponda fortress in their hands as a counter against the Portuguese. The same view is confirmed by a letter in Peshwa Daftar, Part 24, page 154. As a matter of fact the Peshwas had to put up with large expenditure for the protection of this fort. Yet they always wanted to keep it in their possession. In 1750, they had asked it for a year from the prince of Saunde and the Portuguese knew why that demand was made on Saunde. In 1756, the prince of Saunde made an agreement to mortgage the fort with the Peshwa against Rs. 5,50,000. As soon as the Viceroy knew about this, he marched on Ponda on June 1, 1756 to take possession of it, but before he reached there, the Peshwa's army had already captured it.

As the Peshwa had already taken possession of Mardangad, the Viceroy Conde de Alva returned the same day to Goa and on June 22, he made special preparation, crossed the Durbate creek and marched on Mardangad. He had taken with him the new style two cannons and petardos to break the gate of the fort. He had camped near the temple of Kapileshwari. They were getting ready for the assault from there. On June 28, they started bombarding the fort. It was raining cats and dogs and all ammunition became wet. Yesaji Ram Joshi Huprikar was the Captain of the fort.
Four hundred Mahrattas, with a sword and a shield, came out of the fort and attacked the enemy with vigour. The Portuguese were completely routed. The Viceroy himself and 14 other notable Portuguese were killed in action. But the Captain of the fort sent the dead body of the Viceroy to Goa with due honour. Yesaji Ram wrote to the Secretary of the Government of Goa that it was surprising that the Viceroy behaved with such rashness when he and the Peshwa were in constant correspondence. However, effort was made to trace his dead body and send it with due respect. Many others were lying dead or wounded and they should be looked after. This letter bears no date but it was translated in Portuguese on July 1, 1756.

Dulbaji Naik Prataprao Sardessai of Ponda wrote to the Secretary of the Government of Goa on June 30, 1756 that “such excesses would not have been committed had it been known that, it was the Viceroy himself. The soldiers did it unknowingly.” Viceroy Conde de Alva was killed by his own soldiers is the contention of historians like Tomas Rebeiro, Balcemao and others. But it is not supported by contemporary documentary evidence. As a matter of fact these Portuguese writers never had an opportunity to study papers and sources that go against their stand and which the author has seen.

One well-known Portuguese writer, while writing about the assault on Mardangad by Conde de Alva has said: “Many of them were drowned dead. Many fled away half-naked. All the material remained on the battlefield. Those who could manage to run away took shelter in the Kapileshwari temple at Kavle. Had they not fled away, they would have died there. Three days after the Viceroy’s body was searched. It was so hopelessly decomposed that it was difficult to recognise it as his body.”

The Captain of Mardangad wrote to the Peshwa that the Portuguese came unexpectedly, the people were frightened but due to the glory of the Peshwa, the Portuguese were completely discomfited. The Viceroy himself fell and his body and ten cannons, big and small, were captured. Arms captured are numerous. The Portuguese were never so utterly defeated before. There is a letter in part 24 of Peshwa Daftar of Jilkad 2. It is said therein that 1500 Portuguese came and attacked the bazar and were about to attack the fort when the garrison of the fort attacked them and killed five to seven hundred Portuguese. The Chief
of the Portuguese, the Viceroy, had come but he was also killed. (P. 246).

An acting Governor was appointed in Goa after Conde de Alva’s death. The Karbhari of the Bhonsla of Savantvadi, Pandurang Vishram sent a letter of condolence to Goa on the death of the Viceroy and the defeat of the Portuguese at Ponda but ended it with the encouraging words that the Portuguese were powerful and so there was no danger.\textsuperscript{119} This letter does not bear any date but it was translated in Portuguese on September 14, 1756.

In December 1756, Trimbakrao Vishwanath Pethe was camping at Ponda for medical treatment. A Portuguese physician Cosme Pinto, sent by the Goa Government treated him. In Marathi letters he is called Kosmi Diwadkar. The same by wrong interpretation is mentioned as Conde Pinto Manad in \textit{Revival of Maratha Power} (p. 16). Trimbakrao was in Ponda for three months.\textsuperscript{120} The Goa Government has said that the object of Trimbakrao in staying at Ponda was to straighten matters in Ponda Panchmahal and collect information about the military strength of the Portuguese. After he was quite well he tried suddenly to take Sanquelim from the Portuguese by trying to win over Satroji Rane and other Desais, but he failed.\textsuperscript{121} In a letter written to Portugal by the Acting Governor on January 28, 1758, he has said that Trimbakrao was bent on taking revenge on the Portuguese according to his information.

When the English and the Peshwa armies combined to take charge of Vijayadurg, Nanasahib and Bhausahib had gone on the Karnatak Campaign. After defeating the Nawab of Savnoor, the Peshwa returned to Poona on July 20. The Peshwa informed Goa about his victory in Karnatak by a letter dated May 22, 1756 which was translated into Portuguese on June 16, 1756.\textsuperscript{122} Conde de Alva must have received it somewhere in the middle of June. It is at present deposited in Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisbon. The Peshwa writes \textsuperscript{123}:

“Half of Savmur territory has been taken from Abdul Hakim Khan and agreement of eleven lakhs of rupees as tribute has been made. Some of the tribute has been received in cash and for the rest Volav-Bankapur fort has been mortgaged with us. After finishing business there we came to Tungabhadra. Nawab Salabat Jung had come to his help. He was accompanied by Bussy. The Nawab did not like it.
Bussy has been engaged in the service of Salabat Jung but was given leave to go to Tasalipatam. He will join service at the beginning of the rainy season. 

"Goa was in league with Savanur in a secret way. On May 8, 1756 a letter was sent to Savanur by the Viceroy along with 300 muskets and 56 containers of ammunition.\textsuperscript{125}

Antonio Gonçalves, a Portuguese Captain, was kept at Savanur to collect information there under the pretext of a position in the Savanur army.\textsuperscript{126} Even in 1756, the efforts to induce the Portuguese to join the Tarabai conspiracy against the Peshwa were continued. On January 23, 1757, the Governor of Goa informed Portugal that if the Portuguese joined the Tarabai conspiracy, they would have to take Vijayadurg and hand it over to the Angria. In return, the Portuguese would get one lakh of rupees at the beginning for expenses and after the war, she was willing to give back to us Bassein and other stations taken by the Mahrattas. Besides Kalyan and Bhivandi would also be given to the Portuguese.\textsuperscript{127} The envoy of the Peshwa, Ganesh Trimbak wrote to Poona about the plans the Portuguese and the Nawab of Savanur were hatching.\textsuperscript{128} While Nanasaheb was engaged in the Karnatak campaign, the Governor of Goa had informed the Peshwa that the help he had sent to Tulaji Angria was only protective and not for fighting with the English or the Peshwa. But when Tulaji used it for war at Kharepatan, it was immediately called back.\textsuperscript{129} The Goa Government's explanation about Conde de Alva's assault on Mardangad was that the Portuguese army had entered Ponda Panchmahal of the Saunde Prince and captured considerable part of it. It was also going to take Mardangad but in the meanwhile the Prince of Saunde handed over the fort to the Peshwa and that is why the conflict between the Portuguese and the Mahrattas arose.\textsuperscript{130}

\footnote{From September 23, 1758, Conde de Ega was the Viceroy of Portuguese India. He wrote to the King of Portugal to say that Nanasaheb had two lakh horsemen, unlimited footmen and an evergrowing armada and the only way open to the Portuguese was to avoid war with him.\textsuperscript{131} So he said that he had decided to behave with humility with the Peshwa in opposition to the time-honoured Asiatic policy of the Portuguese.\textsuperscript{132} He came to know in Goa that Peshwa Nanasaheb was coming to Vijayadurg in February 1759. On March 6, the Viceroy sent Tomas Jose Codmore with a present to wait upon the Peshwa, but as}
Nanasheeb had already left for Poona; he proceeded to Poona where the Peshwa gave him a hearty welcome and send-off. After Codemore's return to Goa, two Mahratta envoys came to Goa. One of them was Mahadaji Keshav Phadke. On June 26 the Viceroy met the Peshwa's envoy with due ceremony. Through the mediation of this envoy, Conde de Ega made a treaty with the Bhonsla of Savantvadi on July 26, 1759. In accordance with it Pernem, Bicholim (Bhatagram) and Sanquelim (Satari) were given to the Bhonsala on the Khoti tenure. Mahadaji Keshao systematically wrote out the gist of the talks he had with the Viceroy and presented it to him on September 9, 1759. This document is now in Lisbon. It throws burid light on the Peshwa-Portuguese relations of the day. The Viceroy interview took place on June 26, i.e. 30th Savat.

The following points were laid down serially by Phadke:

1. Tulaji Angria was a servant of the Peshwa. His ancestors traditionally conducted themselves as such. Tulaji behaved in a wayward manner and you helped him despite our warning in exchange of Rs. 2 lakhs. We pointed out to you the impropriety of your action and you came back without helping him. So that the sum of Rs. 2 lakhs you should, in fairness, return to us.

2. Savant's several places are with you for 12 years, Alorna, Bicholim and Terekhol. They should be given back to him who also is in our employ. The Peshwa will see to it that you and Savant do not come in conflict.

3. We have taken Jamboli mahal from Saunde. Three villages of this Mahal are with you, Parode, Talavade and Mule. They should be returned to us as parts of Jamboli Mahal.

4. Krishna Savant is your protege. You should send him away and give shelter to no one like him.

5. Mardangad is in our possession. All kinds of goods have to be shipped there. You should allow it to pass through Mormugao and Aguada seaways.

6. You should aid us in war on sea and land.

7. Our envoy should be at your court and your envoy at our court to promote mutual friendship.
You should accept these terms in the interest of mutual friendly relations.

Mahadaji Keshao Phadke probably left Goa for Poona on September 11, 1759. As the Viceroy Conde de Ega held that some of these points needed discussion with the Peshwa, Portuguese envoy Jack Filipe de Landracey was sent to Poona. He took with him some medicines also to Poona. The medicine box carried the warning on its cover that if taken in excess, death may be caused. Landracey was well received by the Peshwa. Viceroy Conde de Ega wrote in his letter dated January 29, 1760: “This envoy was treated very well by Nanasaheb. No one is allowed at the Peshwa’s court with footwear on, but Landracey and his colleagues were admitted to the court with their boots. The Peshwa appointed a team for talks and included Sadashivrao (Bhausaheb) among them. Landracey made friends with him. Most of the talks pertained to the capture of Janjira of the Siddi on which Nanasaheb and Bhausaheb were very keen. They desire that we should take up the task. They want to take these forts merely as a matter of propriety. They are prepared to compensate us richly for this. I intend to regain our northern territory of Bassein from them through these parleys.”

Landresey returned to Goa on January 19, 1760.

On March 20, 1760 the Peshwa made a treaty with the Viceroy at Goa. Mahadaji Keshao Phadke and Vishnu Naik, Sardesai of Ponda represented the Peshwa. A Portuguese version of this treaty is published in Biker’s Tratados volume VII and the Marathi version is kept unpublished in Lisbon. One of the clauses says that there should be friendship between the Peshwa and the Portuguese and they should ally with each other and the Portuguese should not quarrel with any Europeans without the orders of the King of Portugal. If any other Europeans attack Mahratta posts where the Portuguese are employed, they have to fight them.” Another clause provides that the Portuguese will help the Peshwa to take Janjira-Rajpuri and Kansa from the Siddi. It specified that 500 Portuguese soldiers and 100 officers would go to the aid of the Peshwa force for capturing these forts.

According to this treaty, Conde de Ega sent help to the Peshwa to capture Kansa (Padminadurg) and Danda-Rajpuri. Ramaji Mahadeo Barwe was the Commander of the Campaign of Danda-Rajpuri. Conde
de Ega has written about this Sardar that his fortune favoured him more than his capacity. This campaign went on for several months. The Portuguese sent Joao Manuel de Ajambuja with some soldiers at the end of March 1760. Its object was not to engage in any battle but to reconnoitre the battlefield and make preparations for the invasion after the rains.

The English from Bombay complained to Nanasaheb for having taken Portuguese help against the Siddi and in a letter dated April 15, 1760 gave the warning that if the Portuguese fired a cannonball on Siddi's fort in aid of the Peshwa, the English would be compelled to go to the aid of the Siddi. In a letter sent by Nanasaheb to his envoy in Goa on April 27, 1760 says: “Kansa was to be captured in two days. But the English did not like that the Portuguese had given us help and they sent all material to the fort and our business was spoilt.” Nanasaheb wrote to the same effect to the Portuguese on April 26, 1760. In September 1760, the Viceroy sent Landrasey to Poona and had discussions again on the Portuguese aid of land and sea forces being sent on the campaign of capturing Kansa and Danda-Rajpuri. After these talks, the Peshwa wrote to Conde de Ega on October 24, 1760 as follows: Landrasey and Vishnu Naik came and agreed to go on the invasion of Kansa and Danda-Rajpuri. So you may proceed to send army, navy and everything to Janjira and see to it that we take the forts.” This letter and its Portuguese translation done on November 15, 1760 are in Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa.

Complying with the request of the Peshwa, the Viceroy sent the second aid in the last week of February 1761 under the command of some big ships and 1,700 soldiers. The English in Bombay openly helped the Siddi on the pretext that the Peshwa had taken the help of the Portuguese. They took possession of both the forts and flew their flags on them. When the Portuguese armada noticed this while anchoring in front of Danda-Rajpuri and Kansa, the armada returned to Goa. The Portuguese were acting only under pressure from the Peshwa. They got the necessary excuse of the English having taken possession of the forts to become inactive.

Later the great battle of Panipat was fought and the Peshwa had hardly the time to pay attention to this Siddi affair. Besides, Condes de Ega has said that since they had Bassein and Vijayadurga, they
did not really need Kansa and Danda-Rajpuri.\textsuperscript{147} There is a letter written by Sardesai Vishnu Naik to the Secretary of the Goa Government in Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa in which it is said: “The English have said that they would abide by what the Peshwa would say and gave in writing that the forts were in their possession. The Peshwa will demand their possession when he comes.” \textsuperscript{148}

Dr. Sardesai has said that the Peshwa army had captured Kansa alias Padmadurg on February 21, 1760.\textsuperscript{149} His basis for this statement is the letter of Jivaji Nanaji dated February 17, 1760 published in part 24 of the Peshwa daftar. But this letter only says, “Later Kansa is going to be attacked. It will fall in four or eight days.” From this it is obvious that Dr. Sardesai’s statement is baseless.

At this time the Government of Portugal thought that the Viceroy should live amicably and in peace with Savantvadi and Saunde and should not think of extending Portuguese territory.\textsuperscript{150} He should not even accept the Bassein territory even if it could be had by negotiation. Only he should try to see that the Peshwa gives over Ponda to Saunde. The Viceroy was also informed that he should take care to see that the Armada of the Bhonsla did not grow, by a letter dated March 26, 1761. The suggestion was also made that he should not co-operate with the Peshwa to capture Kansa and Danda-Rajpuri.

The Bhonsla was making efforts with the King of Portugal to get back his forts and Mahals. There is a letter on this topic written by the Savant-Bhonsla to the King of Portugal on January 22, 1760 whose Marathi and Portuguese versions, the author had the opportunity of perusing in Lisbon in Arquivo Historico Ultramarino. This letter humbly begs of the King that Pernem, Sanquelim and Bicholim with forts and Terekhol with its fort be given back to him. Acting on the order of the King of Portugal, Vice-Rei Conde de Ega entered into a treaty with the Bhonsala-Savant on December 24, 1761 and gave back to him Pernem, Bicholim and Sanquelim. In this way the Portuguese made one more attempt to make friends with Savantvadi, but unsuccessfully.
NOTES

(1) Pissurlencar, PM. V, p. 67.
(2) Pissurlencar, Assentos, V, p. 643.
(3) Epanaphora Indica, Parte II, p. 11, 12.
(5) Pissurlencar, PM. V, p. 67.
(7) Pissurlencar, PM. V, p. 64.
(8) Pissurlencar, Assentos V, p. 637.
(9) Jose Freire Monteiro, Noticia da Viagem que fez segunda vez as Estado da India O Illustissimo e Excellentissmo Sr. Marquez de Lourical, p. 3; Teixeira de Aragao, Descripcao das moedas, Vol. III, p. 297n.

(10) Letter of Marquez de Tavora dated January, 1, 1751. (Goa Archives : CO 39 fl.).

(11) Pissurlencar, PMV, p. 77, 78.
(13) J. Biker, Tratados, VI, p. 220.
(14) Goa Archives: Translations of Marathi letters in Portuguese No. 545.
(15) Goa Archives: Marathi letters etc.

(16) Goa Archives: MR 111 B, fts. 939: "..... Se VEX" pertender empreza de Bacaim me pode avizar por sua carta sobre que terey fritto as dilligencias necessarias de minha parte occultamente ...."

(18) Goa Archives: MR 111 B, fl. 953.

There is an account about the death of Sambhai Angria in Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisboa in which it is said that in December 1741 Sambhai captured a French ship which had left the Goa bay. Two Portuguese Padres were on board the ship. Both of them were arrested so they were present at the death of Sambhai. His eldest wife, three junior wives and six mistresses burnt themselves with his dead body." (Arquivo das Colonias, Lisboa, 1917). 


(20) Goa Archives: Portuguese translations of Marathi letters, No. 334.
(21) Ibid, No. 333.
(22) Goa Archives, Pissurlencar, PM, V. p. 79-80 Portuguese translations of Marathi letters No. 532.
(23) In a Portuguese letter it is said that there were 2,000 horsemen and some footmen.

(24) Goa Archives: Portuguese translation of Marathi letters.

(25) Relacao das victorias alcanzadas na India contra o inimigo Marata sendo Vice-Rey daquele estado .... D. Luis Carlos Ignacio Xavier de Menezes, 1743, p. 8. In this rare book it is said that on May 10, 1742, the Mahrattas attacked Salsete and recovered the arrears of taxes and took possession of Sanguem and Ponda forts.

(26) The following information is found in the letter of Subedar Krishnarao Gurkar, Saunde's Subedar of Ponda: “Sonaji Tambat came with letters to Naropant from Chhatrapati Shahu, Chhatrapati Sambhaji and Nanasahib Peshwa asking for handing over of Mardangad from Anaji Prabhu who said that he must get a letter from Saunde and further said that he had orders to hand it over to General Kalappa. So for two months matters were delayed. Naropant died in the meanwhile. Ismaikhan was told that Mardangad should be given to Kalappa as per order of Saunde. (This letter in Marathi was translated in Portuguese on 6, April 1751).


(28) Relacao e verdadeiras noticias das ultimas accoens militares ordenadas pelo .... Dr. Luis de Menezes, Marquez de Lourical, 1747.

(29) Relacao das vitorias alcanzadas na India contra o inimigo Marata, p. 13. Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur did not like that Saunde took possession of Ponda Panchmahal with the help of the Portuguese. In a letter written to the Bhonsla the Chhatrapati says, “when vatanars like you were in our employ, it is not proper that Kannadas should keep places in our State.” (Gujir, History of the Karvir Chhatrapati House, Part II, p. 110).

(30) Goa Daftar: CO 30, fls. 44v.


(33) BPE, Cartas da Asia as Conde de Unhao, De Pedro Vicente Vidal, Bombaim 24, November 1744 (cod CXX/2-2 fl. 220).

(34) AHU, Ms. 448, Cons. Ultramarino fls. 7v.-8 : Os povos da Provincia do Norte estao suspirando, que nos o livremos do jugo que padecem .... Eu pendindome que os livre daquella vexacao .... ”.

(35) AHV, Ms. 448, Cons. Ultr. fls. 72v. ; 91-91v.

(36) BUC. Ms. 148, fls. 28.

(37) Pissurleenar, PM, VI, p. 5.

(38) Goa Archives: Translations of Marathi papers No. 464, 2382.

(39) BNL. Caixa 13, No. 3, Sucessos da India desde Janeiro de 1749, ate Janeiro de 1750, fls. 46v.

(40) BNL. Ms. 419, relacao.
(41) Pissurlencar Assentos V, p. 658 (Viceroy’s letter dated 2, November 1746).

(42) ‘Lagartos’ and ‘Petardos’ are the two Portuguese words that occur in the text of the treaty between Savantvadi and Goa made on 11, September 1741. One Portuguese account says, the Portuguese used Petardos for the first time in the battle with the Bhonsla who had no idea at all about it. It was never used before on this side. People regard it as some kind of magic. (Relacao da Conquista das pracas de Alorna, e Bicholim, Avaro e Morley e Satarem pello Illustrissimo e Excellentissso Marquez de Castello Novo Vice-Rey e Capitao General da India).

(43) Epanaphora, II, p. 51. Although the wording in local language (malingua do Pays) appears in this volume it is with reference to Marathi. All declarations of the Portuguese in new conquistas were translated in Marathi from Portuguese.

(44) In these days Marathas and Maratha Vanis were socially one. There were inter-dinners and inter-marriages were in vogue: (In old Portuguese writings the Marathas Vanis were referred to as Chadde Vanis. As many respectable families of the Vaishya Samaj stayed in Portuguese territories of Bardez and Goa, Bhagoon Kamat Vagh suggested to the Viceroy that with their help, Satroji Rane should be admitted to a common caste dinner. Some important documents connected with this subject are in Goa Archives and the author has mentioned them in Assentos do Conselho do estado Part V pages 661-662. Also see in Bharatimitra for January 1941, Pissurlencar’s article, Satroji Ranyacha Panktipawana Vidhi and another article entitled A Proposito de alguns vocabulos Luso-Indianos in Boletim do Instituto Vasco da Gama.

A contemporary account of this affair is found in Epanaphora Indica Part II (p. 64) published in 1747 and Annual Indico Historico, Part III published in 1754.

In a book called Promtuario das Dificicoes Indicas written by a well-informed Goan padre and published in Lisbon in 1713, there is a clear and unequivocal reference to the fact of inter-dinners and inter-marriages between Marathas and Maratha Vanis.

(45) Epanaphora Parte II p. 60. The agreement whereby the Portuguese gave assurances to Ranes and Desais of Sanquelim and Bicholim is registered in Livro das cartas e ordens as No. 35. The agreement is dated October 26, 1746.

Since it is against law to grant religious liberty to Hindus in a Portuguese State, the Viceroy consulted the Christian Religious head when he said that Ranes and Desais were not conquered; they only sought the shelter of the Portuguese Government. (Que estes Desais vinham voluntariamente render a sua obediencia ao Estado; e assim nam tinha este sobre elles o direito de conquista.”—Epanaphora Indica, Parte II, p. 60.

* Epanaphora, II, p. 62.

(46) Pissurlencar, Assentos V, 662, 663.

(47) Epanaphora, Parte III, p. 27.
(48) Following information is found in a letter written by the Sar Subedar of Ponda, appointed by the Prince of Saunde in 1751 to the Goa Government: the Portuguese and Saunde marched against Bhonsla and asked him to deliver the fort of Redi to them and hoist the Portuguese flag on it. It was promised to be returned, later Ramchandra Savant came to demand its return when the Saunde prince told him that he could only take it but for its return, the permission of Portugal would be necessary. We achieved an object diplomatically. Marquez de Alorna did not return Redi and Marquez de Tavora would also did not return it. (Goa Archives: Marathi Documents).
(49) Goa Archives: Marathi Documents.
(50) Portuguese: armas reais means nyal insiguia.
(51) Aitilasik Patravyavahar p. 41.
(52) Jose Freire Monteiro; Epanaphora Indica, Part IV page 4: “... cada dia repetim os avisos por outras vias diferentes, e ate alguns dos regulos, que eram, obrigados a seguir o exercicio inemigo, nos exhortavam a prevencam.” The gist of this is: We were receiving messages from various sources. Some of those who were under obligation to march with the enemy army also gave us cautions.
(53) Goa Archives: Marathi Documents, No. 2340.
(54) Goa Archives: Marathi Documents No. 2416.
(55) Goa Archives: Portuguese translations of Marathi letters No. 540 Epanaphora Indica, Parte VI. It is said that on March 21, the forces under Sadashiv Rao departed after leaving the fort of Supem.
(56) Goa Archives: MR 120, fls. 43-46.
(57) Viceroy’s letter dated December 30, 1747 (Pissurlencar, P. M. VI p. 14-15); Epanaphora, VI prefacio, BNL. Sucessos da India.
(58) Goa Archives: Marathi Documents No. 2041.
(59) Epanaphora, parte VI, A quem ler.
(60) Historical Correspondence, p. 74. Epanaphora, IV, p. 30-31.
(61) Goa Archives: MR 121 A, fls. 225-238; Pissurlencar, PM VI p. 17.
(62) Viceroy’s letter dated 27, December 1747. (Assentos V, p. 665); State Councils Memorandum of May 14, 1747. (Assentos V, p. 598); Historical Correspondence, p. 40 Epanaphora, IV, p. 2.
(63) Assentos V, p. 665; Epanaphora IV, p. 3, 4.
(64) Goa Archives: RV 11, fls. 65v-66; RL. 14, fls. 6.
(65) A. Galleti, the Dutch in Malabar, Madras, 1191, p. 17.
(66) Epanaphora, V, p. 73.
(67) Goa Archives: Marathi Documents No. 2908.
(69) Epanaphora, V, p. 29, 30.
(70) Epanaphora, III, p. 1; Assentos V, p. 681n.

(71) P. K. Godc, Studies in the history of Angrias, in the New Indian Antiquasy.

(72) Goa Archives: Marathi Documents.

(73) Peshwa Daftar, part 28, p. 200. "Bhagwantrao and Savant have taken Mudagad. They will proceed to Masure.


(75) Epanaphora, VI, p. 63-65.

(76) Epanaphora IV, p. 11; V, p. 37; Assentos V, p. 671.

(77) Portuguese word musos means wall.

(78) Portuguese word passos means footway in a creek.

(79) Goa Archives: Marathi Documents.


(81) Goa Archives: CO 35 (Marquez de Alorna's letter dated July 22, 1774).

(82) Epanaphora IV, p. 100.


(84) Goa Archives.

(85) Goa Archives: RV. 13 fl. 12v.

(86) Goa Archives: RV 12 fls. 219v.: "VM. deve por toda a oposicao possivel persuadindo ao dito Xau e aos seus Ministros o perigo que corre fazzerse Nana tao poderoso".

(87) Peshwa Daftar: Part 26, No. 23.


(89) Ibid, p. 13 *VG. Hatalnar, Relations between the French and the Marattas, Ch. XI.

(90) Goa Governor's letter dated January 23, 1757 (Goa Archives: MR 129 fl. 422).

(91) Annal Indico Lusitano, p. 15. *Letter of Marquez de Tavora dated March 26, 1757. (AHV. India, Papeis avulsos, maco No. 1).

(92) Felix Feliciano da Fonseca, Relacao dos felicissimos sucessos obrados na India Oriental em o Vice-Reinado Marquez de Tavora, Lisboa. 1753.

(93) Annal Indico-Historico, p. 89.

(94) Peshwa Daftar, part 34, p. 50-52 "After ascertaining that they were spies from Goa Galbay of Bassein and Duma Koli of Agashi were produced and they admitted their quilt. There was one padre who was went to Bombay and Galbay and Duma were beheaded. Galbao is the same as Galvao.

(95) Goa Archives: Portuguese translations of Marathi letters No. 2031. The letter written by Peshwa Nanasaheb to Conde de Alva bears 17 safar i.e. H 4222—144
December 17, 1754 as the date. Portuguese translation of this letter was done on January 18, 1755.

(96) Goa Archives: RI. 15, fls. 181v.

(97) Biker, Tratados VII, p. 36.

This treaty has a clause which says that the Viceroy has given help of 500 men but they should remain in Redy fort and protect it. This is a step to prevent the Peshwa from making war on Angria.

(98) Sardesai, Balajirao, p. 178; Dr. S. N. Sen, Military system, p. 230.

(99) “A Armada que antes da perda referida reduziu a cinzas o sobretudo Angria” (Goa Archives: MR 129, fl. 283).

(100) Colonel John Biddulph, the Pirates of Malabar p. 246 Biddulph has described gallivats as: Galleywats, or gallivats, were large rowing boats with two masts of forty to seventy tons and carrying four to eight guns.” (p. 92).

(101) Pissurlencar, PM. V, p. 84.

(102) AHV.

(103) Goa Archives: Marathi documents.

(104) Goa Archives: MR 128 A, fl. 626.

(105) Goa Archives: MR 135 fl. 549: “…… e se continuar (Rudraji Duloplo) neste corso me parece que brevemente teremos outro Angria nesta costa).

(106) Shridhar Abaji’s letter to Peshwa dated 24, February 1756: “After the Angria is exterminated, Mardangad should be taken from the prince of Saunde by negotiation so that Portuguese posts could be taken over, if that is the desire of the Peshwa.”


(108) Goa Archives: MR. 123B.

(109) Peshwa Daftar Part 28, 140 “Army was sent to Saunde. Tribute from there came to Rs. 8 lakhs. Some of it in cash and some on sureties. For arrears Mardangad was mortgaged to the Peshwa whose flag is flying there.”

(110) Khare’s History of Ichalkaranji State.

(111) Goa Archives: Marathi documents No. 248.

(112) Joseph Rogers, Relacao dos sucessos … do … do Luiz Mascarenhas, 1757, p. 10.

(113) Goa Archives: Portuguese translations of Marathi letters No. 853.

(114) Goa Archives: Marathi Documents.

(115) Pissurlencar, O Enigma da Morte do Vice-Rei.

(116) Ibid, p. 12. There is a manuscript in the India office. Library, London by Stevens, an Englishman in which he has given a description of the assault on Mardangad by the Portuguese. He was then in Goa: “On the 28th ultimo,
the Portuguese opened a bomb battery before Ponda and threw two or three shells into the port .... and at last the enemy sally'd out to the member of 80 or 100 on which the Portuguese threw down their arms and ran as fast as they could; many officers and soldiers were killed in the retreat, amongst which was the Viceroy .... They retreated so precipitately that no one could give an account of the Viceroy; but two days after, they got liberty to examine the dead, where they wound him and brought him to their place to bury.” (Orme Ms. 32, p. 93-96).

That Conde de Alva was killed by the Mahrattas is clearly stated in contemporary Marathi sources. Contemporary Portuguese sources also confirm this. (Joseph Roger Relacao dos Sucessos .... do .... Conde de Alva, Lisboa, 1757 and Jose da Silva Machado, Relacao dos sucessos da India, escrita em Goa a 31 de Janeiro de 1759. Bispo de Halicarnasso’s Systema Marcial Asiatico, a manuscript of 1772.


(118) Peshwa Daftar, part 16 No. 95, p. 75.

(119) Goa Archives: Marathi Documents.

(120) Pissurlencar, ADP, p. 254-262.

(121) Ibid, p. 258-259.

(122) Goa Archives: MR 130A.

(123) Biker, Tratados, VII p. 50.

(124) AHV. Livro de pazes No. 3, fl. 76.

(125) Goa Archives: Papeis avulsos.

(126) Goa Archives: RI 15, fls. 181v.

(127) Goa Archives: MR 129, fl. 422.


(129) Biker, Tratados VII, p. 43-44.

(130) Biker, Tratados VII, p. 144.

(131) Viceroy’s letter to the King of Portugal dated December 13, 1760 (Tratados VII, p. 266).

(132) Viceroy’s letter dated 30, January 1760: “esta resolucao, alheia interamento do costume da Nacao Portuguesa na Asia. A extremidade em que me via me estava persuadido que se fazia preciso ceder de algum modo da antigã altivez .... ” (AHV. Ms. 446).

(133) AHV. Livro de pazes No. 3.

(134) Iftdai. Ibdatai: Beginning.

(135) The Peshwa wrote to Ismail Khan on the 9th of Rabilakhar it was said that Rs. 2,40,000 which was really due to the Peshwa was not sent till then and it was improper. Ismail Khan was requested to ask the Governor to send the sum immediately.
(136) Biker, Tratados VII, p. 47.

(137) Viceroy’s letter dated 29, January 1760 (AHV., Ms. 446, fls. 97-101).

(138) Peshwa Daftar, part 24, p. 267.

(139) Biker, Tratados VII, p. 240: “Ramajipant Borvo he o cabo maratha, que se acha comandando as suas tropas, este, tendo subido aquelle lugar mais por fortuna que por merecimentos”.

(140) Biker, Tratados VII, p. 182.


(142) Ibid, p. 196.

(143) Goa Archives: Marathi documents.

(144) Biker VII, p. 144.


(148) Biker VII, p. 245.

(149) Sardesai, Marathi Riyasat-Peshwa Balajirao, p. 124 (1953).

9 In 1781-82 the Peshwa made an agreement with the French to get assistance from them to capture Rajpuri fort from the Siddi. (Khare collection of historical documents, part 14, p. 7629).

CHAPTER VI
DURING DECLINE OF PESHWAS

The echoes of the Mahratta disaster at Panipat were heard in contemporary Portuguese documents. On January 31, 1762, the Viceroy wrote to Portugal that the utter rout of the Mahrattas at Panipat caused Nanasaheb’s mental disequilibrium and in a few days he die.¹ In this battle, a trained military force of the Mahrattas was destroyed and a number of experienced generals died in action. The ample tributes from the North that the Mahrattas were getting were stopped. In another letter, the Viceroy wrote that due to the deaths of Bhausaheb, Vishwasrao and Nanasaheb, the Mahratta State sustained an enormous loss.²

The Municipality of Daman in 1766 appealed to the Viceroy to win back Bassein territory. In that appeal he mentioned the Panipat losses of the Mahrattas: It was said that over a lakh of horses, over 800 elephants, more than 500 captains, 500 guns and other armaments and some scions of the Peshwa family were lost.³ In a letter written to the King of Portugal on January 31, 1763, the Viceroy said, “I wrote to you about the situation of the Mahratta Government of Poona last year. I imagined that the hydra would not raise its head again. But during my stay in Bardez, the Mahratta armada at Vijayadurg daringly pursued a Dutch ship as far as Aguada. The ship engaged in a combat with the Mahratta armada but had ultimately to sail away to Goa for safety. Nanasaheb’s son, Madhaorao has conciliated his uncle Raghoba and both of them have made friends with the Nawab of the Deccan and that has caused me some anxiety.” ⁴

At the beginning of 1764, Conde de Ega wrote that though the Mahratta power has declined due to the loss at Panipat, they are still quite powerful.⁵ Goa always found the proximity of the Mahrattas in Ponda rather irksome. So the Viceroy was making efforts to extern them from there. The Portuguese had entered into a secret pact with the Bhonsla whereby he had agreed to send at least 1,600 soldiers to the help of the Prince of Saunde.⁶ It was agreed between the Prince of Saunde and the Portuguese that the prince should lead with 2,000 men and the Portuguese should give him substantial help in a secret
way and thus capture the Ponda fort. The Peshwa's officers Ramaji Hari, Raghuoo Savant and Bapujipant Muzumdar had gone over to the Portuguese.

That there was going to be some commotion in Mardangad was known to the Peshwa Madhaoraao is apparent from his letter dated 22, May 1763 written to the Goa Government. This letter admonishes the Portuguese for not acting in accord with the terms of the treaty and asks that the Dutch ship captured by Anandrao Dhalap be made over to Anandrao. The letter also warns that none should create trouble in the vicinity of Mardangad.

In May 1763, 700 Portuguese soldiers invaded Ponda under the command of Bispo de Halicarmaco. The Sardesai of Ponda, Narba Naik Prataprao, joined him with 70 of his men. The troops of the Prince of Saunde did not join them. But Jiwba Sabnis took the risk of displeasing the Peshwa and sent over 500 men of the Bhonsla commanded by a Portuguese captain to Ponda to help the Portuguese. The Portuguese troops from Goa also entered Ponda and gathered near the temple of Kapileshwari and all of them besieged Mardangad. There were about 700 soldiers in the fort. When the siege was laid, 150 of them joined the besiegers. For thirteen days the remaining soldiers in Mardangad resisted but it was not possible for them to hold out longer for want of water supply. On the 14th day, they hoisted a white flag on the fort indicating surrender and on May 31, 1763 finished all talks of surrender. On June 1, 1763, the Portuguese hoisted their flag on the fort. There were 427 Mahratta soldiers in the fort whom the Portuguese wished happy journey to their homes.

Viceroy Conde de Ega has written that when he visited Ponda the people there cordially welcomed him and he assured them that he would take care of them like his own progeny. On June 5, 1763, he made a declaration in Portuguese and Marathi that the people of Ponda (Antruj), Jambavli (Panchmahal), Canacona (Advot) and Khogad, (Rama's Cape) should behave according to their respective religions. After capturing Mardangad, the Viceroy razed it to the ground and no remnants of it are now seen on that site. The Portuguese took 27 days to demolish completely this fort, built by Chhatrapati Sambhaji. Conde de Ega has described in detail this fort. He said: Now that Mardangad has been destroyed, there is no reason left for
any prince in Konkan to capture it.” Janardanpant was the last Subedar of the fort appointed by the Peshwas.

From a manuscript No. 172 in Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa, it is obvious that Jivba Sabnis had allied with the Portuguese in the invasion of Mardangad. Not only did he send men to join the Portuguese, but also he supplied some secret information about the fort to the Viceroy that he had in his possession. From this manuscript, it is also clear that the Portuguese paid Rs. 14,000 or 28,000 asurpi to some officers in the fort for handing over the fort to them. Even some Marathi documents contain information about the Bhonsla having helped the Portuguese in this campaign. In a letter written in the middle of February 1766 to the Goa Government, the Bhonsla says: “We supplied you men while you marched against Mardangad. We induced Gopalrao to yield and that has led to the Peshwa threatening us.” In another such letter, the Bhonsla says: We are still being blamed by the Maharatta court at Poona, because Gopalrao Barve reported that in taking Mardangad, the major part was played by our men. We stopped Gopalrao’s march by keeping him at Sanquelim and stopping Bajirao Barve, his brother up the ghat with his army. They are brothers-in-law of Raghoba Dada.”

There is a further mention of the Bhonsla’s men having taken part in the Mardangad campaign in his letter to the Secretary of the Goa Government dated August 21, 1764. He says: “Many men and vatandars joined the Portuguese at the time of taking Mardangad from the Peshwa. Gopalrao Barve was at Sanquelim at the time. It was explained by us at the time that those who joined the Portuguese were only mercenaries. Just as some have gone to the Peshwa, some have gone to the Portuguese.” Even Peshwa Madhaoraao came to know about this but beyond writing despatches of protest, the Peshwa does not seem to have done anything.

In a letter sent by the Peshwa to Anandrao Dhulap on December 19, 1763, the following account is seen: “The Portuguese have broken all decorum, such as no Europeans so far have, by encroaching upon Sindhudurg sanctified by Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj. The market was burnt and their guns bombarded its fortifications. When you were so near, you could not obstruct them. Does it mean that just as Jiwaji Vishram made common cause with them, you too walked
into his footsteps? It will not be tolerated if hereafter you do not take steps to chastise the Portuguese. Letters of protest have been sent to the Portuguese also. We shall shortly be going to Miraj.”20 This assault on Sindhudurg by the Portuguese also figures in a report that Conde de Ega sent to Portugal on January 25, 1764.21

A trading ship of the Portuguese coming from Masambi was captured by the Captain of Malvan. The Government of Goa knew about it on November 1, 1763 and Goa immediately protested against it and demanded it. As no reply was received, the Portuguese sent their armada to Sindhudurg under the command of Colonel Jack Filipe de Landresley on November 8, to take forcible possession of it. This armada contained two frigates, two corsarios, one pala, one biate, 12 manchas and over 20 small boats. On November 10, it reached Sindhudurg and the Portuguese landed on Malvan shore. They burned 50 boats that were in the creek and the market. One Portuguese ship that was in the creek was also burnt. Near the Sindhudurg, on a small fortress, there were 200 Mahrattas and six guns. The Portuguese took possession of it and resorted to arson and pillage all around. Not a temple or a mosque was spared. The guns showered fire on the fort through their guns. Nineteen of their men died and many were wounded. For a week this battle went on. The Portuguese armada returned to Goa on 16th November. Conde de Ega informed Portugal that he had received letters from the Peshwa and the Rane of Chhatrapati Sambhaji and requested him not to molest the Captain of Malvan any more on this account.

After the Portuguese had taken Mardangad, the Prince of Saunde entreated them to hand over Ponda Panchmahal to him. Conde de Ega replied that he had conquered it from the Mahrattas and the prince had given him no help whatever in that undertaking. Even then he was prepared nominally to recognise his dominance over it, on the condition that Portuguese army would be stationed there for its protection and its expenses should be borne by the Prince of Saunde. A written agreement to this effect was signed by both.22

A few days later, Haider Ali conquered Saunde’s territory and the prince Savai Inodi Sadashiv stayed at Bandoden on January 11, 1764 as a protege of the Portuguese. Haider Ali captured Ankola, Shiveshwar and Sadashivgad forts and marched on Kholgad in December 1763.24
Even this fort would have gone to him but the Portuguese had already taken possession of it. Consequently Haider Ali’s troops left that place on March 1, 1764. The Viceroy has written that Haider Ali’s army was about to march on Kholgad but it retreated.

Madhavrao Peshwa found fault with the Portuguese for having marched on Mardangad and demolished it and made efforts to regain it with restraint. Several envoys were sent to Goa in pursuit of this aim. On January 20, 1764 (Rajab 16) Madhavrao wrote a letter to the Viceroy demanding the return of Mardangad and the Danish ship that the Portuguese had carried off and to achieve this object, he appointed Janoji Dhulap. But the Poona court did nothing more than this. The reason for inaction is obvious. The Peshwa was to campaign against Haider Ali and he probably thought that the Portuguese co-operation in the task could be enlisted.

On August 3, 1764 Madhavrao wrote to the Viceroy: “In view of the alliance between us, it is strange that Mardangad was taken by you and razed to the ground. Such is the account we hear. If it is true, you should keep in view our friendship, you should hand over administration of Ponda to our officers. This will be in keeping with our friendship. Haider Ali has started disturbance and he needs to be brought to his senses. You should give material and military help to our troops and that will highly please us.” What is important is that far from giving any help to the Mahrattas as against Haider Ali, the Portuguese took possession of Supem fort and stationed their force for the protection of the passes and sealed Digi and Tinai to prevent the Mahrattas from coming down.

In October 1764, a battalion of Janoji Dhulap’s army had camped at Sanquelim and the Bhonsla had written to Goa that its object was to march on Mardangad. But when Madhavrao sent Janoji Dhulap to recapture the places and forts taken by Haider Ali in Konkan, Janoji was warned that he was to behave in a conciliatory spirit with the Portuguese and see to it that they became serviceable to the Peshwa’s cause. In December, 1764, Pandurang Murar came to Goa to carry on talks regarding regaining Mardangad. Goa also continued talks in this connection with the Peshwa through Prabhakar Bhat Shastri at the beginning of 1765.
In 1760 April, an envoy of Peshwas, Vamanji Mahadeo went to Goa and presented on June 23 a despatch from Vesajipant alias Yesaji Ram requesting Goa to rebuild Mardangad and equip it properly and return it. The despatch also said that they should return Jambavli and the revenue recovered from it. On July 29, Yesaji Ram wrote to the Secretary of the Government of Goa that he was going to take back Mardangad under orders of the Peshwa. His 6,000 horsemen were ready and he had asked the help of the Bhonsla. The Portuguese had information about this in March 1768. But the Mahrattas did not implement this threat even at this time.

Between 1764 and 1772 Madhaorao marched on Hyder Ali four times. On each of these occasions, the Portuguese tried to maintain neutrality. While going on the expedition against Hyder Ali in 1771 in Karnatak, the Peshwa tried for passage through Ponda; the object behind this being to capture it incidentally. It was also at the back of his mind to get Mardangad rebuilt from the Portuguese. There were about 10,000 men in the Mahratta army and it was under the command of Visajipant Keshao Lele. Besides this army, the Mahratta navy had anchored near Masure in which there were 17 palas and 85 galvetas.

The forces of the Bhonsala had joined the Mahrattas and the combined army had camped at Bicholim. Ali an adequate idea about the policy of the Bhonsala can be formed from the letter of Deoba Shenvi Sabnis written on January 19, 1771 (Saban 2) to Goa. This letter says: Visajipant has come here with his army and met Som Savant Baba and Krishna Savant Baba. A number of ships have also come in Karli river. The Savant said that their Chief was in Savantvadi and Visajipant should settle everything with him. Jivba’s plan was upset by some intruding Darbaris who brought Visajipant here and if way was not given to him, it would have meant picking up a quarrel with the Peshwa. We want to prosper in company of the Estada de Portuguese. Send some clever spokesman to whom the whole position would be explained. This letter should be destroyed.”

Visajipant intended to force his way to Ponda, if the Portuguese did not willingly give way. He had given a clear warning that if Goa did not agree, the invasion on Hyder Ali would be postponed and Goa properly tackled which would lead to ruin of both, but he was prepared for it. Goa also made vigorous preparations and closed
all ways to the enemy. Really speaking it was impossible for the Portuguese to face Visajipant’s army and they knew it well. Past experience pointed to the same conclusion. So Goa sent Vithal Gorakshe Valavalikar and Prabhakar Shroti Dikshit to the Peshwa and pleaded with him that if the Portuguese allowed the Mahratta army to pass through Ponda, it would mean that they would have to be prepared to fight with Hyder Ali whose envoy had camped in Goa for several months to watch Portuguese moves.

At this time, Frei Liandro de Madri de Deos, a Portuguese Padre was treating Madhao Rao with his medicine in Poona. The Portuguese doctors had entered the Peshwa household many years before. In the diaries of Balaji Bajirao, Madhaorao and Savai Madhaorao published by Vad, references to this Portuguese padre occur. He has been mentioned variously because of failure to decipher Modi calligraphy but the person mentioned is one and the same. This padre was a great favourite of Madhaorao. Goa used his mediation and secured an order from Madhaorao on Visajipant that he should leave the Portuguese alone. Accordingly Visajipant removed his camp from the vicinity of Ponda on March 21, 1771.

Prabhakar Bhat Shroti informed Goa that the Peshwa had directed Visajipant to march on Hyder Ali by a way which was out of Goa’s influence and nearer. The relations with the Portuguese were not to be spoilt. All future plans were to be made without disturbing this relationship and by maintaining friendship with them. Parasnis has said that Portuguese physicians had entry into the Peshwa’s palace. The name of the physician who treated Madhaorao was not known but one was there whose medicine the Peshwa was taking. This Catholic physician is no other than Frei Liandro de Madre de Deos and he was a member of the Franciscan Church. In a letter written to his mother Gopikabai, on October 8, 1771, the Peshwa said that he was taking the medicine of a Portuguese doctor.

In compliance with the request of the Peshwa, one more physician was sent to Poona by Goa whose name was Don Manuel Francisco Gonçalves. He reached Poona on October 23, 1771 and came back at the beginning of next year. So the mention made in Madhaorao’s letter to his mother must be that of Frei Liandro Madre de Deos.
Letter No. 29 in the volume called *Peshwekaleen Samajik ani Arthik Vyavahar*, edited by Prof. R. V. Oturkar must be about him.

At the time of Madhao Rao's death Padre Frei Liandro was present. A messenger came to Goa with a letter from Padre Frei Liandro dated November 20, 1772 who gave the following account of Madhao Rao's passing away. “On November 18, 1772 Madhav Rao expired at Theoor. On the same day his body was consigned to flames at noon. His wife (Ramabai) burnt herself with his body. Frei Liandro was present on that occasion. Raghoba, Narayanrao, Sakharambapu, Moropant and other statesmen and Trimbakrao Mama Pethe (Peshwa's material uncle) were also there at Theoor.” Frei Liandro was with Madhao Rao at Nasik also in June 1771. There is a reference to this in the letter dated June 24, 1771 sent by Vithalrao Valavalikar from Poona. He said: “On June 19, the Peshwa went to Nasik. He was accompanied by Govind Shivram, Haripant Phadke, Gopikabai and Ramabai. There were, besides, 3,000 horsemen, 25 elephants, 75 camels 100 oxen, one gun and 25 palanquins. The padre physician has also gone.”

The Portuguese have written that after the sullen departure of Visajipant from Ponda, Sardar Trimbak Suryaji attempted to take possession of Ponda Panchmahal. The Chief colleague of his in this effort was one Govind Shenvi of Bori. He kept in finding one battalion in Ponda Mahal in May 1771. In this effort, the Desai of Gulelu, Rayaji Naik Borkar, Bharne of Marcaim, Gopal Shenvi of Sanquelim and others participated. Of them, Gopal Shenvi went over to the Portuguese and informed Goa about everything regarding this plot. The Portuguese immediately besieged the forest of Kudal and arrested 109 Mahrattas. The Portuguese arrested Gopal Shenvi also who later died in prison. Govind Shenvi (Borkar) was hauled up in court and on September 20, he was hanged. The judge had ordered that before beheading him one of his hands should be cut off and then his body should be cut in four parts. Accordingly his head was placed on a mount at Kodal and other parts of the body thrown at Bori in the river. His hand, however, was not cut off, because he was converted to Catholicism before death and so obtained this concession. After baptism he was named Caitano.

An event creditable to the Mahratta armada took place in March 1772. Janoji Dhubal had made a vow that during the year he would
capture at least one European ship. Therefore, superior officers of the Portuguese had cautioned their armada to be careful if it met the Mahratta armada.\textsuperscript{50} Even then on March 19, 1772, Dhalap arrested a Portuguese frigate called Santana. The Mahratta armada consisted of 14 palas and 32 galvetas according to a Portuguese document dated January 3, 1781.\textsuperscript{51} But this appears to be an exaggeration. Because in a contemporary news-letter, it is mentioned that the armada consisted of five palas of three-masted ships, two Gurabas of two masts and 17 miscellaneous ships. It was commanded by Janoji Dhalap and under him was Sardar Kushtaji Naik Jaitapurkar. This news-letter also says that Fatehjung, the principal ship (Capitania) had 28 big guns, besides seven or eight small ones and 175 to 200 sailors. The other four palas had 16 to 20 guns and 75 to 100 sailors.

Every Guraba has eight to ten guns and 50 to 75 men. Every galveta has 30, 40, 50, men. The men all told may be over 1,500 but less than 2,000. In the first naval war with the Portuguese two sarangs of the Mahrattas died. One was on board the Fatehjung whose name was Mahomed Sarang. About 200 of the men must have died or been injured. Santana fought well. Shells from it killed many of the enemy’s men. Of the two Portuguese Chalupas, one fought creditably.

The name of the captain of Santana was Francisco de Costa Ataide. The Santana was accompanied by two small Chalupas and a trading ship of one Luiz Jose. This armada was on his way to Manglore. It was equipped with 40 guns, 20 gunners and 120 musketeers. There were 60 sailors besides. The chalupas were fitted up with 14 guns and necessary ammunition and men. Even the trading ship was equipped for a battle. Dhulap’s armada and this Portuguese armada met near Kalyanpur. Dhalap had captured a number of trading ships from the south. One of them belonged to a Portuguese trader of Macao. Within two hours, the Mahratta armada arrested the two chalupas and the trading ship of Luiz Jose. A flock of 19 ships sailing under Portuguese protection was also caught. After this there was a battle between Santana and the Mahratta armada. Many of the Portuguese died or were badly burnt. The mouth and hands of Captain Francisco de Costa were also burnt. After being helpless, it surrendered.
After this became known at Goa on March 22, the Portuguese despatched an armed ship called Penha de Franca in the direction of the Mahratta armada. On the 26th it met the Mahratta armada on the coast of Salcete in Goa all of a sudden and there was a furious battle. The Portuguese recovered many of their ships but Santana was not recovered. It had gone far ahead. That ship and its crew were taken to Vijayadurg. When the Government of Goa complained to the Peshwa about the capture of Santana, the reply received by it was, noteworthy. The Peshwa writes to the Governor of Goa on May 4, 1772: 54 “You sent friendly despatches which were reciprocated in the same spirit. While our relations were friendly, you behaved strangely in respect of Mardangad. Last year you did not allow passage to our army while it was marching on Hyder Ali. Who broke the trust is known well to you. We pay in the same coin. We esteem friendship but tit for tat is our policy.” The Portuguese have described the prowess of Penha de Franca in glowing terms.

The Government of Goa sent a physician called Tome to give medical aid to the Portuguese prisoners kept at Vijayadurg in a private capacity in April 1772. Letters were addressed to some prisoners through this doctor. One Lourenco Paulo also accompanied him. A report written by him is in Goa Archives. It says: “It was night when we reached Vijayadurg. So we were kept under vigil. Next morning we were produced before Anandrao Dhulap. We were closely examined to find out if we had concealed any letters. The letters that they recovered were taken by a Mahratta officer and after they were read by an interpreter, they were handed over to Francisco de Costa, Captain of Santana and he gave them to their owners. The letter from the wife of this captain to him was not traced by the Mahrattas because we had kept it very very stealthily. After the inspection of the letters, there was inquiry as regards who had sent the doctor. He said that it was his profession to go wherever there were ailing persons. This physician is treating the Portuguese prisoners.”

This Portuguese doctor reached Vijayadurg on April 19. Three days before that, the Mahratta armada had gone out cruizing. It had a three-masted pala frigate, six gurabs and 15 galvetas, Janoji Dhulap, Kushtaji Naik and many sailors had gone with it. Only four palas with three masts, and two galvetas had remained at Vijayadurg. Only the hull of the Santana was there. The palas had twelve guns on
either side but they were small. A peon of this physician mentioned above was staying at the house of the Sarang. From his wife this peon learnt that in the two battles with the Portuguese on 19th and 26th March, one hundred men of Dhulap died and 125 were suffering from their injuries then. In a letter written in Portuguese on June 3, 1772 from Vijayadurg it said, “In this fort there are 208 prisoners of the Portuguese and 108 of them are Portuguese. Anandrao Dhulap had given permission to all of them of write letters home. They had to be given to a Mahratta officer for censoring after they were written.”

This is given here as a specimen of Mahratta censorship.

Bispo de Halicarnaso has given the following information about the Mahratta armada in his manuscript Systema Marcial Asiatico written 1772: The Mahrattas immediately raised their armada at Bassein and Arnala after they had captured the Bassein province (Ilha de Vacas) and in 1761 since they captured Vijayadurg, they have three naval centres. Today they have over 100 ships among which there are palas and galvetas. Several of the palas have three masts. Madhaorao Peshwa gets an income of six lakhs of rupees from each of the Bassein, Arnala and Vijayadurga forts and now this income has increased. The Malvan fort belongs to Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur. An armada is stationed in this fort in which there are three palas and ten galvetas. Since Vice-Rei Marquez de Alorna destroyed the armada of the Bhonsla, he has only a few galvetas left with him. In a letter of the Goa Government December 16, 1768, it is mentioned that on that date fourteen palas and 45 galvetas of the Mahratta armada were cruising in the sea. Don Pedro de Menezes, a general of the Portuguese armada, writing about the Mahratta armada, in his letter dated January 19, 1769 says: “At Bassein there are 14 palas and over forty galvetas. At Versova, there are three palas and over 50 galvetas, but all of them are small.”

On August 30, 1773, Peshwa Narayanrao was murdered. In a writing called Brief history of the Peshwa family in Portuguese on April 15, 1780 it is said that Raghoba brought about this murder under instigation of his wife. In another Portuguese chronicle, it is said that Raghoba was under detention, and it was at the instance of Sakharambapu that this murder was brought about. The name of this chronicle is Noticias de Reino, Situacao forcas e Costumes do Marata
and it was written in Goa in about 1777. The Governor of Goa, Don Jose Pedro de Comara says Raghobadada managed to effect this murder at the instigation of Hyder Ali. Go received information from a number of Mahratta sardars and especially from Frei Liandro de Madri de Deos who was living in Poona.

Don Jose Pedro de Comara has said that Hyder Ali openly took the side of Raghoba but his object in it was not that he should be the Chief of the Mahrattas but the elimination of Brahman negemony. In his intrigues against the Poona court, Raghoba tried to enlist the support of Hyder Ali by sending Vithalrao Vishram and Bajirao Rane as his emissaries to him. This was after the murder of Narayanrao. A letter by Vithal Vishram to the Secretary of the Government of Goa was translated in Portuguese and is available in Goa Archives. It says that there is great friendship between Raghoba and Nawab Hyder Ali. The original must have been written somewhere in March 1775. About this time, Hyder Ali sent an envoy named Jivajiram to Goa and wrote to him that Goa should send an army and capture their former northern territory of Bassein and added that Raghobadada was in favour of such a move.

Fakir Savant Bhonsala and Ramaji Naik Sattam of Achra were making efforts from December 1774 to induce the Portuguese to capture Vijaydurg with their assistance and to carry on talks in this behalf with the Portuguese. Govindbhat Paradkar and Appaji Khanderao were camping in Goa. A record of the statement made by this Appaji Khanderao on December 27, 1774 is available in Goa Archives. He told the Governor of Goa: “The people of Vijayadurg are passing their days in penury and misery under the Mahratta rule and so seeking the shelter of the Portuguese. Fakir Savant Bhonsala and Ramaji had 700 men under them. Fakir was an officer at the time of the Angria. Between them they will raise a force of 2,600 people. They desire to capture Gheria (Vijayadurg) with this force and others and the Portuguese. In the fort itself, they have fifty people. They will rebel when we attack the fort. They are trying to win over Janoji Dhulap, Chief of the armada to their side. But if that is not possible, they will try to anchor all the armada in the river. At present there are two padas of three masts and seven galvetas. Under the command of Dhulap, the rest of the armada has gone to the north and it consists of one pada of
three masts, seven gurabs and ten galvetas. In a few days we shall
know what transpires from the overtures with Janoji. Fakir Savant and
Ramaji Naik have authorised me to negotiate with you and even to
stay here as a hostage."

On February 10, 1774, the Prime Minister of Portugal left for the
guidance of the Governor of Goa instructions in which it was said
about the Mahratta armada at Vijayadurg that there were three palas
of three masts fitted up with 20 to 24 guns and that it was not difficult
for the Portuguese to destroy the same. Even the Rani of Fatepur like
Hyder Ali had written to the Governor of Goa for taking back those
villages from Daman which the Mahrattas had taken in terms of the
treaty of 1740. All the same, the Portuguese did not desire war or
conflicts with the Mahrattas. If by persuasion and conciliation anything
could be secured, they were for it. With this object in view, they had
appointed an envoy at the Poona court from January 1775 whose
name was Narayan Shenvi Dhume. At the very start he was instructed
to be guided by the counsel of Frei Liandro de Madre de Deos and
Don Manuel de Noronha. In November 1775, the Portuguese ship
Santana which was kept under arrest at Vijayadurg was made over to
the Portuguese under the orders of the Peshwa. The masts, guns and
other material had already been removed by Dhulap and only its hull
remained. The court of Poona assured the Portuguese that compensa-
tion for the same would be given.

Help from the English of Bombay to Raghoba having stopped in
keeping with the treaty of Purandhar (1-3-1776), he tried to negotiate
with the Portuguese at Daman through the Surat Portuguese factor
Jeronimo Rebeiro Nevice and to go there on March 31, 1776.
Raghoba alias Dadasaheb informed the captain of Daman that the
Portuguese should give him military help and in exchange they should
get their old northern territory of Bassein and Salcette; Some of it
was captured by the English and so to compensate for it, some other
area from the Mahratta state of equal revenue should be given to
them. The Daman Portuguese refused to give Raghoba military help
but allowed him to stay within the limits of Daman on certain
conditions. Having received a setback at Daman, Raghoba sent
Trimbak Krishna to Goa and beseeched Portuguese help from there.
Raghoba did not think that he was safe at Surat and so on August 10, 1776 he left Surat and reached Daman on August 25.\textsuperscript{60} The Governor of Daman writing to the Governor of Goa on September 1, 1776 says that Raghoba had one thousand soldiers including horsemen and footmen, eleven elephants and 100 camels. Dada Saheb requested him that in the event of his enemy attacking him the Governor should give shelter to Raghoba and his retinue of 20 persons. Raghoba wished to proceed to Goa from there in a warship.\textsuperscript{70} The Governor of Goa wrote back to say that Raghoba should be fed on hope for the time being, but he should not be admitted in Daman fort. If he found himself in danger he should be allowed to get in with 20 persons only and sent to Goa in a well furnished warship.\textsuperscript{71} It was not possible for the Portuguese to give military help to Raghoba for fear of invasion of Daman by the Court of Poona. That Raghoba could not realise this for a long time was surprising.

In a letter dated November, 2, 1776 written to the Governor of Goa, Don Jose Pedro de Comara, Raghoba writes: My envoy Trimbak Krishna who is there writes that you are making preparations and sending a ship here in which you might be sending orders to the Governor of Daman. I am now in much financial difficulty. I used to get something from Balsad where the enemy has come. Your Governor here has no orders to help me. So I have come to Tarapore and put in order the fort and carried on for some time. I am waiting for your aid. So send help including guns and war material soon. I have relied on you and taken shelter with you as I you are honest. You should be proud of this and promote your glory by aiding me ...”

Raghoba has said in this letter why he left Daman and went to Tarapore. This shows that it was not because of the pressure of the Poona Barbhai court that the Daman Portuguese turned him out as Dr. Sardesai says.\textsuperscript{74} But it is true that as desired by the Court of Poona, the Portuguese did not give him shelter at Daman, nor military help. From August 25 to October, Raghoba was harbourcd by the Portuguese at Daman. Afterwards he fled to Bombay. On the day following the day on which Raghoba sought shelter at Daman i.e. August 26, Narayan Shenvi Dhume wrote from Poona that the Court of Poona was prepared to pay Rs. 66,454 and wood worth Rs. 3,000 to the Portuguese as compensation for the damage done to Santana. Dhume also
wrote that the Poona court also intended to make over a village of 12,000 revenue near Daman. The Poona court had given territory of 12,50,000 revenue to Nizam Ali to win him over to its side. The Poona court followed the same policy in respect of the Portuguese.

Raghoba had no faith in the English. He expected help from the Portuguese, but they were merely marking time and cheating him. Dadasaheb wrote to the Queen of Portugal on December 2, 1778 and appealed for help. This letter was sent with Jose Francis de Britto, Captain of a Portuguese frigate to Lisbon. On May 26, 1779 Don Frederico Gillerme de Sousa came to Goa as Governor. On May 4, before that, Narayan Vithal Dhume had made a treaty of friendship with the Poona court, but it was not signed. The new Governor confirmed it on January 11, 1780. Mahadaji Scindia took much interest in this treaty being concluded. According to this treaty, the compensation for Santana and ceding of a villages of 12,000 rupees revenue were included in the agreement that was made. These 72 villages are in Nagar Haveli. The Portuguese took possession of 65 villages of these on June 10, 1783, the other seven were taken on July 22, 1785.

The Portuguese envoy, Narayan Vithal Shenvi Dhume, played an important part in connection with this treaty and earned encomiums from both Poona and Goa. The Poona Court gave him two villages as Jagir. After the death of Dhume on May 12, 1790, Vithalrao Goraksha Valavalikar was appointed envoy at Poona. The background of the treaty of 1780 is well explained by a letter that Vithalrao wrote from Poona on June 1, 1791. Vithalrao says in substance: “I have been doing my best since I came here to serve my master’s interests. During the days of Don Jose Pedro Comara, two ships came from Portugal to stay in Goa for ever when Narayanrao Peshwa was murdered; that was done in order that Raghoba should succeed him as Peshwa. Savai Madhaorao was a baby in the cradle. A number of Mahratta statesmen came together and Nana Phadnavis took up their leadership in the name of Savai Madhaorao and turned down Raghoba. He went over to Hyder Ali, the English and Nizam Ali for help. It was so uncertain an hour that there was no knowing who would rise, when and where. Goa was of divided mind. Jivaji Vishram wrote from Savantvadi that Portuguese ships were equipped for going up to
Vijayadurg on the excuse of avenging the Santana disaster. Two envoys were sent to Poona but their errands were to go over to Raghoba or Savai Madhaorao according to exigency. Before we reached Poona, Bhonsla had given news of our arrival. The Poona envoy reached Goa on the same day on which we reached Poona. We were halted six miles off and inquiries about myself (Vithalrao) and Narayanrao Dhume were made. We concealed the letter intended for Sawai Madhaorao. But they held a close inspection; an atmosphere of fright prevailed. Coming to know about this Moroba Phadnis called us at night and told us that the Portuguese should side with Raghoba and not with Savai Madhaorao and write accordingly to Goa. Our orders were to take that side which was powerful and likely to succeed. So we kept on good terms with Nana Phadnis. The situation being uncertain, it took time even to do small things in the interests of the Estado (Goa). But a few days later Santana was returned; compensation for materials on it was given; villages were ceded; figures of damages were called for. We said if they were to be paid, they should be paid in full or not at all. The Poona court said it was conquered properly and yet was being generously returned and compensation for harm done was being; given so, we were told that it would be honourable for both to come to a settlement. So we gave a full list of the cargo and stated its amounting value as Rs. 70,000. There were the prayer utensils of the men and muskets twice the real number and guns as they were. On the whole, we gained all our points. I was in the charge of the negotiations. But when I was difficult to get and they would ask for surety wood was secured. Narayanrao was under detention. He was released and we did everything to put this matter through by staying at Poona and Saswad. Rs. 25,000 as saranjam for the fort of Daman was secured on the plea that from everywhere, evil eyes were cast on the child Peshwa but the Governor of Goa will be a friend. We made it a condition that the fine teakwood in Bassein province should not be given to anybody else but to the Portuguese. At last compensation for Santana and saranjam of Rs. 25,000 for Daman fort were agreed to and the treaty concluded. I was here for a year. Narayanrao fell ill and died. I asked for permission to go to Goa but brought word about proceeding to Pandharpur. I did everything but Narayanrao took 15 years to show that he did them. As a matter of fact neither he nor I could do anything. It is all the credit of the master."
In 1785, there was again a pact whereby the Hindus secured religious freedom in Nagar Haveli, cow-slaughter was stopped, Hindu temples and customs were protected. The Peshwa laid down these conditions and the Portuguese conceded them. One clause in the 1780 treaty was that the Portuguese should not help the enemies of the Peshwa in any way and in keeping with this condition, the Portuguese could not shelter Raghoba. Another important clause was that deserters of either should be arrested by the power concerned and made over to the former master.

According to this condition, the Peshwa made a request that Tulaji Pawar, the murderer of Narayanrao should be delivered to the Peshwa by the Portuguese in 1780. The Portuguese complied with the request in December, 1780. In compliance with the treaty of Purandhar, Raghoba removed Tulaji from his service. He went to Hyder Ali. When there was a treaty between Hyder Ali and Nana Phadnis. Hyder dismissed him and he went to the Bhonsla of Savantvadi. The Bhonsla sent him to Goa and requested the Governor to send him to Raghoba at Surat, from where Tulaji intended to go to Bombay. But the Governor delivered him to the Poona Court. He was eventually put to death.

On February 10, 1781 Goa came in contact with Raghunathji Angria, the son of Tulaji Angria. On that day, five armed manchusas suddenly sought shelter near Aguada fort. A battalion of Hyder's navy under the command of Raghunathji was pursuing them. Raghunathji pleaded with the Governor that those manchusas were plundering trading ships from Hyder's territory and so he was watching them. They had escaped and taken shelter with the Portuguese and therefore they should be made over to him or sent to Sadashivgad or Manglore. The Governor of Goa said that those manchusas were from Vijayadurg and since Goa's relations with Poona were of friendship, it was only proper to give them harbour, Raghunathji's opinion was that they were not from Vijayadurg but pirate ships. On February 12, 1781 Raghunathji wrote to Goa: "These ships do not belong to the Peshwa. We are also Mahrattas. Even though a Mahratta, I am serving for the last ten years the Nawab Hyder." 92

On inquiry the Portuguese found out that the manchusas were from Vijayadurg and engaged in piracy to the south of Goa. They had
plundered four small ships of some Goa traders also. So the Governor arrested the captains of those five *manchuas* and their 183 crew. Raghunathji Angria also wrote to the Secretary of the Government of Goa that the armadas of Hyder Ali and the Portuguese should combine and destroy the Mahratta armada but the Portuguese did not fall in with the suggestion. Without firing a shot they had got Nagar-Haveli by mere negotiation. Also, by a number of tricks they took the Bhonsla's Bhatagram, Sanquelim and Pernem Mahals. All this has a moral.

It has already been stated before that the Portuguese obtained Salecete and Bardez mahals from Ibrahim Adilshah in 1543. These being open territories, they were often invaded. As long as the Bhonsla of Savantvadi and the Prince of Saunde were willing to take a subordinate position, the Portuguese did not find it risky that were on the border. But when Hyder Ali conquered Saunde's territory and took possession of all his posts south of Kholgad, the Portuguese were obliged to keep in their hands Ponda Panchmahal as far as Kholgad. Similarly, for the protection of Bardez they need Sanquelim, Bicholim, Maneri and Pernem mahals of the Bhonsla. As the Bhonsla was a sardar of the Poona power, the Government of Portugal had instructed the Governor of Goa to take possession of these on suitable pretexts and suitable occasions. He got the opportunity to take Bicholim and Sanquelim in 1781. This year the Bhonsla of Savantvadi started a war against the Chhatrapati of Kolhapur and laid siege to his Rangna alias Prasiddhagad. The Khem Savant Bhonsla requested the Governor of Goa to help him by sending troops and ammunition. Seeing that the Bhonsla Savant was engaged in battle with Kolhapur, the Governor sent troops to Bicholim on August 24, 1781 under the command of Brigadier Errice Carlos Errices near Mayem. On the 25th he marched over Bicholim and took possession of the fort. There was a skirmish between the Portuguese and Bhonsla's men, two of whom died and eight were wounded.

After taking the fort of Bicholim the Portuguese proceeded to Sanquelim and besieged the fortifications of the Vithoba temple. For 14 hours the inmates held out but ultimately surrendered. In this battle two Portuguese soldiers died. Kushtoba Rane and Jaitoba Rane gave good help to the Portuguese in conquering Bicholim (Bhatagram).
and Sanquelim (Satari). The Portuguese Government made a declaration that the people of these mahals would have full freedom to follow their customs and observe their social and religious ceremonies. Also the vattis of all vattanders would be preserved.

The Savant-Bhonsla did not put up any resistance to this aggression for a year. In the meantime, he sent an envoy to Goa and requested the Portuguese to return all the territory they had occupied. The Government of Goa told the envoy that the Savant-Bhonsla did not deserve the terms of the treaty previously made and he had not paid the annual tribute due since 1774 and had besides caused much damage. So the Portuguese were compelled to take Bicholim (Bhatagram) and Sanquelim (Satari) mahals. Frederico Gillerme de Sousa also informed the envoy that he had informed the King of Portugal about these developments and he would abide by the orders he would receive. The Bhonsla-Savant realised that the Portuguese had deceitfully captured Bicholim and Sanquelim. He fancied that the Portuguese troops were on their way to help him. Perhaps such a canard was spread by the Portuguese themselves. The Governor of Goa had the sanction of the Government of Portugal to behave in this way.

The Bhonsla-Savant kept his restraint and patience for a year somehow or other but after that period he could not control himself and on October 1, 1782 he took possession of Gululem, which the Portuguese had captured by marching on it with a force of 1000 men. In this way, there was war again between Savantvadi and Goa. In a rare publication, published in Lisbon in 1785, there is mention of this development. In the following words: “Erao constantes as diligencias que fazia o Bonsulo por socorro de gente e deseio, e que o esperava com brevidade de Sagra, dos cunhados, e do Dessai de Evalem desejando recuperar a dessota de Sanquelim e poder continuar a guerra a que dizia o precisava o insulto, que havia recebido do Estado tomando-lhe por sorpresa a praca de Bicholim e forteza de Sanquelim nao so estando em paz com elle, mas com tratado para socorro.” The substance of this passage is that the Bhonsla was constantly trying to get help of men and materials and he felt that he would get it from his mother-in-law, brothers-in-law, the Desais of Hewale. The object was to avenge the defeat of Sanquelim and continue the war. The Bhonsala was saying that he must fight the Portuguese...
and punish them for their crime of using the forces he sent for help according to agreement for suddenly capturing Bicholim and Sanquelim, while his relations with them were friendly.

The despatches of protest that the Bhonsla Savant sent to the Governor of Goa wherein he charged Brigadier Carlos Errice Errices with deceitful conduct by pretending to come to help with an army while his army was engaged in the siege of Rangna are available. They give a fair idea of what tricks and contrivances the Portuguese employed for capturing Bicholim and Sanquelim. On November 9, 1782, the Bhonsla attacked a brigade of the Portuguese at Mulgaon after taking possession of Gululem, Maneri, Menkure, Sal and Dhumase and on November 16 he besieged the fort of Sanquelim. At this time, there were 5000 footmen and 300 cavaliers in his army. On December 6, 1782, the Governor of Goa sent aid of men to the army at Bicholim. There were about 2400 men. Next day, on Saturday, the Portuguese army started for Sanquelim. The Bhonsla’s army threw shells on it at Keri and Kodal but the Bhonsla had to retreat before the disciplined army of the Portuguese and on the same day, it entered Sanquelim fort at about 11 in the morning. The Captain of this fort was Tenente Antonio Barbosa, a Portuguese. This war between the Bhonsla and the Portuguese went on till April 1783 by fits and starts. The Bhonsla attacked many posts occupied by the Portuguese in Bhatagram and Satari.

On March 24, 1783, the Portuguese invaded Pernem and on April 2, 1983 they hoisted their flags on both the forts of Alorna. On the fifth day, they demolished the towers of these forts. In this way, the Portuguese, this time, captured a considerable part of Pernem. They wanted the whole of Pernem for themselves; because they believed that it was the natural boundary for the protection of Pernem. ‘A Província de Pernem e a melhor barreira e a mais natural da provincia de Bardez’ says the Governor of Goa, Don Frederico Gillerme de Sousa. This means that Pernem Mahal is the natural fortification for the protection of Bardez.

Being convinced that the Portuguese would take the rest of Pernem also, the Bhonsala started negotiations for a treaty with them. The Governor of Goa called a truce by acceding to the request of the Bhonsla, taking into consideration the possibility of his getting
assistance from the Peshwa. But he did not return the territory captured from him. On the contrary he took care to see that Portuguese rule there should be stabilised. In May, the Bhonsla sent an envoy to Goa for treaty talks. An envoy from the Poona court also came to settle the strife between the Bhonsla and the Portuguese. His name was Govind Lakshmanrao.

These two envoys tried their utmost for the return of the territory captured by the Portuguese. But it was unfruitful. The Governor of Goa said that he could do nothing unless he had orders from the King of Portugal. The Bhonsla wrote to the King of Portugal for return of the conquered territory but in vain. In August 1784 the Poona envoy Govindrao Lakshman died in Goa. In the next month came the order from the King of Portugal that the conquered territory should be annexed to Goa State. In this way the last curtain fell on this affair. A contemporary biographer of Marquez de Alorna, Monteiro Mascarenhas, has said that all Portuguese statemen felt that the territory of Bhonsla should be incorporated in Goa state for ever.

In his letter dated March 16, 1785, the Governor of Goa, Don Frederico Gillerme de Souza, wrote to Portugal that the Court of Poona was taking the side of the Bhonsla and Nawab Tippu was likely to take aggressive steps and so he had postponed the taking of the rest of Pernem but he would carry out the task at the appropriate time. He got the opportunity in 1785. The Khem Savant III had got the honour of Morchele and the title Rajebahadur from the Emperor of Delhi. He received the same with great ceremony on May 12, 1785, Akshaya Tritiya of 1707 shake. The Khem Savant Bhonsla was tributary of the Chhatrapati of Kolhapur and so he looked upon this step taken by the Bhonsala as his own denigration. Since the Bhonsla had besieged Rangna, their mutual hostility had already become obvious. But when the Chhatrapati knew about Bhonsla’s new title and the kingly emblem of norcheles, Kolhapur declared a war on Savantvadi.

With a view to enlisting Portuguese support in this war or at least to ensure Portuguese neutrality, an envoy from Kolhapur came to see the Governor of Goa. When the Savant knew about it, he also appealed for Portuguese help through his envoy Visaji Mahadeo who was in Goa. The Portuguese considered it necessary to protect the Savant for the
protection of Goa. The Portuguese Government had never forgotten
that the inclusion of Savantvadi in Kolhapur was a danger to Goa. But
on one plea or another, the Portuguese wanted to annex the whole
of Pernem mahal to Goa. So the Kolhapur envoy was very cordially
treated and he was informed that Goa was prepared to hold talks
with him. The position of the Savant-Bhonsla was very precarious
at this hour. Kolhapur had captured the Nevi fort, Bharatgad and
Vengurla and besieged the fort of Redi. He had no ammunition nor
money to buy it in his treasury. In such a situation, if Goa helped
Kolhapur he would be nowhere. Realising this he asked for Portuguese
help and in exchange agreed to make over the whole of Pernem
mahal to them. But the Portuguese were not content with this much.
They made it a condition that the Bhonsla must abandon his claim
to all the previously conquered territory for all time. Being helpless,
the Bhonsla accepted this condition also. At last, a treaty was made
between them on January 29, 1788 and on February 4 and the
Portuguese took possession of the rest of Pernem. There was a secret
clause in this treaty which said that the Portuguese would give full
support to the Bhonsla in his hour of need and would write to Portugal
about the return of his conquered territory. Therefore a copy of this
clause was made over to the Bhonsla.

What is noteworthy is that it was quite in keeping with the policy of
the Government of Portugal that Bicholim, Sanquelim and Pernem
were captured by the Goa Portuguese who wanted these mahals for
the protection of Bardez. It was not, therefore, easy that the Bhonsla
would get them back. Mahadaji Scindia himself intervened in 1794
in this matter and requested the Portuguese to return these mahals to
Savantvadi. In 1795, Bakshi Bahadur Jivbadada Kerkar offered to
Goa Rs. 2 lakhs in exchange of the mahals. Even Nana Phadnavis
took interest in this affair several times. On March 29, 1794, Vithalrao
Valavalikar, the envoy of the Portuguese at the Poona Court, wrote to
the Secretary of the Government of Goa (Barroco) that it was not
only the Scindia but also the Poona Court was anxious that the three
mahals of Bicholim, Sanquelim and Pernem should be returned to
the Bhonsla by the Portuguese. But in spite of efforts in this direc-
tion by Mahadaji and Daulatrao Scindia and the Poona Court, the
Portuguese never released these three mahals from their possession.
Govindrao Lakshman was sent as envoy to Goa by Poona to mediate between Goa and Savantvadi and later Gopalrao Ramchandra Pednekar was sent to Goa in the same capacity in 1786.

At this time the Mahratta campaign against Tippu was in progress. Gopalrao opened talks with the Portuguese under orders of the Peshwa that he, Bhonsla-Savant and the Portuguese should combine and march against Tippu. Ten thousand Mahratta troops were camping at Banda under the command of Jivaji Gopal at the time. The Peshwa was prepared to gift to the Portuguese Tippu’s Sadashivgad and Kurmangad (Simpi) for their help. But the Portuguese suggested that the territory of Saunde 10 miles long and 60 miles broad should be given to them, in addition to what other favours the Peshwa would do. Writing about this Raghunath Mahendale wrote to Nana Phadanavis on March 8, 1786 that the Portuguese had raised several objections to our suggestions which meant that they did not want sincerely to help. Instead of refusing to come outright, they made alternate proposals, possibly believing that they would not be accepted.

The Goa Portuguese really had no strength to fight against Tippu. They had no land army nor money. Their whole strength lay in their armada and the Peshwa also needed only that help. In 1787, there were 7,140 men in the Portuguese army of whom only 2,590 were Portuguese from Europe. Between 1776 and 1800, the Portuguese navy in India had 23 ships, one of which was a big armed ship with 60 guns and seven frigates with 26 to 42 guns. In all there were 382 guns and 3,118 sailors.

Sultan Tippu hated the Portuguese. He arrested 13 padres from Karnataka and sent them to Goa and banished 40,000 Catholics from there. The Portuguese always feared an attack on Goa from Tippu. So they had to keep an army ready for the protection of Goa. Therefore, in February 11, 1788, the Portuguese brought back even the troops that were sent to the help of the Bhonsala against Kolhapur. Narayan Shenvi Dhume wrote to Goa on September 30, 1787 from Poona that Tippu was planning to take Goa with French help. The Portuguese anxiety was augmented because Tippu had sent his envoys to Paris in 1788. Rivara says that some Christians in Goa had plotted against the Portuguese. This conspiracy came to light in
1787 and the accused were found guilty and awarded severe sentences. The Goa Portuguese suspected that there was Tippu’s hand in this conspiracy.\textsuperscript{132} Cunha Rivara is of the opinion that this suspicion of the Goa Government was well-founded.\textsuperscript{133} A contemporary Englishman has also recorded that two Goan padres had said that if the Goa Government did not redress their grievances satisfactorily, they would invite Tippu Sultan to invade Goa.\textsuperscript{134} Under such circumstances, it is no wonder that the Portuguese maintained neutrality in the Mahratta-Tippu war.

On March 12, 1787, the Governor of Goa wrote to Portugal that the envoy of the Poona Court saw him and requested help in war against Tippu. He also said that the friendship of the Bhosla should be regained by returning to him Sanquelim, Bicholim and the captured part of Pernem. Besides, he wanted that the Portuguese should allow the Prince of Saunde to send an emissary to Poona for talks.\textsuperscript{135} Nana Phadnavis called on the Portuguese envoy at Poona Narayan Dhume on August 29, 1787 and made inquiries about the Prince of Saunde and asked Dhume to write to Goa suggesting that the Prince of Saunde should be sent to Poona. Nana said what the Portuguese had done for Saunde prince was clear but he wished to do him a good turn and see to it that he got his own territory.\textsuperscript{136} Gopalrao Ramchandra Pednekar, the envoy of the Court of Poona was then in Goa. Before this Nana Phadnavis had sent Narayan Dhume to Goa in order to make himself well equainted with the Portuguese stand in regard to Savant-Bhosla and Tippu.

Dhume prepared a detailed list of the tasks assigned to him by the Court of Poona in Portuguese and presented it to the Government of Goa. The clauses were as follows.\textsuperscript{137} (1) To collect necessary information to decide the dispute between Savantvadi and Goa. (2) To secure for the Court of Poona from the Portuguese Government some big and small guns of bronze of new style. (3) To secure Portuguese help to the Court of Poona in the war against Tippu. (4) To collect information about the English, the French and the Dutch including what was taking place in their European capitals. (5) To recover the arrears from Goa merchants due to the Court of Poona through Vithal Vishram Sabnis and Sadashiv Ramchandra Malhar. Also to look into Kayle accounts.\textsuperscript{138}
Dhume was in Goa for four months. There is evidence to show that he returned to Poona on May 23, 1787. The Portuguese informed the Poona Court through Dhume that there was sufficient cause for the Portuguese who had declared war against Savantvadi. A detailed note in support of their stand was submitted to the Poona Court by the Portuguese through Dhume.\textsuperscript{140} The Portuguese not only did not participate in the war against Tippu on behalf of the Peshwa but also captured Sadashivgad on January 3, 1791 on behalf of the prince of Saunde.\textsuperscript{141} Four leading sardars were partisans of the prince and they were not prepared to fight against him. In this way without shedding a drop of blood, the Portuguese captured this fort.\textsuperscript{142} The Prince of Saunde was then living in Goa as a dependent of the Portuguese and in accordance with a treaty signed on January 17, 1791 he had passed over his right on Sadashivgad and Kurnagad (Shimpi) to the Portuguese.\textsuperscript{143}

The Mahrattas had taken Kurnagad from Tippu on January 24, 1791 and had made overtures to the captain of Sadashivgad for taking it over.\textsuperscript{144} A Portuguese sardar has written that on January 23, 1791 two big \textit{pulas} of three masts, four \textit{gurubas} and over 20 galvetas had anchored in the neighbourhood of the two forts.\textsuperscript{145} Baburao Salokhe was the commander of this armada and subedar Sakopant Ramachandra was the commander of the land forces. Seeing that Sadashivgad like Kurnagad would pass into the hands of the Mahrattas, the Portuguese general hastened to capture it and took possession of it.\textsuperscript{146}

When the news of the capture of Sadashivgad by the Portuguese reached Poona, Nana Phadnavis called their envoy at the Court (Vithal Valavalikar) for interview and chastised him for the Portuguese having captured Sadashivgad by breach of faith. In a letter written to Goa by Valavalikar in this connection, he says that he was unable to write the words that Nana uttered in the interview.\textsuperscript{147} In a letter written by the Peshwa on March 20, 1791 to the Governor of Goa, Francisco de Cunha Manezes, he says: “While we had sent our army and armada on Sadashivgad in Saunde Panchmahal, you sent your people and took possession of it. This is highly improper in the face of the treaty between us. So you had better hand over the fort and remove your posts. Jairam Babaji and Ramchandra Parsharam have gone there who
will take charge of it. This must happen if the treaty between us is to last and such excess should not be indulged in again.”

Bahiropanth Mehendale was present when Nana Phadnavis called Vithalrao Valavalikar for interview. A Marathi letter written by him to the Secretary of the Government of Goa is available in which he has reported this interview and said a few words about Savai Madharao Peshwa: “... the Peshwa has now come of age and attends to details of administration. So all including the chief administrator try to please him consistently with their self-interest. Gangadharpant and Parshharampant have left nothing unsaid in their letters to him in regard to Sadashivgad ...”.148 In a letter written on June 1, 1791 Vithalrao Valavalikar writes to the Secretary, Government of Goa: At present this Peshwa has no enemy from Hindustan to Pataam. There are no fratricidal quarrels. So he has become a proud person. The custom was that after conquering others and taking tributes from them, they should be stabilised. But there is no desire to do this. The policy is to bow before the strong and kick the weak without taking care of them. This is what is in vogue now. But the Portuguese State and its navy can destroy this. The Durbar knows well that the fort captured by the Portuguese could not be taken but makes a demand for it because its army is there in the proximity. My duty is to inform whatever happens. Yesterday, I pointed out how the fort can be given but now I do not know how it can be done. It is Bhati durbar (Brahmanical). There is no consistency in talk and no note of what is said before. I have to set my sails according to the wind. It will be friendly to the Portuguese as long as it is strong. This is the way of the Mahratta durbar.150

On June 1, 1791, a fire broke out in Shaniwarwada. Three out of the seven stories were affected and the store of grains and other furniture were burnt down. Vithalrao wrote about this to Goa at the suggestion of Bahiropanth Mehendale and requested Goa to write a letter of sympathy in this calamity.

Nana Phadnavis sent another envoy known as Prabhakarpant to negotiate the return of Sadashivgad. The Governor of Goa has written that this envoy came to Goa in September 1791 somewhat arrogantly.151 He had been to Vijayadurg and Savantvadi and had discussions with Gangadharpant and the Bhonsla before he came to Goa. The
Governor met Prabhakarpant on December 24, 1791 and appointed the Secretary to carry on talks with him. In the meanwhile another envoy, called Dhondo Krishna had also come from Parsharambhau. The arrogant letters that he wrote to the Government of Goa are in Goa Archives. In a letter dated November 23, 1791, Dhondo Krishna writes. 152 “You have taken Sadashivgad and other posts from this Saunde province. Please hand them over as well as Ponda Panchmahal for we want to rebuild Mardangad which you have demolished. Give over all the Savkars from Tippu’s territory to us. No making of any conditions will be tolerated. Please understand this well.” In another letter dated July 26, 1791 153 he said: “Please write whether you are giving up Ponda Panchmahal and the provinces of Bhonsla-Savant that you have taken. If you convey agreement in reply, well and good. Otherwise our army and guns are in readiness at Dharwar”. In a letter dated May 20, 1791.154 Dhondo Krishna wrote to the Secretary of the Government of Goa: “As ordered by the Government of Poona take away ammunition and your people and give up Sadashivgad. If you continue to trot out excuses, please take note that I shall have to execute my Government’s orders.”

The Governor of Goa succeeded in pacifying Dhondo Krishna by making efforts through Bahiropant Mahendale and nothing came out of the embassy of this envoy as regards Sadashivgad. The fact of the matter was that Goa merely wanted to mark time, because, the Governor of Goa had already learnt from Poona that the Court of Poona was not going to keep Sadashivgad in terms of the treaty with Tippu that was in the offing.155 The Portuguese had secured the mediation of Mahadaji Scindia regarding Sadashivgad who wrote to Nana Phadnavis on December 21, 1791: “The friendship between the Portuguese and the Peshwa is of long standing and the fort is on their side. Please see that the cavalry that has gone there should be instructed that no harm should be done to the fort and it should remain with them as at present.” 156 Mahadaji Scindia sent a similar letter to Ramoji Patil who was his representative at the Poona Court. 157 As the Portuguese expected the question of Sadashivgad was set aside by the Poona court. Ramji Patil Jadhav sent a letter to Mahadaji Scindia on May 14, 1792: “Your letter was delivered to Nana Phadnavis and I requested him as ordered. He replied that
a treaty with Tippu was concluded whereby Saunde taluka was returned to him and Sadashivgad is part of that Taluka. The Poona Court has nothing to do with it. The Portuguese should settle the matter with Tippu." 158 The Governor of Goa kept the fort with him for a year. Tippu demanded it back and in keeping with the policy of the Government of Portugal, the Captain of the fort was ordered to hand over its possession to Tippu on March 3, 1793. The Sadashivgad matter was settled but the Portuguese did not return Sanquelim, Bicholim and Pernem to Savantvadi till the last. The Poona Court, Mahadaji Scindia and Daulatrao Scindia all failed.

While the negotiations for taking over Sadashivgad from the Portuguese were in progress, Parsharambhau had sent an emissary to Goa to purchase lead and gunpowder. The Governor informed Bhau that there was no gunpowder on the market but he sent 35 khandis of it as a present. Nana Phadnavis did not think it proper to take it free of cost. He asked Parsharambhau an explanation of it. Bhau writes to Nana in a letter dated April 25, 1791; "The Portuguese took Sadashivgad while the Poona Court was campaigning for it. At such a time it is not proper to take gunpowder as a present without paying its cost. So I said no gunpowder from them should be taken at all. But it was badly required at Dharwar and it had to be taken." 159

In August 1792, the Poona Court asked for Portuguese help through Haripant Phadke in order to conquer Danda-Rajpuri fort of the Siddi.160 The Government of Goa did not have the approval of Portugal to extend this help. But the Governor of Goa played the game of delay, the object being that the Poona Court should not attend to the Boshlal-Portuguese dispute.161 In a letter dated March 12, 1793,162 to Portugal the Governor of Goa said: "The Peshwas extended the limits of their State far and wide but they regretted that the temple of the gods of their ancestors was still in the territory of the Siddi. They tried so many times to take Danda-Rajpuri, but they never succeeded." In 1794 also, the Mahrattas did not march on Danda-Rajpuri. Vithalrao Valavalikar, in his letter dated March 29, 1794 informed Goa that the Poona Court had postponed the Danda-Rajpuri project.

In 1808, Valavalikar died in Poona. His son Lakshminarayan was appointed envoy at the Poona Court but in 1811, the Portuguese
embassy at Poona came to an end. This envoy supplied Goa with many minute details of the Poona Court. Specially, the Portuguese letters that he wrote from Poona are of great historical importance. Nana Phadnavis used to get information from Europe and other places through the envoys of the Portuguese. Vithalrao had in one of his letters written in 1793 that Nana Phadnavis complained that he was not getting such information as before.\textsuperscript{163} The English envoy informed Nana about the French having killed their King. Nana had asked for more details about this event from the Portuguese as mentioned in this letter.

In order to get inside information of the Mahratta Court, the envoy of the Portuguese had to use different devices. Bahiro pant Mehendale, secretary for Foreign Affairs under Nana Phadnavis knew important policy matters. The Portuguese Governor wanted information about Nana’s Goa policy of next three or four months. Vithalrao informed the Governor that the Portuguese half dobras were rated very highly in the Poona court and so the Governor should present 14 such coins to the newly wed wife of Bahiro pant Mehendale and also send a congratulatory letter to him. The Governor readily acted upon the suggestion of Vithalrao. Mehendale later made a necklace of these coins from a Goan artisan. Goa often got important information through Bahiro pant.\textsuperscript{165} Besides the envoys, there were procuradors of the Portuguese at the Poona Court and Bahiro pant was one of them. After him Moropant Godbole was appointed as procurador. He was followed by Lakshman pant Chakradeo. In 1807, the post of a procurador in Poona Court was vacant.

Mahadaji Scindia died on February 12, 1794 at Vanavdi. The envoy of the Portuguese at Poona got the news on the 15th at night.\textsuperscript{166} He immediately informed about it to the Secretary of the Government of Goa.\textsuperscript{167} In his letter dated March 7, 1794 Vithalrao informed Goa that Daulatrao Scindia was appointed to succeed Mahadaji on March 6, 1794 by the Peshwa. He wished to do this in April but did it expeditiously for fear of a rising by Nizam Ali.\textsuperscript{168} Vithalrao also wrote that a farewell would be given to Daulatrao in April. In a letter dated March 29, 1794 to Goa, Vithalrao said, “The other day i.e. on March 27, Daulatrao had a discussion with the Peshwa about the tasks that Mahadaji wanted to decide with the Peshwa’s approval. On that
occasion Doulatrao requested the Peshwa to write to Goa about the return of Savantvadi Bhonsla’s Mahals in the possession of the Portuguese. On October 27, 1794 Vithalrao informed Goa that Jivbadada Kerkar, Chief Commander of the Scindia (Cabo General) was coming to Poona with 20,000 troops consisting of cavalry and infantry. His camp was then 10 miles off Poona.

In 1795, the battle of Kharda was fought. In his letter dated May 9, 1795, Vithalrao writes to Goa: “Jivba Kerkar asked the permission of the Peshwa to go on an invasion of Goa with 2,000 men to liberate the Bhonsla’s territory usurped by the Portuguese and give him only 200 horsemen of the Peshwa as aid. This he asked as a reward for the success over the Nizam in the battle of Kharda. Nana said in reply that he would decide the matter next day. Nana spoke about it to Bahiropan when as instructed by me Bahiropan told him that friendship with the Portuguese should not be disturbed and Jivbadada’s wishes should be respected by initiating negotiations in the matter and not by war.” In his letter to Goa dated June 6, 1795 Vithalrao says, “The Prime Minister of the Peshwa, Nana Phadnavis is circumspect in his work and since he knows that the Portuguese will do him no harm he wishes to maintain friendly relations with them. Bahiropan does it only in self-interest. If Nana shows openly his proclivity towards the Bhonsla it is only to please the patrons of the Savant-Bhonsla. As a matter of fact, everybody knows how difficult it is to fight with European nations.”

In his letter to the Secretary to the Government of Goa dated August 11, 1795, Vithalrao says: “As Nana was not really inclined to lose the friendship of the Portuguese for the sake of the Khem Savant, Jivbadada Kerkar lost confidence in Nana and requested Baloba Pinge to make such a treaty with the Portuguese as would be of advantage to the Khem Savant. Baloba Tatya Pagnis was also known as Balaji Anant Pinge. In the letter written on May 29, 1796, Vithalrao wrote that on Thursday the 27th, Bahiropan Mehendale came with clothes and stamps for Chimaji Madhaorao Pantapradhan whom the widow of Savai Madhaorao had adopted as son that morning. He accepted presents and clothes from other ministers and Mankaris. In the evening the Peshwa had darshan of the Parvati temple and at hight about Rs. 25,000 were distributed to poor Brahmans as dakshina. On
the same day, Daulatrao Scindia was given the jagir of four lakhs for his participation in the battles against Nizam Ali and a jagir of Rs 35,000 to the Minister of Scindia. Daulatrao also got the money he had spent. In the place of Nana, Parshurampant was appointed Dewan and Trimbakrao Parchure as Phadnavis.”

In the letter written on June 25, 1796, Vithalrao said “Baloba Pagnis was ill and so I went to see him on the 22nd last. While taking his leave, he told me that Goa should no more correspond with Nana as he had fallen in disfavour of the new Peshwa. “On July 8, 1796 Vithalrao said, ” Baloba Pinge invited me and asked me to write to the Governor of Goa that he should send his armada to that part of the coast where Nana was and prevent him from going out to the sea, but if he insisted on gonig he should be placed under arrest and made over to him. The Goa Government would be adequately compensated for this task. I told Pinge that the sea was closed at the time for any ships to go out. He said first of all Goa’s consent to this should be brought and action could be taken in September.”

The Governor of Goa explained his difficulties to Pinge in a letter written on August 6, 1796. At the same time he wrote that he was ready to act as Daulatrao Scindia directed but the expenses and damages would have to be paid by the Poona Court. In this connection a letter written by Balaji Anant Pagnis alias Pinge is available in Goa Archives. It is dated October 9, 1796. The letter says that the letters received by Vithalrao were seen by him and assurance of continued friendship was given. It was pointed out that the plan of arresting Nana was premature since he was still then up the ghats. If he went to the coastal side, Goa would be informed about it.

In the letter written on October 29, 1796, Vithalrao wrote to Goa: “In the early hours of Thursday, 27th under the orders of Daulatrao Scindia, his Chief Minister, Baloba Pinge, his colleagues and relatives Dhondoba, Jagannath Tatya Arondekar Pandoba Lad and those connected with the gunnery were arrested. Only Bajiba Modi and his son were arrested and handcuffed. As soon as Parshurampant knew this, he went to the palace and ran away with Chimnaji to Junnar. He had with him 1,500 cavalry, his two sons, a son of Bahiropant and some assistants. Government’s cavalry followed him and besieged him at Junnar. Owing to this revolution the power of the Durbar passed
into Nana's hands. Bahiropant was also trying to run away after Parshurampant. He was arrested and hand-cuffed for two days. The same happened to his brother Bachajipant. The other prisoners were Madojipant Kale, Ganpatrao Karambalikar, Ancha Abhyankar, Vithalrao Gore, Ramchandrapant Paranjpe, Shivrampant Modak, Dajiba Limaye, Ganpatrao Joag, Haripant Joag, Apajipant Joag and others. Narayanrao Kerkar, Rayaji Patel, and Kushta Namak Hugur made this palace revolution. All these are in Scindia's service. Their colleagues were Trimbakrao Parchure, Govindrao Pingle and Naropant Chakradeo. They promised to pay two crores of rupees on behalf of Nana. Of this sum, 50 lakhs were given to Scindia, Nizam's jagir of 25 lakhs was returned and Rs. 25 lakhs were given in cash to Holkar.

In the letter written on December 15, 1796, Vithalrao wrote to Goa: "On the 4th of this month, at midnight, Bajirao accepted the insignia of Peshwa sent by the Chhatrapati from Satara. They consisted of clothes, a stamp and a diminutive sword." Most of the letters sent by Vithalrao Gorakshakar from Poona are worth perusing. The author has published extracts from them elsewhere. On February 13, 1800, Nana Phadnavis died. The Governor of Goa at that time was Francisco Antonio de Veiga Cabral. In a letter he wrote to Portugal on May 8, 1800 he expressed the following opinion about Nana: "A confusao, causada presentemente pela morte do celebre Nana Fornis, acontecida em 13 de Fevereiro proximo passado em que deixou de river o Gentio de maiores talentos que se tem conhecido entre elles, capaz de discorrer com acerto sobre as materias mais arduas de huma imaginacao fecunda, e resolucao prompta, disfarsador, e sofredor dos mayores trabalhos e adversidades ...." The gist of this is that much confusion prevails at present on account of the death of Nana Fadnavis on February 13 last: He was recognised as a man of acute intellect among Hindus. His brain could fathom accurately even very difficult subjects. His imagination was powerful and he was prompt in taking decisions. No one could guage the working of his mind and he had a capacity for hard work and facing adverse situations.

On April 16, 1800 Vithalrao has written the following to Goa: "This darbar is suffering from paucity of funds. Mahrratta Sardars are at sixes and sevens. All of them have plundered these territories. They recognise the Peshwa but obey his orders only if it suits them.
The officers of this Government and the Scindia complain that they do not receive their salaries. Only three brigades of the Scindia are an exception. The envoy of the English here spends much money and makes rich presents to the Peshwa. People here generally say that the English will very soon occupy and capture all this country.

What happened subsequently is well known to all. The English not only captured Maharashtra and liquidated Peshwa rule and the Mahratta power, but conquered the whole of India and subdued all princes, making them tributaries and protectorates of the British. Goa was left alone by them, with the other Portuguese possessions of Daman and Diu. A few French possessions including Pondichery also were left alone. But when they left India in 1947 and political power passed into Indian hands India became a free and sovereign country. All the princely states were abolished as inconsistent with the Republican constitution. The French showed the wisdom of quitting like the British and making over their possessions to India. The Portuguese had to be compelled to do so with show of military power, all conciliatory methods having failed. Today Goa, Diu and Daman have been restored to India, which was their natural and inevitable destiny.
NOTES

(1) Pissurlencar, PM, VI, p. 48.
(2) Ibid.,
(3) A. F. Moniz, Historia de Damao, II, p. 95.
(4) Goa Archives: MR, 135 B, f. 549.
(5) Vice-Rei's letter dated 20-1-1764: "... Marata ainda que decadente e bastantemente poderoso."
(6) Biker, Tratados, VII, p. 296.
(8) BNL. Ms. 172. Papers concerning Bispo Halicarnco.
(9) Goa Archives: Marathi documents.
(10) Celestino Soares, documentos comprobativos, III p. 145.
(11) Ibid.,
(12) BNL. Ms. 172.
(13) Celestino Soares, Documentos Compravativos, III.
(14) Ibid., p. 151.
(15) B. P. E. Bandogeral, que dere ser publicado a som de instrumentos bellicos nas 3 Provincias de Ponda, Zambaulim e Canacona conforme o uso e costume praticado nas mesmas escrito em os Indiomas Marata, e Portuguez no mesmo papel. This declaration has 17 clauses. In the copy in the Biblioteca Publica de Evora only the Portuguese portion has been cited. Filipe Nere Xavier has published the Portuguese portion of this declaration. (Colecao de Bandos ... das Novas Conquistas, Pangim 1840, p. 1-8) Zambaulim alias Panchmahal contained five mahals of Astagrahar, Hemadbarshe, Balli, Chandravadi and Kakode. Canacona is part of Shiveshvara alias Advot. Khol is included in the precincts of Kholgad.
(16) Pissurlencar, O Enigma da Morte de Vice-Rei Conde de Alva, p. 2.
(17) Goa Archives: Marathi documents No. 2862.
(18) Goa Archives: Marathi documents.
(19) Goa Archives: Letter from Peshwa Madhaorao to Khem Savant dated December 10, 1763 (Translation into Portuguese of Marathi letters).
(20) Goa Archives: Marathi letters (copy).
(21) Goa Archives: MR 138, f. 676; RI 17, f. 53.
(23) Biker, Tratados, VIII, p. 57, The Descendanto of the Saunde prince live at Babdode in Ponda Mahal. For some time, the Portuguese kept them at Morlem in Goa island. While coming to Goa from Saunde, Sanvai Imodi Sadashiv brought with him 400 bundles of silver and a number of ornaments (Nova a curiosa relacao de him grande regulo usurpador de reynos alheos, que novamente se leventou na India, p. 12, 13 (Lisboa 17).

The Portuguese treated the Saunde prince respectfully.
(24) Khare, collection of historical writings, 391, 411.
(25) BNL, Ms. 172, 172, f. 42.
(26) Goa Governor's letter dated December 18, 1764 (Pissurlencar Antigualhas, p. 157).
(27) Goa Archives: Portuguese translation of Marathi letters No. 1106.
(28) Goa Archives: Marathi letters.
(30) Goa Archives: Portuguese translation of Marathi letters No. 1129.
(31) Peshwa Daftar: Part 37 No. 42.
(32) Goa Archives: Portuguese translations of Marathi letters No. 1134.
(33) Goa Archives: Portuguese translations of Marathi letters No. 1156.
(34) Goa Archives: Portuguese translation of Marathi letters Nos. 1249, 1251, 1252 and 1255.
(35) Goa Archives: Portuguese translations of Marathi letters No. 1310.
(36) Goa Archives: Portuguese translations of Marathi letters No. 1255.
(37) Pissurlencar, ADP. p. 395.
(38) Goa Archives: Marathi letters No. 2290.
(39) Goa Archives: Visajipant Lele's letter 27-1-1771 (MR. 147, fs).
(40) Pissurlencar, contribution a l'Etude de l'Historie de la Medecine Portuguese dans l'Inde (Arquivos da Escola Medica de Goa, 1927) ; um Frade Capucho na corte de Punem (Boletim Institute Vasco da Gama No. 24. 1934) ; Portuguese Physician of Madhaorao Peshwa (Bharata Mitra, November 1933).
(41) Pissurlencar, um Frade Capucho, p. 27.
(42) Goa Archives: MR 149A.
(43) Goa Archives: Marathi letters.
(44) Parasnis, Historical Notes (Historical collections, Part II p. 28).
(45) Parasnis, Historical Notes part II p. 19 and part IV p. 6.
(46) Pissurlencar, um Frade capucho, p. 27.
(47) Ibid.,
(48) Goa Archives: Portuguese translations of Marathi letters No. 1401.
(49) Goa Archives: MR 149, fl. 64 ; co 54, fl. co 55, fls. 26.
(51) Goa Archives: MR 161 B, fl. 557.
(52) Goa Archives: Papeis avulsos (Information given by Abdul Razak).
(54) Goa Archives: Marathi letters.
(55) Goa Archives: Papeis avulsos.
(56) Ibid.,
(57) Goa Archives: RI 18, fl. 30.
(58) Goa Archives: MR 149 B, fl. 472.
(59) Pissurlencar, PM. VI, p. 54, 55.
(60) Pissurlencar, PM, VI, p. 99 (Governor's letter dated March 29, 1776).
(61) Ibid.,
(62) Goa Archives: Portuguese translations of Marathi letters No. 2339.
(63) Pissurleunekar, P. M. VI, p. 91.
(64) Pissurleunekar, P.M. VI, p. 76.
(65) Claudio Lagrange, Instrucao de Marquez do Pombal, p. 46.
(66) Pissurleunecar, PM, VI, p. 98.
(67) Pissurleunecar, P.M. VI, p. 99-100.

(68) The author has given all important correspondence between Raghoba and the Portuguese in Portugueses e Maratas, part VI. He also read an essay on the same subject entitled Some Unknown Dealings between Raghoba and the Portuguese in the Nagpur session of the Historical Records Commission (1928) See Rajwade Marathyancha Itihasachin Sadhanem part 12, p. 127.

(69) Raghoba's letter to Goa dated 3-9-1776 (Pissurleunecar, PM VI, p. 124) Dr. Sardesai writes that Raghoba reached Daman in September in Marathi Riyasat, Uttar Vibhag p. 76 but that is not right.

(70) Pissurleunecar, PM, p. 127.
(71) Goa Archives: Livro de Damaao, No. 1fis. 72v.
(72) Pissurleunecar, PM, VI, p. 128.
(74) Sardesai, Marathi Riyasat, Uttar Vibhag 1, p. 76.
(75) Pissurleunecar, PM, VII, p. 134.
(76) Ibid, p. 130.

(77) Letter dated December 22, 1778 by Governor of Goa, Don Jose Pedro de Comara: "... Tenho determinado enteter esta practica nas melhores esperancas da sua pertencao ..." (PM VI, p. 135).

(78) The author has in his possession contemporary copy of the letter of Raghoba.

(79) Mahadaji Scindia's letters No. 54,55,58 and 63.

(80) In his letter dated 12-3-1787 the Governor of Goa writes: "Posto que das ditas sessanta e tres nil rupias ficou com grande aqele Ministerio" means that a large part Rs. 63,000 was kept by the Ministers for themselves. (Goa Archives: MR 168 D, fl. 1155).

(81) Pissurleunecar, PM VI, p. 166. Goa Archives. MR 168 D, fl. 1155 (Governor's letters dated 11-12-1783 and 12-3-1787) * Goa Archives RV 17, fls. 180.

(82) Goa Archives: Marathi letters.
(83) Portuguese lista.
(84) Portuguese, missa prayer of the Catholica.
(85) Refem—Security.
(86) Mercador, merchant.
(87) Madeira—wood.
(88) Goa Archives: Livro de Damaao No. 10, fls. 84-85.
(89) Parasnis, Treaties and Pacts, p. 40.
(90) Pissurleunecar, ADP, p. 308, 584; Sardesai, Marathi Riyasat, Uttar Vibhag 1, p. 240.

(91) Goa Archives: Portuguese translations of Marathi letters 1623, 1626.
(92) Goa Archives: MR 161 C, fts. 818, RV 15, fl. 68.
(93) Goa Archives: Marathi letters No. 2711.
(94) BNL. Ms. 4401 F. G.
(95) BNL. Ms. 4401 F. G. “No. 8. Sobre a conservacao do rey Sunda nos
dominios Portugueses.
(96) In the letter dated February 21, 1782 by Governor Gillerme de Sousa it
is said: “as tropas fiquem guarnecendo as ditas provincias (Bicholim,
Sanquelim e Manerim) . . . tomando quaisquer pretextoes . . . permitindo usar
com o Bounsulo da simulacao . . . ”
(97) Goa Archives: Portuguese translations of Marathi letters No. 1662
(1-8-1781).
Edition). The Ranes of Satari have at least 22 times rebelled against the
Portuguese as recorded in the history of Goa. Of them Dipaji Rane (January
26, 1852 to June 2, 1855) and Dadaji Rane (September 14, 1895 to September
9, 1896) are famous in Goa.
The author has published the case of Dipaji Rane as presented to the
Government of Goa in Bharatamitra Vol. 9, No. 5, September 1936. The
object of the rebellion is obvious from it.
Even before the advent of the Portuguese, there were frequent risings in
Satari. In a Portuguese report published in 1548 it is said, “there is a Thanedari
in Satari in which there are Kunbi Shetkaris living amongst the hills who are
by nature militant and rebellions because the geographical situation of Satari
is conducive to this attitude. These people are always inclined to rebel (Livro
quetrata das consas da India e do Japao, p. 78).
(100) Goa Archives: MR 163 A, fl. 212.
(101) Letter by Governor Frederico Gillerme de Souza dated February 21,
1782 (Biker, Tratados VIII, p. 160).
(102) Tratados VIII, p. 169).
(103) Goa Archives: MR 163 A. fl. 212.
(104) Nova e curiosa Relacao das batalhas que os Portugueses deram na
India, e das grandes victorias que alcancar contra o Bonsule. Lisboa, 1785, p. 9.
(105) Goa Archives: Portuguese translations of Marathi letters (Shivram
Jivaji’s letter dated 6-11-1782 to Governor of Goa No. 1710) and (Khem
Savant’s letter to Secretary to Goa Government 15-6-1787 No. 1769).
(106) Nova e curiosa Relacao das batalhas . . . 1785.
(107) Goa Archives: MR 163 A, fts. 212 (Letter of Governor of Goa dated
10-2-1783); Nova e curiosa relacao da batalhas . . . 1785).
(108) Goa Archives: MR 164 F. fl. (letter of Governor of Goa dated 16-3-
1785).
(109) Goa Archives: Ibid.,
(110) Goa Archives: Ibid.,
(111) Epanaphora, V, p. 47.
(112) Goa Archives: MR 164 F., fl. 1480.
(113) Pingulkar, History of Savantvadi State, p. 83, Raje Khem Savant wrote to the Governor of Goa on May 16, 1785 that the Emperor of Delhi had sent him clothes of honours and marches and he received them with ceremony on Rajah 1 ie. May 11, but in the Portuguese translation of this letter the date has been given as May 12 (Vagh Daftar, Pissurlenar Collection).


(115) AHV: Livro de pazes.

(116) Goa Archives: Vithal Valavalikar’s letter to Secretary Government of Goa dated January 5, 1794.

(117) Goa Archives: Vithal Valavalikar’s letter to Secretary Government of Goa dated 27-7-1795.

(118) Pissurlenar, ADP, p. 598.


(120) Ibid, p. 325.

(121) Ibid., p. 322, Paranis, Maratha Envoy in foreign Durbars p. 43.

(122) Ibid., p. 44.

(123) Ibid., p. 326.

(124) Celestino Soares, Bosquejo das possessoes portugueses no oriente, 1851 p. 141.


(126) Celestino Soares, Bosquejo .... p. 141, 142.

(127) Pissurlenar, Antigualhas, p. 304, 314.

(128) Ibid., p. 314.

(129) Ibid., p. 304, 314.


(131) Cunha Rivara, A Conjuracao dos Pintos; Mohibbul Hassan Khan, History of Tipu Sultan, p. 124-128.


(133) C. Rivara, A Conjuracao ........ , p. 105.

(134) On May 24, 1788, Honourable Robert Salpole wrote as follows to Marquis of Carmarthen from Lisbon: “Upon my inquiry in regard to the truth of a report which has been current here upon an apprehension of an intended insurrection on Goa in favour of Tippu Saheb, monseur de Mello stated to me, that two turbulent friars who had been sent away from hence had been taken up by order of the Governor of Goa for ambitions demands, they would invite Tippu Saib to attack the place which language had been confirmed by an intercepted letter to the same purpose. A judicial inquiry had been instituted, in order to discover the accomplices,
or other measures which may have been adopted: this was all that for the present had been communicated by the Governor of Goa to this court and monsieur de Mello supposes that it will turn out to be nothing more than the intemperate language of the two friars abovementioned.” (India office Records, Home Miscellaneous services).

(135) Pissurlencar, ADP, p. 306.
(136) Pissurlencar, Antigualhas, p. 332.
(137) Pissurlencar, ADP, p. 305, Biker, Tratados VIII, p. 236.
(138) About this clause, there is a reference in Bahlropant Mahendiale’s letter dated March 25, 1786 as follows: There is money to be received from merchants in Goa and the Government of Goa was informed about it, but no reply was received. (Parasnis, Mahratta envoys in foreign darbars, p. 48).
(139) Biker, Tratados, Pissurlencar, ADP, p. 314.
(140) Ibid., p. 307-310; Biker, Tratados VIII.
(141) Biker, Tratados IX, p. 125.
(142) Biker, Tratados IX, p. 268.
(143) Biker, Tratados IX, p. 7.
(144) Ibid., p. 126.
(145) Ibid., p. 126.
(146) Ibid., p. 129.
(147) Pissurlencar, ADP, p. 145.
(148) Goa Archives: Marathi letters MR. 172.
(149) Goa Archives: Marathi letters.
(150) Goa Archives: Marathi letters.
(151) Pissurlencar: ADP, p. 434.
(152) Goa Archives: Marathi letters, 2837.
(153) Goa Archives: Marathi letters 2836.
(154) Goa Archives: Marathi letters 2839.
(156) Goa Archives: Marathi letters No. 122; Pissurlencar, ADP p. 165.
(157) Goa Archives: Portuguese Translation of Marathi letters No. 1922.
(158) Goa Archives: Marathi letters No. 2764. Translation No. 1930.
(161) Pissurlencar, ADP, p. 594.
(163) Pissurlencar: ADP, p. 593.
(164) Ibid., p. 595.
(165) Ibid., p. 431.
(166) Gorki is a corruption of Gorakha. Sardesai has called him Gholak which is wrong (Marathi Riyasat, Uttar Vibagh 2, p. 386).
(167) Pissurlencar, ADP, p. 597.
(168) Ibid.,
(169) Ibid., p. 579-620.
(171) Pissurlencar, ADP, p. 618.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMING UP

The history of the Portuguese began in Goa and near Bassein, about a hundred years before Shivaji the Great was born. They had already established their hegemony in the Indian Ocean. Before the Portuguese power found firm roots in Goa, their principal seat was at Cochin in Kerala. Goa was honoured with that position from 1521 onwards.

Most people in Tiswadi, Salcette and Bardez had been converted to Roman Catholicism before the rise of Shivaji the Great. The Portuguese had destroyed all Hindu temples without an exception. On their ruins they erected magnificent churches. They built up the townships in Goa, Daman, Chaul and Bassein in the western style and had their engineers to construct big fortresses in Gujarat and Konkan. The hospital (ospital) that they erected in Goa was reputed to be the best in the whole world in the sixteenth and the seventeenth century.

The Portuguese won victories over the Adilshahi, Nizamshahi and Gujarati Sultans several times. Since the voyage of Vasco da Gama, numerous Portuguese ships landed on Indian shores. It is on record that during the first hundred years of the event, about 800 ships reached India. It is under the influence of the Portuguese maritime power that the Portuguese word armada found a habitation and a name in Marathi as armar.

The Portuguese founded factories to produce gunpowder, guns and cannons as well as docks to construct naval ships at Goa and Bassein. The gun-powder factories were called ‘casas de polvora’. Though the principal artisans in these factories were naturally Portuguese, quite often Goan Hindus were employed there to do a number of jobs. In 1665, one Krishnashet, a Goan Hindu, was the chief of manufacturing cannons who was designated ‘Mestre da fundicao da artilharia’.

There were excellent artisans in Goa in the first half of the sixteenth and seventeenth the Portuguese employed for their work. In 1513, Albuquerque had sent a Hindu artisan to Portugal who made very satisfactory guns. In 1518, a Goan goldsmith had also gone to Portugal. The brilliant tradition of Goan goldsmiths as skilled workmen continued down to the eighteenth century. Even in the Goan mint, the Chief artisans used to be Hindus. It is on record that some
beautifully made bells as well as the wooden and ivory images in the churches were turned out by Hindu craftsmen. Even the reputed painters of the sixteenth century were Hindus. Vice-roy Don Juan de Castro’s portrait drawn by a Hindu artist in 1547 was hung in the Palace da Idalco of Panaji till very recently.

When Albuquerque captured Goa, Yusuf Adil Khan had already started building naval ships there. The Portuguese found in the dock 40 big and 26 small ships. They also found 40 cannons, 55 guns and a good deal of gun-powder. Albuquerque greatly improved this plant. The Portuguese designated it Ribeira Grande or Ribeira da nauis and subsequently Arsenal de Marinha. Between 1567 and 1580, a number of ships were built in this Goa dock. Before this, the Portuguese used to build their naval ships at Cochin, because they used to secure suitable wood and skilled artisans there at comparatively less cost. A number of ships belonging to the Portuguese were built at Daman and Bassein after 1650. They found serviceable for long were. Santo Antonio da Tana, the well-known man-of-war having nine cannons was built in the Thana Creek near Bassein in 1681. Shawji the Great employed a number of artisan trained under Portuguese masters to build his own ships.

In about 1774, the chief mestre of the Portuguese in charge of constructing ships at Daman was a Hindu, Kalyan by name. He was designated ‘Construtor regio’. The Portuguese have showered encomiums on him. After Kalyan, one Sadashiv Keshav occupied the same position. He was paid a salary of 1,200 pardao or Rs. 600 per year. It has already been mentioned that Shivaji the Great made the beginning of the Mahratta navy with Portuguese help and cooperation.

There were some Portuguese employees in the service of the navy of Kanhoji Angria. The Viceroy of Goa wrote in his letter dated January 12, 1718 that some Portuguese absconded and accepted service in a neighbouring state. In a letter dated 13 December 1721, the Viceroy wrote that Portuguese soldiers deserted their own navy and took up jobs with the Angria and other princes.

Kanhoji Angria has mentioned a Portuguese sardar having been in his employ in a letter dated 27 April 1718, to the Portuguese Governor Bon. One Dom Lourenco, a sailor-soldier, is recorded to have been
killed in a skirmish between the Portuguese and the Angria in the Goa Archives. He was in the employ of Kanhoji Angria.\textsuperscript{16} Captain Abraham Anselm has mentioned that a Portuguese gunner was in the employ of Sambhaji Angria’s navy. Mercaise da Tavor, a Viceroy of Goa, has stated in a letter dated 1 January 1751 that a Portuguese artillery man was employed by the Angria.\textsuperscript{18} His name is stated as Louis and he was formerly a ‘soldado’ in the Corpo de Artilharia. He deserted his post and sought shelter, with the Angria and revealed some secrets about the new system of cannons manufactured by the Portuguese, thinking that the Angria had similar cannons made as stated in this letter of Marcais de Tavor. In 1750, the Angria had a cannon of this type.

Viceroy Marcais de Tavor has recorded that Marcais de Alorna told him about this on the same day (27-9-1750) on which he reached Goa. The Portuguese artillery man, Louis, probably took up service with Tulaji Angria after the death of Sambhaji Angria. About 1775 the captain of the Portuguese Armada, (Capitãl de Mar e Guerra da Armada ligoira) was a Maratha sardar, Raghoo Savant Desai. He had under his command ten small ships fitted up with nine cannons each. He took up employ under the Portuguese at the time of the invasion of Mardangad by Viceroy Conde de Vega. Before Raghoo Savant Desai, Ismail Khan, a brave Muslim, commanded the Portuguese Armada.

Several Portuguese served in the armies of the Adilshahi, Nizamshahi, Kutubshahi and Moghul Kings. Burhan Nizamshah had in his service one Sanxo Perris as an artillery man (bombardeiro), holdin high office. He used to be called Firangikhan.\textsuperscript{19} The brothers, Diago de Melo and Francisco de Melo, two Portuguese from Bassein, were in the employ of Aurangzeb.\textsuperscript{20} Viceroy Conde de Vidigeiro has recorded in his letter dated 9 February, 1627, that he had got murdered a Portuguese man who was working at Bijapur for manufacturing big guns for Adilshah.\textsuperscript{21}

Even in the army of Shivaji the Great, there were some Portuguese and on this account Mirza Rajah Jaisingh had protested to the Viceroy, Antonio de Melo Castro.\textsuperscript{22} Also in the army of the Peshwas, since the days of Balaji Bajirao alias NanaSaheb, there were many Portuguese and Goan Christians.\textsuperscript{23} During 1777 and 1798, a Portuguese sardar, born in Goa and named Don Manuel de Noronha made a great name
under the Peshwas. He was called Mussa Naran in Marathi. (Monsieur Noronha). The modi script of Marathi led scholars like Rajwade, Parasnis and Sen to decipher his name wrongly.25

A battalion under Don Manuel de Noronha was in the service of the Peshwas and his two sons, Don Yenriki de Noronha and Francisco Saraivo de Melo e Sampayo were sardars.26 In the battle of Talegaon (January 1779) Don Manuel de Noronha was wounded.27

Like the battalion under Noronha, there were two battalions in the artillery of the Peshwa in 1788, under the command of Manuel Taixeir and Jose de Silva e Melo. Both these Portuguese were Goa-born.28 In 1795, the Poona Durbar made a demand on Goa to send some trained artillers. Accordingly in the month of March of that year Possidonio Jose de Matus e Sequeira as Captain and three under him were sent to Poona.29

Vithal Valavalikar who was the consul of the Portuguese at the Poona Durbar since 3 August 1795, has mentioned in a letter this Sequeira who is reported to have earned encomiums for an artillery demonstration in the presence of the Peshwa.30 This captain was paid 150 ashrafis or Rs. 75 per month and 70 ashrafis or Rs. 35 was paid to those under him order of the Peshwas as stated by Valavalikar. Nana Phadnis had kept this captain Sequeira under Raghupant.31

Among the Goan Christian Sardars who were employed in the Peshwa’s army, it is necessary to mention prominently Jose Antonio Pinto and Joaquim Luis Antonio Vaz. From Valavalikar’s frequent mention of them in his letters, it would appear that they were particularly in the Peshwa’s favour.32

These are the two men whom Rajwade calls Musa Peet and Musa Vas. Pinto was educated at Candolim (Goa) and Rome. Vaz was born at Diwadi and educated in Lisbon. Both of them went to Poona via Bombay after their return from Europe in about 1789 and took employ under the Peshwas. They were well made as soldiers. Pinto spoke besides his native Konkni, French, Italian, Marathi and Hindustani.34

In a Portuguese letter dated March 8, 1796, Vithalrao Valavalikar writes: “Bajirao and Chimnaji, two sons of Raghobha have camped on the banks of the river Ladki on the 4th of the current month. On
the 5th, Friday, Nana called upon them and did not leave till Saturday morning. In the evening Nana came again and with the permission of the Peshwa invited members of the ministry and all sardars to pay their homage to the Peshwa. Among the Topikars (Europeans) who called, were Don Manuel de Noronha, Joaquim Antonio Vaz and Jose Antonio Pinto. 

In 1788, there were about 100 Portuguese and over 200 Goan Catholic Christian soldiers in the army of the Peshwa. Peshwa Madhaorao granted a sanad for the construction of a church in Nana Peth, because they had no place of prayer. Later in 1792, a church was built there.

The consuls and ambassadors that the Portuguese stationed at the Peshwa's durbar were usually Hindu. Occasionally, Portuguese Padres or officials holding high positions were sent but they were accompanied by Hindu assistants, because the Portuguese did not know the Mahratta durbar customs and manners nor did they know the Marathi language.

Written instructions were given for their guidance to these state representatives and they were fairly detailed. Among those who were at the durbar of Shivaji the Great, was the Jesuit padre Gonsalo Martins (1667), Ramoji Shenvi Kothari (1667), Pedro Roise (1673) and Raghunath Ramoji Shenvi Kothari (1678). The durbar of Sambhaji was attended by Manuel Saraev de Albuquerque (1684) and Augustine Padre Frei Antonio de Sant Joseph (1684). Ramkrishna Naik Barve accompanied these padres.

Among the vakils sent at the Court of the Peshwa by the Portuguese were Santu Shenvi Dangi (1740), Tomas Jose Codmore (1759), Jack Philippe de Landrasey (1759), Vithalrao Valavlikar (1771) and (1791 to 1808), Narayanrao Shenvi Dhume (1774 to 1790) and others.

Similarly, Shivaji the Great sent Sakopant in 1667, Vithal Pandit in 1669, Naro Gopinath Pandit in 1670, Pitambar Shenvi Gulgule in 1678, Jivaji Shenvi in 1678 and Ganesh Shet in 1679, to the Goa Court.

Sambhaji despatched Ramoji Naik in 1684, Sidoji Farjand and Rangaji Lakshmidhar in 1684 to Goa.
The Peshwas sent Yesaji Rangaji in 1735, Balaji Mahadeo in 1737, Ragho Ganesh in 1756, Mahadaji Keshav 1758, Vamanji Mahadeo 1767, Pandurangpant in 1768, Govindrao Lakshman in 1784, Gopal Ramchandra in 1786 and Prabakar Mukund in 1791 as vakils at the Portuguese court in Goa.

Rangaji Lakashmidhar among these knew Portuguese but most of the Mahratta State representatives did not know the Portuguese manners and way of life. So they had to depend on some respectable Hindu interpreters from Goa who knew both Portuguese and Marathi. Usually they were Saraswat Brahmins who were loyal to the State whose citizens they were. Some of the interpreters of the rules of Goa were as follows: Anju Naik (1610 to 1626), Kagu Shenvi (1620), Krishna Shenvi Bhende (1667 to 1714), Bahugoon Kamat Vagh (1719 to 1751), Anant Kamat Vagh (1752 to 1793), Sakharam Narayan Vagh (1807 to 1844) and others.\(^\text{40}\)

There used to be an appropriate ceremony according to a well-defined procedure at the Portuguese Viceroy’s court for the reception of representatives of foreign states. Some of them held a high position, others a lesser position. After the battle with Chhatrapati Sambhaji, the Goa Durbar decided to accord the same honour to the Mahratta Vakil as was given to the Vakil of the King of Karnatak.\(^\text{41}\) The Portuguese had codified procedures for such occasions. Descriptions of some such ceremonies are available in Portuguese records.\(^\text{42}\)

Portuguese State representatives were also respectfully treated at the Mahratta court. A detailed account of the reception accorded to the Portuguese representatives at Kelshi after Vyankatrao Ghorpade’s invasion of Goa and the treaty talks that followed is to be found in a Portuguese report of Bahuguna Kamat Vagh while in the Mahratta account of that event is briefly given a letter by Dadajirao Bhave Nargundkar in the Peshwa Daftar as follows: “There is a village called Keloshi on the bank of a small river, where the Portuguese arrived. Dhondiba, Govindpant and Mahadaji Vithal brought them to the camp.”

The Portuguese Government used to find suitable accommodation for the vakils of the Mahratta Durbar after arrival in Goa and allot a fixed sum for their maintenance. The Goa daftar records that in 1794 (G.C.P.) Pub-I H 4222—18 (1212—8-33)
one Prabhakarpant was given 10,000 ashrafis.\textsuperscript{44} The Portuguese vakils were similarly entertained at the Mahratta Durbar. There was an agreement to pay Rs. 500 per month to Narayan Vithal Shenvi Dhume, the Portuguese vakil at Poona.\textsuperscript{45} In 1791, Vithalrao Goraksha Valavalikar was appointed as Portuguese ambassador at Poona. In a letter written on January 20, 1791 by Vithalrao to the Secretary to the Government of Goa, there is the following information.\textsuperscript{46} “I reached Poona on January 13. Two days more than expected were required for the journey. I informed Bahiropant Mehendale about my arrival. He received me well and made arrangements for my residence and that of my retinue. On the 15th we met each other at leisure. I presented papers and clothes which he received respectfully. On the 17th he arranged an interview with Nana Phadnavis, whom despatches and presents were handed over. He promised to arrange for a meeting with the Peshwa and I left his presence.”

The Portuguese had a fixed methodical procedure in regard to such matters. Whether the Mahrattas had done so is not known at least to the author.\textsuperscript{46}

In order to maintain friendly relations with the Mahrattas, the Portuguese Government often allowed them to purchase ammunition, guns and cannons from Goa. During the reign of Shivaji the Great or Sambhaji, such deals do not seem to have taken place. There is no mention of such matters in the treaty entered into with Shivaji the Great by the Portuguese in 1667 nor in the one in 1670. There is no such mention even in the treaty with Sambhaji in 1684. But such mention is found in the treaties with Chhatrapati Sambhaji in 1716 and with Bajirao in 1722\textsuperscript{47} as also in a treaty of 1731-32.\textsuperscript{48}

The Portuguese used to import expert mestries and machinery from Portugal in order to produce such ammunition as was produced in Portugal. That necessary improvements were made in the ammunition factory in Goa in 1748 is recorded in the rare Portuguese book \textit{Epanaphora Indica}.\textsuperscript{49} Ammunition of several varieties was produced in the Goa factories and stocked in the arsenal.

The Portuguese Government at Goa handed over 30 boxes of such ammunition to Anandrao Dhulap from the Goa arsenal at the request of Madhavrao Scindia on 12 December 1793.\textsuperscript{50} A letter from Vithalrao
Valavalikar shows that Nana Phadnavis had asked for permission of the Goa Government to purchase 200 khandis of ammunition in May 1794. Next year the Goa Government sent 20 khandis of ammunition to the Peshwa at the Poona Durbar’s request.

Bahiropant Mehendale writes to the Secretary to the Government of Goa in this behalf in a letter dated 4 January, 1795 as follows. “The friendship between the Peshwas and the Portuguese is there and should increase. Prabhakarpant will speak in detail. We need men in the artillery and 24 khandis of ammunition which may be made over to him. The price of the same would be sent afterwards.”

In 1758, Maharani Tarabai of Kolhapur demanded of the Goa Government 2,000 guns for Nawab Samsher Jung Bahadur. In 1798, the Peshwa asked from Goa one thousand guns and four cannons as is on record. Several times ammunition, guns and cannons were sent even as presents to the Peshwa by the Portuguese.

In a letter dated October 20, 1734 written by the Portuguese Viceroy, it is stated that 5 cannons, five Tuvad sword-blades and a bottle of Brazilian snuff were sent to Bajirao I as presents. It is clear from a Portuguese manuscript, Breve tratado ou Epílogo dos Vice-Reis in the National Library, Paris that such sword-blades were very costly in India. They were called Jamdads.

The Portuguese Power was really gradually on the decline since the days of Shivaji the Great. Their economy became shaky after Bassein was captured by Chimaji Appa. But its pomp was maintained. The biographer of Marcaizes de Tavora has stated that the income from Goa was not enough to balance even expenditure when his rule began in 1751. But what is surprising is that the descriptions of State ceremonies placed on record by Portuguese writes of those days reminded one of the glorious days of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century.

One such festive occasion was celebrated in December 1751 in memory of the accession to the throne by the Portuguese King Don Jose I. A contemporary account of it is available. This celebration went on for a whole week. The Viceroy was present in person in a boat in the Mandavi at night to watch the illuminations on both its banks on the city of Goa. Hindus also participated in this jubilation in
a competitive spirit at considerable expenses. On this occasion a stage was improvised in the Palace at Panaji and two plays were staged on the 5th and 7th December. On the first day *La Tragedie de Porus* by Monsieur Corneille, a French play, was produced. The main theme of this play is the victory won by Alexander over Porus. The Indian costumes of Porus and his retinue were remarkable. But the poetic French language of the play went over the heads of the audience. So next day the Portuguese playlet *Adolonymo em Sydonia* was presented.

The biographer of the Viceroy has not stated what his possible object was in staging a play around Alexander’s victory over Porus. But the Portuguese were certainly smarting under their defeat at Bassein and they were unable to take revenge for it. Who can say that the staging of this play was not an expression of the dormant and hidden feelings of the Viceroy?

In the latter half of the eighteenth century, the Portuguese power in Goa had just so much army as to enable it to protect itself. But its navy was still quite noteworthy till 1,800. The Portuguese archives are replete with descriptions of their many victories over the Mahratta navy.

The Peshwa had often requisitioned the aid of the Portuguese armada. On 14 January 1740 Bajirao I opened negotiations with the Portuguese for a treaty through Captain Inchbird. One of the items of the treaty stipulated that whenever the Peshwa had a conflict with the Angria, the British and the Portuguese should give him their naval help. In the treaty concluded on September 18, 1740 also it was agreed that the Portuguese should go to the help of the Peshwa when he attacked the Angria.

Savantvadikar Bhonslas and Hiroji Naik indulged in acts of piracy near Goa. The Portuguese destroyed their ships. The Portuguese possessions, Daman and Diu, were often molested by Umabai Dabhade and Sangan. So in 1750, the Portuguese assaulted the fort of Kanja near Navabandel and destroyed all the naval ships under its shelter. Seven *gulivats* and three *palas* of Dabhade’s navy attacked a Portuguese pataxo at the end of 1751 but they did not succeed against the bombardment of the Portuguese. Apaji Gopal, the Mahratta naval Chief died in this skirmish. The Portuguese records say that about 500
Mahrattas were killed. The wife of Apaji performed sati i.e. burnt herself on the pyre of her husband’s dead body.  

After the destruction of Tulaji Angria’s armada, the Portuguese were not prepared to find out what fighting ships there were with the Mahrattas as a navy or armada. (such contempt they had developed for it.) The author came across a few pages of a hand written Portuguese report written in 1773 which is preserved in the Archivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisbon. It is said in it that the navies of the Angria and Bhonsla were no more. The English had destroyed Angrias’ navy and the Portuguese that of the Bhonsala. Now only the Mahratta (Peshwa) navy remains, in which there were about a dozen pals and a number of machvas (manchuas). This was described so pompously as the Mahratta navy. It never went out in the sea for cruising and such of it as did was only for the purpose of looting on behalf of the contractors. These contractors took Government permits at fixed rates and sent out some ships to loot foreign ones. These contractors had to return the ships to the Government in tact.

The Portuguese Prime Minister, Marcaize de Pombal, wrote to the Goa Government in 1774 giving some directions. He said, the trade and navigation on the sea is impeded after the Mahrattas (Peshwas) had captured the fortress of Gheria, (Vijaydurg) only 52 miles from Goa because of the imbecility of Goa Government. And this only when the Mahratta navy consisted of only three pals of three sails equipped with 24 cannons and seven pals equipped with four to six cannons. “After giving this information Marcalze de Pombal says, “The Mahratta navy does not know how to use the mariner’s compass and so it cannot stray very far from the coast. It has its eyes always fixed on land. So poor it is. We should have no difficulty whatsoever in completely smashing it.”

The Goa Government provided the Mahratta sardars and Peshwas with Portuguese or Goan Christian physicians on numerous occasions. In 1684 May, when Kavi Kalasha was ill, the Goa Government had sent him Portuguese medicines. What is remarkable is that these Portuguese physicians took the help of Hindu Vaidyas. In 1724, Bajirao I had requested the Government of Goa to send a doctor who could cure a bullet wound. In 1747, the Viceroy of Goa had sent a Goan Christian physician Cosme Pinto of Diwadi to Sadashirao, the Peshwa’s
cousin. In a letter dated 18 March 1749 Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur had requested that a Portuguese doctor should be sent to him. 

Dr. Cosme Pinto was called by Nanasaheb Peshwa in 1757 to Poona through the Viceroy of Goa. In a letter dated 26, April, 1758 he wrote to the Viceroy of Goa to say that the said physician was being sent back to Goa after he had rendered excellent service and that his services should be further appreciated. Nanasaheb Peshwa seemed to have formed a very good opinion about Portuguese doctors. He had made a demand for such a doctor after Sardar Antoji Yadav had been administered poison by somebody. In a letter dated 26 April 1747 addressed to the Viceroy of Goa, he spoke highly of the ability of Portuguese doctors and hoped that they knew of antidotes against poison.

Dr. Cosme Pinto mentioned above was recommended by Nanasaheb and Bhausaheb to Nawab Mohamed Ijjat Khan of Malwa who came to Mashel near Goa in 1758 to benefit by his treatment. The Nawab has written to the Governor of Goa in a letter dated October 16, 1738 that Dr. Cosme Pinto had served Trimbakrao Pethe (Peshwa's maternal uncle) and was called by the Peshwa to Poona of whom Nanasaheb and Bhausaheb spoke highly and he was serving the Nawab at the time of writing this letter. Sardar Trimbakrao Pethe had camped at Ponda in December 1756 and on request from him, the Goa Government asked Pinto to treat him. In a letter of the same year, Pinto is mentioned as treating Raghunathrao, the Peshwa's uncle. Like Trimbakrao Pethe, Sardar Gangadharrao Raste also was camping at Sanquelim in February 1767 for medical treatment. He wrote in a complimentary way to the Governor of Goa. In 1763, Raghunathrao alias Dadasaheb Peshwa had written to the Viceroy Conde de Yego to send him a Portuguese physician.

Maharani Jijabai of Kolhapur requested for the services of a Portuguese physician in 1764 and one was accordingly sent. In January 1781. Akubai Ghatge, daughter of Khem Savant III used to be treated by Don Catarin Manuel de Menezes, a lady physician. On December 21, 1818, a Portuguese physician, Francisco de Paul Fernandes was sent to Savantvadi by the Portuguese Viceroy at the request of Durgabai Bhonsale.
In the eighteenth century, members of high families in Maharashtra used to be treated by Portuguese and Goan Christian doctors in this way. Even widows from these high families were among them, Sakhubai Shinde, mother-in-law of Khem Savant III used to be treated by Caitano Goraj of Narvem in October 1772. Similady Radhabai, widow of Peshwa Nanasaheb used to take the medicine prescribed by Dr. Manuel Francisco Gonsalves in 1771.

On the recommendation of Nana Phadnavis, the Goa Government had sent Dr. Jose Manuel Antonio to Sardar Parshurampant Patwardhan at Miraj in 1789. In 1815, Trimbakrao Raghunath had requested the Government of Goa to send Dr. Herculano de Noronha to him. In the Purandar Daftar one who has been mentioned as Saloo Phirangi is probably Salvador, a physician.

In a letter dated 29 May 1803, Anandrao Abaji Vishalgadkar wrote that Salvador, a Portuguese physician was with him whom he had sent to Goa to bring medicines. In 1780 a physician called Salvador Baptista Gonsalves da Piedade was in the employ of the Government of Goa. He probably was retained in the service of the Patwardhans of Miraj.

Like Portuguese physicians, mangoes from Goa were also sent to Poona as presents to the Peshwas and their sardars. In a letter sent from Poona, Vithalrao Valavalikar pointed out that Goan mangoes were very highly prized in the Poona court and therefore no merchants should be allowed to export them to Maharashtra. If that was done, the presents of mangoes to the Durbaris would be still more appreciated. No private traders could export mangoes from Goa without special permission.

The Portuguese had cultivated a number of quality varieties of mangoes in Goa and given them Portuguese names. Alfonso and Nicolav Alfonso are well known. Many others, besides, called Bisp, Carel, Colaco, Costa, Daurado, Fernandine, Bencurade, Malecurade, Malgesta, Monserate, Papale, Peris, Salgado, Secreti, Temud, Xavier, Ilariyo etc. But presents sent to princes and potentates were necessarily Alfonso. Some times even Fernandine mangoes were also sent.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Alfonso mangoes reached as far as Delhi. The Portuguese and the Bhonsalas of Savantvadi sent these presents to the Nababs of Delhi.
The Portuguese imported and planted a number of fruit plants from Brazil and Portugal to Goa. In the reign of the Viceroy Constantine de Braganza (1558-1578) was brought the pineapple in Goa.\textsuperscript{93} Even the cashewnut plants were brought from Brazil during 1563 to 1578, first to Cochin and thence in Goa.\textsuperscript{94} Pineapples or cashew packets were sent as presents to several Hindu vakils but no other fruit than mango was sent to the Poona court or the Satara Court. Mangoes were sent to Poona at the end of April or beginning of May and the Portuguese vakils there presented them to the Peshwa and other dignitaries.\textsuperscript{95} In 1747, one thousand and five hundred fruit were sent to Satara by the Viceroy of Goa which cost 22 ashrasis or eleven rupees as recorded.\textsuperscript{96}

Tea from Macao, Chinese dolls, a number of curios from Portugal, fragrant articles like ambar, knives and sword blades, pistols, binoculars, guns, cannons, eye-glasses, clocks and watches, Brazilian snuff and balsam were sent to Poona as presents from Goa. From 1766, tobacco began to be imported from Brazil and that was also added to the list of presentable articles.\textsuperscript{97} In 1760, Colonel Landrasye was the Portuguese ambassador at the Poona Court. Among the presents that he brought to Poona for the Peshwa was a barrel of Vinho anizado and eight bottles of aguardente anizada, a scented brandy.

In 1771, Vithalrao Valavalikar was sent to the Poona Court as Vakil, when Peshwa Madhaorao was ruling. He took, with him some Chinese dolls, a box which looked like a book some curios and an Arabian horse as presents to the Peshwa. In his letter dated 17 May 1771, sent to the Governor of Goa, Vithalrao writes as follows in substance: That he was allowed an audience with the Peshwa in his garden accompanied by Ramjibava Chitnavis and Padre Frei Landrasye de Madre de Deus.\textsuperscript{100} After salutation, all the presents were shown. The horse was taken in and examined. He was found to be 17 years old but was not pronounced as excellent and apparently was not considered as genuine Arabian. The books and box were closely examined. The vakil was then dismissed and the Peshwa went in. Nana Phadnavis was much pleased with the Chinese doll and asked Liandro if many more of the kind were procurable. A little later they may be available. It appeared that all were disposed in a friendly way towards the Portuguese.
As soon as the Governor received Valavalikar's letter he sent half a dozen Chinese dolls to Poona. A number of Curios from all parts of the world, mainly from China and Portugal arrived in Mormugao Port in those days for sale.

After the invasion of Goa by Vyankatrao Ghorpade (brother-in-law of Bajirao I and Chimnaji) simultaneously with the attack on Bassein by Chimnaji Appa in 1739, Chhatrapati Shahu was of the opinion that Goa should remain with the Portuguese. His reason was that a number of curios and commodities came from abroad to Goa by sea. In a letter written to the Secretary of the Government of Goa in June 1741, Shivajipant Devji says, in substance, that within 13 days of leaving Goa he reached Satara and acquainted the minister of Shahu with news from Goa. The Chhhatrapati was very well disposed towards the Portuguese and said that the port of Goa was very good and it should not be allowed to deteriorate. It should remain with the Portuguese, because they managed to import a number of articles from abroad through the port.

Among the articles that were sent as presents to the Portuguese at Goa were shawls and chaddars, headwears of an ornamental character, cloth with gold and silver borders etc. Madhaorao Peshwa once sent a few dancing and singing birds. In 1752, Maharani Tarabai of Kolhapur presented to the Viceroy Marceise de Tovar's enlightened wife four domesticated deer as recorded in a contemporary Portuguese publication. Animals presented in this way were often exported to Portugal. It is on record that an Indian rhenoceros was sent to the Portuguese King by the then Viceroy of Portuguese India in 1515. A little before this he had also shipped an elephant to Lisbon.

The impact of Mahratta-Portuguese relations is noticeable on the correspondence of the Mahratta rulers. The author has published a number of treaties in Marathi from the Goa archives in a Goan Marathi monthly periodical, Bharatamitra which are fairly rich in Portuguese vocabulary. In the several volumes of the Peshwa Daftar, edited by G. S. Sardesai, there are a number of such words to be met with. They are among others: Viceroy, Geral, Captitao, Capitao mor, padre, feitoria, reino, dons, soldados, senhor, real santomes, igrejas, batarias, libra, holandez, frances, pedreiro etc. In the Marathi
documents of Shivaji's days Cadeira meaning chair is to be found. In
the historical papers collected by Parasnis 'bacamar', a Portuguese
word occurs. Similarly 'muro' meaning wall is also seen in these
papers.

In the treaty between Shivaji the Great and the Portuguese concluded
in 1667 Conde Visorey, Novembro and Dezembro are Portuguese
words.\footnote{111} In a letter from Bajirao I dated January 20, 1735, Secretario,
Virsoey, Geral and such words are found. In the Chronicle of
Salcette 'reinois' meaning Portuguese soldiers is mentioned. Chimaji
Appa in one of his letters mentions Portuguese soldiers as dons.\footnote{113}

Dadajirao Bhave Nargundkar described the forts in Bardez by the
Portuguese term forte.\footnote{114} Similarly the northern province is referred
to as forte in Marathi documents.\footnote{115} Dadajirao mentions the Arch
Bishop of Goa as Arasbhishma.\footnote{118} In a letter of Nanasaheb Peshwa
dated March 28, 1741 the Portuguese word Bispo has been corrupted
as Bhishma.\footnote{117} Recibo and Rezma have occured in a letter by a sardar
of Peshwa written in 1740. The Portuguese word Feitoria is noticeable
in Mahikavatichi Bakhar and Kavyetihasasangraha. Naro Chimnaji,
the Chief Subedar of Ponda mentions balarn to mean a boat, in a letter
written in 1740.\footnote{119}

In a chapter entitled 'sources of history of Goa' published in
Itihasa sangraha one frequently comes across such words as Estado,
Senhor, Assignado, Juiz, Notificar, termo, auto, Citar etc. in somewhat
corrupted versions. In a document of the Comunidade in Ponda of
1767 Ordem, Livro, Partes, Regimento etc. have made their appearance.

Similarly a number of Marathi words found their way in Portuguese
and in the correspondence of officials. For instance in a Portuguese
epistle of 1759 Meta and Swari are used.\footnote{121} Parpotekar is the corrupt
form of Marathi Paripatyagar i.e. one who vindicates a cause or takes
revenge for a wrong or inflicts proper punishment for an offence.

In the correspondence of Vithalrao Talavalkar, the ambassador of
Goa at the Poona Durbar uses a number of Marathi words in his
Portuguese letters like Kotuval, (cotual), Mankari (manecares),
Huzure (uzure), Sarkar (Sarcar), Karkun (Carcunos), Dastak
(dastaca), Har (aru), Swari (suarim) etc.
There are books written by the Portuguese in Marathi and Konkani. In 1802, a grammar of Marathi language was published in Lisbon in Portuguese, entitled grammatica Marastta of which the author of this book has a copy. It was first published in Rome in 1778.

The Portuguese, the Dutch, the French and the English founded kingdoms in India. The Portuguese were the earliest to reach here and the last to leave India's shores. In 1510, they captured the island of Goa and ruled there for 450 years. In this long period, they came in contact with several ruling dynasties in India. The whole of this history is worthy of study and the sources for the pursuit of such study are also ample.
NOTES

(1) Luís de Figueiredo Falcao, Livro em que se contem toda a Fazenda a Real Patrimonio dos Reinos de Portugal, India a Ilhas adjacentes e outras particularidades, Lisboa, 1859, page 194.


(3) Pissurlencar, ADP, page 2.

(4) Ibid.,

(5) The well educated wife of Marquez de Tovar, in a letter to her son dated 24-11-1752 to Portugal says: “aquí as obras de ouro em que trabalham excellentemente”. This means excellent gold articles are made here. (C. Castelo Branco, Narcolicos II page 114).


(10) C. R. Boxer, The carreira da India, page 41.


(12) Goa Archives: Livro de Damao No. 1, fls., 44.

(13) Goa Archives MR 83, fls. 18.

(14) Goa Archives MR 87, fls. 52, 115.

(15) Dr. S. N. Sen, Military System of the Marathas p. 129.

(16) Goa Archives MR 71 fl. 265V.

(17) Dr. S. N. Sen, Military System of the Marathas.

(18) Goa Archives Co 39 fl. (Letter to Geral Columbano Pinto de Silva).


(20) Pissurleencar, Assentos IV, page 147; P. M. II. Sarkar, Shivaji P, 106.

(21) BNL. Ms F. G. 1975, Cartas Diversas fl. 181.

(22) Biker, Tratados IV, page 126.

(23) Dr. S. Sen, Military System of the Marathas p. 120-21.

(24) Dr. Germano Correa, Historia da Colonizacao Portuguesa no Oriente, Vol. VI.

(25) Dr. Sen, Military System of the Marathas, page 121.

Rajwade, Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sadhane, Khanda 7, page 15 (Musa Taranji), Parasnis (Musa Naranj) Sarkar, Fall of Moghul Empire, Vol. IV, page 125 (Musa Naras).


(27) Pissurleencar, P. M. VI, page 131.

(28) Pissurleencar, ADP, page 581.

(30) Pissurlencar, page 601.
(31) Vithal Valavalikar's letter dated January 28, 1796.
(32) Pissurlencar, ADP, page 600-601.
(33) Rajwade, Maratihyachya Itihasachi Sadhan, Khandha 7, page 15;
Dr. S. N. Sen, Military System of the Marathas, page 134.
(34) Miguel Vincente de Abreu, Nocao de alguns filhos distintos da India
Portuguesa, page 79-82; Cunha Rivara, A Conjuração de 1787 em Goa, page
153-155.
(35) Pissurlencar, ADP, page 603.
(36) Pissurlencar, ADP page 580.
(37) Lokahitacadi, Alitihisik Goshti ani Upayukta Mahiti, page 78.
(38) Pissurlencar, ADP, page 589.
(39) Goa Archives Livro de Chaul no. 1 f1s. 47 (Pero Roiz, que mando
por enviado a Sivagi Raze, 3-3-1673).
(40) Pissurlencar ADP, page 8081.
(42) For example, Relação de Embaixada que o Sunda depois de vencido
das armas Portuguesas mandou a ... Marquez de Tavora, page 8.
(43) Peshwa Daftar, Bhag 16, page 115.
(44) Goa Archives, Livro de registos gerais No. 8, f1s. 18v.
(45) Parasnis, Pararashtrechniya Darbarantil Marathi Vakil, page 43.
(46) Goa Archives, Marathi letter of Vithal Goraksha Valavalikar.
(47) Biker, Tratados VI page 11.
(48) Biker, Tratados VI pages 2-3-177.
(49) Epianphora III page 14.
(50) Goa Archives: Marathi Letters.
(51) Goa Archives: Valavalikar's Portuguese letter dated May 16, 1794.
(52) Pissurlencar ADP. pages 441, 443, 445.
(53) Goa Archives—Marathi Letters.
(54) Biker, Tratados VII page 126.
(55) Pissurlencar ADP, page 481.
(56) Biker, Tratados IX page 181.
(57) Goa Archives. CO 19 fl. 68.
(58) Francisco Raymundo de Moraes Pareira, Annal Indico-Lusitano.
(60) Celestino Soares, Bosquejo das Possessões pages 138-142.
(61) E. Balsemao, Os Portugueses no Oriente III Feliz Feliciano da Fonseca
Relación de him grande Combate, e victoria, que contra o genito, a arábio
cosegundo a armada que do porto de Goa sahio de Guarda-Costa em Julho 1753,
commandada pelo valeroso Ismailcam, Commandante de dez Galias. BPE Ms
Relación da batalha naval que a nome N. S. da Victoria teve a Costa do sul etc.
(62) J. F. de Monterroyo Mascarenhas, Epianphora Parte III page 26-28;
(63) Relação da victoria, com que a Divina Providencia se serviu de abençoa
as armas Portugueses das contra o Regulo Moura, situado na Naubandel alcançada
no dia 21 de Dezembro, Dr. F. R. D. Moraes Pereira, *Relação da Viagem que Marquez de Tavora ..... Lisboa 1751 page 7.*


(65) AHU. Maco 32, *India avulsos.*

(66) Claudio Barbuda, *Instrucoes com que el-rei D Jose I ..... Pangim 1841, page 46.*

(67) Pissurlenecar, *Contribution a l'Etude de l'histoire de la Medecine Portuguese dans l'Inde, 1927; Um Frade Capucho na Corte de Pernem In Bol. Inst. Vasco da Gama No. 24 (1934); Goa Pre-Portuguesa através das Escritores Lusitanos dos seculos XVI e XVII; os Pandotos our Medicos Hindus, in Heraldo, Goa.*

(68) BA. 31-IX-1 Cartas da India, fl. 406.

(69) *Goa Archives* MR 90, fls. 174.

(70) Pissurlenecar, ADP, page 250.

(71) BNL. Caixa X-1-15, Ms. *Noticiias da India desde Jan de 1749 ate Jan de 1750.*

(72) *Goa Archives : Marathi letters.*


(75) *Ibid., Pissurlenecar, ADP. page 255.*

(76) Dr. P. M. Joshi, *Revival of Maratha Power* page 162. This doctors has been mentioned as Conde Pinto Manad by Dr. P. M. Joshi. But it is an error. It should be Cosme Pinto Malar.

(77) *Goa Archives : Marathi Letters.*


(79) *Ibid., Translations into Portuguese of Original Marathi Letters.*

(80) *Goa Archives : Marathi letters.*


(82) *Goa Archives* RV 21, fl. 36-36v. Durgabai Bhonsle Sardesai had requested the services of a Portuguese physician from Goa for Babajirao Khanwarkar of Sanytvari (Goa Archives Marathi letter No. 2506).

(83) *Goa Archives : Marathi letters.*

(84) Pissurlenecar, ADP, page 276.

(85) *Goa Archives : Narayan Shenvi Dhume’s Portuguese letter dated 15-8-1789.*

(86) Marathi letters No. 2460.

(87) Purandare Correspondence, Part I page 181. *Goa Archives* RV. 15 fl. 1.

(88) Pissurlenecar, ADP, page 584.

(89) *Goa Archives : Translations into Portuguese of original Marathi letters No. 1475.*

(90) Manucel, *Storia do Mogor, II page 169.*

(91) BA 51 VIII-53.
(92) BA 51 VIII-53, Livro que Contem cousas do governo do Almotace Mor em Pernambuco, Bafia e India: e o governo nella de Luis de Mendonca Furtado. Khem Savant’s letter dated April 25, 1701 saying ten Kavdis of mangoes were being sent to the Moghul Emperor at Delhi. They should be allowed to pass without detention (page 152).

(93) Dra Virginia Rau and Maria Fernandes Gomes de Silva, Os Manuscritos de Arquivo da casa de Cadaval respeitantes ao Brasil 2 volumes, Coimbra, 1956, page 325.

(94) Conde de Ficalho, Coloquios . . . de Garcia de Orta, Voll page.

(95) Pissurlencar, ADP. pages 451, 469, 470, 478, 480.

(96) Goa Archives CO 36 ffs. 84.


(99) Goa Archives: Marathi Letters.

(100) Frei Liandro de Madre de Deus had good influence in the Peshwa’s court. In 1755-56, he was given Rs. 25 and some paddy from Revdanda Suba as inam. In 1764, the padre applied for an cart being given as inam to his deity for a nine day festival of it. He asked for two salvos of gun instead of one. He was given three by Peshwa Madhao Rao. He was allowed to construct a church at Korlai (Avlaskar’s Angrekalina Ashtagar page 13). The Peshwas had also allowed him a palanquin—Y. N. Kelkar in Amrit, October 1964, pages 200, 216.


(102) Boceta means a box in Portuguese.

(103) Pissurlencar, ADP., page 398.


(105) Goa Archives: Marathi letters.

(106) Dr. Baltazar Manoel de Chaves Annal Indico Historico, 3a parte, Lisboa, 1754, page 3.

(107) A Fantoura da Costa, Deambulacoes da Ganda de Modafar, Rei de Combaia, de 1514 a 1516 Lisboa, 1937.


(109) Peshwa Daftar Parts 16, 24, 26, 30, 34, etc.

(110) Shivacharitra Sahitya Part 10 page and Pissurlencar Mahratta invasions of Goa.

(111) Pissurlencar, P.M. I Shivaji Souvenir.

(112) Pissurlencar, Bajirao and Portuguese (Sahyadri May 1940).

(113) Sardesai, Aitihasik Pratibodh.

(114) Peshwa Daftar part 16 page 115.

(115) Goa Archives: Marathi letters.
(116) Goa Archives Marathi letters.
(117) Goa Archives Marathi letters.
(118) Goa Archives (Sardar Rangajipant's letter dated 27-11-1740).
(119) Goa Archives Marathi letters.
(120) Goa Archives: Livro de registo das oreens da Communidade de Bandora, nol. ffs. 74 (1767).
(121) Goa Archives: CPA 178, ffs. 68 ("queimar, destmir e saquear hos repetidos suarins onze aldeas e muitas metas").
(122) Pissurlencar ADP.
VIDA,
E ACCÕENS DO FAMOSO,
E FELICÍSSIMO
SEVAGY,
DA INDIA ORIENTAL.
ESCrita POr
COSME DA GUARDA,
Natural de Murmugão.
DEDICADA
AO EXCéLLENTISSIMO SENHOR
DUQUE
ESTRIBEIRO MOR.
LISBOA OCCIDENTAL,
Na Officina da Musica.
ANNO M.DCC.XXX.
Com todas as licenças necessárias.
Vende-se na mesma Offici, com Privilegios.

Frontispiece of a biography of Shivaji in Portuguese
Muzaffar Jung's letter to a Portuguese Viceroy on behalf of Tarabai.
Portuguese assault on the Fort of Ponda (1555)
(Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna).
A page from the daily journal of Vice-Rei Conde de Linhares containing important information of Shahaji Raje, father of Shivaji.
Portuguese Musketeers (1555)
(Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna).
Chhatrapati Sambhaji's Vatan document to Durgah of Pir Abdullah Khan at Ponda Fort. (Pissurlekar Collection).
The Portuguese Viceroy who fought Sambhaji, Conde do Alvora
Portuguese Fortress in Juvem (St. Stephens) taken by Sambhaji Chhatrapati on November 24, 1683.

Letter to Portuguese Viceroy from Shaikh Mohamed, Envoy of Moghuls (Biblioteca da Ajuda, Lisbon).
Fort of Bassein (1646) (Bibliothèque National de Paris, Paris)
Sardar Dadajirao Bhave's letter to the Portuguese Viceroy
(Goa Archives)

Sardar Dadajirao Bhave's letter to the Portuguese Viceroy
(Last Portion)
Portuguese invasion on Bicholim Fort (1779) (Arquivo Historico Ultramarino, Lisbon).

Map of Moghul Maharrat War (Goi Archives)
The statement of information regarding Chhatrapati Sambhaji of Kolhapur's forts in South Konkan presented to the Viceroy by Keshav Prabhu Desai of Penem (1683).